World War 2 In Review: U.S. Army

Showing posts with label U.S. Army. Show all posts

Battle for Henderson Field

Dead Japanese soldiers from the Imperial Japanese Army’s 2nd Infantry Division after the Battle for Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, October 25-26, 1942.

The Battle for Henderson Field, also known as the Battle of Guadalcanal or Battle of Lunga Point by the Japanese, took place from 23–26 October 1942 on and around Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. The battle was a land, sea, and air battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II and was fought between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy and Allied (mainly United States (U.S.) Marine and U.S. Army) forces. The battle was the third of the three major land offensives conducted by the Japanese during the Guadalcanal campaign.

In the battle, U.S. Marine and Army forces, under the overall command of Major General Alexander Vandegrift, repulsed an attack by the Japanese 17th Army, under the command of Japanese Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake. The U.S. forces were defending the Lunga perimeter, which guarded Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, that had been captured from the Japanese by the Allies in landings on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942. Hyakutake’s force was sent to Guadalcanal in response to the Allied landings with the mission of recapturing the airfield and driving the Allied forces off the island.

Hyakutake’s soldiers conducted numerous assaults over three days at various locations around the Lunga perimeter, all repulsed with heavy Japanese losses. At the same time, Allied aircraft operating from Henderson Field successfully defended U.S. positions on Guadalcanal from attacks by Japanese naval air and sea forces.

The battle was the last serious ground offensive conducted by Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. After an attempt to deliver further reinforcements failed during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942, Japan conceded defeat in the struggle for the island and evacuated many of its remaining forces by the first week of February 1943.

Background

On 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.

Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on 8 August, the 11,000 Allied troops—under the command of then Major General Alexander Vandegrift and mainly consisting of U.S. Marine Corps units—had secured Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The airfield was later named “Henderson Field” by Allied forces. The Allied aircraft that subsequently operated out of the airfield became known as the “Cactus Air Force” (CAF) after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal. To protect the airfield, the U.S. Marines established a perimeter defense around Lunga Point.

In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army’s 17th Army—a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake—with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces. On 19 August, various units of the 17th Army began to arrive on Guadalcanal with the goal of driving Allied forces from the island.

Because of the threat by CAF aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver troops and supplies to the island. Instead, the Japanese used warships based at Rabaul and the Shortland Islands to carry their forces to Guadalcanal. The Japanese warships, mainly light cruisers or destroyers from the Eighth Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, were usually able to make the round trip down “The Slot” to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to CAF air attack. Delivering the troops in this manner, however, prevented most of the soldiers’ heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. These high-speed warship runs to Guadalcanal occurred throughout the campaign and were later called the “Tokyo Express” by Allied forces and “Rat Transportation” by the Japanese.

The first Japanese attempt to recapture Henderson Field failed when a 917-man force was defeated on 21 August in the Battle of the Tenaru. The next attempt took place from 12–14 September, with the 6,000 soldiers under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi being defeated in the Battle of Edson’s Ridge. After their defeat at Edson’s Ridge, Kawaguchi and the surviving Japanese troops regrouped west of the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal.

Hyakutake immediately began to prepare for another attempt to recapture Henderson Field. The Japanese navy promised to support Hyakutake’s next offensive by delivering the necessary troops, equipment, and supplies to the island, and by stepping-up air attacks on Henderson Field and sending warships to bombard the airfield.

As the Japanese regrouped, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses. On 18 September, an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the U.S. 7th Marine Regiment to Guadalcanal. This regiment had previously formed part of the 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade and was fresh from garrison duty in Samoa. These reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on 19 September, to establish an unbroken line of defense completely around the Lunga perimeter.

General Vandegrift and his staff were aware that Kawaguchi’s troops had retreated to the area west of the Matanikau and that numerous groups of Japanese stragglers were scattered throughout the area between the Lunga Perimeter and the Matanikau River. Vandegrift, therefore, decided to conduct a series of small unit operations around the Matanikau Valley.

The first U.S. Marine operation against Japanese forces west of the Matanikau, conducted between 23 and 27 September 1942 by elements of three U.S. Marine battalions, was repulsed by Kawaguchi’s troops under Colonel Akinosuke Oka’s local command. In the second action, between 6 and 9 October, a larger force of U.S. Marines successfully crossed the Matanikau River, attacked newly landed Japanese forces from the 2nd (Sendai) Infantry Division under the command of generals Masao Maruyama and Yumio Nasu and inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese 4th Infantry Regiment. The second action forced the Japanese to retreat from their positions east of the Matanikau.

In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon, commander of U.S. Army forces in the South Pacific, convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific Area, that U.S. Marine forces on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus on 13 October, a naval convoy delivered the 2,837-strong 164th U.S. Infantry Regiment, a North Dakota Army National Guard formation from the U.S. Army’s Americal Division, commanded by Colonel Robert Hall, to Guadalcanal.

Mikawa’s ships continued nocturnal deliveries of men and materiel to Guadalcanal. Between 1 and 17 October, Japanese convoys delivered 15,000 Japanese troops, comprising the remainder of the 2nd Infantry Division and one regiment of the 38th Infantry Division, plus artillery, tanks, ammunition, and provisions, to Guadalcanal. One of these—on 9 October—landed General Hyakutake on the island to personally lead the Japanese forces in the planned offensive. Mikawa also sent heavy cruisers on several occasions to bombard Henderson Field. On the night of 11 October, one of these bombardment missions was intercepted by U.S. naval forces and defeated in the Battle of Cape Esperance.

On 13 October, in order to help protect the transit of an important supply convoy to Guadalcanal that consisted of six slower cargo ships, the Japanese Combined Fleet commander Isoroku Yamamoto sent a naval force from Truk—commanded by Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita—to bombard Henderson Field. Kurita’s force—consisting of the battleships Kongō and Haruna, escorted by one light cruiser and nine destroyers—approached Guadalcanal unopposed and opened fire on Henderson Field at 01:33 on 14 October. Over the next 83 minutes, they fired 973 14 in (360 mm) shells into the Lunga perimeter, most of them falling in and around the 2,200 m² area of the airfield. The bombardment heavily damaged the airfield’s two runways, burned almost all of the available aviation fuel, destroyed 48 of the CAF’s 90 aircraft, and killed 41 men, including six CAF aircrew.

Despite the heavy damage, Henderson personnel were able to restore one of the runways to operational condition within a few hours. Over the next several weeks, the CAF gradually recovered as Allied forces delivered more aircraft, fuel, and aircrew personnel to Guadalcanal. Observing the Japanese deliveries of troops and supplies to the island, American forces were expecting an imminent offensive by Japanese ground forces, but they were not sure where and when it would take place.

Troop Movement

Because of the loss of their positions on the east side of the Matanikau, the Japanese decided that an attack on the U.S. defenses along the coast would be prohibitively difficult. Thus, after observation of the American defenses around Lunga Point by his staff officers, Hyakutake decided that the main thrust of his planned attack would be from south of Henderson Field. His 2nd Division (augmented by one regiment from 38th Division), under Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama and comprising 7,000 soldiers in three infantry regiments of three battalions each was ordered to march through the jungle and attack the American defenses from the south near the east bank of the Lunga River. The 2nd Division was split into three units; the Left Wing Unit under Major General Yumio Nasu containing the 29th Infantry Regiment, the Right Wing Unit under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi consisting of the 230th Infantry Regiment (from the 38th Infantry Division), and the division reserve led by Maruyama comprising the 16th Infantry Regiment. The date of the attack was set for 22 October. To distract the Americans from the planned attack from the south, Hyakutake’s heavy artillery plus five battalions of infantry (about 2,900 men) under Major General Tadashi Sumiyoshi were to attack the American defenses from the west along the coastal corridor. The Japanese estimated that there were 10,000 American troops on the island, when in fact there were about 23,000.

At this time, the Lunga perimeter was defended by four American regiments comprising 13 infantry battalions. The 164th Infantry Regiment guarded the easternmost sector. Extending from the 164th south and west across Edson’s Ridge to the Lunga River was the 7th Marine Regiment. Covering the sector west of the Lunga to the coast were the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments. Defending the mouth of the Matanikau for the Americans were two battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William J. McKelvy: the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. McKelvy’s force was separated from the Lunga perimeter by a gap that was covered by patrols.

Prelude

On 12 October, a company of Japanese engineers began to break a trail, called the “Maruyama Road,” from the Matanikau towards the southern portion of the U.S. Lunga perimeter. The trail traversed some 15 mi (24 km) of the most difficult terrain on Guadalcanal, including numerous rivers and streams, deep, muddy ravines, steep ridges, and dense jungle. Between 16 and 18 October, the 2nd Division began their march along the Maruyama Road, led by Nasu’s unit and followed in order by Kawaguchi and Maruyama. Each soldier had been ordered to carry one artillery shell plus his pack and rifle.

Early on the morning of 20 October, Maruyama reached the Lunga River. Believing that his units were about 4 mi (6.4 km) south of the airfield, he ordered the left and right wing units to advance abreast of each other parallel to the Lunga north towards the American lines and set the time of the attack for 18:00 on 22 October. Maruyama, however, was mistaken. He and his troops were actually 8 mi (13 km) south of the airfield. By the evening of 21 October, it was clear to Maruyama that his units would not be in position to attack the next day, so he postponed the attack to 23 October and put his men on half rations to conserve their dwindling food supply. At nightfall on 22 October, much of the 2nd Division still remained strung out along the Maruyama Road, but Maruyama ruled out any postponement of the attack.

During this time, Sumiyoshi prepared his command to attack the American forces from the west. On 18 October, he began shelling Henderson Field with 15 150 mm (5.9 in) howitzers. What remained of the 4th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Nomasu Nakaguma began to gather openly near Point Cruz (on the coast just west of the Matanikau). On 19 October, Colonel Akinosuka Oka led the 1,200 troops of his 124th Infantry Regiment inland across the Matanikau and began moving up the east bank towards high ground east of the river.

On 23 October, Maruyama’s forces struggled through the jungle to reach the American lines. Kawaguchi, on his own initiative, began to shift his right wing unit to the east, believing that the American defenses were weaker in that area. Maruyama—through one of his staff officers—ordered Kawaguchi to keep to the original attack plan. When he refused, Kawaguchi was relieved of command and replaced by Colonel Toshinari Shōji, commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment. That evening, after learning that the left and right wing forces were still struggling to reach the American lines, Hyakutake postponed the attack to 19:00 on 24 October. The Americans remained completely unaware of the approach of Maruyama’s forces.

On this day, the Japanese 11th Air Fleet under Jinichi Kusaka based at Rabaul sent 16 Mitsubishi G4M2 “Betty” bombers and 28 A6M2 Zero fighters to attack Henderson Field. In response, 24 F4F-4 Wildcats and four P-400 Airacobras from the CAF (Cactus Air Force) rose to meet them, resulting in a large aerial battle. The Japanese appeared, to Allied observers, to lose several aircraft in the day’s engagements, but their actual losses are unknown. The CAF lost one Wildcat to battle damage but the pilot was uninjured.

Battle

Nakaguma’s Attack on the Matanikau

Sumiyoshi was informed by Hyakutake’s staff of the postponement of the offensive to 24 October, but was unable to contact Nakaguma to inform him of the delay. Thus, at dusk on 23 October, two battalions of Nakaguma’s 4th Infantry Regiment and the nine tanks of the 1st Independent Tank Company launched attacks on the U.S. Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matanikau.

Nakaguma’s tanks attacked in pairs across the sandbar at the mouth of the Matanikau behind a barrage of artillery. Marine 37 mm (1.46 in) anti-tank guns and artillery quickly destroyed all nine tanks. At the same time, four battalions of Marine artillery, totaling 40 howitzers, fired over 6,000 rounds into the area between Point Cruz and the Matanikau, causing heavy casualties in Nakaguma’s infantry battalions as they tried to approach the Marine lines. Nakaguma’s attacks ended by 01:15 on 24 October, inflicting only light casualties on the Marines and gaining no ground.

Partly in response to Nakaguma’s attacks, on 24 October the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines under Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken deployed to the Matanikau. After Oka’s forces were sighted approaching the Marine Matanikau positions from the south, Hanneken’s battalion was placed on a ridge facing south which formed a continuous extension of the inland flank of the Marine’s horseshoe-shaped Matanikau defenses. A gap, however, still remained between Hanneken’s left (east) flank and the main perimeter.

Maruyama’s First Attacks on the Perimeter

With the redeployment of Hanneken’s battalion, the 700 troops of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines under Lieutenant Colonel Chesty Puller were left alone to hold the entire 2,500 yd (2,300 m) line on the southern face of the Lunga perimeter east of the Lunga River. Late on 24 October, Marine patrols detected Maruyama’s approaching forces, but it was now too late in the day for the Marines to rearrange their dispositions.

At 14:00 on 24 October, Maruyama’s left- and right-wing units began to deploy for their attacks. Maruyama’s troops had very little artillery or mortar support for their upcoming assault, having abandoned most of their heavy cannons along the Maruyama Road. Between 16:00 and 21:00, heavy rain fell, delaying the Japanese approach and causing “chaos” in the Japanese formations, already exhausted from the long march through the jungle. Shoji’s right-wing force accidentally turned parallel to the Marine lines, and all but one battalion failed to make contact with the Marine defenses. Shoji’s 1st Battalion, 230th Infantry Regiment “stumbled” into Puller’s lines about 22:00 and were driven off by Puller’s men. For unknown reasons, Maruyama’s staff then reported to Hyakutake that Shoji’s men had overrun Henderson Field. At 00:50 on 25 October, Hyakutake signaled Rabaul that, “A little before 23:00 the Right Wing captured the airfield.”

At about this time, Nasu’s left wing battalions finally began to reach the Marine defenses. At 00:30 on 25 October, the 11th Company of Nasu’s 3rd Battalion under Captain Jiro Katsumata found and attacked Company A of Puller’s battalion. Katsumata’s attack was impeded by heavy barbed wire in front of the Marine line and then hit heavily by American machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. By 01:00, the Marine fire had killed most of Katsumata’s company.

Further west, the 9th Company of Nasu’s 3rd Battalion charged straight into Puller’s Company C at 01:15. Within five minutes, a Marine machine gun section led by Sergeant John Basilone killed almost every member of the 9th Company. By 01:25, heavy fire from the Marine divisional artillery was falling into Nasu’s troop assembly and approach routes, causing heavy casualties.

Recognizing that a major Japanese attack was underway, Puller requested reinforcement. At 03:45, the 3rd Battalion, 164th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hall and being held in reserve, was fed piecemeal into Puller’s line. In spite of the darkness and intermittent heavy rain, the Army National Guard troops were placed in Puller’s defenses before daybreak.

Just before dawn, Colonel Masajiro Furimiya, the commander of the 29th Infantry, with two companies from his 3rd Battalion plus his headquarters staff, was able to penetrate the Marine artillery fire and reach Puller’s lines about 03:30. Most of Furimiya’s troops were killed during their assault, but about 100 broke through the American defenses and carved a salient 150 yd (140 m) in width and 100 yd (91 m) deep in the center of Puller’s line. After sunrise, Furimiya’s 2nd Battalion joined in the assault on Puller, but were thrown back. At 07:30, Nasu decided to withdraw most of the remainder of his troops back into the jungle and prepare for another attack that night.

During the day of 25 October, Puller’s men attacked and eradicated the salient in their lines and hunted small groups of Japanese infiltrators, killing 104 Japanese soldiers. More than 300 of Maruyama’s men in total were killed in their first attacks on the Lunga perimeter. At 04:30, Hyakutake rescinded the message announcing the capture of the airfield, but at 07:00 declared that the results of Maruyama’s attack were unknown.

Naval and Air Attacks

The Japanese 8th Fleet had task units ready to support the Army’s attacks on Guadalcanal. Upon receipt of Hyakutake’s message declaring success at 00:50 on 24 October, the task units went into action. The light cruiser Sendai and three destroyers patrolled west of Guadalcanal to interdict any Allied ships that tried to approach the island. A First Assault Unit with three destroyers and a Second Assault Unit with the light cruiser Yura and five destroyers approached Guadalcanal to attack any Allied ships off the island’s north or east coast and to provide gunfire support for Hyakutake’s forces.

At 10:14, the First Assault Unit arrived off Lunga Point and chased away two old U.S. destroyers converted to minesweepers—Zane and Trever—which were delivering aviation fuel to Henderson Field. The Japanese destroyers then sighted and sank the U.S. tugboat Seminole and patrol boat YP-284 before beginning their bombardment of the U.S. positions around Lunga Point. At 10:53, a Marine shore gun hit and damaged the destroyer Akatsuki, and all three Japanese destroyers withdrew while being strafed by four CAF Wildcat fighters.

As the Second Assault Unit approached Guadalcanal through Indispensable Strait, it was attacked by five CAF SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers. Bomb hits caused heavy damage to Yura, and the unit reversed course to try to escape. More CAF air attacks on Yura throughout the day caused further damage, and the cruiser was abandoned and scuttled at 21:00 that night.

Meanwhile, 82 Japanese bombers and fighters from the 11th Air Fleet and from the aircraft carriers Junyō and Hiyō attacked Henderson Field in six waves throughout the day and were engaged by CAF fighters and Marine anti-aircraft guns. By the end of the day, the Japanese had lost 11 fighters, two bombers, and one reconnaissance aircraft along with most of the aircrews in the downed aircraft. Two CAF fighters were destroyed in the day’s fighting but both pilots survived. The Japanese air attacks caused only light damage to Henderson Field and the American defenses. The Americans later referred to this day as “Dugout Sunday” because the continuous Japanese air, naval, and artillery attacks kept many of the Lunga defenders in their foxholes and shelters throughout the day.

Maruyama’s Second Attacks on the Perimeter

Throughout the day of 25 October, the Americans redeployed and improved their defenses against the Japanese attack they were expecting that night. In the west, Hanneken and the 5th Marines closed the gap between their two forces. Along the southern portion of the perimeter, Puller’s and Hall’s troops disentwined and repositioned. Puller’s men fortified the western 1,400 yd (1,300 m) of the sector and the 164th soldiers took the eastern 1,100 yd (1,000 m) segment. The division reserve, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment was placed directly behind Hall’s and Puller’s positions.

Maruyama committed his reserve force, the 16th Infantry Regiment, to Nasu’s left wing unit. Beginning at 20:00 on 25 October, and extending into the early morning hours of the 26th, the 16th and what remained of Nasu’s other units conducted numerous, unsuccessful frontal assaults on Puller’s and Hall’s lines. U.S. Marine and Army rifle, machine gun, mortar, artillery and direct canister fire from 37 mm anti-tank guns “wrought terrible carnage” on Nasu’s men. Colonel Toshiro Hiroyasu, the commander of the 16th, and most of his staff as well as four Japanese battalion commanders were killed in the assaults. Nasu was hit by rifle fire and mortally wounded, dying a few hours later. A few small groups of Nasu’s men broke through the American defenses, including one led by Colonel Furimiya, but were all hunted down and killed over the next several days. Shoji’s right wing units did not participate in the attacks, choosing instead to remain in place to cover Nasu’s right flank against a possible attack in that area by U.S. forces that never materialized.

Oka’s Attack

At 03:00 on 26 October, Oka’s unit finally reached and attacked the Marine defenses near the Matanikau. Oka’s troops assaulted all along an east-west saddle ridge held by Hanneken’s battalion but concentrated particularly on Hanneken’s Company F, which defended the extreme left flank of the Marine positions on the ridge. A Company F machine gun section under Mitchell Paige killed many of the Japanese attackers, but Japanese fire eventually killed or injured almost all the Marine machine gunners. At 05:00, Oka’s 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry succeeded in scaling the steep slope of the ridge and pushed the surviving members of Company F off the crest.

Responding to the Japanese capture of part of the ridgeline, Major Odell M. Conoley—Hanneken’s battalion executive officer—quickly gathered a counterattack unit of 17 men, including communications specialists, messmen, a cook, and a bandsman. Conoley’s scratch force was joined by elements of Hanneken’s Company G, Company C, and a few unwounded survivors from Company F and attacked the Japanese before they could consolidate their positions on top of the ridge. By 06:00, Conoley’s force had pushed the Japanese back off the ridge, effectively ending Oka’s attack. The Marines counted 98 Japanese bodies on the ridge and 200 more in the ravine in front of it. Hanneken’s unit suffered 14 killed and 32 wounded.

Aftermath

Retreat

At 08:00 on 26 October, Hyakutake called off any further attacks and ordered his forces to retreat. Maruyama’s men recovered some of their wounded from near the American lines on the night of 26–27 October, and began to withdraw back into the deep jungle. The Americans recovered and buried or burned as quickly as possible the remains of 1,500 of Maruyama’s men left lying in front of Pullers’s and Hall’s lines. Said one U.S. Army participant, John E. Stannard, of the scene after the battle, “The carnage of the battlefield was a sight that perhaps only the combat infantryman, who has fought at close quarters, could fully comprehend and look upon without a feeling of horror. One soldier, after a walk among the Japanese dead, said to his comrade: ‘My God, what a sight. There’s dead Japs stretched from the Corner back along the edge of the jungle for a half a mile.’“

Maruyama’s left wing survivors were ordered to retreat back to the area west of the Matanikau River while Shoji’s right wing was told to head for Koli Point, east of the Lunga perimeter. The left wing soldiers, who had run out of food several days before, began the retreat on 27 October. During the retreat, many of the Japanese wounded succumbed to their injuries and were buried along the Maruyama road. One of Maruyama’s men, Lieutenant Keijiro Minegishi, noted in his diary, “I never dreamed of retreating over the same mountainous trail through the jungle we crossed with such enthusiasm... we haven’t eaten in three days and even walking is difficult. On the uphill my body swayed around unable to walk. I must rest every two meters.”

Leading elements of the 2nd Division reached the 17th Army headquarters area at Kokumbona, west of the Matanikau on 4 November. The same day, Shoji’s unit reached Koli Point and made camp. Decimated by battle deaths, combat injuries, malnutrition, and tropical diseases, the 2nd Division was incapable of further offensive action and would fight as a defensive force for the rest of the campaign. Later in November, U.S. forces drove Shoji’s soldiers from Koli Point back to the Kokumbuna area, with a battalion-sized Marine patrol attacking and harassing them almost the entire way. Only about 700 of Shoji’s original 3,000 men ultimately returned to Kokumbuna.

Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

At the same time that Hyakutake’s troops were attacking the Lunga perimeter, Japanese warships under the overall direction of Isoroku Yamamoto moved into a position near the southern Solomon Islands. From this location, the Japanese naval forces hoped to engage and decisively defeat any Allied (primarily U.S.) naval forces, especially carrier forces, that responded to Hyakutake’s ground offensive. Allied naval carrier forces in the area, now under the command of William Halsey, Jr. who had replaced Ghormley, also hoped to meet the Japanese naval forces in battle.

The two opposing carrier forces confronted each other on the morning of October 26, in what became known as the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. After an exchange of carrier air attacks, Allied surface ships retreated from the battle area with the loss of one carrier sunk and another heavily damaged. The participating Japanese carrier forces, however, also retreated because of high aircraft and aircrew losses and significant damage to two carriers. This was a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk and damaged, but the loss of veteran aircrews was a long-term strategic advantage for the Allies, whose aircrew losses in the battle were relatively low.

Later Events

Although the Japanese Army’s attack on the Allied Lunga perimeter was decisively defeated in this battle, the Japanese were not yet ready to give up the struggle for Guadalcanal. The Japanese Army and navy made immediate plans to move the rest of the 38th Division to the island, along with the 51st Infantry Division, to try a further offensive against Henderson Field in November 1942.

The Japanese again planned to bombard Henderson Field with battleships in order to allow a convoy of transport ships to deliver the 38th’s troops and heavy equipment. In contrast, however, to what occurred on 14 October, this time the U.S. Navy moved to intercept the battleship forces sent by Yamamoto from Truk to shell the airfield. During the ensuing Naval Battle of Guadalcanal from 13–15 November, Allied naval and air forces turned back two Japanese attempts to bombard Henderson Field and almost completely destroyed the transport convoy carrying the remainder of the 38th Division. After this failure to deliver significant additional troops to the island, the Japanese commanders finally conceded defeat in the battle for Guadalcanal and evacuated most of their surviving troops by the first week of February 1943. Building on their success at Guadalcanal and elsewhere, the Allies continued their island-hopping campaign against Japan, culminating in Japan’s defeat and the end of World War II.

Boeing B-17E 41-9122 (Eager Beavers), 11th Bomb Group, 42d Bomb Squadron, taxiing on two engines at Henderson Field, Guadalcanal in 1943. Captain Frank L. Houx and his crew were lost on 1 February 1943 along with two other 42nd B-17Es: 41-9151 (Captain Earl O. Hall) and 41-2442 “Yokohama Express” (Captain Harold P. Hensley). These were the last three B-17s of the 42nd BS.

During the lull in the Battle for Henderson Field, October 1942, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for coffee, with his sub-machine gun on his knee and his .30-caliber light machine gun in position.

U.S. Marine Sergeant John Basilone was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the late October 1942 battles on Guadalcanal. Also a recipient of the Navy Cross and Purple Heart.

Sgt Mitchell Paige receives the Medal of Honor from Gen Vandegrift as a reward for outstanding heroism while manning a machine gun of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines during the late October 1942 battles for Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.

Colonel Clifton Cates (right) commander of the 1st Marine Regiment and Colonel Mike Edson (center, third from right), commander of the 5th Marine Regiment, inspect the battlefield at the mouth of the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal after the Battle for Henderson Field in late October 1942.

The Way of War on Guadalcanal

Marines rest on Guadalcanal, August 8, 1942.

by Darrell S. Stiffler

To the student of military history, the land campaign on Guadalcanal provides one of the most interesting campaigns of World War II. The entire campaign provides many interesting examples of almost any type of modern warfare, as practiced on Guadalcanal.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the campaign, aside from its now obvious outcome, was the lessons learned there. This battle was the first time American and Japanese troops met on anything like equal terms. Each side had much to learn about the effects of jungle conditions upon their established tactics and weaponry. One side learned from its mistakes while the other refused to relent to reality; this, in effect, resulted in the campaign’s decisive outcome.

The purpose of this article is to examine the various factors which made the Guadalcanal campaign run its now well-known course.

The Opposing Forces

The Japanese forces committed on Guadalcanal were well-trained, confident, and battle-experienced troops. These men, who had never known defeat, were confident of their ability to destroy the Americans, no matter what the odds might be.

This high morale was a two-bladed weapon. To be sure the long, exhaustive marches endured by the Japanese, while on low or almost no rations, showed a high degree of discipline and spirit which kept the Japanese going towards what they thought must be a sure victory. The negative side of such positive thinking was that it made the Japanese commanders and troops overly careless in their moves and attacks. This high spirit, in addition to tactical doctrine, caused the horrendous losses in the frontal attacks launched by the Japanese in their three offensive attempts.

The Japanese code of Bushido made them a ferocious warrior. They would fight on against any odds so as to have an honorable death, therefore their endurance could be counted upon to surpass that of most Western troops. The code was, however, not entirely beneficial. The Japanese soldier’s fanatical belief in the code made him throw away his life in frontal attacks, even when the outcome of the attack was so apparently futile. A good example of this shows up when the 35^th Japanese Brigade (the Kawaguchi Force) attacked the Marine positions on Bloody Ridge twelve separate times in what certainly became futile attempts after the first few attacks.

The American troops on Guadalcanal were, unlike their Japanese counterparts, almost totally inexperienced. This inexperience was compounded by the operation being amphibious in nature, which only complicated the problems inherent in any outfits’ first combat.

The U.S. Marines who landed on 7 August 1942 were a young (average age: nineteen), aggressive type, who had no doubts as to their ability to defeat “Tojo.” This American confidence was, however, much better placed than that of the Japanese. It was a confidence which didn’t border or intertwine with any fanatical religious code. American self-confidence, reinforced by their early land victories over the Japanese, made them formidable in both attack and defense.

The U.S. Army troops and commanders, which came in after the Marines, were able to benefit from the Marines’ battle experience. This experience helped the Army troops and commanders adapt to the fighting conditions in a remarkably short time. This experience was, of course, only beneficial in certain areas. Conditions, such as the heat, lack of water, and insects, were only overcome after the climate had been adapted to.

Command

The Japanese commanders on Guadalcanal were faced with many difficult problems. The distance from Rabaul to Guadalcanal was some 650 miles which, when coupled with local American air superiority, gave the Japanese a long line of communications which made command control touch and go at best.

Even communications between commanders on the island suffered. The standard radio being used gave off so much light that it could only be used during the day and the telephone system was unreliable because of the constant disruptions along the line. These various communications problems gave the Japanese commanders little tactical flexibility which forced them to adhere to a plan, once it had been formulated, as if it were a directive from the Heavens. This allowed for poor coordination and had the result of launching non-supporting piecemeal attacks.

Another fault in Japanese planning was their poor logistical work. This resulted in Japanese troops marching off into the jungle with totally inadequate food supplies. This logistical problem was probably a result of the Japanese underestimating the march time required to reach the point of attack. This resulted in sufficient supplies for the established plans but when the plans fell apart the Japanese were in dire logistical trouble.

The Japanese showed an unhealthy degree of tactical inability by attacking with almost completely inadequate reserves. The reserves, which rarely totaled more than one battalion, would have been totally inadequate had a breakthrough been effected. The Japanese officers seemed to place their confidence in the ability of the front line troops to exploit their own success which is little short of sheer stupidity.

Japanese officers seem to have had little faith in artillery preparation and laid down only the scantiest of barrages. This problem was, however, greatly magnified by a lack of artillery ammunition and having to leave the artillery far in the rear. This is to say, had the Japanese been given the proper conditions they would have used their artillery more effectively.

Overall, the Japanese commanders were faced with a situation that they were totally unable to cope with. They were a victim of both poor intelligence and a battlefield experience which was far from applicable on Guadalcanal.

American commanders were usually far more flexible and cautious than their Japanese counterparts. The superior flexibility was a product of both better communications and the advantage of interior lines. When on the attack, American officers were usually in the positions of fighting a set-piece battle. The set-piece battle required little flexibility but when a certain degree of initiative was required the Americans usually came through.

Some aspects of the American advances could be regarded as overly cautious, especially their slow advances when confronted with snipers. This caution, while it was overdone on certain occasions, was usually well-founded. The Japanese defenses made rapid advances both unlikely and very costly. Therefore the American commanders made good use of their superior firepower and communications and slowly but surely routed the Japanese out while taking a minimum of casualties.

American junior officers were usually of good quality and could, along with the higher ranking officers, handle unexpected situations well and take immediate action against any threatening situation. The ability of the junior officers is evident on several occasions where their initiative gained unexpected results over difficult terrain.

Overall, American commanders were of good quality. They planned well and showed a fair degree of initiative when it was needed. The command recognized the need for much work in the amphibious supply problem and did much to further the knowledge of amphibious operations. The American commanders learned much on Guadalcanal and put it to work with great effectiveness throughout the Pacific campaign.

Communications

Japanese communications on Guadalcanal were, at best, only fair. The Japanese radios were large, bulky, and gave off too much light for night operations. Japanese communications therefore relied heavily upon wirephone and flares. The wirephone system was reliable, in that a message could be sent and received without regard to atmospheric conditions, but they were, at the same time, prone to breaks along the line. Flares are usually a very unreliable form of communications and their use on Guadalcanal proved to be no exception.

A good example of poor Japanese communications is evident in their October offensive. The piecemeal attacks and the commanders’ ignorance of what the others were doing, all a result of poor land communications, resulted in the offensive’s colossal failure. Flares also showed their usefulness when they were used to signal the Japanese observation aircraft which resulted in giving the high command a very unrealistic picture of the land campaign. The use of flares also suggests that ground to air communications were not of a high standard. The poor quality of Japanese communications on Guadalcanal was, undoubtedly, a major reason for the dismal failure of every offensive attempt.

American communications, although by no means perfect, were much better than those of the Japanese. American use of the SCR 194 and 195 “walkie-talkies” provided the small American units (squad platoon) with radios which were light and highly mobile. The major drawback to the “walkie-talkie” was its almost complete uselessness in jungle terrain. On clear ground and higher elevations the SCR 194 and 195 had an effective range of one to two miles.

The larger infantry units had a wide variety of radios which provided them with adequate communications. The battery-powered six-pound SCR 536 was used but it had a range of only twelve miles and was very fragile.

The twenty-pound SCR 511 was dependable up to five miles and could be easily carried by one man. Its major drawback was its inability to operate in wet or damp weather.

The best infantry radio was the SCR 254. This radio, which weighed about 110 pounds, had a range of about seven miles and was generally reliable.

The bulky SCR 193 was used for communications between divisions and corps headquarters along with ground to air work.

American use of phones was extensive on Guadalcanal because of the constant wear on the wireless sets. The common short range phone was the EE-8, while long range work usually involved sound-powered phones. American use of flares and smoke was limited to marking the front lines and pointing out targets to ground support aircraft.

American communications on Guadalcanal were usually sufficient and allowed good coordination between units, which proved almost impossible for the Japanese.

Small Unit Tactics

Japanese tactics on Guadalcanal were one of the prime reasons that the attacks launched against Henderson Field failed and, at the same time, a major reason why the American offensive was a painfully slow one. Japanese offensive tactics, which were nurtured in China, involved marching through what appeared to be impassable terrain and then attacking on a narrow front with massed charges. Diversion and infiltration, to harass the enemy rear areas, were also very important to Japanese offensive thinking.

To begin with, marching through what the Japanese thought the Americans would think was impassable terrain usually had an adverse effect upon the Japanese. These long exhaustive marches, often on half or less rations, had a definite negative effect upon the Japanese. Probably the worst effect was the inability of the Japanese to transport their heavy guns through the jungle, which forced the Japanese to launch attacks without proper artillery preparations. The effect of the long marches upon the individual infantryman is, however, more difficult to determine. The marches through the rough jungle must have weakened the men but when their subsequent attacks were launched they were both ferocious and often repeated. Surely if the marches had had a great effect upon the men the assaults would have been correspondingly weak. The assaults were anything but weak and therefore the Japanese soldier must be credited with an achievement which is a just tribute to his outstanding ability to overcome great hardships and come out fighting.

The infiltration and diversion tactics used by the Japanese on Guadalcanal were generally a waste of manpower and weapons which the Japanese could ill afford. The idea behind the infiltration tactics was to disrupt the enemy rear areas and cause panic and possible rout on the front. This tactic, while well-conceived, was very poorly executed. The practice of infiltrating only a few men, instead of attacking with infiltration tactics, proved to be more of a nuisance than a threat. Had the Japanese used infiltration tactics instead of the mass charges the outcome of some of the land battles could have been altered. The lack of barbed wire and other essential defensive measures would have made the infiltration tactics all the more effective.

The diversion of strength (two or more prongs to an attack) was also a well-conceived plan which may have worked had coordination of effort been accomplished. The coordination of effort, which was needed to launch simultaneous attacks, proved to be impossible due to poor communications and the long trek through the jungle. The lack of coordination resulted in the piecemeal attacks which were subsequently destroyed with relative ease.

The mass assaults instituted by the Japanese were perhaps the most bitterly learned lesson of the campaign. To effect a mass rush it was necessary to group a large body of men in a relatively small area. This provided perfect targets for the American artillery which could devastate the Japanese even before the assaults were launched.

On defense the Japanese soldier was a much more worthy adversary. Their ability to build and camouflage bunkers and foxholes made any attack a slow business. The weakness in this defense, which was dependent upon a series of strong points, was two-fold.

First, the Japanese were in such poor physical condition as to make any quick counterattacks, to eliminate a threatening advance, out of the question. Secondly, the American artillery advantage made Japanese movement, in the battle zone, almost impossible. This allowed the Americans to gain a lodgment and proceed to destroy bunkers from a more advantageous position. Had the Japanese maintained an efficient reserve, and a respectable artillery potential they could have extended the campaign indefinitely.

American offensive tactics on Guadalcanal, while being slow, were far less costly than the Japanese tactics. Furthermore, the Americans never based everything on one large attack, which allowed the Americans to make mistakes and live to correct them. All assaults were carried out in a manner to outflank enemy positions and gain a more favorable position from which to continue the attack. They were supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire which stunned the Japanese and, when properly conducted, resulted in a quick initial gain with only light losses.

The Americans found coordination to be a problem and therefore deployed as late and as near to the enemy as possible. In addition, units were kept in columns so as to provide better overall control and protect the flanks. In the jungle and open hilly areas squad columns and skirmish lines were found to be effective. When deployed deep in the jungle, often with only one narrow trail for an entire battalion, the best system was found to be a column of files deployed as near to the front and as late as possible.

Americans stressed daylight assaults and vast artillery preparations. Night assaults were never attempted, although they were suggested. The idea for a night attack was to launch the assault with no artillery and to advance as quickly and quietly as possible. This attack style was never attempted on Guadalcanal although it might have added a new dimension to the American attack which could have obtained quick significant results in a heavily defended area.

All American movement was usually halted in the late afternoon to dig emplacements and establish positions. This was probably fortunate as large scale unplanned night movements tend to start firefights between friendly units which can have a disastrous effect.

American defense tactics were, contrary to Japanese defenses, placed on one line with no definite strong points. Instead of a defense line in depth the Americans deployed a battalion in reserve of each regiment to counter any enemy breakthrough. The battalion could be brought under immediate divisional control to counter an extreme threat.

Fields of fire were cleared, when possible, to a depth of between sixty to one hundred yards. These fields of fire, which were cleared by burning and trampling the jungle vegetation, provided the defense with a killing zone which was usually able to maul an attacker before he reached the main line of defense. In addition to the fields of fire, listening posts were placed well in front of the main line and would retreat upon contact with a strong enemy force. The listening posts could be compared with the skirmishers of days gone by.

Overall, American offensive and defensive tactics were sound and worked well in the jungle. The slow nature of the tactics could be considered overly cautious, but it must be remembered that these tactics, while admittedly slow, did get the job done with a minimum of casualties.

Small Unit Weapons

The Japanese infantry units on Guadalcanal were generally well supplied with light infantry weapons. The primary infantry weapon of the Japanese arsenal was, of course, the rifle. Two types of rifles were used on Guadalcanal, the Arisaka Models 38 and 39. These weapons, while fairly efficient, were loose fitting and therefore noisy during movement.

Perhaps the weakest point in the Japanese infantry arsenal was its complete lack of automatic rifles and submachine guns. This lack of firepower was a crippling force which had a marked effect upon all Japanese operations.

On the defensive side the Japanese were well equipped with efficient weapons which were reasonably effective when properly used. The Japanese light machine gun, the 7.7 mm Type 99, was a dependable weapon with its chief drawback being a low rate of fire. The Model 93 heavy machine gun (13 mm) was efficient but it also suffered from a low rate of fire. These machine guns partially made up for the absence of automatic weapons, were backed up by mortars of good quality, and generally comparable with the American types.

The standard rifle platoon included three light machine guns. The company, which consisted of three platoons reinforced with a heavy weapons platoon, included nine light and two heavy machine guns. This organization fared somewhat better than the American set up of only two light and one heavy machine gun.

The Japanese brought both 47 mm anti-tank guns and flame-throwers to Guadalcanal. The anti-tank guns were only rarely used and the flame-throwers never saw action. The idleness of both of these weapons is curious because the 47 mm anti-tank gun, when it was used, proved to be effective against American tanks, and the flame-throwers, which were fairly plentiful, could have been highly effective.

Guadalcanal proved to be the testing ground of American infantry weapons. The results, which were from useless to excellent, were applied to increase the infantryman’s firepower to a point where he could deal effectively with any given situation.

Two types of rifles were employed on Guadalcanal. The first type, which was used in most Marine units, was the Springfield M1903 bolt-action rifle. This weapon was efficient, as good as any Japanese rifle, and was only replaced because of the Garand M1 which had a much higher rate of fire. (The Garand was probably the best rifle of World War II.) The Garand M1 was an efficient weapon which could fire thirty rounds per minute. This, in addition to its rugged construction, was its greatest asset.

In the field of automatic weapons, the American Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) and the Thompson submachine gun gave the Americans an edge in close combat which was decisive in many instances. The BAR was a light weapon with a high rate of fire and an excellent range. It was most valuable in the attack where its mobility could be brought to its fullest use. The Thompson submachine gun was an effective weapon, although somewhat fragile, which, while having an extremely high rate of fire, was very limited in range. The submachine gun also suffered from sounding like the Japanese .25 caliber weapons which limited its night use severely.

The American light machine gun (Browning M1917) was extremely efficient and easily movable. This weapon, in addition to the M2 heavy machine gun, were both excellent weapons with higher rates of fire and longer ranges than their Japanese counterparts.

The two principle mortars being used were the 60 and 81 mm weapons. The 60 mm mortar was highly movable but was ineffective in the dense jungle because the shells had a tendency of exploding in the trees. The 81 mm mortar was less portable but was effective as a close-support weapon.

The 37 mm anti-tank gun was the only anti-tank gun used by the Americans on Guadalcanal. Its small size made it usable in the jungle although it was best used in defense. The 37 mm gun was capable of firing both hard shot and canister.

Perhaps the most efficient weapon used in clearing an enemy strong point was the flame-thrower. The flame-throwers, which were first used on 15 January 1943, were highly effective in clearing enemy positions quickly. Army troops were somewhat dubious of the flame-thrower because it exposed the operator to intense enemy fire. These complaints, while certainly true, overlooked the fact that they could take care of a very messy job in a minimum amount of time while exposing a minimum amount of personnel.

Tactical Air and Naval Support

The Japanese, because of the great distance between Rabaul and Guadalcanal, received little in the way of direct support. The Navy was unable to supply direct support because the long distance between Rabaul and Guadalcanal, coupled with local American air superiority, made any prolonged stay impossible. The Air Force, because of the poor ground-to-air communications and the limited time the airplanes could remain over the target, found it almost impossible to provide direct tactical support. For these reasons most support was given indirectly.

The Japanese Army relied on the Navy for most of its indirect support and all of its supplies. The tactical support was mostly in the capacity of shelling Henderson airfield. The shelling of Henderson, especially when performed by the battleships, was very effective.

The Japanese Air Force, which was mostly naval, provided both direct and indirect support. The direct support, which was only rarely undertaken, came in the form of bombing the American front lines. This direct support was largely ineffective and had little impact upon the land combat. (Some Marines claimed that the Japanese bombs made dandy foxholes!)

The indirect support provided by the Japanese Air Force was largely effective although it fell short of being decisive. Both Henderson Field and shipping were favorite targets of the Japanese. The bombing of Henderson was usually scattered and could be easily repaired but the attacks against shipping proved to be another matter. Shipping was constantly being harassed which, besides the loss of the ships, made unloading a difficult task. Unloading was often delayed because the ships had to set sail when an air raid was announced. This often took a great deal of time and resulted in ships leaving with half of their cargo still in their holds.

In review it appears that the only tactical support the Japanese got was that which limited the American tactical support ability. In this capacity they were often effective, but unfortunately for Japan, not often enough.

The Americans used a combination of direct and indirect support, which proved to be highly useful and did much to shorten the campaign.

The American Navy gave both direct and indirect fire support to many of the American land offensives on Guadalcanal. On the direct support side the Navy would support landings, both large and small, with gunfire from destroyers and cruisers. This support was limited to daylight and usually to small tactical amphibious operations. By the end of the campaign, after local naval superiority had been established, fire support was given on a regular basis.

The indirect support came in the form of shelling the Japanese airfield at Munda Point. The shelling of this airfield, which began in late January 1943, was probably largely anti-climactic as the Japanese had already decided to evacuate Guadalcanal.

The “Cactus Air Force” on Guadalcanal proved to be a decisive weapon which far out did the Navy in tactical support. The air units, while providing fair direct tactical support, were most valuable in the indirect sense. The punishment dealt out to the “Tokyo Express” by the Air Force kept the Japanese units on Guadalcanal both poorly supplied and severely undermanned. This air support decimated several Japanese units before they ever reached the island, and was probably the most important indirect support given during the campaign.

The close match of strength allowed neither side much in the way of direct tactical support, or at least until after the critical first few months. The indirect support was, on the contrary, very important to both sides. The better indirect support of the Americans gave them the necessary edge to win the campaign.

Artillery

The Japanese artillery arm was forced to operate under conditions severely limiting its fighting ability. One problem was the lack of sufficient ammunition which severely limited the use of artillery. This lack of ammunition kept the Japanese artillery fire to a minimum and forced it to be directed against only the choicest of targets. Another pressing problem was the dense jungle which made it extremely difficult to move any artillery, other than the small 70 mm type, to good supporting positions, which had the result of forcing the Japanese to launch attacks with little or no artillery preparation.

The Japanese also had their own inherent problems which inhibited good artillery fire. The Japanese had a difficult time registering their fire from one sector to another, which handicapped the artillery arm when a quick barrage was needed. Artillery units also suffered from poor communications with front line troops which made close support fire difficult.

The Japanese employed three basic types of artillery on Guadalcanal: the 70, 75, and 150 mm howitzers which were basically sound with good rates of fire. They did, however, suffer from their short range.

The American artillery on Guadalcanal proved to be a very important, if not decisive, part of almost every operation, proving its worth early by smashing up enemy attacks with uncanny success and, later, by paving the way for the infantry.

On the defense, the artillery battalion would set their guns into a set field of fire so as to have fire support ready at an instant’s notice to counter any enemy threat. This policy worked out well and resulted in destroying every Japanese attack made in the face of it.

For offensive work, the artillery would register in on their targets before any advance. This registering was usually done in the late afternoon so as to be ready for the next day’s assault. At first, artillery battalions would fire indiscriminately upon the targets with each salvo hitting the target at a different time. On 11 December 1942 a new technique, known as “Time On Target” (TOT) firing, was attempted for the first time in World War II. TOT fire was simply firing each battalion’s guns so that the shells would land on the target area in a single instant. This type of fire was meant to catch enemy troops above ground by giving them no warning of the upcoming barrage. The TOT fire seems to have worked extremely well, and when used, enemy resistance was usually considerably diminished.

The three types of American artillery used on Guadalcanal were the 75, 105, and 155 mm howitzers. These guns were highly efficient and packed a punch which the Japanese howitzers lacked. The American artillery did suffer from shells not exploding on contact, which may have diminished the artillery’s effectiveness.

The Americans maintained a significant, if not absolute, artillery advantage over the Japanese throughout the entire campaign which was possibly the most decisive advantage of the entire campaign.

Armor

The Japanese brought between eleven and fourteen tanks to Guadalcanal. These were of two types, the Model 2598 Ishikawajima tankette and the Type 98 medium tank.

The Japanese attempted to use their tanks as a mere extension of the infantry. They simply lined the tanks up and rushed out across the open ground with little or no close infantry support. Such poor tactics obtained, as you might expect, poor results.

Had the Japanese used their tanks in tank-infantry combat teams and hit the Americans in a weak point they might have been able to make good use of their few tanks; they certainly couldn’t have done worse.

The American M3 Stuart light tank, which was roughly equal to its Japanese counterparts, was the only type of American tank used on Guadalcanal. Most of the tanks were concentrated in the 1^st Marine Tank Battalion, which was the only tank unit on Guadalcanal. The Army had no tanks of any type on Guadalcanal.

The Americans used their tanks in tank-infantry teams which proved to be generally effective. The tank-infantry team usually consisted of one tank and about two squads of infantry. They would support each other, with the infantry keeping Japanese soldiers from reaching the tanks, and the tank would smash the enemy bunkers for the infantry. The biggest difficulty in using the tanks proved to be the jungle, making it difficult, and often impossible to get tanks to the fighting.

All things considered the tanks were nice to have but they were not vital. They tended to keep the casualties down in cracking a defensive position but the job could be done without them.

Supply

The most critical problem faced by the Japanese on Guadalcanal was one of supply. The Japanese depended upon the Navy for all their supplies and once the Navy began to lose control of the area around Guadalcanal the Army began to lose its supplies.

Once the supplies reached the island the Japanese found it difficult to distribute even the meager stocks available. Troops on the offensive could take only as many supplies as could be carried. When the Japanese went on the defensive the front line troops still remained poorly supplied because the rear area troops often took more than their share.

The real problem, however, lay in the inability of the Japanese to get supplies to the island. One convoy on 14 November 1942 landed only five out of the ten thousand tons of supplies sent. Upon failure of the daylight attempts to re-supply the island the Japanese tried destroyers with barrels on the deck, which could be pushed off and allowed to float ashore, and submarines. Only thirty percent of all barrels sent ashore were recovered and the submarines lacked sufficient storage in the first place.

The engineers on the island were faced with supply problems which they were totally unable to solve. Trail building, which was their primary function when the Japanese were advancing to attack, proved to be a task in which they were both undermanned and ill-equipped to perform. This lack of engineers severely limited the amount of artillery and supplies which could be transported to the front line troops.

The American supply situation, while at times unsatisfactory, was never as critical as that of the Japanese. The Americans, like the Japanese, were almost completely dependent upon the Navy for all of their supplies. The Americans had the advantage, due to their air superiority, of unloading in the daylight. The use of fast destroyer transports enabled the American ships to arrive at daybreak, unload their three thousand ton cargo, and be gone by nightfall.

The lack of 2¹/₂-ton trucks hindered the movement of supplies during the early part of the campaign. This, in addition to poor shore party organization, stacked supplies up on the beaches which could have proven disastrous. After the arrival of more trucks, especially the 2¹/₂-ton type, the efficient movement of supplies within the perimeter was made commonplace.

When the Americans finally took the offensive they found it difficult to keep the artillery units supplied with enough shells. An experiment was attempted by which the artillery shells would be transported to the front by mules. The mules, however, proved to make more of a logistical problem than they solved.

The movement through the interior of the jungle provided some logistical problems. To begin with, a road had to be built to support the advancing troops. This was a very slow process. Even after completing the road a truck could only average about twenty miles per hour and when it rained the trails became axle-deep in mud.

Once in the jungle units often had to depend upon airdrops. These airdrops were executed without the use of parachutes which resulted in destroying fifteen percent of the food and eighty-five percent of the ammunition and nearly all of the water cans were ruined upon impact.

Another method of jungle supply was to transport supplies up the small rivers in both American and captured Japanese boats. The boats utilized were small rowboat types some of which had outboard motors while others had to be pushed. The system worked well, keeping American troops at least partially supplied until roads could be built to the front line.

Overall, the supply situation faced by the Americans, although often low in many items, especially aviation fuel and barbed wire, never had the shortages of the Japanese.

Disease

The disease problem faced by the Japanese on Guadalcanal was, without a doubt, the greatest faced in any Pacific operation. Almost every Japanese soldier on the island was either infected with malaria, malnutrition, beriberi, or dysentery. These diseases are considered to have caused nine thousand deaths out of the 28,500 casualties suffered by the Japanese on Guadalcanal.

The major reasons for this universal sickness of the Japanese soldiers was poor prevention facilities. Mosquito nets were almost non-existent and hospitals were few and far between. The Japanese also suffered from having to stay deep in the jungle because of American air superiority. Living in the jungle constantly made prevention and cure almost impossible.

Conditions from disease and hunger became so bad that one Japanese commander placed his men in three categories: those that could move and fight, those that could fight but couldn’t move, and those who could neither move nor fight.

The Americans also suffered heavily from the jungle diseases. A prime example was the 1st Marine Division. The unit suffered 10,730 casualties between 7 August and 10 December 1942 and only 1,472 were from gunshot. The others were a combination of battle fatigue and malaria, with malaria taking 5,742 alone.

The Americans made attempts to prevent diseases but these were only partially successful. The administration of atabrine tablets was only partially successful because many men refused to take them. Other methods such as mosquito nets and sleeping on the high open slopes also worked to some degree.

On Guadalcanal malaria provided sixty-five percent of the losses while wounds were only responsible for twenty-five percent. In this way malaria and other diseases had a most effective way of rendering entire battalions and regiments ineffective.

Morale

Morale on Guadalcanal was high on both sides, therefore morale proved to be a constant condition which provided neither side with an advantage.

The average Japanese soldier’s confidence was at first enough to maintain a high morale because they were supremely confident that victory would be theirs. After the defeats of their offensive attempts the Japanese High Command then had to begin telling their men that victory was near if only they could hold out. The Japanese soldier, although he must have had some doubts, believed his commanders and fought on resolutely right up to the end. The Japanese morale did tend to give out a little during the American January offensive but it never reached anything near the danger stage.

The Americans on Guadalcanal managed to keep their morale up in a variety of ways. The best method of building morale was to defeat the Japanese in combat. The success of the defense and general success of the small land offensives launched by the Marines worked to keep morale at a satisfactory level. The brief periods of rest given all units by placing them in reserve, along with the satisfaction of being part of America’s first offensive action, must also have contributed to the troops’ morale.

American troops did suffer a lowering of morale after prolonged periods of combat. The morale, especially when heavy casualties were taken, tended to reduce the offensive ability of American units. The problem was, however, never present for very long and after a few weeks of rest units were ready for combat a gain.

Intelligence

Japanese intelligence work on Guadalcanal was nothing short of disgusting. They constantly underestimated American ability and, after telling the same lies so often, allowed themselves to be lulled into believing their own lies.

The early Japanese defeats can be directly attributed to poor intelligence work. The Japanese insisted that only one thousand Marines had landed on Guadalcanal and that these were poorly trained and ill-equipped. Such gross underestimation’s, even after thorough aerial reconnaissance, revealed a sad lack of good Japanese intelligence work.

The Japanese continued, throughout the entire campaign, to underestimate American strength. This is vividly illustrated by the Japanese plans to start a counteroffensive as late as January 1943. Aside from poor intelligence this shows a fanciful wishful thinking which produced many Japanese defeats.

American intelligence during the Guadalcanal campaign showed a definite improvement in efficiency. The increase in efficiency was, however, not fully implemented until after the campaign.

American intelligence work showed it needed much more experience when it thoroughly bungled its estimates of Japanese troops in the Guadalcanal area. The 1^st Marine Division estimated 8,400 men in the entire area, with seven thousand on Guadalcanal and 1,400 on Tulagi. The Navy came through with estimates of 7,125 (Admiral Turner), and 3,100 (Admiral Ghormley). The 3,100 turned out to be closer as the actual number was approximately 3,010 men.

After the initial foul-ups, intelligence work became better and proved more beneficial. The intelligence section of the 1^st Marine Division accurately estimated the size of the Kawaguchi Force and thereafter was usually fairly close.

Intelligence was usually received from any one of four sources. Probably the most useless to the ground troops were the coastwatchers. These men, who are a story in themselves, provided much vital information, but it was mostly valuable only to the Navy and Air Force.

Perhaps the best source of information was the Japanese themselves. The Japanese frequently carried diaries and orders along with them into battle. These were often invaluable in determining enemy strength and intentions. Japanese POWs were also very cooperative, probably because they were never told different and would answer almost any question to the greatest extent of their personal knowledge.

American small unit intelligence usually involved sending a platoon-sized recon group to search for weak points and provide estimates of enemy strength. The small recon groups were fairly efficient but they had a tendency to overestimate distances and become involved in fire-fights with the Japanese which could have been avoided.

Conclusions

The land battle on Guadalcanal was completely a one-sided affair, with the Americans maintaining the advantage in almost every category. This superiority, when combined with local American air superiority, gave the Americans an insurmountable advantage.

The Japanese, for their part, could be said to have defeated themselves. They threw troops into the battle piecemeal and had them destroyed before they could be properly reinforced. Had the Japanese held their troops back for one large offensive they might have accomplished something of consequence. The seeds of Japanese defeat do not lie in the average soldier, or the equipment, they lie in the Japanese commanders. If the Japanese would have been realistic about the situation and conducted coordinated and well-led attacks they might have accomplished something besides losing much of the 17^th Army and setting the war on an irreversible course.

Bibliography

Coggins, Jack. The Campaign for Guadalcanal. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972.

Kent, Graeme. Guadalcanal: Island Ordeal. New York: Ballantine, 1971.

Kershaw, Andrew. Weapons of War. England: Oxley Press, 1973.

Miller, John, Jr. Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1948.

Patrick, Stephen B. “The Battle for Guadalcanal.” Strategy & Tactics, Number 39 (August 1973).

A U.S. Marine patrol crosses the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal in September 1942.

Supplies are unloaded manually from boats on Guadalcanal sometime between August 1942, and February 1943.

Australian Major J.W. Mather pays wages to a local laborer on Guadalcanal sometime during the battle August - February 1942.

Captured Japanese 150mm artillery gun on Guadalcanal.

Japanese prisoners of war on Guadalcanal, 1942-1943.

A Japanese POW is interrogated by U.S. Marine intelligence personnel on Guadalcanal.

A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the 11th Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy on Guadalcanal.

Japanese soldier demonstrates use of the Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger. Often called a “knee mortar” by U.S. troops, they were used extensively in Pacific battles by Japanese forces, including on Guadalcanal.

A Japanese 75mm field gun captured by U.S. forces on Guadalcanal in 1942.

Marine M3 Stuart tank on Guadalcanal in 1942.

Using captured Japanese guns such as the 3-inch dual purpose weapon shown here, Marines of Company M, 5th Marines, dueled with a Japanese cruiser on 19 August 1942 on Guadalcanal. No hits were scored by either party.

Japanese machine gun crew on Guadalcanal, probably training before the Allied landings.

A U.S. Marine patrol descends from “Edson’s” Ridge, Guadalcanal, sometime in 1942. Henderson Field is in the background.

U.S. Marines suffering from malaria in a rough field hospital on Guadalcanal, probably in October 1942.

U.S. Marines of the 1st Marine Division debark from a transport at Melbourne, Australia after being relieved from duty on Guadalcanal, December 1942. Note M1903 rifles and sprinkling of “Old Marine Corps” field hats.

U.S. Marine 105mm gun on Guadalcanal, September 1942.

U.S. 11th Marines 75mm pack howitzer and crew on Guadalcanal, September or October 1942. The lean condition of the crew members indicate that they haven’t been getting enough nutrition during this period.

Guadalcanal presents a varied terrain. This view looking south over Point Cruz shows the jumble of sharp-grassed ridges, foothills and mountainous jungle which was Guadalcanal.