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| Tanks of the 2nd RCA in Oran, 1943. The French Renault D1 tanks fought against the American armored forces at Oran in late 1942. |
by William R. Betson
The Oran landings were part of Operation Torch, the 1942 Anglo-American invasion of North Africa. Oran was selected because it is a major Mediterranean port and its nearby airfields were vital.
Algeria, then a colony of defeated France, was administered and defended by the Nazi-imposed Vichy French regime. The Germans permitted the Vichy government to maintain an army in North Africa for the external defense and internal security of their colonies there. Appreciating Oran's qualities as a potential air and logistical base, the French Army stationed some 16,000 men in the port and its environs and organized them into the Oran Division of eleven infantry, seven cavalry, and five artillery battalions. The division was at about 80-85 percent strength, but Axis restrictions on vehicles and spare parts kept it relatively immobile and denied it modern armored fighting vehicles. Although the Allies considered the division's colonial infantry as second rate, they believed that the French cadre of professional officers made the division more or less battle worthy. Further, the Allies counted the division's two Foreign Legion battalions among the best troops in the world.
French resolve was also in question. No one knew if the French would actually resist the landings and fight their old American allies but if they did, the Oran Division was not to be considered an insignificant force.
Several French warships and forty-five fortified coastal defense guns raised even greater concern about an Oran landing. There were also six more guns at nearby Arzew, a potential landing site. In addition to ground troops and warships, there were about one hundred French warplanes, including modern fighters, at the airfields of La Senia and Tafaraoui. This air force was estimated to be capable of wresting local air superiority from the British carrier-based naval aircraft that would support the operation. Should the Allied force fail to quickly neutralize the French aviation, the establishment of an amphibious force ashore would prove impossible.
In addition to the threat posed by the enemy air, land and sea forces, Allied shipping assets were questionable. Until almost the last minute, no one knew how many ships would be available and at that time, there were no specialized tank landing ships (LSTs) available to put armored forces ashore. The British did provide three makeshift landing ships—converted from the shallow draft oil tankers used on Venezuela's Lake Maracaibo—but because of height restrictions, these could carry only light tanks and half-tracks; American medium tanks were too tall. Until a port was seized, armored support for the operation would be limited to the sixty M3 light tanks and sixty half-tracks which could be crammed aboard these converted ships.
In addition, the following factors were also considered to be a source of potential trouble for the Allied forces landing at Oran:
An amphibious landing had to be carried out at some distance from the port against a well-defended area.
Unless the landing force seized the local airfields quickly, the French could gain air superiority and doom the operation.
Unless the operation succeeded quickly, the French would have time to demolish the port and render the entire operation pointless.
Finally, the swift movement from the relatively distant beaches to the port and airfields would be difficult since only enough armored vehicles to equip one light tank and one mechanized infantry battalion could be quickly put ashore.
The Allies were unsure whether the Vichy French would fight. But the planners of the operation had to assume resistance would be fierce. Facing a risky undertaking, their bold use of the available armor bears our close analysis.
The Allied plan was conceived at Headquarters, Center Task Force (CTF), commanded by Lt. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. The force was comprised of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, CCB of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, an airborne battalion, elements of the U.S. 1st Engineer Special Brigade, and assorted support troops. Fredendall's staff consisted basically of the staff of the U.S. II Corps, which he also commanded.
The concept of operations was imaginative and daring. The operation would begin with a parachute assault on the main French airfield at Tafaraoui, followed by amphibious landings at three separate points on the coast. Small armored units put ashore from the makeshift LSTs would attempt to link up with the airborne force. Then all forces would converge on the port. While this was underway, an infantry battalion on board two ex-U.S. Coast Guard cutters would attempt to sail into the port, rush the docks and seize them by force. Additionally, as soon as the airfields were seized, word would be flashed to Gibraltar where the Spitfires of the 31st U.S. Fighter Group would be waiting to fly to Oran. If all went according to plan, fighters would be flown to the seized airfield and be operational by D-Day afternoon. Air superiority, a major prerequisite for success, would be assured.
Speed was essential, for the objective was to overwhelm the French before they could make up their minds to resist. No overwhelming predominance of force was being employed—the number of maneuver battalions in CTF was about equal to the number in the Oran Division—and the latter could be heavily reinforced within a few days by other French units in North Africa. The plan depended on lightning maneuver to paralyze the enemy. Since speed was such a prerequisite for success, the armored forces had an importance much beyond their numbers.
The armored combat command was divided into two task forces which would land on either flank of the assault. The first, Task Force Red, under the command of Brig. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, would land some 20 miles east of Oran at Beach "Z," near Arzew. Under the "Z Force" plan, two regimental combat teams of the 1st Infantry Division (16 and 18) would land and secure a foothold southeast of Arzew, while the 1st Ranger Battalion would take out a pair of coastal defense batteries north of the town. As soon as possible after the landing, TF Red would pass a flying column through the secured beachhead to race the 25 miles to the Tafaraoui airfield via Ste. Barbe-du-Tielot. The makeup of the flying column was determined by the number of vehicles that could be jammed into the two converted landing ships.
The other half of CCB, 1st Armored Division—Task Force Green under Col. Paul Robinett—would accomplish the right flank landing of the operation at "X" Beach, some 30 miles west of Oran near Mersa Bou Zedjar. TF Green's plan was similar to that at "Z" Beach. Two dismounted companies of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment would seize a beachhead through which a flying column would pass. The only difference was that this column would move inland to Lourmel where it would receive orders from CCB to either move north of a salt marsh southwest of Oran to seize La Senia airfield, or go south of the marsh to help with the capture of Tafaraoui. As with TF Red, the size of the flying column was determined by the number of vehicles which could fit into the single landing craft allotted "X" Force.
The main bodies of the two task forces would move along the routes cleared by the flying columns as soon as the former could get ashore and organized. This would take time as the armored vehicles not delivered to the shore would have to be transported from a cargo ship to a landing craft and landed one or two at a time. In the case of the M3 medium tanks of the 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, the docks at Arzew were required. The success of the operation then, depended on the skill and élan of the flying columns. In the final analysis, the success of the Oran landings and of Operation Torch depended on three light tank companies.
Two disasters quickly jeopardized the operation and made its success even more dependent on the 1st Armored's tankers. The airborne operation, under Lt. Col. Edson Raff, never really got started because the transport planes carrying the unit from Britain got lost. Although most of the inexperienced pilots managed to get their paratroopers to the vicinity of Oran, the 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, never got to the airfield until after the operation. Even then, Raff could assemble only 300 of his 556 troops.
The other disaster resulted from the attempted coup de main on the docks at Oran. The plan, Operation Reservist, called for the 1st Armored Division's 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, to sail straight into Oran harbor aboard British-manned ex-U.S. Coast Guard cutters, dock at the wharves and seize the port facilities. CTF opposed this seemingly reckless idea, but the British pressed for its approval. The cutters approached the harbor with large American flags flying and loudspeakers announcing both the American nature of the operation and its friendly intentions, but once the two small warships broke into the harbor, they were promptly blown out of the water by French gunners firing at point-blank range. Operation Reservist remains one of the war's most complete disasters. Only forty-seven uninjured soldiers got ashore and were immediately captured.
If the armored columns met similar fates, the operation would fail.
The main landings took place uneventfully just east of Arzew at 0100 hours. The thirty-four transports of "Z" Force began to put ashore two-thirds of the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Ranger Battalion, and the armored Task Force Red. The Rangers quickly seized the Arzew coastal batteries and the infantry secured the beaches against minimal opposition. But disembarking the tanks posed problems and took longer than planned. This delayed the operation, but by about 0820, the reconnaissance force under Capt. Samuel Yeiter, moved out from the beach, followed fifteen minutes later by the rest of the flying column commanded by Lt. Col. John K. Waters. Waters' flying column moved toward Tafaraoui airfield, covering the 25 miles to the field without opposition. At Tafaraoui, fire from French dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns halted Waters' advance. Waters directed his attached tank destroyer platoon to engage the French guns while he detached two infantry platoons to go beyond the airfield and cut the road to Oran, blocking the approach of reinforcements. Simultaneously, A Co., 1st Armored Regiment, attacked the airfield from the south while B Co., and 1st Platoon, E Co., 6th Infantry, struck from the east. Shocked by finding their inland airfield under attack by American armor, the French surrendered, quickly yielding some three hundred prisoners.
At 1215 hours, word reached Gibraltar that Tafaraoui airfield was captured and by 1630 the Spitfires of the 308th and 309th Fighter Squadrons, 31st Fighter Group, USAAF, arrived. In one bold stroke, French airpower in northwestern Algeria had been dealt a crippling blow, American air superiority was assured and the major communications route from Oran to the interior had been cut.
CCB's other element, TF Green, had a more difficult time. Although the initial echelons met no resistance, the transport landing Lt. Col. John H. Todd's flying column grounded 360 feet offshore. It took until 0815 to ferry the column's twenty-seven half-tracks, sixteen jeeps and twenty light tanks to the beach.
Once ashore, Todd's reconnaissance force departed for Lourmel where it clashed briefly with a French armored car of the 2nd Chasseurs d'Afrique. Soon, the rest of the force was rolling and by 1135 was in Lourmel. Todd had been in Lourmel for about thirty minutes when the TF commander directed him to take the northern route to the La Senia airfield because TF Red needed no help at Tafaraoui. Leaving one tank platoon to outpost Lourmel, he set off with a much depleted force of fifteen tanks and several half-tracks.
Communications problems then began to plague TF Green. Units moving to Lourmel lost contact with the beach because of the intervening high ground. The flying column lost contact with the task force and Robinett had no idea of his subordinate's position or situation until the next day when the main body of TF Green closed on La Senia. As Todd maneuvered to overcome resistance from French armored cars at Bou Tlelis, he lost contact with his assault gun section and a tank platoon. These losses, plus two tanks damaged by enemy fire, further reduced Todd's force to seven light tanks and a few half-tracks—out of the force of forty-seven armored vehicles that had left "X" Beach. Deep in the rear of a 16,000-man enemy division, he pushed on with his puny force and destroyed a 75-mm gun position at Bredea Station. After meeting more resistance near Misserrhin, he halted for the night.
Robinett followed Todd, collecting his stragglers. Headquarters picked up Todd's detached platoon at Lourmel and collected Todd's other elements near Bou Tlelis. With most of the flying column now under his direct command, Robinett spent the night between Bou Tlelis and Bredea Station. Thus, at the end of D-Day, TF Green lay scattered between Mersa Bou Zedjar on the coast at "X" Beach, and Misserrhin, its precarious position aggravated by communications difficulties. Had the French counterattacked, they could have defeated Robinett's command in detail.
But despite all these problems, plus the failures of the airborne landings and the harbor assault, CTF had securely established all three beachheads and captured the critical airfield at Tafaraoui. Some 14,000 troops were ashore and progressing toward their objectives. At "Y" Beach, the 26th Regimental Combat Team had made good progress and was in contact with the French 2nd Zouaves Regiment on the Djebel (Mountain) Murjadjo. The 18th and 16th RCTs had pushed well inland, meeting serious resistance only at St. Cloud where the 1st Battalion of the 1st Foreign Legion Regiment and the 16th Tunisian Tirailleurs were well entrenched. At sea, the Allied naval escort had easily repulsed several forays by French naval units and destroyed or neutralized the coastal artillery positions.
On the other hand, the operation was not yet out of the woods. Units of CCB were deep within enemy territory, and difficult or impossible to support should they get in trouble. The French had resisted much more firmly than expected; the Zouaves on the Djebel and, especially, the Legionnaires at St. Cloud, had fought spiritedly and skillfully. In fact, CTF at first decided that St. Cloud, astride the main supply route from "Z" Beach to Oran, would have to be taken before the final assault on Oran could begin.
The French high command realized, of course, that its relatively numerous dispersed forces could be defeated in detail. So, they concentrated their available mobile formations into two light mechanized brigades for use as rapid reaction forces. But their obsolescent Renault R-35s were no match for even the M3 light tanks.
The French command had positioned one of these brigades south of Oran, near Sidi-bel-Abbes (home of the Foreign Legion) and, upon hearing of the American landings, they ordered this force to attack northward, recapture Tafaraoui, and breakthrough to Oran.
In contrast to the French command's sluggish reactions, the Americans now demonstrated their flexibility. Expecting an attack from Sidi-bel-Abbes, they used air patrols to reconnoiter the roads north of that town. The French move was observed and the American command reacted quickly. CTF sent dive bombers to attack the column and rushed a platoon each of light tanks and tank destroyers, plus the only two debarked medium tanks of the 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, forward from the docks at Arzew. In addition, Fredendall held most of TF Red at the Tafaraoui airfield instead of moving it north to attack Valmy. This last move was decisive.
The Americans were ready when the French brigade made contact with the reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, on the afternoon of 9 November 1942, near Ste. Barbe-du-Tielot. This would be the U.S. Army's first North African tank-versus-tank action and it ended quickly with victory for the Americans.
While Lt. Robert Whitsit's platoon of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion laid down a fire base, Capt. William Tuck's B Co., 1st Armored Regiment, attacked the French in an inverted wedge formation. The old, slow Renaults were no match for the U.S. tanks and the qualitative difference was decisive. Tuck's tankers knocked out fourteen French tanks in rapid succession. The commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, described the action as more of a tragic massacre than a battle. The French light mechanized brigade retreated and did not again threaten the landings. The Americans lost one tank, one half-track, and one man.
Another French effort caused the American commanders more worry. Near La Macta, on the far eastern flank of the U.S. landings, elements of the 2nd Algerian Tirailleurs infiltrated the positions of the 1st Battalion, 16th U.S. Infantry, and temporarily cut off the Americans. However, by the time relief armored units reached the area, the 16th Infantry had restored the situation.
The failure of the counterattacks meant that the French could not reinforce Oran before the Americans could conduct a coordinated attack. The city's defense would lay in the hands of its approximately five infantry battalions and one cavalry regiment, a force decidedly inferior to the thirteen-plus better-equipped U.S. battalions now ashore. But all was not yet lost for the French. Their force had not yet suffered severe casualties, and they could concentrate their still-fresh infantry battalions in an arc of relatively strong positions south of the cities of St. Cloud Arcole, Valmy, La Senia, Misserrhin and the Djebel Murdjadjo.
As daylight broke on the 9th, Todd's greatly depleted flying column on the other side of Oran resumed its march toward the La Senia airfield. Bypassing Misserrhin, Todd thrust his small force between the French positions at Valmy and La Senia, surprising and overrunning the airfield, capturing a few planes, some 75-mm artillery pieces, and a considerable number of prisoners. He then deployed his puny force, now surrounded on three sides by superior French forces, and on the fourth by an impossible marsh. Although the French directed artillery fire onto the airfield, for some reason they never attacked this weak and exposed force. Todd hung on and was joined that afternoon by a tank company and mechanized platoon which Oliver had detached from TF Red and sent to the airfield. This reinforcement enabled Todd to conduct a spoiling attack that silenced the most troublesome French artillery battery.
Meanwhile, Robinett, with elements of both the flying column and the main body, moved out at dawn from his position near Bredea. His force made rapid progress until it reached the French outpost at Misserrhin where he took artillery fire. Replying with his self-propelled guns of the 27th Artillery, Robinett ordered an attack on the town. But having no infantry (it was left back at Er Rahel), he could either wait until infantry could be brought up from Mersa Bou Zedjar, or take his command around Misserrhin through the only route left to him, the supposedly impassable Sebkra marsh. Robinett still had no communications with Todd, but knew that the remnants of the flying column were weak and might be destroyed by a French counterattack.
Robinett decided to attempt to bypass by moving through the marsh. In the dying light, Robinett's force immediately set out. Slowly, and with many halts to recover mired vehicles, the force struggled through the lake bed. The mud seemed like wet cement, and Robinett began to despair of getting through. Finally, at about midnight, Robinett drove on ahead of his column in a jeep to attempt to make contact with Todd, who had traversed the marsh during daylight. Robinett found a guide that Todd had posted, and closed on Todd at about 0400—and none too soon. Todd's force was out of fuel and running out of ammunition. Robinett's arrival coupled with that of Lt. Col. William Kern and half of the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment at daybreak, assured the position at La Senia airfield.
While CCB was securing La Senia airfield and defeating the French counterattacks, the main elements of the 1st Infantry Division continued to close on Oran.
The 18th Infantry attempted a coordinated attack on St. Cloud, east of the city, on the 9th, but French troops, especially the Legionnaires, put up fierce resistance, and the attack bogged down by noon with considerable casualties. Wanting to keep moving toward Oran and desiring to avoid heavy civilian casualties, the commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, ordered that St. Cloud be invested by one battalion and that the remainder of the regiment move toward Oran in preparation for the general assault on the city to be carried out the next morning.
As night fell on 9 November, CTF could again be satisfied. The 18th and 16th Infantry Regiments were closing on Oran from the east. Both major airfields had been taken and the main French counterattacks defeated. Both CCB and 1st Infantry Division were in good positions to conduct a concentric attack on Oran the next day. Fredendall dispatched his G-3, Col. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, ashore to headquarters, 1st Inf. Div., to coordinate the move. Meeting with Allen and Oliver, Ferenbaugh directed that all units jump off at 0730 on the 10th. Speed was essential, as no one wanted to give the French another day to wreck the harbor.
None of the American units made their line of departure (LD) by 0730. Exhausted after two weeks confinement aboard ship and three days fighting with little sleep, the infantry could not reach their start lines on time. Once the 16th and 18th Regiments did get going, they met spirited resistance from the 2nd Zouaves near Arcole and St. Eugene and were delayed.
CCB planned to make its main attack with the elements of TF Green at La Senia airfield. Robinett, however, did not receive orders for the attack until a few hours before LD time, just as he was preparing to attack the enemy around Valmy. Robinett refused to make this new attack before he was ready and asked Oliver if he could delay his LD time and "be allowed to get it off just as quickly as possible." The commanding general of CCB concurred, but stressed the need for speed.
Robinett concentrated the bulk of his force—two and one-half tank companies, one company of armored infantry, and a section of tank destroyers, under Lt. Col. Todd and ordered him to bypass the enemy near La Senia and drive straight for the port and for the French headquarters in town.
Todd jumped off in massed formation at about 0930 and traversed the open ground west of La Senia opposed only by sporadic artillery fire (which may have been misdirected British naval gunfire). While Todd moved west of town, TF Red detached Lt. Col. Waters east of the village in a supporting attack along a parallel route.
Once Todd and Waters had bypassed La Senia, Robinett ordered his headquarters tank platoon to attack the town. French resistance suddenly collapsed when tanks penetrated their defensive belt. Over 1,000 Frenchmen surrendered to the tank platoon. This behavior was in stark contrast to that exhibited at St. Cloud where the French had fought against a standard infantry/artillery attack.
Todd and Waters now had little in front of them. Eliminating a roadblock on the outskirts of town, CCB encountered only scattered sniper fire, and small arms and vehicular machine gun fire effectively dealt with that. As Lt. Col. Todd observed, ."50-caliber machine guns are excellent against snipers. They will shoot right through a house." By 1100, Todd's forces had reached the port and French military headquarters and captured the French commanding general. With this, the battle was over and the remaining French forces surrendered, although St. Cloud resisted one more attack. That afternoon, CCB moved to the vicinity of Tafaraoui to rest, reorganize, and prepare for further action against the Germans in Tunisia.
The American victory at Oran is not a well-known feat of arms. Neither France nor the U.S. really wanted to publicize a battle fought between old allies. CTF suffered over six hundred casualties, including 276 killed. But these losses, considering the importance of the objective, were acceptable, and the Oran operation must be considered a significant victory.
The Allies had moved over 27,000 men a great distance on relatively short notice and had seized two important airfields and a port in minimal time against considerable resistance. All arms contributed to the victory.
In examining these implications, we may first note the use of the limited armor available (it was never more than five light companies) as a maneuver force. The Allied command had two reasons for initially concentrating its armor and not dispersing it among the infantry. First, the Americans had to quickly seize the Tafaraoui airfield. Secondly, because many enemy coastal defenses precluded a landing nearer the objective, the attackers had to complete a fast overland movement to prevent Oran from being significantly reinforced.
But even on the third day when the opportunity presented itself for the use of armor to support a traditional combined arms assault on the city, Fredendall kept his available armor concentrated and used it to pierce a hole through the enemy defense rather than to crush it.
Obviously, there are tactical situations where it might be necessary to parcel out armor to support infantry. The infantry could have used some tanks in the assault on St. Cloud, but St. Cloud was not the objective. If available armor is limited, one must mass it at the decisive point.
If concentration of armor appears to be one lesson of Oran, redundancy in planning seems to be another. CTF did not rely on one strike force to eliminate the main threat to the success of the operation—French airpower. Three separate elements, TF Red, TF Green, and the airborne battalions, received the mission of securing Tafaraoui airfield. Should one or even two of the forces have been delayed or destroyed, another could have accomplished the mission.
Finally, when one studies the Oran experience of 1942, one is struck by the boldness of the planners' concept of operations. Landing at widely separated points and sending small armored flying columns deep into a numerically superior enemy rear is not a cautious operational maneuver. But, I believe, boldness was desirable. Indeed, in the uncertain political situation that existed in 1942 at Oran, boldness was required. Lightning movement seems to have paralyzed the uncertain French and caused the main prizes—the port and airfields, to fall almost without a fight.
The ill-fated Operation Reservist, however, demonstrates that planners must not cross the border between boldness and recklessness. The plan for the 3rd Battalion, 6th Infantry's coup de main appears so ridiculous in hindsight that it would be almost comical, were it not so tragic. If the Oran operation as a whole seems to bolster the arguments of those who favor the maneuver over the firepower/attrition approach to tactics, the Reservist episode should remind us that sometimes bold movement and élan are not enough.
Maneuver, and not firepower, seems, nevertheless, to have been the key to victory at Oran. Tafaraoui airfield was captured when American amphibious forces landed at distance from the main enemy forces and struck rapidly with light armor into the enemy's rear. The Americans took the indirect approach. They did not attempt to use the firepower of the battleship to suppress coastal fortifications and attempt a frontal assault.
Similarly, at La Senia, TF Green bypassed Misserrhin and struck between the enemy positions at Valmy and La Senia to seize a lightly defended airfield. Finally, on 10 November, CCB bypassed enemy positions leaving a strong force astride their communications at Valmy and La Senia, and struck directly toward the port and French headquarters where French forces had been drawn in a linear-type defense with strongpoints south of the city.
At Oran, boldness and maneuver worked together against an irresolute and quickly dispirited enemy. Had the vital objective been St. Cloud, defended by the Foreign Legion, rather than the Oran docks, success would have required a traditional combined arms assault. Similarly, the deep strike maneuver conducted by light forces to seize Tafaraoui would have failed had the armored counterattack been made by a battalion of German PzKpfw. IVs or even French Char B1s, rather than the pitiful Renaults. That fight was decided by weight of armor and caliber of gun, not maneuver. Maneuver can enhance firepower, but it cannot replace it. Oran tells us that, too.
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| Landing M7 Gun Motor Carriage of the 1st Armored Division at Oran, Algeria, part of Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa. 9 November 1942. |
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| X White Beach on the Bay of Mersa Bou Zedjar. Note barriers to exit from beach. |
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| Y Beaches, Les Andalouses. |
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| Y White Beach, Les Andalouses. Landing craft at left is an LCM. |
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| Troops and equipment coming ashore, Z White Beach near St. Leu. |
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| The Maracaibo H.M.S. Misoa, a converted shallow-draft oiler used as a tank landing ship. At Z Red Beach, light tanks were discharged through doors in the bow over bridge sections to the shore. |
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| French prisoners captured by men of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, are guarded by MP's on the beach near St. Leu, 8 November 1942. |
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| Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, center, U.S. Commander of the Center Task Force. From left, officers are Brig. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, Brig. Gen. Lowell Rooks, General Fredendall, Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, and Brig. Gen. James H. Doolittle. (Photograph taken December 1942.) |
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| Seizure of Oran, 8-10 November 1942. |
