War Tails: American Dogs at War

Insignia of USMC Dog Handlers. Red dog’s head on yellow disc, on red field with white stars; “FMF-PAC” white lettering on red field; white eagle’s head with red outlining and wings; all on yellow background with red edging.

by Salvatore J. Stazzone

Late in 1943, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, journeyed to the Italian front to meet a most unusual GI. This soldier’s exploits in French Morocco and Sicily had earned him the Silver Star, Purple Heart and Distinguished Service Cross, promotion to Private First Class and recognition as a national war hero. Yet, this crafty veteran of Fedala, Blue Beach and several other fierce military encounters stood a mere twenty inches high, weighed about seventy pounds and was only four years old. Remarkably, Eisenhower had traveled to one of the world’s most dangerous battle zones to personally congratulate and pet Pfc. Chips, a powerfully-built mongrel war dog of the United States K-9 Corps.

During World War II, tens of thousands of dogs aided the war effort in a potpourri of fields. Dogs patrolled our coastal beaches and boundaries; guarded government buildings, reservoirs, production plants, airfields, and shipyards; searched for anti-­personnel and anti-tank mines; carried messages, mail, ammunition, medical supplies and communications equipment; sniffed out smoke­less powder and dynamite; and served in front line and forward patrol units in every war theater.

These ‘devil dogs,’ ‘Wags,’ and ‘K-9s’ found niches within each of this nation’s military branches, with each service aiming to induct whelps with those particular traits and physiques best suited to enhance the human elements within those branches.

The Navy sought out those breeds best suited to the unique needs of Marine Corps invaders frantically dashing into enemy-infested jungle terrain within seconds. The Coast Guard grabbed medium-sized dowsers with penchants for sand and salt water to patrol our coastline from Long Island Sound to Tacoma, Washington. The Army, well, the Army just took and took and took. By December 1945, Army records revealed that Airedales, Belgian Shepherds, Friads, Chesapeake Bay Dogs, Collies, Dalmatians, Doberman Pinschers, Huskies, Labrador Retrievers, Malamutes, French Poodles, Pointers, Newfoundlands, Setters, Great Danes, Great Pyrenees, and St. Bernards had all been a part of the U.S. Army K-9 Corps.

Actually, the U.S. was the last of the major powers to mobilize its dog population. Germany had over 200,000 police and military dogs available by 1939. By the beginning of World War II, Hitler’s war machine was so overstocked with canines that over 20,000 dogs were sent to Japan, in 1940, as a gift. Many of these same animals were used by the Japanese in the invasion and conquest of British-held Hong Kong and Malaysia. The Soviet Union produced over 100,000 so-called ‘demolition dogs’ capable of carrying dynamite into the paths of onrushing enemy tanks. When the Germans unexpectedly overwhelmed Soviet positions around Pavlograd, the Soviets lost a huge kennel complex and over 25,000 of their unique dogs. Even lesser powers such as Finland and Canada had formidable dog armies adept at patrol, messenger and rescue work, and peaceful Switzerland employed hundreds of dog sentries in its efforts to maintain an efficient and internationally-respected neutrality.

But there had never been a canine tradition within any of our service branches and no provisions for the procurement and training of dogs by our armed forces existed as late as eight months after Pearl Harbor. It was not until 17 August 1942 that a belated, almost desperate canine mobilization was announced by the U.S. War Department. Within weeks several massive advanced training centers went into action under the supervision of the Department of Remount Services (Quartermaster Corps). From Front Royal, Virginia to Fort Robinson, Nebraska, over a thousand dog-training specialists began graduating the first elements of the K-9 Corps. By January 1943, 5,000 dogs a month were heading overseas. But the war dog program did have critics and they began to make them­selves heard as the first war dog platoons entered North Africa.

The U.S. Army had taken its lumps from Rommel’s Afrika Korps, in the vast desert expanse of Tunisia, in March 1943. The tank disaster of Sidi bou Zid was the talk of the Congress and the shame of the nation. In this atmosphere of crisis and concern, many questioned the value of dogs in a battle zone dominated by armor-plated panzers, Stukas and lightning desert tactics.

While the critics sounded off, the nation’s war dog supporters saw to it that a constant stream of dogs and dollars reached the Quartermaster Corps, and its supporting agencies. The premier dog procurement organization of the civilian sector, Dogs for Defense (DFD), functioned as such a capable adjunct to the Quarter­master Corps that not one cent of government funds was ever spent for the processing of dog camp candidates.

American dog owners volunteered their pets in such numbers that huge waiting lists were posted at all dog training centers. Professional dogdom staged a nationwide series of dog show benefits for the war dog program. The ultimate fund-raiser occurred in February 1943, when the 67th Westminster Kennel Club show at Madison Square Garden, New York, donated its entire purse to the cause of war dog procurement. Nornay Saddler, a black-and-white fox terrier with over fifty-six best-of-show titles and some twenty champion offspring to his credit, made the headlines when his owner donated all of Nornay’s earnings from dog show purses, stud fees and dog food testimonials, over $10,000, to war charities.

With the creation of the Civilian Canine Corps early in 1943, even 4-F dogs had an opportunity to aid the war effort. With millions of disappointed, public-spirited and jealous owners of 4-F pooches searching for alternative methods of participation in the war dog program, the CCC offered 4-F dogs honorary military rank in return for modest financial contributions. A dollar donated to the CCC gave the contributor’s dog the rating of Private. A $100 donation obtained the rank of General and if the contributor was an ‘old salt,’ the equivalent rank of Admiral was bestowed. The initial response to the Civilian Canine Corps was phenomenal with over ninety percent of the dog owners approached enlisting their pets in the honorary organization.

So much depended upon the actions, sacrifices and morale of the American dog owner, that in April 1943 Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau offered a public apology to the country for allowing a war bond drive advertisement to feature the caricature of a Hitler-faced Dachshund. The war dog lobby was demonstrating its muscle.

In the months that followed the Morgenthau incident, the topography of the war theaters began to change. In the Mediterranean, Americans were sweeping across the heavily wooded Sicilian country­side; in the Pacific, Marines were hitting small island beaches which led to thick jungle terrain. The dogs of war were about to make a name for themselves.

First reports were sketchy and only a few paragraphs in length. As early as January 1943, short press releases were relating nondescript and incomplete stories of Hawaiian-trained dogs dis­rupting Japanese sniper activity in the Solomon islands.

By the summer of 1943, more and more newspaper reports were telling of the achievements of Army war dogs and this time the dispatches were coming from Europe. In Sicily, dogs were taking part in amphibious landings, escorting front-line troops into combat and serving with forward patrol units.

In November 1943, Marine dogs finally broke into the combat picture. At Bougainville in the South Pacific, an entire dog platoon, twenty-four dogs and fifty-five enlisted men, stormed ashore in the first wave. One member of that historic platoon, a Shepherd named Caesar, was credited with delivering vital messages to Marine units which had been cut off by Japanese troops during critical moments of the battle. Caesar performed this hazardous service over nine times, although wounded by mortar fire. Photos of Caesar being carried to the rear on a stretcher by two Marine buddies turned him into a celebrity and did much to convince people at home that dogs could be trusted under the worst of combat conditions.

As 1944 began, the dog was a wartime reality and when the K-9 Corps announced the acceptance of a musical composition written by the Dog Editor of the New York Sun as its official marching song, it came as no surprise that the lyrics spoke of dogs in battle:

From the kennels of our country,

From the Homes and firesides too,

We have joined the canine army,

Our nation’s work to do.

*

We serve with men in battle,

And scout thru jungles dense;

We are proud to be enlisted

In the cause of The Dogs for Defense.

Throughout the war, field commanders entered episodes of canine heroism into official military logs. Dogs were cited for bravery in hundreds of War Department reports and at least twenty-five dogs received formal documents attesting to their extraordinary feats of individual bravery.

The commanding American officer at Cape Gloucester reported to his superiors, “… there was not a single instance when a patrol led by a war dog failed to accomplish a mission, nor was there an instance when a patrol led by a war dog was fired upon first or suffered casualties.”

The war dog had found his niche. As a scout attached to front-line or forward patrol troops, he was a mechanism which prevented ambush, surprise and disaster. His keen sense of smell and acutely sensitive ears detected unusual odors and distant sounds. Patrols that used dogs covered more ground and suffered fewer casualties than dogless counterparts. This exceedingly dangerous job turned many dogs into fatality statistics.

Wolf, attached to the 27th Infantry Division, in the Pacific, was one such statistic. Alerting his squad to the presence of an overwhelming enemy force, his detachment had enough time to set up a perimeter. Although critically wounded by exploding shells, Wolf led his squad safely around and away from the enemy. Wolf died that same day despite immediate surgery and devote prayer and the hero’s owners back home received the following message from the War Department:

It is with deep regret that I write to you of the death of Wolf, donated by you for use in connection with the Armed Forces of the United States. It is hoped that the knowledge that this brave dog was killed in the service of our country will mitigate the regret occasioned by the news of his death.

Such telegrams were a daily burden to all too many dog lovers throughout the war years.

The war dog program had its lighter moments as well. One dog in Tunisia dropped nine puppies during an air raid and was promptly shipped home by an embarrassed division commander. At the famous Sicilian encounter between Gen. Eisenhower and Pfc. Chips, any doubts about the dog’s courage were permanently dispelled when Chips ended the meeting by biting Eisenhower’s hand. Andy, a Marine Doberman, was a real ‘chow hound.’ He would stand on the mess line with the rest of his squad, patiently holding a combat helmet between his teeth. When his turn came, the messmen would drop Andy’s rations into his helmet and the Doberman would quietly walk over to the nearest foxhole and eat his meal just like any other GI. Sinbad, a Coast Guard dog that served in the North Atlantic for the duration, had unique appetites even for a war dog. He was acknowledged to have run up bar tabs in several ports-of-call and was officially banned from taking shore leave whenever in Greenland because of his reputation as a nasty sheep-chaser.

As the war rolled to a conclusion in 1945, dog owners who had volunteered their animals for war duty wondered if their former pets could ever again adjust to civilian life. It was a question for which there was no immediate answer.

War dogs had received six rugged weeks of basic training. They had been gassed, shot at, cursed, clubbed, threatened by strangers, walked through fire, smoke and chemical irritants, taught to be suspicious of anyone not wearing a U.S. military uniform and trained to attack on command. Additionally, many dogs had seen over two years combat. Fearing that dog veterans could never return to the domestic existence they had once known, hundreds of returning war dogs were never claimed by their former owners.

Uncle Sam did not abandon these vets. The War Department began a nationwide publicity campaign highlighting the strict depro­gramming techniques used to prepare soon to be discharged dogs for civilian life. Again they received obedience training. They had their service records checked for ‘idiosyncrasies.’ They were allowed play periods with street dogs and placed near civilians under carefully monitored conditions. Confusion tests were arranged and several days of exploding firecrackers, screaming strangers and discharging pistols were used to gauge temperaments. Finally, trainers placed their hands and arms into the animals’ mouths as the ultimate temptation. It took stable dogs to meet such strict discharge requirements. Tens of thousands of war dogs readjusted. Abandoned dogs were placed with new owners after a careful screening. Some dogs did turn neurotic, the number being kept secret. But one discharge worker summed it all up when he offered: “Dogs are the same as people. Those who came in mean left mean.”

On 11 December 1945, Chips, the hero of the invasion of Sicily, returned to his master’s home in Pleasantville, New York, accompanied on his train trip home by an entourage of reporters and photographers. Chips recognized his former masters quickly and it was reliably reported that the frisky mongrel started his domestic career with a quiet nap. Chips lived out his days with the Wren family, a five member household, without incident and quickly faded from prominence.

Early in 1946, major military personnel announced the beginning of a ‘career dogs’ program within the service branches. No better proof than that was needed; the dog had ‘made good’ in the military.

 

General Eisenhower’s meeting with “Chips,” the hero war dog of Fedala and Blue Beach, Sicily, in Italy on 22 October 1943. This canine hero was awarded the Purple Heart for wounds received for attacking and silencing a German machine gun nest. “Chips” was promoted to Pfc. He is being held by his combat trainer, Pvt. Louis Kearns.

“Caesar,” a German shepherd dog, is carried back from the front lines in a litter by two Marines after he was wounded in action on Bougainville.

 
Dressings cover wounds on the flank and side of Caesar as he rests after treatment. The dog was one of three used by the Marines to hunt out Japanese in the jungle and was the first reported wounded.

AWPD-1: Targeting for Victory: The Rationale Behind Strategic Bombing Objectives in America’s First Air War Plan

by C1C Steven A. Parker, USAFA

On 9 July 1941 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sent letters to the secretary of war and the secretary of the Navy asking for “an estimate of the ‘overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies.’” Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate note that, “within the War Department, responsibility for giving effect to the President’s directive … devolved upon the War Plans Division.” Within the air arm, it fell to the newly created Air War Plans Division. On the morning of 3 August 1941, the division—less than four weeks old at the time—set out to create what would become a blueprint for the American air campaign in the approaching war with Germany. This document would be known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1 (AWPD-1).

According to Craven and Cate, “actual authorship of a military document is seldom known.” This fact was especially apparent in the development of AWPD-1, since “a number of officers from the several staff agencies of the AAF [Army Air Forces] … contributed information which went into AWPD/I.” In the end, however, the creative genius of four individuals was primarily responsible for AWPD-1. Barry D. Watts writes that the “theory of precision bombardment … called for identification, by scientific analysis, of those key links in the enemy’s economy whose elimination would either cripple his capacity to wage war or else shatter his will to continue fighting.” In constructing the war plan, the four men drew upon years of doctrinal analysis and theoretical application of the principles of war, relying heavily upon their years of instruction and education at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama. Donald Wilson notes that the key concept taught at the school was that a nation’s ability to pursue war “would depend on maintaining intact a closely-knit and interdependent industrial fabric.” Precision bombing, however, could destroy this fabric. By concentrating Allied bombing against objectives vital to the German war effort and the German people’s livelihood. AWPD-1’s planners aimed to accomplish the primary goal of any war—to defeat the enemy by breaking his will to fight. To accomplish this goal in the simplest and most efficient manner, Allied bombers were tasked with destroying the enemy’s forces before they deployed into the field. AWPD-1’s developers sought to destroy Company’s capability to fight by attacking it at the home front and in doing so, wreck the country’s will to resist. These efforts contributed to shaping the general nature of Air Force thinking for years to come.

General Henry “Hap” Arnold, chief of the Air Corps at the time of AWPD-l’s conception and—after March 1942—commanding general of the AAF, “had chosen wisely in selecting Harold George to head the new Air War Plans Division of the Air Staff.” George possessed an extensive background in air power, and years of instruction at ACT’S gave him the experience required to lead the Air War Plans Division in the development of a sound war plan. In addition, Colonel George had testified at the 1925 Morrow hearings, which covered the force requirements of the US Army Air Service in detail. At this point in his career, he had developed a great deal of knowledge on aircraft capabilities and Air Corps constraints.

George was pleased to find that he would be working with Lt Col Kenneth Walker, who a taught George at ACTS. Walker served as a bombardment instructor at the school, and during his stay he coined the “rallying cry” of the entire bombardment division: “A well planned and well organized air attack once launched cannot be stopped.” This motto became the “creed of the bomber,” and the doctrine it represented was largely inspired by Colonel Walker.

Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., recalls his introduction to the project: “The day following his assignment as Chief of the Air War Plans Division George learned that I, who was then in General Arnold’s Intelligence Division, had just returned from England where I had been in contact with officers of the Intelligence Group of the Royal Air Force.” General Arnold wasted no time in having Hansell transferred to the Air War Plans Division. James C. Gaston notes that Hansell, whose contributions to AWPD-1 were tremendous, had gathered “intelligence about the economic-industrial systems and air forces of foreign powers.” This allowed him to coordinate targets, based on his own familiarity with the general pattern and potential of various industrial components. He combined this knowledge with the practical information that he had obtained through British Intelligence to provide insight into the specific nature of the German economy.

Maj Laurence Kuter, another graduate of ACTS, was an the faculty with Hansell. Gaston points out that Kuter had worked extensively with the “first major expansion of the Air Corps into a force for hemispheric defense,” and his vast experience qualified him to develop similar plans utilized in AWPD-1.

The four men worked well together. They had to, since they had only nine days to accomplish their mission. “We had one definite asset going for us,” stated Hansell in his memoirs. “We had spent years together as instructors in Bombardment and Air Force at the Air Corps Tactical School. We embraced a common concept of air warfare and we spoke a common language.” Years of studying and preaching the doctrine of precision bombing came to a climax in August of 1941 when General Arnold tasked these four men to develop a war plan. Kuter later commented that “when the time for critical decision arrived the American concept [of air warfare] was wholly endorsed, completely accepted, and officially implemented in the approval of a paper entitled ‘AWPD-1.’”

“Strategic plans involve, of course, a constant accommodation between desires and capabilities,” Hansell noted.” AWPD-1 was the result of numerous struggles between such desires and capabilities, and the first step was to examine overall conditions in Germany. At the time of AWPD-1’s conception, over 8 million men served in the German military. An additional 8.5 million were estimated to work in armaments works alone, with over half of them in the steel industry. In all, nearly 17 million people supported the German war effort—not including civil pursuits and production—and the perceived result was a tremendous drain on the social and economic structure of the nation. The most effective method of waging war against Germany appeared to be by destroying this inner structure and thereby breaking down the country’s capacity to wage war. As George had stated in a lecture at ACTS, “There is one thing certain: air power has given to the world a means whereby the heart of a nation can be attacked at once without first having to wage an exhaustive war at the nation’s frontiers.” Germany had to be destroyed from the inside so that the outer walls would crumble, and the first step in planning was to determine a list of targets within the heart of the nation that would bring about the desired collapse.

The target selection process used in AWPD-1 evaluated four possible options to accomplish the air mission in Europe. These options included, in order of priority, the disruption of a major portion of Germany’s electric power system, the disruption of the German transportation system, the destruction of German on and petroleum systems, and the undermining of German morale by air attack on civil concentrations. A list of intermediate options was cited that would be used to improve the chances of success against the major objectives. These options included the neutralization of the German Air Force and diversionary bombing attacks. These targets would continue as appropriate bomber objectives in the final phase of warfare if invasion became necessary. In this case, additional targets of opportunity in the combat zone and battlefield proper would be added according to the situation, since selecting such targets would not be feasible during the drafting of the basic plan.

The air war planners placed German electric power at the top of the list on the basis of current intelligence information. At the time of the plan’s conception, the German electric system was the second largest in the world, and it expanded considerably for the war. Initially, the system’s output was adequate to maintain German productivity. But as mobilization increased—especially after 1939—power shortages became serious enough to force the rationing of electric power to homes and industries nationwide. Electric power affected every production aspect of the war—from aircraft manufacture to urban transportation—and it was closely integrated into a “power grid” that, if destroyed, would theoretically isolate principal manufacturing and population centers from their sources of electric energy.

Capt Robert Webster, an instructor at ACTS during the 1936-37 school year, had noted the importance of electric power to an advanced industrial nation. Basing his assessments on research he had done on the electric structure of New York City, Webster concluded that approximately one-tenth of the people in the United States depended daily on the electric power provided by 20 power plants in New York. At the cost of one accurately dropped bomb on each of these potential targets, 90 percent of the power in the city would be destroyed, causing its immediate evacuation. By comparing this information with what was known about the German electric system of the time, Webster demonstrated the advantage of destroying this potential target. Estimates at the time predicted that 20 percent of German electricity was produced at Leipzig, 20 percent in the Ruhr, and 20 percent in southwest Germany. Two-thirds of the entire output was located somewhere in the range of 45 targets. 

In December 1942 General Arnold issued a directive to the director of management services to have a group of operational analysis submit a report “analyzing the rate of progressive deterioration that could be anticipated in the German war effort as a result of the increasing air operations we are prepared to employ against its sustaining sources.” The resulting committee of operations analysts (COA) reevaluated what George and his staff had painstakingly developed.

The target systems most carefully considered by the COA closely resembled those of AWPD-1 and its successor, AWPD-42. However, some significant differences existed between the COA’s target selection list and the list that George and his crew had developed in AWPD-1. Hansell points out that Germany’s electric power system became 13th in priority. According to Hansell, this shift of priorities constituted “one of the tragic mistakes of the war.” He speculates that two possible motives contributed to this change: the COA had determined that attacking German electric power systems would have no effect on setting a date for the invasion of Europe, or available forces did not have the “operational capability” to destroy the targets. Hansell’s treatment of the subject in the years following the war indicates that the civilian analysts and intelligence personnel operated out of their proper province in making such a decision. He contends that military operations analysts—who had already evaluated the force’s capability to destroy each target system—should have made the final targeting decisions.

The second-priority target in AWPD-1 was the German transportation system. George noted that the selection of transportation systems as a target came from the realization that “the trend in modern nations has been towards industry and agriculture, which makes for large territories which are not self-supporting.” Mobilization highlighted the interdependency between the city dweller and rural communities. By cutting off the vital lines of transportation, Allied forces could apparently eliminate an important source of economic stability and military strength, and tax the enemy’s will to wage war.

AWPD-1 divided the transportation system into three main components. Railroad operations took up 72 percent of the total, and waterways and long-haul truckage took up 25 percent and 3 percent, respectively. One of the key factors in choosing transportation targets was that the railroad systems were already operating at maximum capability, so they could not handle any excess requirements in the event of breakdown in any of the other areas.

Railroads appeared to be profitable strategic targets for several reasons. The majority of the railroads served the Ruhr, which possessed 70 percent of the nation’s steel industry. Bombers could therefore restrict their operations to a smaller area, thus performing the majority of attacks with optimal results. Additionally, an estimated eight marshaling yards handled all of the traffic to the Ruhr, and these potential targets were only 350 miles from Great Britain. The railroad targets, however, were more easily repaired than other targets. This factor meant that Allied forces would have to make repeated attacks.

Inland waterways were essential to German transportation as well, since they carried what the railroads could not handle. The locks and ships chosen by the air-war planners were precision targets, as opposed to the area targets represented by the railroads. But their destruction—unlike the destruction of the railroads—would have a relatively permanent effect on the German transportation system due to the increased amount of time required to return them to operation.

Total destruction of the transportation system would sever Germany from the rest of Europe, leaving only its own inadequate supplies of foodstuffs, raw materials, and the- like. Forty-seven targets were chosen in AWPD-1 to accomplish this task, and their selection highlighted the fact that two-thirds of Germany’s iron ore arrived from external sources. Transportation remained a primary target throughout the development of an American air strategy, and—to many observers—this choice of targets appeared to deliver the decisive blow to the German economy.

AWPD-1 listed synthetic on as the third priority target system. The effects of a decisive attack on the petroleum-producing industries of an enemy nation seemed obvious. Without petroleum, planes could not fly, tanks could not roll, and a good percentage of the transportation of vital war materiel could not occur. Essentially, all German forces were dependent on oil, and its destruction would render helpless an industrialized nation waging total war.

Oil and petroleum products were promising bombardment targets from the start. Approximately 60 percent of Germany’s aviation gas was synthetic, and 60 percent of this total came from 27 plants located 400 to 1,000 miles from Great Britain. Twenty-two percent of its aviation gas came from Romania, delivered by water transportation up the Danube. In fact, well over 50 percent of Germany’s imports came directly from Ploesti. Therefore, the destruction of all the synthetic plants in Germany would not have the required effect on the nation’s war effort unless the Allied forces destroyed the oil refineries at Ploesti as well. Twenty-six plants producing approximately 70 percent of the Nazis’ aviation gas were within Germany. Because they were fairly deep within the country and were precise, small targets, they would be hard to destroy. However, they seemed to be essential targets, so their priority never substantially changed throughout the bombing offensive.

AWPD-1’s planners had assumed that the oil-producing targets would be difficult to replace, but they were mistaken. The Germans rebuilt oil refineries and put them back in operation in less time than the six months estimated in the war plan, so repeated attacks were necessary to assure effectiveness.

The effects of the Allied attack on the petroleum and on industry were more pronounced in the latter stages of the war. One instance of the Germans’ suffering noticeably from this lack of oil occurred on 3 March 1945, when the Germans counterattacked the Soviet forces in western Hungary. Donald W. Treadgold relates that “the blow was … spearheaded by the German Sixth SS Panzer Army, which had led the thrust into the Ardennes. The Germans broke through the Soviet front … and came near to reaching the Danube. However, as in the Ardennes offensive, the tanks ran out of gasoline, and by the middle of March the Nazi salient was eliminated.”

The fourth priority listed in AWPD-1 was to undermine German morale by air attack on civil concentrations. This aim coincided with the prime directive of the war, which was to defeat the enemy by destroying his will to fight. However, it did not go along with the basic concepts taught at ACTS and, therefore, was never actually applied in the American bombing campaign. Although in several instances civilian populations were devastated by inaccurate bomb drops, German civilians were never directly targeted by American bombing attacks. From the beginning, war planners at ACTS considered attacks on morale targets risky, since the accepted theory held that only massive, sudden, and unheralded attacks would have any effect on civilian morale, “Piecemeal” attacks would only temporarily dull the enemy’s morale and, in the long run, might actually help build up resistance. AWPD-1, therefore, never established a specific number of targets but stated that the best course of action would be to wait until the proper psychological conditions existed and then divert the entire bombing effort to the purpose.

The secondary targets proposed to assist in accomplishing the main efforts of the bombing campaign concentrated on neutralizing the German Air Force. Hansell notes that planners considered the German Air Force a primary target throughout the entire planning phase, even though AWPD-1 officially listed “the German fighter force as an intermediate objective carrying ‘overriding priority.’” This category included aircraft factories, aluminum plants, magnesium plants, and engine factories in both AWPD-1 and AWPD-42, but the COA eliminated magnesium and aluminum plants in the list of priorities used to develop the combined bomber offensive. Hansell acknowledged that AWPD-1’s drafters based their strategic thinking on the “growing experience with the fighting capability and strength of the German Air Force, coupled with knowledge gained from covert sources of the expansion program being undertaken in the construction of German fighters.” This type of thinking led to the emphasis on attacking the enemy air force.

The German combat estimate of 1 September 1939 did not present exact figures on the production capacity of aircraft industries in Germany, but estimates based on the previous year’s output established that Germany could produce between 9,000 and 10,000 military and commercial airplanes in 1939. Additionally, in case of an emergency, aircraft factories could produce an additional 1,500 complete aircraft and attain a monthly rate of 5,000 per month six months after the emergency, and 6,000 per month after a year. These estimates clearly indicated the Allied need to concentrate on aircraft factories within the German homeland. Although most of the known assembly plants were well dispersed, some of the older plants used to assemble aircraft were well known and located only 500 to 700 miles from Great Britain. The total number of targets was not readily available, but AWPD-1 designated 18 of the principal known assembly plants as prime targets.

Overall, the German Air Force did not present a very promising target at the outbreak of hostilities. Nevertheless, its elimination was essential to achieve numerous other objectives, such as clearing the way for an eventual land invasion. AWPD-1 estimated that there were approximately 500 bases in west Germany and the occupied territories that were provided with “exceptionally strong light flak defenses.” The plan assumed that the Germans had dispersed the aircraft—generally about a mile from the landing areas for the bombers—and provided each airplane with individual protection in the form of a revetment and concrete taxiways, with the entire system carefully camouflaged. Regardless, air-war planners consistently considered the German Air Force a primary target of opportunity whenever possible.

AWPD-1 listed diversionary bombing attacks as secondary missions that could assist in accomplishing the main efforts of the bombing campaign. These alternatives included attacking such targets as submarine bases, surface seacraft, and assorted “invasion” bases. In the end, however, the planners decided that diversionary attacks would best be left to other Allied powers, such as Great Britain. This decision went along with doctrine taught at ACTS. In a speech on “The Principle of Objective.” Hansell stated that the selected targets should make the maximum contribution toward the purpose of the offensive. The advantage of using an offensive doctrine was that it kept an offensive force from wasting time on targets that did not contribute directly to the war effort. It also ensured against neglecting more fruitful targets because of a hasty conclusion or inference suggesting that a particular mission could not be accomplished. Offensive doctrine also supported a conclusion made by the COA during the war, which stated that optimal results could be obtained by causing a high degree of destruction in a few really essential industries or services rather than causing a small degree of destruction in many industries.

A good portion of the theory that went into the development of AWPD-1 came from observation of industries deemed important in time of war. Hansell’s description of how observations on the home front during peacetime helped set the pattern for US strategic doctrine throughout the war shows this factor clearly:

We discovered one day that we were taking delivery on new airplanes, flying them to their points of reception, removing the propellers back to the factories and ferrying out additional airplanes. The delivery of controllable pitch propellers had fallen down. Inquiries showed that the propeller manufacturer was not behind schedule. Actually, it was a relatively simple, but highly specialized spring that was lacking, and we found that all the springs made for all the controllable pitch propellers of that variety in the U.S. came from one plant and that that plant in Pittsburgh had suffered from a flood.

This observation led Hansell and the other planners to conclude that the loss of one specialized item, such as the spring, could have a tremendous effect on industrial output in time of war and could ground airplanes just as effectively as if enemy forces had shot them up or if enemy bombs had destroyed the factories.

Hansell notes that, “by the end of the war, the U.S. Air Forces had flown 755,000 bomber sorties and dropped some 1,410,000 tons of bombs. “Almost half of this tonnage fell “on the selected targets of the combined bomber offensive.” This total was greater than the estimates in AWPD-1 for a number of reasons. For one, the developers of AWPD-1 overestimated the effect of bomb damage and underestimated the Germans’ ability to repair damaged targets. German fighters, antiaircraft artillery, and weather complications impaired bombing accuracy as well. Craven and Cate report, however, that “the selection of target objectives was almost identical with that suggested by the postwar analysis of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey—which is to say that, if the analysis was well founded, the program suggested in 1941 was more realistic than that which was later followed.”

Hindsight shows clearly that several other flaws existed in the plan. Actual experience proved that the forces allocated for strategic defense in the Pacific were inadequate and those for hemispheric defense too abundant. The assumed ability of air power alone to defeat Germany proved unfounded as well. However, when viewing AWPD-1 solely as a guide for the strategic bombing of Germany, one must concede that it is a remarkable document. And, if the planners had more accurately predicted the Allies’ future ability to develop escort fighters, the document could have been even more successful.

AWPD-1’s success is often gauged in terms of how well it worked under the circumstances of World War II, but it can also be gauged in terms of the effects that it had on current Air Force doctrine. Transposing the effects of conventional strategic air warfare against Nazi Germany into today’s environment is not easy, but modern strategists can learn a number of lessons from such a comparison. Today’s environment is, of course, highlighted by the presence of advanced nuclear weapons, and the Air Force has modified its strategic bombing plans to accommodate this fact. However, if the United States were faced with selecting a new set of targets to be destroyed by conventional means, the doctrine used in AWPD-1 would be extremely useful in determining the requirements for such a modern air-war plan. And, with the presence of such factors as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the growing pressure for mutual nuclear disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union, such a comparison might prove more than just an item of passing interest.

The supporting structure of the Soviet Union is by no means identical to that of Nazi Germany, but its reliance upon major industrial systems—such as electric power, transportation, fuel sources, and certain arsenals and factories—is at least similar. So it is conceivable that, by using current aircraft and contemporary bombs, modern air-war planners could develop a conventional strategic bombing campaign against the Soviet Union that would closely resemble AWPD-1 in its basic structure. The difference of most significance, of course, would be the massive Soviet air defense. But, putting aside the numerous details and statistics that separate the two scenarios, one must acknowledge the basic fact that eliminating the enemy’s will to fight is the key to winning any war. And AWPD-1’s basic doctrine rests on that principle.

The Army Air Forces’ official historians, in discussing the genesis of AWPD-1, noted that “it was not an American tradition to enter a war with a carefully conceived strategic concept. For once, in this respect, the nation was prepared.” And, even though AWPD-1 was never intended to be put to the test as early as it was, the unpredicted attack on Pearl Harbor forced the plan into a position where its viability was soon proven. Fortunately, years of research and the establishment of sound doctrine by men such as Harold George, Kenneth Walker, Haywood Hansell, and Laurence Kuter provided the basis that was essential for a successful air war in Europe.

The Author

Cadet First Class Steven A. Parker is a member of the class of 1989 of the United States Air Force Academy, assigned to Cadet Squadron 20. Prior to entering the Academy, he served as a precision measurement equipment specialist at Laughlin AFB, Texas, and attended the US Air Force Academy Preparatory School.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

 

 

Air War Plans Division: America's Long-term Plans for War

A U.S. Navy Consolidated PB4Y-1 Liberator of bombing squadron VB-103 off Cornwall in the summer of 1943. VB-103 began operating from St. Eval, Cornwall, in August 1943. Under AWPD-42, the aircraft would have been flown by Army Air Forces, not the Navy.

 

The Air War Plans Division (AWPD) was an American military organization established to make long-term plans for war. Headed by Harold L. George, the unit was tasked in July 1941 to provide President Franklin D. Roosevelt with "overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies." The plans that were made at the AWPD eventually proved significant in the defeat of Nazi Germany.

The AWPD went beyond offering basic production requirements and provided a comprehensive air plan which was designed to defeat the Axis powers. The plan, AWPD-1, was completed in nine days. The plan emphasized using heavy bombers to carry out precision bombing attacks as the primary method of defeating Germany and its allies. A year later, after the United States became directly involved in World War II, AWPD delivered a second plan—AWPD-42—which slightly changed the earlier plan to incorporate lessons learned from eight months of the war. Neither AWPD-1 nor AWPD-42 were approved as combat battle plans or war operations; they were simply accepted as guidelines for the production of materiel and the creation of necessary air squadrons. Finally, in 1943, an operational aerial warfare plan was agreed in meetings between American and British war planners, based on a combination of British plans and those from the AWPD, to create the Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO).

Founding

On 20 June 1941, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) were established as a way to combine and streamline two conflicting air commands: GHQ Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Major General Henry H. Arnold commanded the USAAF and formed an Air Staff to lead it; within the Air Staff, the Air War Plans Division was established with Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. George at its head. George was to coordinate his planning efforts with the War Plans Division (WPD) of the War Department.

Up to this point, the WPD was responsible for planning all aspects of Army and Army Air Corps expansion in the U.S. George was challenged by WPD, which contested AWPD's and Air Staff's authority to make strategic plans. WPD recommended that AWPD should be limited to tactical planning, and that the Air Staff, in a subordinate role, should advise the WPD rather than make its own operational or strategic plans. George pushed for greater autonomy—he wished to prepare all plans for all air operations.

On 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt asked Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, and Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, for an exploration of the total war production required for the United States to prevail in case of war. The WPD, in order to project long-term numbers, realized that the Rainbow 5 plan would be used as a basis for production quantities, but it lacked detailed air power figures. Stimson requested of Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, that the USAAF be tapped for their ideas about production numbers. After some bureaucratic delay, the AWPD received the request.

AWPD-1

In early 1941, American, Canadian and British war planners convened in Washington D.C. for a series of secret planning sessions called the American–British Conference, or ABC-1, to determine a course of action should the United States become a belligerent in the war. An overarching strategy of Europe first was agreed to, where American energies would primarily be directed against Germany, Italy and their European conquests, during which a secondary defensive posture was to be held against Japan. Royal Air Force Air Vice-Marshal John Slessor and other airmen present at the conference agreed on the general concept of using strategic bombing by both British and American air units based in the United Kingdom to reduce Axis military power in Europe. Incorporating this work in April 1941, the joint U.S. Army-Navy Board developed Rainbow 5, the final version of general military guidelines the U.S. would follow in case of war.

At the beginning of August 1941, the AWPD consisted of only four officers: Harold L. George, Orvil Anderson, Kenneth Walker (each one a lieutenant colonel), and Major Haywood S. Hansell. To help answer the urgent need for planning, George could have sent a couple of his air officers to WPD to assist them, following the standard Army policy since air warfare first arose in World War I. An air plan would have been made emphasizing tactical air coordination with ground forces, one which targeted Axis military formations and supplies in preparation and support of an invasion. George wished to implement the strategic bombing theories that had been debated and refined at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) during the preceding decade, but was sure that the Army and the War Department would not accept a strategy that assumed air attack would prevail alone. Instead, he intended to implement a middle path which began with strategic air attack but contained allowances for the eventual support of a ground invasion. In requesting autonomy to make his own plans, George gained approval from General Arnold and from General Leonard T. Gerow, head of the overworked WPD, who approved as long as AWPD held to the guidelines of ABC-1 and Rainbow 5.

George sought out men he knew were bombing advocates. He obtained temporary help from five more air officers: Lieutenant Colonels Max F. Schneider and Arthur W. Vanaman, and Majors Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Laurence S. Kuter, and Samuel E. Anderson. All but Samuel E. Anderson had passed through ACTS, where precision bombing theories were ascendant. Orvil Anderson was assigned to continue with ongoing projects while the rest of the men concentrated on the new request. On 4 August 1941, the augmented AWPD set to work.

George, Walker, Kuter, and Hansell provided the key concepts for the AWPD task force. George's vision was that the plan should not be a simple list of quantities of men and materiel—it should be a clear expression of the strategic direction required to win the war by use of air power. The main feature of the plan was the proposal to use massive fleets of heavy bombers to attack economic targets, the choke points of Axis industry. Hansell, fresh from a fact-finding mission to England in which he was briefed on British appreciations of German industrial and military targets, immediately became immersed in the job of target selection.

Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces to Defeat Our Potential Enemies, or AWPD-1, standing for "Air War Plans Division, plan number one", was the first concrete result of AWPD; it was delivered on 12 August after nine days of preparation. The plan used industrial web theory to describe how air power could be used to attack vulnerable nodes in Germany's economy, including electrical power systems, transportation networks, and oil and petroleum resources. The civil population of Berlin could be targeted as a final step to achieving enemy capitulation, but such an attack was optional: "No special bombardment unit [would be] set up for this purpose."

The plan also described, in less detail, how to use air power to draw a defensive perimeter around the Western Hemisphere and around America's interests in Alaska, Hawaii, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines in the Pacific Ocean. In the Atlantic, AWPD indicated bases be developed in Iceland, Newfoundland, and Greenland to augment bases in the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, bases were to be established in India and staging areas arranged in Siberia.

Finally, the plan detailed large tactical air formations to assist in an invasion of Europe and to fight in the land campaigns to follow, to be ready by Spring 1944—the same time that invasion forces would be ready.

Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall approved AWPD-1 in September, as did Secretary of War Stimson. Army planners were worried that both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom would be defeated, and that an invasion of Europe would become remote. The strategy of weakening Germany by bombing, long before an invasion could be prepared, gave hope that America would not lose any allies in the interim.

AWPD-2

On 9 September 1941, the president asked for more detail regarding allocation of aircraft based on estimates of peacetime production for the next nine months. In AWPD-2, Arnold and George designated two-thirds of the aircraft to be pooled for anti-Axis purposes such as Lend-Lease and one-third to be sent to the USAAF.

Public Knowledge

Roosevelt incorporated the Army's, Navy's and Air Staff's detailed plans into an executive policy he called his "Victory Program". Roosevelt hoped to engage public opinion in favor of the Victory Program because the increase in production it promised meant more jobs and a healthier economy. Opponents of the policy included a powerful supporter of the isolationist America First Committee, Senator Burton K. Wheeler. Wheeler obtained a copy of the Victory Program, classified Secret, from a source within the Air Corps, and on 4 December 1941 leaked the plan to two isolationist newspapers, the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald. Vocal public opposition to the plan ceased three days later on 7 December, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Congress soon passed the Victory Program with few changes.

German agents monitoring American newspapers wired the compromised secret program to Berlin where Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, realized its critical importance. On 12 December, Adolf Hitler issued Directive 39 which countered the American strategic bombing and invasion plans by massing air defenses around key industries and by greatly increasing Atlantic Ocean attacks so that an Allied invasion fleet could not be formed. Hitler directed his forces opposing the Soviet Union to go on the defensive so that they could hold their ground at least cost. Four days later, after visiting the Eastern Front and seeing the extent of his strategic failures there, Hitler "angrily and irrationally rescinded Directive 39" and focused his armies once again on the attack.

AWPD-4

After 7 December, all of America's former plans required revision—none had projected such early involvement in direct combat. Orvil Anderson was asked to rewrite the air plans. On 15 December, Anderson submitted AWPD-4, mostly a restatement of the goals of AWPD-1, but with augmented quantities to meet the greater needs of a two-front war. The number of combat aircraft was increased by 65%, and total aircraft production was more than doubled.

AWPD-42

On 24 August 1942, in light of the grim global situation, President Roosevelt called for a major reassessment of U.S. air power requirements, "in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy." The Japanese had expanded quickly in the Pacific Theater, North Africa was being rolled up by Rommel with Egypt threatened, Soviet forces were falling back against the German advances toward Stalingrad and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and German U-boats in the Atlantic sank 589 ships in early 1942. On 25 August, Arnold received word of the president's request from Army Chief of Staff George Marshall. The individual AWPD-1 team members had been reassigned to a wide variety of posts and duties, so to perform the reassessment Arnold recommended Hansell, recently made brigadier general. Marshall cabled Hansell in the UK, where he had been working under General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Air Planner, and under General Carl Andrew Spaatz as Deputy Theater Air Officer. Marshall ordered Hansell to hurry back to AWPD and that "the results of the work of this group are of such far-reaching importance that it will probably determine whether or not we control the air." Hansell brought with him VIII Bomber Command Chief of Intelligence Colonel Harris Hull and RAF Group Captain Bobby Sharp, as well as the little data compiled from five UK-based raids which had been flown by U.S. bombers. Hansell was assisted on a consultative basis by George, Kuter and Walker, old AWPD-1 hands, and by Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Moss, who was a sharp businessman in civil life. The team had just 11 days to finish the work. Arnold was more closely involved than before in leading the group and formulating the new plan. Like AWPD-1, the new framework was based largely on untried bombing theory. The report, entitled Requirements for Air Ascendancy, 1942, or AWPD-42, was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 6 September 1942. Harry Hopkins had obtained his copy at 1 am the day it was to be released, and Hopkins read it in time to tell Roosevelt over breakfast that the plan was sound. Roosevelt called Stimson to say he approved it, but Stimson hadn't had not seen it; nor had Marshall when Stimson called him. Hansell left hurriedly for England so that he would not have to face Marshall's anger at being caught unprepared.

AWPD-42 was written under the assumption that the Soviet Union would be knocked out of the war, and that German forces in the East would then be brought to bear against the West. The plan thus assumed that German ground forces defending Europe would be numerically superior to Allied invasion forces, making invasion extremely costly and perhaps impossible. It was also assumed that two-front tension in the German economy would lessen, and Allied damage to Axis industry would be more easily absorbed. An increase in American air power was projected as the best way to reduce Axis industrial might. An air campaign against two major European objectives was encompassed: first to paralyze Axis industrial power, and second to defeat Axis air power. Axis aircraft factories and aircraft engine plants were to be targeted during 1943–1944 so that, in the Spring of 1944, an invasion of Europe could be undertaken.

In the president's request, he had not asked for the combined numbers of U.S. Army and U.S. Navy aircraft; he asked for the "number of combat aircraft by types which should be produced in this country for the Army and our Allies in 1943..." This meant that the Navy's aircraft needs, which were significant, were not requested, but that the aircraft needs for America's allies would be included, allies that were to receive a certain number of Navy-type aircraft. Hansell decided to make his plan wholly inclusive of all American aircraft requirements—Army, Navy, and Allied—so that there would be no misunderstanding about how aircraft-producing resources would be allocated. Hansell accepted the aircraft production plans that the Navy submitted, but with one vital change: the four-engined bombers the Navy wanted would be built as Air Corps bombers, flown by USAAF units.

The Navy was not at all satisfied with AWPD-42. The Navy's intention to divert 1250 land-based heavy bombers from AAF requirements, to use for long-range patrol and for attacking enemy vessels, was dismissed in favor of USAAF flights to achieve the same goals. The Navy expected that command and control differences between the services, as well as differing targeting preferences, would create impossible barriers to successful employment of the notional USAAF patrol bombers against enemy naval forces. The Navy flatly rejected AWPD-42, which barred acceptance by the JCS, but by 15 October 1942 the president had established it as the U.S.'s aircraft manufacturing plan, saying that the lofty aircraft production proposal "will be given the highest priority and whatever preference is needed to insure its accomplishment."

Quantities

AWPD-1 called for the production of 61,800 aircraft, of which 37,000 would be trainers and 11,800 would be for combat. The remaining 13,000 would be military transport aircraft and other types. Of the combat aircraft, 5000 were to be heavy and very heavy bombers. AWPD-4 increased the combat aircraft to 19,520 and the total to 146,000. Numbers increased again in AWPD-42, which proposed that combat aircraft should top 63,000 in 1943. Total U.S. aircraft production, including for the Navy, was set at 139,000 until it was realized that the goal could not be reached by American industry. 107,000 was instead proposed.

AWPD-1 projected a force of 2.1 million airmen. AWPD-42 increased this to 2.7 million.

In drawing up AWPD-1, George had predicted that two very heavy bombers that were on the drawing board, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress and the Consolidated-Vultee B-36, would be ready in time to take part in the attack on Germany. Delays in both programs kept them from consideration in Europe. In AWPD-42, the B-29 was shifted to attacks on Japan, and the B-36 development at Consolidated-Vultee was slowed in favor of manufacturing more B-24 Liberators. The extra-long range of the B-36 would not be needed now that the United Kingdom appeared secure from attack.

Targets

AWPD-1 identified 154 targets in four areas of concern: electric power, transportation, petroleum and the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force. An arbitrary time frame was given, suggesting that six months after the strategic bombing forces were ready for large-scale attacks, the enemy targets would be destroyed.

AWPD-42 called for 177 targets to be hit, covering seven strategic areas, with the highest priority being enemy aircraft production. Other priorities were submarine pens and building yards, transportation systems, electric power generation and distribution, the petroleum industry, aluminum refining and manufacture, and the synthetic rubber industry. Hansell considered it a mistake to remove electricity from the top priority, and worse still to place submarine pens there. Political expediency dictated the shift in target priorities, not pure strategic considerations.

Subsequent Groups

Targeting proved a difficult task for AWPD—attaining the proper selection required a wide range of intelligence input as well as operational considerations. In December 1942, Arnold set up the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) to better study the problem. The COA performed target selection for the USAAF.

In January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to begin the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) in June and set targeting priorities. Based on these priorities but with some changes, the British Air Ministry issued the Casablanca directive on 4 February, targeting the German military, German industrial and economic systems, and German morale. More methodically, USAAF General Ira C. Eaker assembled an Anglo-American planning team to take the COA's list of targets and schedule them for combined bomber operations. This unnamed group, sometimes called the CBO Planning Team, was led by Hansell and included among others USAAF Brigadier General Franklin Anderson and RAF Air Commodore Sidney Osborne Bufton. Finished in April 1943, the plan recommended 18 operations during each three-month phase against a total of 76 specific targets. The Combined Bomber Offensive began on 10 June 1943.

In late 1944, the COA was superseded by the Joint Target Group, a combined service unit organized by the JCS.

Bibliography

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Lieutenant General Harold Lee George.

Air Marshal (later Marshal of the RAF) Sir John Slessor. 16 April 1943.

Brigadier General Kenneth N. Walker, commanding general V Bomber Command in the Southwest Pacific. Promoted to brigadier general in June 1942. Killed in action over Rabaul in January 1943. During August 1941, Lt. Colonel Kenneth N. Walker was one of four authors of Air War Plans Division -1 (AWPD-1), written in nine days. The four officers involved were: Lt. Col Harold L. George; Lt. Col Orvil Anderson; Lt. Col Kenneth N. Walker; Major Haywood S. Hansell. All four individuals later became General Officers and served during World War II. Kenneth N. Walker was awarded the Legion of Merit in recognition of his contributions as a staff officer at Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff

General Laurence S. Kuter.

Major General Haywood S. Hansell Jr., circa 1951.

Senator Burton K. Wheeler compromised the secret plans in his wish to keep America out of the war.

15-foot reinforced ferro-concrete U-Boat pen roof penetrated by a 22,000 lb MC Grand Slam bomb.