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| Italian M13/40 medium tanks advance into battle. |
by Ralph Riccio
If one were to form an opinion of the performance of Italian armor in the North African theater based upon the scant, and usually uncomplimentary, remarks which are to be found in most English-language publications dealing with the desert war, it would be difficult to conclude other than that the use of Italian armor was very limited, its achievements mediocre, and its performance not even worthy of serious mention. A brief look at one engagement in which Italian armor participated, Bir el Gobi, counters the foregoing conclusions or hypotheses, and gives some insight into the true status of Italian armor in the desert. It is realized that this battle alone does not typify, nor can it summarize, all Italian armored operations in the desert, as many aspects of it are unique. The example is merely meant to engender an awareness that a great deal of information concerning Italian armored operations in North Africa has either been improperly reported, whether by accident or by design, or has failed to have been reported in English-language publications.
On 18 November 1941, the British Eighth Army unleashed the CRUSADER offensive, designed to destroy the Italo-German forces in Libya. The Eighth Army, under General Sir Alan Cunningham, was composed of the XIII Corps (motorized infantry) and the XXX Corps (armored). To XXX Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Willoughby Norrie, comprising the 7th Armoured Division, 22nd Guards Brigade, and 1st South African Division, fell the task of destroying the one Italian and two German armored divisions in Libya at the time. The German panzer divisions of the Afrika Korps—the 15th and 21st—subordinate to Rommel's Panzergruppe Afrika were located in the coastal area between Bardia and Tobruk, while the Italian 132nd "Ariete" Armored Division was occupying a position at Bir el Gobi, at a crossroads on the Trig el Abd.
"Ariete," along with the 101st "Trieste" Motorized Division, formed the Italian XX Corps under the command of General Gastone Gambara, and did not come under Rommel's control until 24 November.
Eighth Army's original concept of operations envisioned the use of the 7th Armoured Division as a whole against the Axis armor. The division's tank strength in its three brigades—the 4th, 7th and 22nd—was somewhat superior in numbers to that of the three Axis armored divisions combined. Any serious opposition by "Ariete" seems to have been discounted by the British, and plans were based on the supposition that elements of the 7th Armoured Division would not be delayed by "Ariete."
The Italians, however, had made a shrewd appraisal of the situation, were convinced that a British offensive was imminent (their intelligence service had guessed at 20 November as the probable starting date of the offensive), and refused to honor a request of Rommel's on the morning of 18 November to displace about 20 kilometers from Bir el Gobi. Rommel, discounting Italian intelligence reports on the grounds that they were a manifestation of "excessive Latin nervousness," did not share the belief that a British offensive was imminent.
At any rate, the Italians remained in the Bir el Gobi position. This intransigence on the part of the Italians was to prove extremely costly to the British, in terms of losses to the 22nd Armoured Brigade and ruined the original plan of the British to wait at Gabr Saleh with all three armored brigades to await the attack of the Afrika Korps.
The engagement didn't stop the 7th Armoured Division from concentrating against the DAK. On 21 and 22 November the DAK was engaged with the entire 7th Armoured Division including the 4th, 7th and 22nd Armoured Brigades and the 7th Support Group. But, these actions revolved around Sidi Rezegh instead of Gabr Saleh. In the meantime, from 20 to 22 November, "Ariete" remained in Bir el Gobi, not even sending out patrols. During this period they were only facing a single infantry brigade (South African) which they would not attack despite the absence of British armor in the area.
"Ariete," commanded by Brigadier General Mario Balotta, was composed of the 132nd Tank Regiment, the 132nd Artillery Regiment, and the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment (light infantry), reinforced by one 75/27 artillery group from the 17th "Pavia" Infantry Division, a 105/28 artillery group from Army level, and two batteries of truck-mounted 102-mm coastal guns manned by MILMART (Fascist artillery militia) personnel.
The 22nd Armoured Brigade, commanded by Brigadier J. Scott-Cockburn, was made up of three armored regiments: the 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, and the 3rd and 4th County of London Yeomanry. It lacked, however, adequate artillery and infantry support, having one battery of the 4th Royal Horse Artillery with 25-pounders, and one troop of the 102nd Royal Horse Artillery (Royal Northumberland Hussars) with anti-tank guns. Infantry support was provided by a solitary company of the 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps.
For armor, on the British side there were 136 Crusaders on the morning of the attack, which came up against 137 M13/40s on the Italian side. The Crusaders (from which the offensive had taken its name) were faster and more heavily armored than the M13s and their gun (a 2-pounder) could penetrate thicker armor than the 47/32 mounted in the Italian tank.
Elements of "Ariete" had begun to occupy the position at Bir el Gobi on 10 November, and by 12 November the entire division had completed the move from its previous position at Bir Hacheim, to the west. The division immediately set about organizing and fortifying the position, digging emplacements for all artillery pieces and anti-tank guns, and making extensive use of camouflage. The prepared positions faced southeast, and were organized in three strongpoints.
The left flank was held by III Bersaglieri Battalion, reinforced by one company of 47/32 anti-tank guns; the center was held by V Bersaglieri Battalion, reinforced by II Group, 132nd Artillery, and by one company of 47/32 anti-tank guns; the right flank was held by XII Bersaglieri Battalion, reinforced by I Group, 132nd Artillery, and by two companies of 37/45 anti-tank guns. To the north of the strongpoints were deployed the 105/28 group and the two 102-mm MILMART batteries. Further to the northwest, and further to the rear, the bulk of the 132nd Tank Regiment was kept in divisional reserve.
Late on the morning of 19 November, a patrol consisting of the 3rd Company, VII Tank Battalion, and a section of 75/27 guns was sent out from the Bir. This was to be the baptism of fire, in a tank-against-tank battle, for "Ariete." South of Bir el Gobi, in the vicinity of Got el Dleua, the patrol ran into the advancing 22nd Armoured and was driven back by the Gloucestershire Hussars, who pursued the remnants of the patrol and broke into the Italian positions. The Hussars were checked by concentrated Italian artillery and anti-tank fire, however. The two County of London Yeomanry regiments, which had not yet been committed, were then sent to work around the flanks of the Italian position, but were in turn engaged by the dug-in artillery and anti-tank weapons. The British tanks on the west and in the center were stalemated by the Italians in their fixed positions.
At this point, the 3rd County of Yeomanry, on the northeast flank, was counterattacked by the entire 132nd Tank Regiment, minus the one company which had been on the Got el Dleua patrol. VII and VIII Battalions began to close with the British armor, while IX Battalion swung out to get to the flank and rear of the British tanks.
The battle raged throughout the afternoon, with the British tankers very gallantly—although somewhat ill-advisedly—continuing their charges against the skillfully prepared Italian positions, and engaging the Italian armor. The Italian artillery continued to pour accurate fire against the British tanks, and the Italian armor showed its mettle against its British opposites.
There was no lack of courage or determination on either side, but by late afternoon (about 1700 hours), the British were forced to withdraw, leaving "Ariete" the undisputed master of the crossroads at Bir el Gobi.
Although the Italians had the advantage of having their artillery in prepared defensive positions and were forewarned of the imminence of the British attack by their intelligence service, "Ariete's" armor had no more practical experience in combat than did the 22nd Armoured Brigade.
The Italians lost twelve guns, thirty-four tanks (with an additional fifteen tanks damaged), and 205 officers and men killed, wounded or missing.
The British lost fifty-three Crusaders; how many were lost to artillery, and how many were destroyed as a result of the tank engagement is a matter of conjecture.
The Battle of Bir el Gobi, although only a small piece in the whole CRUSADER puzzle, was noteworthy for a number of reasons. It was the first taste of tank-versus-tank combat for both "Ariete" and the 22nd Armoured Brigade, as well as being the first engagement of an Italian armored division against a force equal in numbers and types of tanks. It gave the officers and men of "Ariete," who had been in the desert since February 1941, a tremendous morale boost as they had scored a victory over a very determined British attack.
The Italian defensive position had been well chosen and well organized, and their skill in employing and handling their armor was demonstrated. It might also be noted that in no respect were the Italians influenced by or under the control of their German allies during the battle—a situation which was soon to change with Rommel's assumption of operational control over all Italian as well as German units the following week.
It was a rather different story for the British, however. The engagement turned out to be an inauspicious beginning for the Eighth Army's armor, as the 22nd Armoured Brigade was delayed and disorganized. It ruined the original plan of CRUSADER for a massive tank-versus-tank engagement between the concentrated 7th Armoured Division and the DAK at Gabr Saleh.
What seems to have gone unnoticed or unsaid about the battle is the fact that the Italian victory over a similarly-equipped and experienced (or inexperienced) British force marked the end of the easy victories over Italian forces which the British had enjoyed during Wavell's offensive a year earlier.
Bibliography
Agar-Hamilton, J. A. I., and L. C. F. Turner. The Sidi-Rezeg Battles, 1941. Prime Minister's Department, Union of South Africa War Histories Section. Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press, 1957.
Graham, Andrew. Sharpshooters at War. London: The Sharpshooters Regimental Association, 1964.
Manzetti, Ferruccio. Seconda offensiva britannica in Africa Settentrionale e ripiegamento italo-tedesco nella Sirtica Orientale. Roma: Ministero della Difesa, Stato Maggiore Escercito, Ufficio Storico, 1949.
Mollo, Boris. The Sharpshooters. London: Historical Research Unit, 1970.
Playfair, Major General I. S. O. The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume III. London: HMSO, 1960.
Rizzo, Giuseppe. Buche e croci nel deserto. Verona: Tip Editrice "Aurora, 1969.
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| Italian M13/40 tank of the Ariete Armored Division, Autumn, 1941. |
