Wacht am Rhein: Total War in the West

German paratroopers riding Tiger II ‘222’ forward towards Ligneuville to the south of Malmédy.

 

by Bruce P. Schoch

The German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 16 December 1944 through 2 January 1945, is an interesting cam­paign in that it depicts a microcosm of the larger, strategic movements used by the Germans earlier in the war, and also in that it was the first and only truly large-scale application of the concept of “Total War.” What is of particular interest for historians and students of war is the method by which a supposedly on-the-ropes nation was able to create and marshal the forces and means to again seize the initiative and make one last desperate try to reverse a most unfavor­able situation. The true significance of this campaign is that it is possible to prepare and to execute a surprise offen­sive when all the indicators point the other way.

Although this campaign was often referred to as the “Rundstedt Offensive,” it was the total product of the brilliant if erratic mind of Adolf Hitler.[1] He personally conceived the concept of operations, dictated the time, setting, and objectives of the offensive, and very closely directed most of the minute details of planning development, task organization, and logistical preparations necessary for its execution.[2] The primary purpose of the of­fen­sive was to regain the initiative lost in the west during the disastrous summer and fall following the Allied landings in Nor­mandy.[3] That the offensive was necessary, regardless of the quantity and quality of the forces and resources still available to Germany, has been attested to by OKH chief, Field Marshal Alfred Jodl:

I fully agreed with Hitler that the Antwerp undertaking was an operation of the utmost daring. But we were in a desperate situation, and the only way to save it was by a desperate decision. By hanging on the defensive, we could not expect to escape the evil fate hanging over us. By fighting, rather than waiting, we might save something.[4]

No historian has recorded when Hit­ler conceived his counterstroke. He is­sued his planning guidance, however, at the daily staff meeting at his East Prussian headquarters on 16 August 1944, specifically directing the pre­paration of a 25-division counterattack against the Ardennes sector in late November, during weather conditions that would negate Allied air superiority.[5] Clearly, the operation was not a precipitous one. There was also a political objective: to drive a wedge between the American and British allies, sowing havoc and con­fu­sion among them, and to play upon what he felt was a growing distrust among the Allied common soldiers of the Soviet Union and Stalin.[6] The newly-liberated Belgian port of Antwerp was the major terrain objective, whose seizure would critically weaken the Allies’ precarious supply situation.[7] The attack was to penetrate the weak American front in the Ardennes, force multiple crossings of the Meuse River, and then to drive on to both sides of Antwerp, splitting the British 21^st Army Group under Mont­gomery from the American 12^th Army Group under Bradley.[8]

German losses in manpower and materiel during the second half of 1944 had not placed her in an enviable posi­tion for launching any major operations.[9] To remedy this, Hitler placed emphasis upon total war, an oft-preached doctrine that had never been truly implemented.[10] To his various chieftains, he assigned the tasks of raising and equipping the army that was to turn the tide of war to Germany’s favor again. Minister of Propaganda Dr. Joseph Goebbels was entrusted with awakening the German nation to the perils approaching the Fatherland and psychologically prepar­ing the populace for the efforts required.[11] Reichsführer der SS Heinrich Himmler, commander of the Replacement Army since the abortive 20 July 1944 assassination plot against Hitler, was ordered to raise 25 Volksgrenadier divisions, which he accomp­lished by culling excess personnel from Wehrmacht service units, Luftwaffe ground crews, and shore parties and dry-docked Kriegsmarine crews, and by lowering the conscription age to sixteen.[12] The real miracle, however, was achieved by Armaments Minister Albert Speer; he created the necessary arms, equipment and supplies by dint of an enforced 60-hour work week, maximum use of female and slave labor, and an almost complete exhaustion of Germany’s dwind­ling stocks of raw materials.[13] The results of this combined drive were truly impres­sive for the desperate task at hand: twelve panzer and eighteen infantry divisions were earmarked for the offensive[14] and a tremendous stockpile of materiel had been produced, under furious Allied aerial bombardment, to outfit this force:

1,500 tanks

3,000 combat aircraft

5,000 howitzers

1,700 assault guns

4,800 anti-tank guns

1,000,000 rifles

125,000 machine guns

11,000 mortars

1,500,000 tons of ammunition

3,700,000 gallons of fuel[15]

Conflict arose almost immediately as to how these vast resources could be best utilized. Field Marshal Heinz Gude­rian, commander on the Eastern Front, was constantly demanding additional resources to shore up his shaky defenses, while Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt, newly reinstated Com­mander-in-Chief, West, felt that these weapons and troops could be best used to strengthen the critically weak and obsolescent “West Wall” defenses.[16] Hitler, however, turned a deaf ear to these demands and per­mitted only a trickle of reinforcements; the bulk of this force, designated as “Führer reserves” could not be com­mitted prior to the attack.[17]

Detailed planning was under the direct supervision of Hitler. He still recalled his spectacular victories earlier in the war and believed that a repeat performance was still possible. The area he had chosen for the thrust, the Ardennes, had been the scene of great German drives in 1871, 1914 and again in 1940. Therefore, he pressed ahead with his undertaking and refused to listen to any objections or suggestions for lesser goals, such as cutting off the American salient at Aachen, or merely restoring the Meuse River front, that his field commanders had proposed. The “grand slam” was his last chance to exploit what he believed was a tottering alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and newly-liberated France.[18]

Rigid security was established and maintained throughout the planning and preparation phrases. The original code­ word for the operation, Christrose, was changed to the more deceptive Wacht am Rhein (watch on the Rhine) on 21 October 1944, suggesting preparation of defensive plans in case of an Allied breakthrough to that river. It was again changed, this time to Herbst­nebel (autumn fog) on 6 December.[19] All but a handful of per­sonnel, the chief commanders initially involved, were kept completely in the dark concerning this counterstroke, not learning of it until 3 November 1944.[20] Since the build-up of divisions and supplies could not be indefinitely con­cealed from Allied aerial reconnais­sance, a decoy formation, the 25^th Pan­zer Army, was created, located between Bonn and Cologne, maintaining normal radio traffic and troop movements for an army of its supposed size, specifically to deceive Allied intelligence.[21]

Two idiosyncrasies of Hitler became manifest during the planning phase of the operation, both of which would ulti­mately hamper the commander, Field Marshal Walter Model, popularly known as the Führer’s “fireman.” The politically reliable Waffen-SS was clearly favored in the allocation of tanks and armored combat vehicles, received the largest and best-qualified replacements, and was designated as the spearhead of the offensive. The SS formations were given what was perceived to be the weakest spot in the American line to penetrate, on the northern axis of the advance.[22] The Sixth Pan­zer Army (it would not be given its honorific Sixth SS Panzer Army until the offensive was over), under the command of an old “struggle comrade,” SS-Ober­gruppenführer Joseph “Sepp” Dietrich, therefore received the bulk of combat power available: four SS panzer divi­sions (“Leibstan­darte,” “Das Reich,” “Hit­ler­jugend,” and “Hohenstaufen”), four of the newly-raised Volksgrenadier divi­sions, and one Luftwaffe parachute divi­sion. Field Marshal Hasso von Manteuf­fel, to his south, commanded the Fifth Panzer Army, with three panzer and four Volksgrenadier divisions. On the extreme southern flank, General Erich Branden­berger’s reconstituted Seventh Army had but three Volksgrenadier divisions and one Luftwaffe parachute division. The Volksgrenadier divisions, despite their impressive name, were essentially light infantry formations, and the parachute divisions, the remnants of Reichs­mar­schall Hermann Göring’s private army, were basically non-jump-qualified mo­tori­­zed infantry, though fully equipped with assault guns and light armor.[23]

The basic concept of the operation was that the Sixth Panzer Army would force its way to the Meuse River, cross­ing on both sides of Brussels but not tak­ing the city, and then wheel to the north, fanning out on the Albert Canal to form a northern front from Maastricht to Ant­werp. The Fifth Panzer Army was to fol­low generally along the southern flank of the Sixth Panzer Army, and to secure a southern front from Antwerp to Dinant. The Seventh Army’s mission was to pro­vide a hard southern blocking operation for the Fifth Panzer Army. The area to be breached, the weakest sector of the Allied front, was 88 twisting miles of dense forest and sheer hills maintained by only five American divisions. Two were experienced, but exhausted: the 4^th Infantry and 28^th Infantry Divisions had taken enormous casualties during the fall campaign, especially the 28^th in the futile Hürtgen Forest campaign a month earlier. The others, the 99^th and 106^th Infantry and the 9^th Armored Divi­sions, were as yet unblooded and green.[24] Typical of the Amer­ican units was the brand-new 106^th Infantry Division, charged with the mis­sion of conducting “an aggressive de­fense” to harden and battle-condition its raw troops on a lightly-held sector, with supplies and other facilities drawn from points 40 miles to the rear.[25] That the Allies did not believe that the Germans could still launch a large-scale attack was evident by the 12^th Army Group Intelligence Sum­mary for 12 December 1944:

It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front and that the crust of defense is thinner, more brittle, and more vulnerable than it appears on our G-2 maps or to the troops on the line.[26]

This is not to say that the Allies did not appreciate the vulnerability of the Ar­dennes; Eisenhower had been shocked, while on a casual inspection through the area, to discover just how lightly it was being held.[27] Bradley had assured him that no major supply activities were located in the area, but was apparently only considering local counterattacks, as several major depots were located further back, but along the axis of advance selected for the Sixth Panzer Army.[28] These facilities were to play a key role in German logistical thinking for the exploitation of the initial attack.[29]

The second idiosyncrasy was di­rectly related to Hitler’s view of the im­pending break-up of the Grand Alliance. Desiring to capitalize upon the shock that the offensive would produce, he wanted to create as much chaos, con­fusion, and fear in the Allied rear areas as possible, with a view towards creating panic and despair among the common soldiers, leading them to think about pressuring their leaders to find a way out of the war. To this end, he emphasized two special operations that had served him well in the past: commando opera­tions and parachutists. The primary tasks for these groups, to seize and hold Meuse River crossings and to sever “Skyline Drive,” the Allied main supply route, and further to demoralize the Allies, were kept even more secret than the offensive itself.[30]

Operation Grief (condor) involved the hero of the Mussolini rescue mission the year before, a tough Austrian ad­venturer, SS-Obersturm­bann­führer Otto Skorzeny. Placed in command of the special 150^th Armored Brigade, Waffen-SS, by Hitler himself, his mission was grandiose in scope and concept:

I want you to command a group of American and British troops and get them across the Meuse and seize one of the bridges. Not, my dear Skorzeny, real Americans or British. I want you to create special units wearing American and British uniforms. They will travel in captured Allied tanks. Think of the confusion you could cause! I envisage a whole string of false orders which will upset communications and attack morale.[31]

Skorzeny quickly found that he could gather neither the properly fluent English-speaking troops, nor the cap­tured American tanks and jeeps, to properly establish such a large-scale opera­tion. His deception effort, the “Einheit Steilau,” consisted ultimately of only twenty-eight men. Only two captured Sher­man tanks were available, and one had transmission problems. Jeeps were popu­lar items with the front-line units which had captured them, and most commanders refused to give them up. Allied uniforms were generally already marked with POW devices. With all of these obstacles, Skorzeny’s deception campaign amounted to a thin front be­hind his lightly armored force.[32]

The parachute drop was an even more perilous and sketchily prepared under­taking. The commander, Colonel Friedrich Baron von der Heydte, was given his orders literally at the last minute to create a force of 1,200 parachutists from existing troops within the parachute divisions. As commandant of the parachute school, he knew there were but 3,000 jump-qualified men of the 130,000 in these divisions. When he received his contingent, he had but two hundred properly-trained troops. His complaints brought him no relief from Model and only contempt from Dietrich, who con­fused his operation with that of Skor­zeny. A general lack of Luftwaffe and ground support coordination, and a vague tactical objective near Malmédy doomed this afterthought even before it began.[33]

As the date for the attack neared, preparations of the staging area for the counterattack were thorough and meti­cu­lous. Secrecy was maintained through rigid discipline of movements and camouflage.[34] Move­ments of supplies and troops were made at night wherever possible, and no build-up of either was permitted in the forward assembly areas until a few days before the assault began.[35] All bridges over the Rhine River were strengthened to carry heavy equip­ment, and heavy barges and ferries were provided in case a bridge were put out of action by bombing.[36] The dates were shifted for the commencement of the assault four times, to allow for maximum preparation and the worst possible flying weather.[37] Basically, the Ardennes counterstroke failed for four primary reasons. Allied airpower, once the weather improved, harassed the Ger­mans constantly, and with almost no opposition from the Luftwaffe.[38] The German logis­tical effort could not keep pace with the advancing units, and led to a de­pen­dence on and even an expectation of use of captured American stocks.[39] Unexpectedly heavy resistance from the green and/or ex­hausted American formations seriously upset the rigid German timetable and prevented the consolidation of hard northern and southern shoulders for the penetration. This resistance also halted the advance of the highly favored Waffen-SS units for the first crucial days and forced difficult division shifts south to von Manteuffel’s more rapid and deeper advance.[40] Finally, Hitler’s in­tran­sigence prevented the orderly, timely break-off of unprofitable engagements, especially the siege of Bastogne.[41]

The Ardennes offensive was a bril­liant plan that was supported by a sur­prising reserve of resources. Its execu­tion, however, was too slow and too bound by continued attempts to take unprofitable objectives. Had the plan been executed with the same dash that it was conceived, it may well have suc­ceeded and bought the Germans more time for perhaps a negotiated settlement to the war. The use of special operations contributed little to the operation due to poor planning and coordination; it repre­sented a criminal use of special assets. But the preparation of the operation repre­sents a model for the massive, sudden attack which all tacticians and historians should study.

Bibliography

Beaumont, Roger A. Military Elites. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1974.

Butler, Rupert. The Black Angels. St. Mar­tin’s Press, New York, 1979.

Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. Office of the Chief of Mili­tary History, Washington, D.C., 1965.

Cortesi, Lawrence. Operation Boden-Platte. Kensington Publishing Co., New York, 1980.

Dupuy, R. Ernest. St. Vith: Lion in the Way. Infantry Journal Press, Wash­ing­ton, D.C., 1949.

Elstob, Peter. Hitler’s Last Offensive. Mac­millan, New York, 1971.

Foley, Charles. Commando Extra­or­di­nary. G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1955.

Galland, Adolf. The First and the Last. Bal­lantine Books, New York, 1954.

Merriam, Robert. Dark December. Ziff-Davis Co., Chicago, 1947.

Messenger, Charles. The Blitzkrieg Story. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1976.

Rup­penthal, Roland G. Logistical Sup­port of the Armies, Volume 2. Office of the Chief of Military History, Wash­ing­ton, D.C., 1959.

Smith, General Walter Bedell Smith. Eisen­hower’s Six Great Decisions. Long­man, Green, New York, 1956.

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Mac­millan, New York, 1970.

Toland, John. Battle: The Story of the Bulge. Random House, New York, 1959.

Whiting, Charles. Hunters from the Sky. Leo Cooper, London, 1974.

Wilmot, Chester. The Struggle for Eur­ope. Harper & Bros., New York, 1952.

---

[1]     Elstob, page 4.

[2]     Cole, pages 1-2.

[3]     Toland, pages 13-14.

[4]     Smith, page 98.

[5]     Toland, page 13.

[6]     Foley, page 111.

[7]     Elstob, page 4.

[8]     Cole, pages 1-2.

[9]     Elstob, pages 8-9; Galland, page 210; Wilmot, pages 384-387.

[10]   Cole, page 8.

[11]   Elstob, pages 7-8.

[12]   Cole, pages 7-8; Elstob, page 8.

[13]   Speer, pages 488-492.

[14]   Cole, page 33; Messenger, pages 234-235

[15]   Toland, page 21; Messenger, page 235; Cortesi, page 10

[16]   Elstob, page 9; Speer, page 493; Mer­riam, page 20.

[17]   Cole, pages 36-37.

[18]   Cole, pages 18-21; Elstob, pages 12-15; Speer, page 492.

[19]   Toland, page 15; Mes­sen­ger, page 237.

[20]   Cole, page 11; Cortesi, pages 7-9.

[21]   Cole, page 50.

[22]   Cole, page 34; Messenger, page 236; Butler, pages 176-177.

[23]   Whit­ing, pages 161-162.

[24]   Cole, pages 59, 75; Elstob, page 30; Mer­riam, pages 77-80.

[25]   Dupuy, pages 11-16.

[26]   Cole, page 57.

[27]   Wilmot, page 574.

[28]   Smith, page 92; Rup­pen­thal, pages 181-183.

[29]   Cole, page 665.

[30]   Foley, pages 51-53; Wilmot, page 492.

[31]   Butler, pages 183-184.

[32]   Beau­mont, pages 74-75; Butler, pages 184-185.

[33]   Whiting, pages 161-167.

[34]   Toland, pages 17-18.

[35]   Cole, pages 68-70.

[36]   Toland, page 14; Wilmot, page 492.

[37]   Cole, page 69.

[38]   Cole, page 661; Speer, pages 494-495; To­land, pages 218-221.

[39]   Cole, page 214; Elstob, pages 181-182; Ruppenthal, page 183; Speer, page 493; Wilmot, page 603.

[40]   Cole, pages 211, 651; Elstob, page 387.

[41]   Mes­senger, page 240.

 

 

The Western Front, 15 December 1944.

 

Ardennes Offensive, 16-25 December 1944.

 

Ardennes Offensive, 16-26 December 1944.

 

German field commanders plan the advance.

 

Joseph Sepp Dietrich, 1943.

 

German officer inspecting the troops.

 

German soldiers move through a forest.

 

During the last German counteroffensive on the western front, a German tank unit moves through a village in the Hohe Venn region, near Malmédy, Belgium, on January 6, 1945. In the foreground is a captured American M8 armored car, followed by a captured American jeep.

 

An SS-Oberscharführer and SS-Unterscharführer of 1. SS-Panzer-Division ‘LSSAH,’ SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1, (Kampfgruppe Knittel) at the Kaiserbaracke crossroads on the road between Saint-Vith and Malmédy, December 18, 1944.

 

German soldiers search for rations and fuel in an abandoned American camp.

 

Panzergrenadier-SS of Kampfgruppe Hansen in action during clashes in Poteau against Task Force Myers, December 18, 1944.

 

A German soldier, heavily armed, carries ammunition boxes forward with a companion in territory taken by their counteroffensive in this scene from captured German film. Belgium, December 1944. A member of Kampfgruppe Hansen, they ambushed and completely destroyed the U.S. 14th Cavalry Group on the road between Poteau and Recht. December 18, 1944.

 

American soldiers of the 3rd Battalion 119th Infantry Regiment are taken prisoner by members of Kampfgruppe Peiper in Stoumont, Belgium on December 19, 1944.

 

U.S. POWs on 22 December 1944.

 

An American soldier escorts a German crewman from his wrecked Panther tank during the Battle of Elsenborn Ridge.

 

A dead German soldier, killed on a street corner in Stavelot, Belgium, on January 2, 1945.

 

American engineers emerge from the woods and move out of defensive positions after fighting in the vicinity of Bastogne, Belgium.

 

Infantrymen of the US First Army in Belgium’s Ardennes Forest advance to contact German forces at the Battle of the Bulge, 1944.

 

M3 90mm gun-armed M36 tank destroyers of the 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, attached to the 82nd Airborne Division, move forward during heavy fog to stem German spearhead near Werbomont, Belgium, 20 December 1944.

 

American soldiers of the 289th Infantry Regiment march along the snow-covered road on their way to cut off the St. Vith-Houffalize road in Belgium. 24 January 1945.

 

A soldier prepares to bed down for the night in a Belgian forest during the Battle of the Bulge. December 21, 1944.

 

An American GI draws water from a stream with his steel helmet. December 22, 1944.

 

GIs move up to the front in open trucks in subzero weather to stop the German advance. December 22, 1944.

 

An infantryman from the 82nd Airborne Division going on a one-man sortie while covered by a comrade in the background, near Bra, Belgium, on December 24, 1944.

 

U.S. infantrymen with General George Patton’s Third Army advance at dawn on German gun positions to relieve encircled airborne troops at Bastogne.

 

Patton was one of the most aggressive and able generals of World War II.

 

Three members, of an American patrol, Sgt. James Storey, of Newman, Ga., Pvt. Frank A. Fox, of Wilmington, Del., and Cpl. Dennis Lavanoha, of Harrisville, N.Y., cross a snow-covered Luxembourg field on a scouting mission in Lellig, Luxembourg, December 30, 1944. White bed sheets camouflage them in the snow.

 

A U.S. half-track during the Battle of the Bulge crossing a temporary bridge over the Ourthe River in the war-torn Belgian city of Houffalize, in January 1945.

 

Maj.-Gen. Quesada (left), commanding the 9th TAC (Tactical Air Command) and his chief of combat operation, Col. Gilbert Meyers, examine a disabled tank on a road north of St. Vith, Belgium.

 

American troops near Krinkelt.

 

John Perry, a movie photographer with Unit 129, films GIs of the 290th Infantry Regiment, 75th Infantry Division, and 4th Cavalry Group ferreting out German snipers near Beffe, Belgium. Twelve Germans were killed. The scene was photographed by Carmen Corrado of the 129th. January 7, 1945.

 

John Perry, a movie photographer with Unit 129, films GIs of the 290th Infantry Regiment, 75th Infantry Division, and 4th Cavalry Group ferreting out German snipers near Beffe, Belgium, in early January 1945. Twelve Germans were killed. The scene was photographed by Carmen Corrado of the 129th. January 7, 1945.

 

M8 armored car and M20 scout car of the 30th Infantry Division 1½ miles from Malmédy, Belgium, January 15, 1945.

 

Advancing along the road to St. Vith, Belgium, troops of the 30th Division pass the bodies of Germans and destroyed German equipment, January 23, 1945.

 

American patrols in St. Vith, January 23, 1945.

 

Tanks and Infantrymen of the 82nd Airborne Division push through the snow towards their objective in Belgium, January 28, 1945.

 

A US soldier with a German prisoner of war near Bastogne, circa 23-26 December 1944.

 

Bigonville, Luxembourg, was taken by Patton's 4th Armored Division after a 3-hour battle with German paratroopers of the 5th Fallschirmjäger Division.

 

A Panther tank knocked out during the Battle of the Bulge.