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| “Two Way Traffic at Bastogne”. Painting by Olin Dows, Belgium, 1945. |
by Ralph M. Mitchell,
Colonel, U.S. Army
First published by the
Combat Studies Institute,
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 1986
First reprinted in book form by the Merriam Press in 2000
Foreword
The defense
of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II is one of the
supreme achievements of American arms. Bastogne is deservedly identified with
the finest characteristics of the American soldier, and the name Bastogne
symbolizes a heroic battle. Bastogne has long held the attention of students of
war, yet the battle offers new insights for soldiers with modern concerns.
Colonel Ralph M. Mitchell’s study reveals how a
light infantry division, complemented by key attachments, stopped an
armor-heavy German corps. Using original documents and reports, Colonel
Mitchell traces the fight at Bastogne with emphasis on the organization,
movement, and employment of the 101st Airborne Division. Although a
variety of factors influenced the outcome at Bastogne, the flexibility of the
101st to reconfigure for sustained operations and to defeat strong
opposition forces even when surrounded shows how properly augmented light
infantry can fight and win.
Louis D. F. Frasche, Colonel,
Infantry
Director, Combat Studies Institute
Bastogne: The Context of the Battle
By October 1944, the
rapid Allied advance into Germany that followed the breakout from the Normandy
beaches had slowed to a crawl. Stiffening German resistance and Allied
logistical and communications problems exerted a significant influence on the
Allied advance. In the American sector, Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley’s 12th
Army Group occupied an extended front, with the First and Third Armies along
the Siegfried Line and the Ninth Army facing the Roer River. There would be
little change in these positions in October and November (see Map 1).
The First Army had an
extensive line of defense near Aachen, Germany. Major General Troy H.
Middleton’s VIII Corps occupied that army’s southern sector. Its 88-mile front
extended from Losheim, Germany, north through eastern Belgium and Luxembourg to
where the Our River crosses the Franco-German border. The corps’ mission was to
defend in place in a relatively quiet sector. There, new divisions could
receive a safe indoctrination, and battle-weary ones could rest and
reconstitute for future operations. Headquarters, VIII Corps, was located in
the small Belgian town of Bastogne. The area around Bastogne was characterized
by rugged hills, high plateaus, deep-cut valleys, and restricted road nets.
Bastogne itself was the hub for seven roads and a railroad. Both sides
understood the significance of that fact (see Map 2).
Alarmed by the
continuing grave situation in the east, Adolph Hitler saw an opportunity for a
decisive offensive in the west as the Allied offensive stalled there. Without
complete support from his closest advisers, he directed the launching of a
winter offensive against the western Allies through the Aisne-Ardennes sector
of the front. The purpose was to recapture the important port of Antwerp while
encircling and destroying the 21st Army Group. In so doing, Hitler
would turn the fate of the war in Germany’s favor. Middleton’s VIII Corps,
however, was directly astride the main avenue of advance of the Fifth Panzer
Army.
Few German officers were
privy to the plans for this offensive, called “Watch on the Rhine.” Most
Germans thought preparations were for defensive measures until a few days
before the attack began. Operating with little insight as to the ultimate
objectives of their own units, many commanders had insufficient opportunity for
reconnaissance and failed to consider the numerous contingencies that might
soon arise. They remained unaware of the tactical implications of their
situations, while Hitler’s intuition was allowed to prevail.
The Germans, however,
had identified Bastogne as a possible point of major difficulty and had
considered the control of the vital crossroads through that town to be
absolutely necessary to maintain their rear area lines of communication. Hitler
had expressly ordered Bastogne’s capture, and that mission had been passed
through Army Group (Heeresgruppe) and
Fifth Army to XLVII Panzer Corps, which would be attacking through the Bastogne
sector. Specifically, the corps was to cross the Our River on a wide front,
bypass the Clerf sector, take Bastogne, and move to and cross the Meuse River
south of Namur (see Map 3). The corps’ commander, General Baron Heinrich von
Lüttwitz, had specifically asked about Bastogne at a conference in Kyllburg
prior to the offensive. In the presence of General von Manteuffel, the Fifth
Army commander, von Lüttwitz was told that Bastogne would definitely have to be
taken. Accordingly, in instructions to his subordinates, he stated: “Bastogne
must be captured, if necessary from the rear. Otherwise it will be an abscess
in the route of advance and tie up too many forces. Bastogne is to be mopped up
first, then the bulk of the corps continues its advance.”
In light of such
specific guidance prior to the operation, it is curious that the Fifth Panzer
Army staff did not interpret those instructions the same way. Chief of Staff,
Brig. Gen. Carl Wagener, stated, “Bastogne would not necessarily have to be
taken but merely encircled. This would avoid any loss of time east of the Maas
[Meuse].” The Germans expected that the advance to the Meuse would not be
delayed by any attack on Bastogne because both would be accomplished
simultaneously. Lüttwitz also differed with Fifth Panzer Army about the amount
of time it would take his men to reach the Meuse. The Fifth Panzer’s staff
expected the attack to take four days; the commander of XLVII Panzer Corps
thought it would take six days and had doubts about taking Bastogne by the end
of the second day as Fifth Army had projected. Lüttwitz had good reason to be
pessimistic.
In the midst of general
confusion about the forthcoming operation, pessimism seemed the order of the
day, and vital planning went awry. Lüttwitz himself doubted whether the
offensive would succeed. The Germans had to achieve surprise, and the Allied
air forces somehow had to be neutralized. Hitler would have to deliver both a
sufficient quantity of fuel and the three thousand German aircraft he had
promised on 11 December 1944. Perhaps the attacking German columns could reach
the Meuse, but without divisions to cover their extended flanks and without
adequate bridging equipment, there was little hope that they could push
farther.
Organization and Deployment of Units
With the attack scheduled for 16 December
1944, there was good reason for German concern. The number of their soldiers
available had steadily decreased, most units had not been rested, and all units
encountered significant shortages of organic weapons, tanks, trucks, spare
parts, ammunition, and fuel. Moreover, there were no plans to capture enemy
supplies, and the success of the operation did not hinge on that possibility.
German general staffs at all echelons also believed that the enemy had no
strategic reserves available on the Continent and that there would be little
Allied resistance in the Bastogne area. Both assumptions proved fatally
incorrect.
The XLVII Panzer Corps
consisted of the 2nd Panzer Division, Panzer Lehr Division, and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, all reinforced by one volks mortar brigade, one volks artillery corps, and the 600th
Army Engineer Battalion for bridging purposes. None was at full strength. The 2nd
Panzer Division had been in the rear area for four weeks to rest and refit. It
had only eighty percent of its authorized personnel and equipment, but its
commanders were seasoned veterans. One panzergrenadier
battalion was on bicycles to save fuel and vehicles. It would be totally
unfit for combat in the hilly roads of the rugged Ardennes and ultimately would
have to be used only for replacement troops.
The Panzer Lehr Division had just returned from the
Saar area. It had sixty percent of its troops, forty percent of its tanks and
tank destroyers, sixty percent of its guns, and forty percent of its other
types of weapons. One tank battalion had no tanks and, thus, was unavailable
for the attack. In its place, the division received the 539th Heavy
Tank Destroyer Battalion equipped with thirty percent of its authorized
Jagdpanther tank destroyers. Due to previous battle losses, the 26th
Volksgrenadier Division was without
one regiment. But the remainder of the division was at full strength and had
several seasoned senior commanders. Many subordinate commanders, however, were
without previous combat experience, and the division had not been trained in offensive
operations. Organizations later assigned to the XLVII Panzer Corps in
operations around Bastogne would arrive in poor condition, with strengths
ranging from fifty to seventy percent. These included the 9th and
116th Panzer Divisions, the 3rd and 15th Panzergrenadier Divisions, and the Führer Begleit (Escort) Brigade.
Following a heavy
artillery bombardment at 0500 on 16 December 1944, the Germans launched their
offensive, gaining surprise and immediate local successes in all sectors. In
the American VIII Corps sector alone, twenty-five German divisions were
attacking. They struck and advanced through the veteran, but weary, 28th
and 4th Infantry Divisions as well as the green 106th
Infantry Division and the equally inexperienced 14th Cavalry Group.
Only in the 4th Division sector was action light. The only U.S.
corps reserve consisted of an armored combat command and four battalions of
combat engineers. Amid much confusion and disorganization in the American
units, the Germans advanced steadily, but not as rapidly as they had hoped.
Poor roads became overcrowded, and small pockets of determined resistance
waged by American infantry and armored units slowed, but did not stop, the
German advance. The Allied high command realized that Bastogne was threatened
and reserves were needed immediately. Accordingly, on 17 December 1944, the
101st Airborne Division, then in Camp Mourmelon, France, resting and
refitting after operations in Holland, was alerted to move to the vicinity of
Bastogne. Bastogne, if held, could interrupt lines of communication as the
Germans continued their attack westward. But, meanwhile, VIII Corps’ defenses
were crumbling, and the Germans, who averaged four to eight miles advance on
the first day, were within eleven miles of Bastogne. Time had become a critical
factor. The race was on!
The 101st
Airborne Division, the unit chosen to stem the advance, was a well-trained,
veteran outfit. Prior to and during its deployment in Europe, the unit had
placed special training emphasis on decentralizing and massing artillery, the
repair and operation of enemy equipment, air-ground liaison, signal security,
night operations, and defense against mechanized, aerial, and infantry
infiltration. Its strength at the time of the alert was 805 officers and 11,035
enlisted men. Included in its organization were four infantry regiments and all
supporting arms, though there were shortages of personnel and equipment. Its
commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, was in the United States. His deputy,
Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, was in England with five senior and sixteen
junior officers. Command of the division for operations around Bastogne,
therefore, fell to Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, the division’s artillery
commandeer. In record time, he got the division on the road moving toward the
town of Werbomont, twenty-five miles north of Bastogne, where he was originally
ordered to report. In an oversight that could have led to catastrophe, however,
no one had informed the division that it was now attached to VIII Corps. The
advance party that reached Werbomont on the night of 18 December only then
discovered they were meant to report to Bastogne.
General McAuliffe’s
fortuitous stop in Bastogne to confer with Middleton in late afternoon that day
saved the rest of the division the same fate. Learning of his attachment to
VIII Corps and receiving orders from Middleton to defend Bastogne, McAuliffe made
immediate preparations to reroute and receive the division. This was
accomplished superbly by a few staff officers without the help of any advance
party. As McAuliffe’s columns moved through heavy traffic toward Bastogne,
forty tanks from Combat Command B (CCB), the 10th Armored Division,
the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion (with 76-mm self-propelled guns),
and two battalions of 155-mm artillery were ordered to Bastogne to be attached
to the 101st. These organizations and a makeshift replacement pool
of stragglers—Team Snafu—from U.S. elements withdrawing near Bastogne, would
bolster the defense of the 101st Airborne Division throughout the
critical period in the battle for Bastogne.
Even as the 101st
and its attachments were moving into Bastogne during the night of 18 December,
the German advance had moved rapidly down the Wiltz-Bastogne road to a point
just three kilometers from the town. There they collided with the first
elements of the 101st. With VIII Corps evacuating the area, the
defense of Bastogne became the division’s task. The paratroopers had barely won
the race for the town; now the problem was to hold it.
In the early stages of
the German advance, supply difficulties had not been a particularly critical
issue. While some German division commanders had hoped to capture American
supplies, none relied on that possibility for a primary source of re-supply.
Fuel, however, was immediately in short supply because only half the promised
initial issue was delivered. Furthermore, unusually heavy consumption rates,
brought about by rough terrain and poor weather near Bastogne, further drained
the meager fuel supplies. Throughout the operation, the fuel situation would
only worsen for the Germans. But until 18 December, the XLVII Corps heading for
Bastogne was still in good fighting shape; there was good cooperation
throughout the corps; reports were timely; communications were good; troop
morale was reasonably high; the attack had begun on time on the 16th;
and the U.S. 28th Infantry Division’s first line of defense had been
broken.
Even so, there had been
some serious problems that threw the XLVII Corps off its timetable.
Unanticipated high water across the Our River caused delays while engineers
extended and bolstered bridges for tanks to cross. Elimination of abatis (constructed by both Americans
and Germans while on the defensive) and the filling in of craters caused
additional delays. Because of poor roads and few bridges, two assault divisions
were involved in a bottleneck at one vital bridge. These hindrances, combined
with a stiffening American resistance that was in greater depth than the
Germans expected, prevented the Panzer Lehr
Division from arriving in Bastogne at the appointed time—1800, 18 December
1944. Had the Germans arrived on schedule, the 101st would have been
five kilometers west of the town. After the Germans intercepted an alert
message by the 101st on 17 December and discovered the paratroopers’
projected 18 December arrival time in Bastogne, greater pressure was placed on
the XLVII Corps for a more rapid advance. However, there was no advice on how
the corps should overcome the obstacles it faced nor was there any offer of
assistance.
As the 101st
and its attachments, practically on the run, formed a perimeter in the villages
around Bastogne on the night of 18 December, the tide of events had begun to
turn. German troops, pressed by their commanders for a faster rate of advance,
were near exhaustion. Previous losses of men and equipment and the prospects
for more of the same sapped their will to fight. The American units they now
faced were fresh, motivated, and in control of Bastogne. But Bastogne would be
hotly contested in the week ahead.
By any comparison, the
Americans, with a light infantry (paratroop) division, some additional
artillery, forty tanks, and a tank destroyer battalion, should not have been a
match for the superior German forces, which consisted of two panzer divisions
and a volksgrenadier division; yet
they were. Their ability to resist the Germans at Bastogne was enhanced by
their timely occupation of the town. Low German morale also strengthened U.S.
resolve. The Germans of Army Group West and the Fifth Panzer Army had no choice
but to sustain the momentum of the offensive at all costs in accordance with
Hitler’s demands. Ultimately, German commanders who were too far removed from
the action would make fateful decisions that would allow the lightly equipped
defenders of Bastogne to survive.
Saving Bastogne: A Chronology
The first steps to save Bastogne were
taken on 18 December, when Middleton dispatched the recently arrived Combat Command
B to the northeast, east, and southeast of the town with orders to hold their
positions at all cost. Such action indicated to the Germans that Bastogne would
not be surrendered. In the week that followed, the Germans squeezed the
perimeter around Bastogne tighter and tighter, but it did not break.
Throughout the defensive
sector, McAuliffe organized the 101st and its attachments into
regimental task forces. Each had its proportional share of artillery, tanks,
anti-tank, and anti-air forces. Thus, light infantry received supplemental
firepower in their defense. With the exception of artillery, the Germans were
similarly organized. Their artillery was kept primarily in general support.
On 19 December (see Map
4), small German infantry-armor forces, both with and without artillery
support, infiltrated under cover of bad weather. German action also included
night fighting with tanks. The Americans resisted strongly in all sectors, defending
outlying villages and road intersections. By nightfall, XLVII Corps had been
contained along the line Noville-Bizory-Neffe. The inadequate road network;
old, broken-down and overloaded German vehicles; and the American artillery
around Bastogne were slowing the German advance. With pressure from Heeresgruppe to push beyond Bastogne,
Fifth Panzer Army and XLVII Corps decided that the Panzer Lehr Division should take Bastogne on the twentieth while the other
forces continued their westward advance.
On 20 and 21 December
(see Maps 5 and 6), the same pattern of small-unit infiltration continued, with
some gains accruing to the Germans. The villages of Noville and Bizory were
finally taken, but an attack against Marvie was repulsed. Bastogne continued to
be a matter of concern to XLVII Corps. But it was believed on the twentieth
that, with advances continuing north and south of the town, Bastogne would
soon be encircled and that the 26th Volksgrenadier Division following the panzer divisions could
capture it. Indeed, the town was surrounded on the twenty-first, but the 26th
Volksgrenadier Division was not
strong enough to take it. Though surrounded, the 101st was not cut
off. The division still maintained communication with VIII Corps and knew an
American relief column was pushing toward them as German advances along the
entire Western Front were diminishing. The Fifth Panzer Army refused to
authorize sufficient additional forces to take Bastogne and to keep the
faltering offensive alive. But the 26th Volksgrenadier Division still had the mission, with some help from
the Panzer Lehr Division. On the
evening of 21 December, Manteuffel and Lüttwitz composed the now famous
surrender note that, after being delivered to the 101st on 22
December, received McAuliffe’s more famous reply: “Nuts.”
In addition to the note
on 22 December, there were continuous probes along the entire perimeter (see
Map 7). Only two German attacks of any significance occurred, however, and both
were no larger than company size. On 23 December (see Map 8), probes continued
to the west and southeast, but the weather had cleared and American airpower
was beginning to take its toll of German forces and equipment. Aerial re-supply
also began that day, bringing the 101st badly needed supplies and
sending American morale soaring.
The Germans were
becoming desperate. The XLVII Corps was informed that the 9th Panzer
Division and 15th Panzergrenadier
Division would come under corps control on 24 December, and the 3rd
Panzergrenadier Division would arrive
later. Heeresgruppe still insisted on
Bastogne being taken in conjunction with the advance to the Meuse, but with
Fifth Panzer Army now on the defensive almost everywhere and the possibility of
advancing to the Meuse River becoming slimmer each day, Army Chief of Staff
General Wagener felt “the initiative seemed to have passed to the enemy.”
The situation on 24 and
25 December (see Maps 9 and 10) revived Lüttwitz’ hope that his corps could
take Bastogne. Reinforcements now promised by Fifth Panzer Army were essential
for this success. During the night of 24 December, German combined arms and
infantry attacks by pessimistic commanders and uninspired soldiers were
uncoordinated and failed. On the twenty-fifth, the ring around Bastogne was
tightened as a result of regimental-size attacks, but again, they were
uncoordinated. The American advantage of interior lines clearly served to
complicate German attempts to coordinate their efforts. That evening, XLVII
Corps, apprehensive about the American relief column pushing through, requested
reinforcements and wanted to call off the attacks. The German Fifth Army,
appreciating the situation but powerless to act, could only offer sympathy and
a promise to look for more reinforcements.
On 26 December (see Map
11), German forces again attacked with battalion-size infantry and armor teams.
Striking American combined arms teams arrayed in depth, the Germans were again
unsuccessful. Other units, forming for attack in assembly areas, were attacked
by American artillery and dispersed. At 1600 hours that afternoon, American
tanks broke through the 2nd Panzer and 26th Volksgrenadier Divisions and linked up
with the 101st. All hope for German success had died. The XLVII
Corps had no forces available to eliminate this penetration, and the Fifth
Panzer Army’s offer of the Führer Begleit
Brigade was too little and too late. Light German probing attacks continued
on the 27th and 28th, but the XLVII Panzer Corps’
defensive inclinations were more predominant. The 101st had held
Bastogne and seriously retarded the German Ardennes offensive. In action from
18 through 27 December, the 101st and its attachments had suffered
115 officer and 1,933 enlisted casualties. They had killed 7,000 Germans,
captured 697 prisoners, and destroyed approximately 200 armored vehicles.
Applications of Force
Though fighting in the villages around
Bastogne pitted a multi-division force against a reinforced light division,
combat for the most part was characterized by small-unit actions. Fate, as it
always does, played a significant role in the outcome, but a more detailed look
at how the 101st was organized and equipped to fight also provides
insight into its success. Firepower for the light division was far greater
than would have ordinarily been the case. In addition to its own artillery of
four battalions, the division had at its disposal a field artillery group
consisting of two 155-mm gun battalions and a 4.5-inch howitzer battalion. It
also had one 155-mm gun and two 105-mm howitzer battalions (which had fallen
back after initial German assaults on 16 December). In all, that meant that as
many as ten field artillery battalions could have supported the division at any
one time. Two battalions of the attached group were overrun and lost on 20
December after the group commander moved them without permission. For his
actions, he was summarily relieved that day by General McAuliffe. But even with
that loss, the American artillery in Bastogne was still a potent force,
especially when compared to the weaker German artillery.
When alerted for
movement to the Bastogne area, the 101st Division’s artillery was
still reconstituting from operations in Holland. Many of the howitzers were in
poor condition but were repaired or replaced before the road march.
Anticipating a departure from their traditional airborne role, the artillerymen
reconfigured for land movement and consequently carried with them far more
ammunition than they would, or could, otherwise have taken via aircraft. Without the
additional loads, they would have run out of ammunition before aerial re-supply
was possible.
Upon arrival at
Bastogne, all battalions task organized for a static defense. Personnel
shortages, especially in forward observer and liaison teams to supported
infantry, quickly became acute. Headquarters and firing units were stripped to
fill the void. Command, control, and communications problems, as well as
general supply shortages, occasionally detracted from the effectiveness of the
defense but were never insurmountable. The biggest problem remained a shortage
of ammunition. As the intensity of the fighting increased and overland supply
lines were cut, ammunition conservation became critical.
The majority of all
rounds fired were directed against enemy armor. Firing in the direct and
indirect mode, artillery was effective against German tanks, while unsupported
infantry rarely stopped the German armor. But had it not been for the timely
aerial re-supply of 23 December and subsequent drops on succeeding days, the
guns would have fallen silent and been easy prey for attacking German forces.
By that day, some units were down to less than three high-explosive rounds per
howitzer and had no remaining rations.
As it was, the Germans
had much to be concerned with when in the vicinity of American artillery. The
cold, hungry, and exhausted artillerymen manning the guns repeatedly stated
their willingness to endure any deprivation if only they could get some more
ammunition. American morale was excellent, and no German tank within range of
American artillery was safe. The encirclement and the widely disseminated 22
December surrender note were considered amusing incidents rather than
awe-inspiring threats. On Christmas Eve, an entry in one battalion journal
read, “Christmas Eve, and all personnel here wish for plenty of ammunition and
one good supply route.” On Christmas day, the entry read, “Three cooks in C
Battery took a little time from their regular chores to kill two Germans in a
tank with a grenade, and captured six others.” That same day, another artillery
battalion, under attack by seven tanks and accompanying infantry, employed its
howitzers as anti-tank guns and destroyed two tanks, captured one intact,
killed a number of infantrymen, and captured twenty-four others. Similar
actions occurred throughout the operation. On 20 December alone, no less than
seven battalions fired 2,600 rounds solely at enemy armor. The incomprehensible
German failure to attempt to destroy or neutralize American artillery only
served to bolster the cannoneers’ confidence and determination. In his
after-action report, one direct-support battalion commander wrote, “After
arriving at Bastogne and going into position, we found ourselves in exactly the
situation we had been trained to handle.” Perhaps that was ultimately why they
acquitted themselves so well.
A prime example of task
organizing can be seen in the case of the division’s 81st Airborne
Anti-aircraft Battalion. Entering combat with three anti-aircraft and three
57-mm anti-tank batteries, that unit found its role quickly changed to meet
the German armor threat. Initially, the anti-aircraft batteries supported the
division’s artillery, but they were shifted to the main line of resistance
(MLR) to strengthen the defensive perimeter. While that action caused division
headquarters and the division artillery to be more vulnerable to German air
strikes, it provided firepower where it was most needed—in ground support in
the secondary line of defense.
The anti-tank batteries
were also positioned on the MLR, where, in conjunction with the larger vehicles
of the tank destroyer battalion, they formed a defense in depth that the
Germans could not penetrate without unacceptable losses. The 81st’s
weapons would engage German tanks at maximum range, slow the German tanks, and
thus give the more mobile tank and tank destroyer units time to move to the
point of the German attack and defeat the enemy’s armor. Time and again, this
technique was used to counter uncoordinated enemy thrusts that came from all
directions.
Other effective
anti-tank measures included active infantry patrolling to give early warning of
German assembly or attack, preparation of tank barriers and obstacles, and
aggressive hand-to-hand fighting to separate German infantry and tanks after penetrations
had occurred. Most tanks were destroyed after they had penetrated the defenses
and had been separated from their infantry. That task was most frequently
accomplished by direct-fire artillery, anti-tank weapons, and bazooka fire at
close range.
Typical of the close-in
violence of the battles was an incident on 23 December in the town of Marvie.
There, Pfc. Norman Osterberg, a member of the 327th Glider Infantry
Regiment, exposed himself to intense enemy fire and, using his bazooka,
repeatedly drove attacking tanks away even though they came within ten yards of
his position. Wounded in the process, he continued his stand for three hours,
thus stopping the attack in his sector. Such bravery and esprit were common
throughout the elite division. Fighting against tanks, soldiers quickly discovered
that digging in around a town was far preferable and more effective than
occupying its buildings and being crushed in the rubble. Teamwork, cooperation,
effective combined arms attacks on targets, and stubborn and brave resistance
gave the paratroopers a fighting edge they never relinquished.
Combat Support
The successful defensive activities at
Bastogne were made possible in good measure through the efforts of the 101st
Signal Company, which provided outstanding communications support and ensured
excellent command and control. From the beginning, the signal company was hard
pressed to keep communications operational in an encircled town subject to
intense enemy fire. Their task began when the division was first alerted.
Signal loads had to be configured for ground, rather than airborne, operations.
Their deployment was excellent, and by 0600, 19 December, all elements were in
radio and wire contact with division headquarters. Secure and non-secure
communications with VIII Corps were also established and never lost throughout
the operation. Indeed, these were the only links with the outside after
Bastogne was surrounded.
Batteries for radios
posed a problem. With only a three-day supply, the division had to rely on
strict supply economy and conservation. Even with such conservation measures,
many divisional units ran out of essential batteries on the 23rd;
but that was the day they were re-supplied by air. Wire was also constantly
being broken by shelling, bombing, and heavy equipment passing over it. Teams
serviced the lines constantly, often under fire. From the first day, signal
personnel continuously expanded the net, establishing alternate routes,
laterals, and additional circuits.
Communication among units
was rarely lost. Radios were in poor condition from the Holland operation, but
they were sufficient to meet all divisional requirements. The nets established
allowed for real-time dissemination of intelligence information from all
sources, even down to local patrols. Frequent German jamming was overcome, as
was the problem of friendly elements nearby operating on division frequencies.
Contact was established with the 4th Armored Division two days
before that element broke through to the 101st, and it was
maintained continuously from that point until no longer needed. Wire communication
was established as soon as the linkup occurred. With such signal efficiency, it
is no wonder that the Americans enjoyed communications superiority.
Flexibility and adaptability
also characterized the 101st’s operations in and around Bastogne.
The most serious problem occurred during the night of 19 December, when the
Division Clearing Station, operated by the 326th Medical Company,
was overrun by six German vehicles (half-tracks and tanks) supported by a
hundred infantrymen. In that action, the Germans captured eighteen American
officers and 124 enlisted men, as well as most of the unit’s medical equipment
and supplies. Until a surgical team arrived by glider on 26 December, only two
medical and two dental officers, four medical administration officers, and 113
enlisted men remained to handle all of the division’s medical needs. A
makeshift casualty collection station had to suffice because there were no
means to evacuate the wounded after 20 December. The station quickly became
overcrowded. Medical supply shortages soon plagued the operation, and the overworked
staff’s primary focus became the survival of the wounded by any means
available. Over a thousand American and German wounded eventually were treated
at the collection center.
Another major problem
for the division was the constant shortage of supply and maintenance troops.
The 801st Ordnance Company started for Bastogne on 19 December. Five
miles from the town, the Germans ambushed them. The Allied command then
diverted the unit and placed it under VIII Corps’ control until 29 December.
Therefore, the division had no direct support maintenance or evacuation
capability until after the Allies broke the German encirclement.
More serious was the
supply situation. Convoying supplies to Bastogne on 19 December, the 426th
Quartermaster Company was ambushed and subsequently diverted to VIII Corps’
control until 27 December. The division was, in effect, without normal supply
operations during the entire period. Further complicating matters was the loss
of the division’s reconnaissance platoon on 22 December. The platoon had been
used to establish an anti-tank warning net and had called for and directed
field artillery fire to destroy German tanks. But on leading a cut-off artillery
battalion to safety at Neufchâteau, the platoon was isolated and would not
return until 28 December.
According to its
commander, the 326th Engineer Battalion might as well have been
among the missing. Its deployment around Bastogne was a classic case of misuse
through ignorance. Although the men set up a few roadblocks and prepared
several bridges for demolition, they were committed piecemeal as infantry early
in the battle rather than in their engineer-support role with the different
regiments. When promised infantry protection to accomplish engineer tasks, the
engineers frequently found themselves alone, unprotected, and exposed. Fighting
as infantry, they had no responsive, designated artillery support. Strangely,
no one used them in any way to prepare anti-tank obstacles.
Re-supply was the most
serious problem, which was exacerbated further by the absence of the 426th
Quartermaster Company. Soldiers could fight only as long as supplies of food,
ammunition, fuel, and equipment were available. Some food and medical supplies
were found in abandoned dumps in Bastogne, but most of the critical items had
to be brought in from the outside. After the German encirclement on the
twenty-first, aerial re-supply was the only way to accomplish this. The first
request for aerial re-supply was sent by the division on 20 December. The G4
maintained strict supply control and accountability and required and received
daily status reports from all units. Redistribution was accomplished as
needed. Despite all possible supply economy, the division could not hold out
without re-supply. On 23 December, the weather finally cleared, and 241 cargo
planes dropped supply bundles that gave the division new life. They contained
ammunition, rations, medical supplies, signal items, and gasoline.
Bolstered by this
re-supply and the knowledge that an American relief column was fighting its
way through to Bastogne, the soldiers of the 101st had reason to
feel optimistic. Succeeding re-supply drops on the 24th, 26th,
and 27th eased the supply difficulties considerably. With the linkup
of attacking American troops and a more stable supply situation, the 101st
could predict success. But the battle was not over. Weeks of hard fighting lay
ahead. Nevertheless, a light infantry division, complemented by key
attachments, especially artillery and anti-tank support, had stopped an
armor-heavy German corps. At the outset, no one would have dared expect such
success—no one, that is, but the men and their leaders who were given the
mission.
Conclusions
Assessing their actions at Bastogne, German
generals concluded that they had failed for a number of reasons. Poor terrain
and a restrictive road net had caused them to have disastrous traffic jams that
disrupted their timetable from the start. Moreover, they had no forces
available for traffic regulation. Poor weather favored a German advance until
23 December but created a thaw which kept German tanks bound to the roads.
After 23 December, Allied air superiority made any German advance difficult and
interdicted lines of communication, causing all logistical activities to be
slow and cumbersome. Supply depots could not be moved forward with the advance,
nor could fuel depots remain operational for long. Fighting under such circumstances
was an army whose leaders and soldiers were weary from six years of war.
Commanders doubted the feasibility of their mission, and after a small surge of
morale as the offensive kicked off, the already tired soldiers soon lost the
will to fight. Units were understrength in personnel and equipment, and there
were significant shortages in the officer and NCO ranks. Replacements for the
ground forces were not well trained, many having come from the naval and air
forces. Combined arms tactics were either nonexistent or uncoordinated.
The piecemeal German
attacks at Bastogne illustrated the deficiencies. American forces were allowed
time to react at each decisive sector where the Germans attacked, thus
preventing any serious breakthroughs. Continued refusal by Heeresgruppe and Fifth Panzer Army Headquarters to permit XLVII
Panzer Corps to concentrate all of its forces against Bastogne (obviously
influenced by Hitler’s insistence that the offensive continue) clearly saved
its gallant defenders from a horrible defeat. Sheer weight of forces would have
given the Germans control of Bastogne, if they were willing to pay the price in
casualties. But the German’s overall timetable was considered more important.
German generals also expressed grudging admiration for the Americans who
rapidly met the German offensive with strategic forces. The American tactic of
delaying through the use of successive positions was highlighted as was the
continuous artillery support made available to the infantry. The continuing
ability of American artillery units to fight was also cited. Proper credit was
given American leadership, which “played a very essential role by making the
proper tactical resolution with great flexibility and with equal rapidity
adopting all countermeasures and performing them with great energy and skill.”
Repeatedly cited was the brave determination of the men of the 101st
Airborne Division.
An in-depth analysis of
the Battle of Bastogne, focusing on the ability of a light division to defeat
heavier ones, leads to predictable conclusions. At Bastogne, well-coordinated
combined arms teams defeated uncoordinated armored and infantry forces committed
to an unrealistic plan. Results of isolated cases in which American infantry
fought German armored forces point out how important the attached package of
tanks and tank destroyers was to the 101st. Without them, even the
bravest of infantry actions would have been no match for the tanks. The
infantry, fighting alone, would have lost Bastogne early in the battle.
Coordinated German attacks in mass, rather than the small-unit attacks they
employed, might also have resulted in a decisive German victory over the 101st
and its attachments.
In the final equation,
moral strength, luck, and the “fog of war” must also be considered. The
Americans had advantages in all three of these categories. The right
combination of events and situations—conditions unfavorable to the Germans and
favorable to the Americans—produced the American victory at Bastogne. At
Bastogne, a light infantry division, properly augmented by good artillery and
armor support, was able to defeat a numerically superior and heavier opponent.
But the conditions of that victory were particular, not universal in
application.
Bibliography
Bayerlein, F. “Panzer Lehr Division (1 December 1944-26
January 1945).” Foreign Military Studies No. MS A-941. Historical Division,
U.S. Army, Europe, 1945.
Lüttwitz, Heinrich von.
“XLVII Panzer Corps—Ardennes.” Foreign Military Studies No. MS A-938.
Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1945.
—. “XLVII Panzer Corps
in the Ardennes Offensive.” Foreign Military Studies No. MS A-940. Historical
Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 27 February 1946.
—. “The Commitment of
the XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes, 1944-45.” Foreign Military Studies No.
MS A-939. Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, n.d.
Rapport, Leonard, and
Arthur Northwood. Rendezvous with
Destiny: A History of the 101st Airborne Division. Washington,
D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948.
Schramm, Percy Ernst.
“The Course of Events of the German Offensive in the Ardennes (16 December
1944-14 January 1945).” Foreign Military Studies No. MS A-858. Historical Division,
U.S. Army, Europe, 1945.
U.S. Army. 101st
Airborne Division. “History of the 101st Airborne Division,
1942-1964.” Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 1964. Mimeographed.
Wagener, Carl. “Fifth
Panzer Army (2 November 1944-16 January 1945).” Foreign Military Studies No.
MS B-235. Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1945.
—. “Main Reasons for the
Failure of the Ardennes Offensive.” Foreign Military Studies No. MS A-963.
Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, December 1945.
National
Archives Documents
Documents listed below are from 101st Airborne Division
records in the Report Files, 1941-54, of the Records of the Adjutant General’s
Office, 1917-, Record Group 407. File box numbers for documents are provided
when available.
Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood. “Interview Notes with General Patton
Concerning Ardennes Campaign.”
U.S. Army. 81st Airborne Anti-aircraft Battalion. “The 81st
Airborne Anti-aircraft Battalion of the 101st Airborne Division
Campaign History, 4 September 1942-11 September 1945.” Box 14379.
U.S. Army. 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment. “S-3 Journal,
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne
Division, 17 December 1944-26 February 1945.” Box 14445.
U.S. Army Ground Forces. Airborne Command. “101st Abn. Div.
Training Directive and Bulletin, 4 November 1942.” Fort Bragg, NC, 1942.
U.S. Army. 101st Airborne Division. “After Action Report,
Belgium and France, December 1944.” The many annexes to this basic
report exist as separate documents and are listed as follows:
—. Artillery Annex. “After Action Report, Belgium, France and Germany, 1
January 1945, Ardennes Campaign.”
—. Chief of Staff Annex. “After Action Report, Chief of Staff, 101st
Abn. Div., 17-27 December 1944.” Box 14378.
—. Unnumbered Annex. “After Action Report, 81st Abn. AA Bn.”
Box 14379.
—. Annex 3A. “Signal Officer After Action Report.” Box 14378.
—. Annex 4. “G-4 After Action Report, Admin. Orders and Journal.” Box
14377.
—. Annex 5. “Headquarters, and Headquarters Battery, 101st
Airborne Division Artillery.” Box 14389.
—. Annex 6. “327th Glider Infantry.” Box 14773.
—. Annex 10. “321st Glider F.A. Battalion.” 15 March 1945. Box 14403.
—. Annex 11. “377th Parachute F.A. Battalion.” 9 March 1945.
Box 14409.
—. Annex 12. “463rd Parachute F.A. Bn.” 9 March 1945. Box
14414.
—. Annex 15. “326th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 10 March
1945.” Box 14401.
—. Annex 16. “101st Airborne Signal Company.” Box 14448.
—. Annex 17. “326th Airborne Medical Company.” Box 14447.
—. Annex 18. “426th Airborne Quartermaster Company.” Box
14447.
—. Annex 19. “801st Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company.”
Box 14447.
—. Annex 20. “101st Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon.” Box
14399.
U.S. Army. 101st Airborne Division. “G-3 Operational
Memorandums [Nos.] 10, 23, 24, 27, [dated] 22 May 1944.” Box 14376.
—. Miscellaneous journals and files, 18 December 1944-April 1945. Box
14388.
—. “101st Abn. Div. G-2 Periodic Reports, 19-31 December
1944.”
—.“Report on Air Re-supply to 101st Airborne Division at
Bastogne, 11 January 1945.”
U.S. Army. 327th Glider Infantry Regiment. “Unit History—327th
Glider Infantry Regiment, 1942-1945. Battle Summary.”
The Author
Colonel Ralph M. Mitchell wrote this special
study while he was a student at the United States Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania. A graduate of the United States Military Academy, he
received a master’s degree in history from Rice University, Houston, Texas. He
also had a tour of duty as an instructor and assistant professor of military
history at West Point. A field artilleryman, he has had numerous command and
staff assignments and including command of the 1st Battalion, 11th
Field Artillery. His combat service has included one tour in the Dominican
Republic and two tours in Vietnam. In July 1984, Mitchell became Director,
Strategic Military Studies, Department of Corresponding Studies, United States
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
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| Map 1: Troop dispositions before the German advance. |
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| Map 2: The road and rail configuration, Bastogne area. |
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| Map 3: The German plan for the Ardennes offensive, December 1944. |
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| Map 4: Situation, 19 December 1944. |
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| Map 5: Situation, 20 December 1944. |
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| Map 6: Situation, 21 December 1944. |
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| Map 7: Situation, 22 December 1944. |
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| Map 8: Situation, 23 December 1944. |
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| Map 9: Situation, 24 December 1944. |
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| Map 10: Situation, 25 December 1944. |
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| Map 11: Situation, 26 December 1944. |
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| "Medics Moving in Near Bastogne / Relief Station at Bastogne". Painting by Olin Dows, Hemroulle, Belgium, 1945. |
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| "Message Center, 101st Airborne Division". Painting by Olin Dows, Bastogne, Belgium, 1945. |
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| "The Monastary Courtyard". Painting by Olin Dows, Bastogne, Belgium, 1945. |
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| "Main Street". Painting by Olin Dows, Bastogne, Belgium, 1945. |
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| Refugees evacuate the Belgian town of Bastogne while American troops hold the town against the power thrusts by the Germans. |
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| M4 Medium Tank, 101st Airborne Division, Bastogne, Belgium, December 1944. |
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| Adam H. Davis and Milford A. Sillars of 110th Regiment, part of the “Battered Bastards of Bastogne,” taking a break during the eight-day German siege. Bastogne, 19 December 1944. |
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| Manning a .50-cal. machine gun, Bastogne, Belgium. |
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| U.S. troops of the 28th Infantry Division, who have been regrouped in security platoons for defense of Bastogne, Belgium, march down a street. Some of these soldiers lost their weapons during the German advance in this area. Bastogne, Belgium. 20 December 1944. |
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| Casualties in an improvised emergency ward during the siege of Bastogne. |
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| M18 Gun Motor Carriage “Hellcat,” near Bastogne, Belgium. |
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| Members of the 101st Airborne Division walk past dead comrades, killed during the Christmas Eve bombing of Bastogne, Belgium, the town in which this division was besieged for ten days. |
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| A Bastogne street after Luftwaffe bombardment. |
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| The 101st prepare for another attack by the Germans. |
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| The members of the 101st Airborne Division, right, are on guard for enemy tanks, on the road leading to Bastogne, Belgium. They are armed with bazookas. 23 December 1944. |
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| The pathfinder unit of the 101st Airborne Division, dropped by parachute, sets up radar equipment near Bastogne to guide planes with medical supplies and ammunition to the division, besieged by the Germans. December 23, 1944. |
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| German soldiers who attempted to storm the 101st Airborne command post in Bastogne, Belgium, lie dead on the ground after they were mowed down by American machine gun fire. The tanks, behind which they were advancing, were knocked out also. This photo was taken while Bastogne was still under seige. 25 December 1944. |
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| 101st Airborne Division troops watch as C-47s drop supplies over Bastogne, 26 December 1944. |
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| 101st Airborne troops picking up air-dropped supplies during the siege. |
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| Infantrymen, attached to the 4th Armored Division, fire at German troops, in the American advance to relieve the pressure on surrounded airborne troops in Bastogne. 27 December 1944. |
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| 44th Armored Infantry and 6th Armored Division tanks near Bastogne, 31 December 1944. |
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| The 101st Airborne troops move out of Bastogne, after having been besieged there for ten days, to drive the enemy out of the surrounding district. Belgium. 31 December 1944. |
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| German prisoners of war dig graves for members of the 101st Airborne Division who were killed defending Bastogne against the Germans. |
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| T/Sgt. Harry A. Downard, San Diego, California, Signal Corps Photographer, holds up leather thong which was used to tie the legs and coat of this paratrooper 101st Airborne Division, who was killed near Bastogne, Belgium. 12 January 1945. |
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| General Patton's jeep in Bastogne, 1 January 1945. |
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| Members of C Company, 9th Engineers, conduct a memorial service for those killed during the siege, 22 January 1945. |
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| This dead GI was felled while fighting with fellow soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division, to drive Germans from a heavily wooded area near Bastogne, Belgium, where Germans were entrenched. 10 January 1945. |
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| German 7.5cm anti-tank gun, near Bastogne, Belgium. |
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| Letter from General McAuliffe on Christmas Day to the 101st Airborne troops defending Bastogne. |
