Japanese Battle Orders for Pearl Harbor Attack

Foreword

This monograph is a collection of pertinent Navy Orders and Directives, Combined Fleet Orders, and Carrier Striking Task Force Orders concerning the Pearl Harbor operation. Since all copies of these orders were destroyed prior to the end of the war, they have been reconstructed from personal notes and memory.

In editing, explanatory footnotes were added when deemed necessary.

19 February 1953

 

Preface

Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, 12 October 1945, subject: Institution for War Records Investigation, steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, research and compilation continued and developed into a series of historical monographs.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed form memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable.

Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau, the basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. Translation was effected through the facilities of Military Intelligence Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command.

This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division, Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, and is based on the translation of the Japanese original. Editorial corrections are limited to those necessary for coherence and accuracy.

 

Navy Order No. 1

5 November 1941

Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet

1. In view of the great possibility of being compelled to go to war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the cause of self-existence and self-defense, Japan has decided to complete various operational preparations within the first ten days of December.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will make the necessary operational preparations.
3. The details of the operation shall be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

—By Imperial Order, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, Osami

 

Navy Directive No. 1

5 November 1941

Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet

1. The Combined Fleet will advance necessary forces at a suitable time to their preparatory points to stand by for the start of operations in the event of unavoidable hostilities against America, Great Britain and the Netherlands, in the first ten days of December.[1]
2. During the above-mentioned advance, strict watch will be kept against unexpected attacks.
3. The operational policy against America, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, in case of hostilities, is scheduled as cited in the separate volume.[2]

—Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, Osami

Note:

Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1 issued on 5 November 1941 and titled “Preparations for War and Commencement of Hostilities” was an 89-page volume covering all phases of war preparations. In general this order stated the following:

The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. When the decision is made to complete all operational preparations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of hostilities and announcing “First Preparations for War.”

When these orders are issued, the forces will act as follows:

(1)   All fleets and forces, without special orders, will organize and complete battle preparations for operations in accordance with “the Allocation of Forces for First Period Operations of First Phase Operations.” When directed by respective commanding officers, they will proceed at a proper time to the pre-operation rendezvous points and wait in readiness.

(2)   All forces will be on strict lookout for unexpected attacks by the U.S., British, and Netherlands forces.

(3)   The commanding officers of various forces may carry out such secret reconnaissance as is necessary for the operations.

 

Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 2

7 November 1941

Order to: Combined Fleet

First Preparations for War

Y Day 8 December.[3]

—C in C, Combined Fleet, Yamamoto, Isoroku

 

Navy Order No. 5

21 November 1941

Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet

1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will dispatch at an appropriate time the necessary forces for the execution of operations to positions of readiness.[4]
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is empowered to use force in self-defense in case his fleet is challenged by American, British or Dutch forces during the process of carrying out military preparations.
3. The details concerned will be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.[5]

—By Imperial Order, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano Osami

 

Navy Directive No. 5

21 November 1941

Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet

1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will immediately assemble and call back the operational units if the Japanese-American negotiation is successful.
2. The exercise of military authority cited in the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 5 will be effected in the event the American, British, or Dutch naval forces invade our territorial waters and carry out reconnaissance, or approach our territorial waters and their move is recognized to be threatening, or an aggressive act is taken to endanger us even beyond our territorial waters.

—Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, Osami

 

Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 1

23 November 1941

To: Carrier Striking Task Force

1. The Carrier Striking Task Force will proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day. Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will immediately withdraw and return to Japan and, after taking on new supplies, take its position for Second Period Operations. In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.
2. The disposition of Force will be:

Task Force

Classification: Air Attack Force

Commander: 1^st Air Fleet Commander

Strength: 1^st Air Fleet

1^st Carrier Division

CV Akagi

CV Kaga

2^nd Carrier Division

CV Hiryu

CV Soryu

3^rd Carrier Division

CV Zuikaku

CV Shokaku

Duties: Air Attacks

Classification: Screening Unit

Commander: 1^st Destroyer Squadron Commander

Strength:

17^th Destroyer Division (Nagara Flagship)

18^th Destroyer Division (Akigumo Flagship)

Duties: Screening and escort

Classification: Support Force

Commander: 3^rd Battleship Division Commander

Strength:

3^rd Battleship Division (less the 2nd section)

8th Cruiser Division

Duties: Screen and support

Classification: Patrol Unit

Commander: 2^nd Submarine Division Commander

Strength:

I-19 (Flagship)

I-21

I-23

Duties: Patrol

Classification: Midway Bombardment Unit

Commander: 7^th Destroyer Division Commander

Strength:

7^th Destroyer Division (less the 2^nd section)

Duties: Midway air base attack

Classification: Supply Force

Overall Commander: Kyokuto Maru Commander

Classification: Supply Force (1^st Supply Unit)

Commander: Kyokuto Maru Commander

Strength:

Kenyo Maru

Kyokuto Maru

Kokuyo Maru

Shinkoku Maru

Akebono Maru

Duties: Supply

Classification: Supply Force (2^nd Supply Unit)

Commander: Toho Maru Inspector

Strength:

Toho Maru

Toei Maru

Nippon Maru

Duties: Supply

 

3. The Operation of Each Force.

a.      General

While exercising strict antiaircraft and antisubmarine measures and making every effort to conceal its position and movements, the entire force (except the Midway Bombardment Unit) in accordance with special orders will depart as a group from Hitokappu Bay at a speed of 12-14 knots. The force refueling en route whenever possible will arrive at the standby point (42 degrees North, 165 degrees West). In the event bad weather prevents refueling en route to the standby point, the screening unit will be ordered to return to the home base. Subsequent to the issuance of the order designating X Day (the day of the outbreak of hostilities), the force will proceed to the approaching point (32 degrees North, 157 degrees West).

Around 0700 hours, X-1 Day the Task Force will turn southward at high speed (approximately 24 knots) from the vicinity of the approaching point. It will arrive at the take-off point (200 nautical miles north of the enemy fleet anchorage) at 0100 hours X Day (0530 Honolulu time) and commit the entire air strength to attack the enemy fleet and important airfields on Oahu.

Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will assemble the aircraft, skirt 800 nautical miles north of Midway, return about X + 15 Day to the western part of the Inland Sea via the assembly point (30 degrees North, 165 degrees East) and prepare for Second Period Operations. In the event of a fuel shortage the Task Force will proceed to Truk via the assembly point.

The force may skirt near Midway in the event that consideration of an enemy counter-attack is unnecessary due to successful air attacks or if such action is necessitated by fuel shortage.

In this event, the 5^th Carrier Division with the support of the Kirishima from the 3^rd Battleship Division will leave the Task Force on the night of X Day or the early morning of X + 1 Day and carry out air attacks on Midway in the early morning of X + 2 Day.

If a powerful enemy force intercepts our return route, the Task Force will break through the Hawaiian Islands area southward and proceed to the Marshall Islands.

b.     Patrol unit

The patrol unit will accompany the main force. In the event the screening unit is returned to the home base, the patrol unit will screen the advance of the main force and the launching and the landing of aircraft. After the air attacks, the patrol unit will station itself between the flank of the main force and the enemy. In the event of an enemy fleet sortie, the patrol unit will shadow the enemy and in a favorable situation attack him.

c.      The Midway Bombardment Unit

The Midway Bombardment Unit will depart from Tokyo Bay around X-6 Day and, after refueling, secretly approach Midway. It will arrive on the night of X Day and shell the air base. The unit will then withdraw and, after refueling, return to the western part of the Inland Sea. The oiler Shiriya will accompany the bombardment unit on this mission and will be responsible for the refueling operation.

d.     Supply Force

The supply force will accompany the main force to the approaching point, carrying out refuelings, separate from the main force, skirt 800 nautical miles north of Midway, return to the assembly point by 0800 hours, X + 6 Day, and stand by.

4. The Task Force may suspend operations en route to the Hawaiian area and return to Hitokappu Bay, Hokkaido or Mutsu Bay, depending upon the situation.

—Commander, Carrier Striking Task Force, Nagumo, Chuichi

 

Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3

23 November 1941

To: Carrier Striking Task Force

The Hawaiian operations air attack plan has been decided as follows:

1. The Operation of the Air Attack Forces

The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots.

Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours.

After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.

Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.

If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.

In the event that a powerful enemy surface fleet appears, it will be attacked.

2. Organization of the Air Attack Units

First Attack Units — CO Commander Fuchida

                        1^st Group — CO ditto

1^st Attack Unit — CO ditto

15 Kates each fitted with a 800-kg armor-piercing bomb for level (high-altitude) bombing

2^nd Attack Unit — CO Lt. Comdr. Hashiguchi

15 Kates (same bombs as 1^st Attack Unit)

3^rd Attack Unit — CO Lt. Abe

10 Kates (same bombs as 1^st Attack Unit)

4^th Attack Unit — CO Lt. Comdr. Kusmi

10 Kates (same bombs as 1^st Attack Unit)

1^st Torpedo Attack Unit — CO Lt. Comdr. Murata

12 Kates (each fitted with an aerial torpedo, Mark 91)

2^nd Torpedo Attack Unit — CO Lt. Kitajima

12 Kates (same torpedoes as 1^st Torpedo Attack Unit)

3^rd Torpedo Attack Unit — CO Lt. Nagai

8 Kates (same torpedoes as 1^st Torpedo Attack Unit)

4^th Torpedo Attack Unit — CO Lt. Matsumura

8 Kates (same torpedoes as 1^st Torpedo Attack Unit)

                        2^nd Group — CO Lt. Comdr. Takahashi

15^th Attack Unit — CO ditto

27 Vals (each fitted with a 250-kg anti-ground [general purpose] bomb for dive bombing)

16^th Attack Unit — CO Lt. Sakamoto

27 Vals (same bomb as 15^th Attack Unit)

                        3^rd Group — CO Lt. Comdr. Itaya

1^st Fighter Combat Unit — CO ditto

9 Zekes (for air control and strafing)

2^nd Fighter Combat Unit — CO Lt. Shiga

9 Zekes (same mission)

3^rd Fighter Combat Unit — CO Lt. Suganami

9 Zekes (same mission)

4^th Fighter Combat Unit — CO Lt. Okajima

6 Zekes (same mission)

5^th Fighter Combat Unit — CO Lt. Sato

6 Zekes (same mission)

6^th Fighter Combat Unit — CO Lt. Kaneko

6 Zekes (same mission)

Second Attack Units

                        1^st Group — CO Lt. Comdr. Shimazaki

6^th Attack Unit — CO ditto

27 Kates (each fitted with a 250-kg Anti-ground [general purpose] bomb and six 60-kg ordinary bombs for level [high altitude] bombing)

5^th Attack Unit — CO Lt. Ichihara

27 Kates (same bombs as 6^th Attack Unit)

                        2^nd Group — CO Lt. Comdr. Egusa

13^th Attack Unit — CO ditto

18 Vals (each fitted with a 250-kg ordinary bomb for dive bombing)

14^th Attack Unit CO — Lt. Kobayashi

18 Vals (same bombs as 13^th Attack Unit)

11^th Attack Unit — CO Lt. Chihaya

18 Vals (same bombs as 13^th Attack Unit)

12^th Attack Unit — CO Lt. Makino

18 Vals (same bombs as 13^th Attack Unit)

                        3^rd Group — CO Lt. Shindo

1^st Fighter Combat Unit — CO ditto

9 Zekes (for air control and strafing)

2^nd Fighter Combat Unit — CO Lt. Nikaido

9 Zekes (same mission)

3^rd Fighter Combat Unit — CO Lt. Iida

9 Zekes (same mission)

4^th Fighter Combat Unit — CO Lt. Kumano

9 Zekes (same mission)

3. Targets

a.      The First Attack Units

The targets for the first group will be limited to about four battleships and four aircraft carriers; the order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers.

The second group will attack the enemy land-based air strength according to the following assignment:

The 15 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Ford Island

The 16 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Wheeler Field

The targets of Fighter Combat Units will be enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.

b.     The Second Attack Units

The first group will attack the enemy air bases according to the following assignment:

The 5 Attack Unit: Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point.

The 6 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field.

The targets for the second group will be limited to four or five enemy aircraft carriers. If the number of targets is insufficient, they will select targets in the order of cruisers and battleships.

The Fighter Combat Units will attack the enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.

4. Attack Procedure

c.      The First Attack Units

(1)   With the element of surprise as the principle, attacks will be carried out by the torpedo unit and bomber unit of the First Group, and then the Second Group.

(2)   During the initial phase of the attack, the Fighter Combat Units will, in one formation, storm the enemy skies about the same time as the First Group, and contact and destroy chiefly the enemy interceptor planes.

In the event that no enemy aircraft are encountered in the air, the units will immediately shift to the strafing of parked aircraft as follows:

1^st and 2^nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field.

3^rd and 4^th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Barbers Point.

5^th and 6^th Fighter Combat Units: Kaneohe

(3)   In the event that the advantage of surprise attack cannot be expected due to strict enemy security, the approach and attack will be made in the order of the Fighter Combat Units, Dive Bombing Units, Horizontal Bombing Units and the Torpedo Attacking Units.

d.     The Second Attack Units

All units will storm the enemy skies almost simultaneously and launch the attacks.

Although the general outline of the operations of the Fighter Combat Units corresponds to that of the First Attack Units, the strafing will be carried out according to the following in case there are no enemy aircraft in the air.

      1^st and 2^nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field

      3^rd and 4^th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Kaneohe

e.      The general outline of attack in the event that enemy aircraft carriers and the main body of the U.S. Fleet are in anchorages outside Pearl Harbor are:

(1)   The organization and targets are the same as mentioned above. The First Attack Units of the First Group, however, will increase the number of torpedo bombers as much as possible.

(2)   Escorted by the Fighter Combat Units, the Air Attack Units will proceed in a group and attack the designated targets in the order of the enemy fleet anchorages and the Island of Oahu. If attacks on the enemy fleet anchorages progress favorably, however, the Fighter Combat Units and the 2^nd Group of the First Air Attack Unit will immediately proceed to the Island of Oahu. Upon completion of the attacks, the anchorage attack unit will return directly to the carriers.

f.       Rendezvous for Return to Carriers

(1)   The rendezvous point will be 20 nautical miles at 340 degrees from the western extremity (Kaena Point) of the Island of Oahu. The rendezvous altitude will be 1,000 meters. (If this vicinity is covered with clouds, it will be below the cloud ceiling.)

(2)   The Attack Units will wait at the rendezvous point for about 30 minutes and return to their carriers, after being joined by the Fighter Combat Units.

(3)   While returning to carriers, the Fighter Combat Unit will become the rear guards for the whole unit and intercept any enemy pursuit.

5. Reconnaissance

g.     Pre-operation Reconnaissance

Pre-operation reconnaissance will not be carried out unless otherwise ordered.

h.     Immediate Pre-attack Reconnaissance

Two reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8^th Cruiser Division will take off at 0030 hours, X Day, secretly reconnoiter Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage and report the presence of the enemy fleet (chiefly carriers and the main body of the fleet).

i.        Scouting Patrol

The reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8^th Cruiser Division will take off at 0300 hours and will carry out an extensive search of the waters between the enemy and the friendly forces and the waters adjacent to the two channels situated to the east and west of the Island of Oahu. They will observe and report the presence and activities of the enemy sortie force and enemy aircraft on counter-attack missions.

j.        Before returning to its carrier, after the attack, an element of fighters designated by the Fighter Combat Unit Commander will fly as low and as fast as circumstances permit and observe and determine the extent of damage inflicted upon the enemy aircraft and ships.

Air Security Disposition No. 1 Method B will be followed from one hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of the air attack.[6]

—Commander, Carrier Striking Task Force, Nagumo, Chuichi

 

Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 5 (General Outline)

25 November 1941

Order to: Carrier Striking Task Force

The Carrier Striking Task Force will immediately complete taking on supplies and depart with utmost secrecy from Hitokappu Bay on 26 November and advance to the standby point (42 degrees North, 170 degrees West) by the evening of 3 December.

—Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, Yamamoto, Isoroku

 

Navy Order No. 9

1 December 1941

Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet

1. Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands early in December.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will smash the enemy fleets and air forces in the Orient and at the same time will intercept and annihilate enemy fleets should they come to attack us.
3. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined fleet will occupy immediately the key bases of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in East Asia in close cooperation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army and will capture and secure the key areas of the southern regions.
4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined fleet will cooperate with the operations of the China Area Fleet, if necessary.
5. The time of the start of operations based on the aforementioned items will be made known later.
6. The Chief of the Naval General Staff will issue instructions concerning particulars.

—By Imperial Order, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, Osami

 

Navy Directive No. 9

1 December 1941

Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet

Operations of the Combined Fleet against American, England and Holland will be conducted in accordance with the Separate Volume, Imperial Navy’s Course of Action in Operations against United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

—Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, Osami

 

Navy Order No. 12

2 December 1941

Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet

1. As of 8 December the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will start military operations in accordance with Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 9.
2. Military operations will be launched against the Netherlands at an opportune time after attacking the United States and Great Britain.

—By Imperial Order, Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, Osami

 

Verbal Directive of the Naval General Staff

2 December 1941

Verbal Directive to: Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet (in Tokyo at the time)

Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the Combined Fleet are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders.

—Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, Osami

 

Combined Fleet Telegraphic Operations Order No. 021 730

(Date and time of dispatch)

8^th December designated as X Day.

—Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, Yamamoto, Isoroku

 

Imperial Navy’s Course of Action in Operations Against United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands (Attached to Navy Directives No. 1 and No. 9)

I.           Outline of Operations

Continue control over China Coast and Yangtze River.

Quickly destroy enemy fleet and air power in East Asia.

Occupy and hold strategic points in Southern Area.

Destroy enemy fleet.

Consolidate strength to hold out for a long time and destroy enemy’s will to fight.

II.     Combined Fleet Course of Action

(a)   The First Phase of Operations

1.      With the forces of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, First Expeditionary Fleet and Eleventh Air Fleet as a nucleus destroy enemy fleets and air forces in the Philippines, British Malay, and Netherlands Indies. In cooperation with the Army, take the initiative in attacks on air forces and fleets in the Philippines and Malaya. Push forward our bases by landing advance troops. Then with main body of invasion forces occupy the Philippines and Malaya.

In early stages of operations, first occupy British Borneo and then as quickly as possible occupy Dutch Borneo, Celebes and Southern Sumatra. The above to be followed by occupation of Molucca Islands and Timor. Established air bases in all of the above-mentioned places. Utilize the air bases for subjugation of Java and then occupy Java. After capture of Singapore, occupy northern Sumatra and then at an opportune time commence operations in Burma. Cut supply routes to China.

2.      Forces of the Fourth Fleet

Patrol, maintain surface communications, and defend the South Sea Islands. Capture Wake. At opportune time attack and destroy enemy advance bases in the South Pacific Area. In cooperation with Army capture Guam and then at an opportune time Bismarck Area.

3.      Forces of the Fifth Fleet

Patrol the area east of the home islands. Make preparations against surprise attacks by enemy. Make reconnaissance of Aleutians and defend Bonin Islands. Maintain surface communications. Be on guard against Soviet Russia.

4.      Forces of the Sixth Fleet (Submarines)

Make reconnaissance of American Fleet in Hawaii and West Coast areas and, by surprise attacks on shipping, destroy lines of communications.

5.      Forces of First Air Fleet (Carriers)

Hawaiian attack. Thereafter support Fourth Fleet operations and assist in capture of Southern areas.

6.      Main Body of Combined Fleet

Support operations in general. Operate according to the situation.

7.      Part of Combined Fleet (24^th Commercial Destruction Unit)

Destroy enemy lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

(b)  Second Phase of Operations

1.      Forces of Sixth Fleet (Submarines)

Make reconnaissance and surprise attacks on main forces of enemy fleet. Destroy enemy surface communications in cooperation with a part of Combined Fleet. At opportune time make surprise attacks on enemy advanced bases.

2.      Forces of First and Eleventh Air Fleets (Carriers and Land-Based Air Forces)

Search for and attack enemy forces. Destroy enemy advanced bases.

3.      Forces of Third Fleet, First Expeditionary Fleet and Other Forces as Necessary

Defend occupied key areas in Southern area. Operate patrols, maintain surface communications, search for and destroy enemy shipping in Southern Area, attack and destroy enemy advanced bases on our perimeter.

4.      Forces of Fourth Fleet

Defend and patrol points in South Seas Islands and Bismarcks. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy shipping. Make surprise attacks and destroy enemy bases on our perimeter.

5.      Forces of Fifth Fleet

Defend Bonin Islands and patrol area to north of those islands and east of home islands. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy fleet should it appear in the area. Attack and destroy enemy bases in the Aleutians.

6.      Part of Combined Fleet (24^th Commercial Destruction Unit)

Destroy enemy surface communications in Pacific and Indian Oceans.

7.      Main Body of Combined Fleet

Support all operations. Operate as required.

8.      In case of attack by strong American Force

A part of the Sixth Fleet will maintain contact with the enemy. Reduce enemy strength by air and submarine attacks. At suitable opportunity assemble major portion of Combined Fleet and destroy enemy.

9.      In case of attack by strong British Force

By movement the Third Fleet, Fourth Fleet, First Expeditionary Fleet, Air Force, and Submarine Squadrons will maintain contact with enemy force and destroy it by concerted attacks. The main body of Combined Fleet, depending upon the strength, movement and location of American Fleet, will also be used in destruction of the British Fleet.

10. The important places to be defended among the points which were to be occupied were as follows: Manila*, Hong Kong, Davao, Singapore, Batavia, Surabaya*, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Mendao, Makassar, Ambon, Penang, Rabaul. (Asterisk indicates advanced bases.)

III.   China Area Fleet Operations

Continue operations against China. Cooperate with the Army in destruction of United States and British forces in China. Second China Fleet cooperate with Army in capture of Hong Kong and destruction of enemy forces there. Maintain surface communications along China coast. Prevent enemy from using China coast. Cooperate with Combined Fleet and Army in operations. (Escort of surface transport and defense of assembly points.)

IV.   Operations of Naval District and Auxiliary Naval Station Forces

Defend assigned areas. Maintain surface communications in assigned areas. Cooperate with Combined Fleet and China Area Fleet in operations affecting assigned areas.

---

[1]   Preparatory Points

     Carrier Striking Task Force................ Hitokappu Bay

     Philippine Invasion Force................... Bako (Formosa)

     Malay Invasion Force........................... Camranh Bay

     Main Body, Southern Force............... Samah (Hainan Island)

     Submarine Force.................................. Kwajalein

[2]   All copies of “The Separate Volume” were destroyed prior to the end of the war. Attached as Appendix I is a reconstructed version prepared from personal notes and memory by Captain T. Ohmae, former Chief, Plans Section, Naval General Staff.

[3]   This order was issued by C-in-C, Combined Fleet, after he had received verbal notification from Chief, Naval General Staff, that 8 December had been tentatively selected as “Y” Day.

[4]   So-called positions of readiness were designated operational sea areas. They were as follows:

Southern Force (2^nd, 3^rd and Southern Expeditionary Fleets): South China Sea (elements in Western Caroline Area)

South Seas Force (4^th Fleet): Inner South Seas Area

Northern Force (5^th Fleet): Kurile Area

Submarine Force (6^th Fleet): Hawaiian Sea Area

Carrier Striking Task Force (1^st Air Fleet): Hawaiian Sea Area

Commerce Destruction Force: Indian Ocean

Land Based Air Force (11^th Air Fleet): Formosa, French Indo-China and Palau

[5]   On the same day C-in-C, Combined Fleet, issued the necessary orders for dispatch of forces to the designated operational sea areas. Time of departure was left to the discretion of respective force commanders.

[6]   This Security Disposition called for combat air cover over the carriers.

Japanese Spy at Pearl Harbor

by Jules Archer

As Japanese planes roared in to put the finishing touches to America’s worst defeat, Takeo Yoshikawa swelled with pride. For he, and he alone, had been responsible for the success of the infamous sneak attack.

Takeo Yoshikawa was just sitting down to breakfast at the Japanese Consulate on the outskirts of Honolulu when he heard the first rumbling blasts from nearby Pearl Harbor. Some kind of maneuver, he reflected, yawning. He felt a little bleary-eyed from his late work the night before.

Suddenly his narrow eyes came fully awake with an electrifying thought. Jumping up, he rushed to his office. Through powerful binoculars he peered eagerly out of the open window at the great American naval base.

“At last,” he exulted. “At last!”

Twenty-seven Japanese dive bombers were hurtling out of the blue tropic skies toward Ford Island and Hickam Field. Another forty torpedo planes were swooping down upon Battleship Row. Pressing home the attack behind them were fifty horizontal bombers, followed by forty-five fighters. Every important naval and air installation on Oahu was under simultaneous attack.

Yoshikawa’s eyes glowed as he watched the proud harbor taken by surprise turned into a scene out of Dante’s Inferno. The big PBY hangar on Ford Island blew up suddenly, its twenty-nine patrol planes blazing and exploding. Nipponese torpedo planes skimmed across the harbor, dropping their deadly loads at the helpless naval giants whose crews stared up in disbelief and horror.

The battleship Arizona exploded, engulfed in giant oil fires and black smoke. South of her the West Virginia began to burn brilliantly amidships, sinking. Four fiery flashes leaped up from the hull of the Oklahoma, which keeled helplessly over on her side. The California burst into flames and began settling at its moorings.

At last stunned crews of many of the ninety-six U.S. ships in the harbor started firing away at the Oriental hornets in the sky. Some of the attackers were hit; these made spectacular torches until extinguished by the hissing blue waters of the harbor. But the retaliatory fire came too late. Most of the damage had been done in just fifteen swift minutes of a totally successful surprise attack.

Yoshikawa watched, heart leaping excitedly, as ship after ship became a flaming funeral pyre. Swinging his binoculars around, he could see other spectacular sights that warmed his heart. Westward, the Marine airfield at Ewa was alight with forty-nine torches that moments ago had been planes. Wheeler and Hickam Fields were smoking, blazing shambles. And raising his glasses to the sky, Yoshikawa could watch a second wave of 171 Japanese planes roar in to put the finishing touches on America’s greatest military disaster.

“Banzai!” Yoshikawa said with great pride. Because he, and he alone, had been the architect of the stunning surprise attack which would make every American remember 7 December 1941 for as long as he lived.

Takeo Yoshikawa was the sole intelligence agent in Hawaii for the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff in Tokyo. In official Honolulu circles he was known as Ito Morimura, Vice Consul of the Japanese Consulate under Consul Nagao Kita.

It was this amazingly clever spy who, single-handedly, actually blueprinted the attack on Pearl for Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto. It was Yoshikawa who told Tokyo that the battleships in Pearl Harbor were always moored in pairs, so that any torpedo attacks would not damage the inboard ships. This had led Yamamoto to plan the assault on Pearl Harbor largely as a raid of dive bombers, using 16 inch armor-piercing shells.

Yoshikawa’s reports on the restricted and shallow waters of Pearl Harbor led the Japanese to develop special torpedoes with short vanes, to prevent their diving to the bottom when dropped. Yoshikawa also advised Tokyo that, if the attack were a complete surprise, the planes could come in very close to the water, making the torpedoes doubly effective.

And it was Yoshikawa who answered Tokyo’s question: “On what day of the week would the largest number of ships be in Pearl Harbor?”

His one-word reply: “Sunday.”

Who was this almost unknown Japanese who admitted, two decades after Pearl Harbor, “In truth, if only for a moment in time, I held history in the palm of my hand!”

Takeo Yoshikawa was born on 7 March 1914 on the island of Shikoku, southeast of Tokyo. His father, a policeman, held a highly respected position in the days when police were the personification of Imperial law. He grew up in an era of expanding Japanese imperialism, when the greatest glory a boy could aspire to was to die young in battle for the Emperor.

In the tradition of the island of Shikoku, which produced some of Japan’s most famous sea fighters, Yoshikawa was given a military upbringing by his father and teachers. In high school he became a champion at kendo, or staff dueling, and was able to swim eight miles in the choppy seas off the rock-bound coast.

He was further molded to his destiny by the rigid mind training which gave Japan a nation of perfect pawns to deploy craftily on the international chessboard. Yoshikawa learned bushido, the medieval code of the samurai prescribing unquestionable, absolute loyalty; and he mastered Zen, the Buddhist sect teaching self-disciplined and ruthless selflessness.

This education was completed at the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in Eta Jima, which Yoshikawa entered in 1929. Upon graduating four years later, he was given special training cruises on a battleship, a light cruiser and a submarine. He also qualified as a naval aviator in 1934.

The envy of his classmates, Yoshikawa dreamed of a steady, rapid ascent to the highest levels of the Imperial Navy. But his dreams suddenly turned to ashes one day when he was seized by excruciating pains in the abdomen while coming back from the flight line. Rushed to the hospital, he was found to have a serious ailment which kept him off active duty for two years.

During this time Yoshikawa spent twelve hours a day pouring over studies of sea power and naval strategy. He even committed to memory large portions of the works of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, the U.S. Navy’s classic strategist, “to know and outguess the enemy mind.” For even then he knew that Japan was planning a naval war against the United States.

At the Naval Academy he had been taught that the Navy stood for commercial expansion southward to include the Philippines, Dutch East Indies and Australia. To make this possible it was first necessary to paralyze the naval forces of the United States, a nation unalterably opposed to Japanese expansion.

Yoshikawa suffered a crushing blow when, after seven years of fanatical devotion to mastering naval strategy in classrooms, ships, planes, and books, he was forced to retire as an ensign from the Imperial Japanese Navy because of broken health. For a while he gloomily contemplated hari kiri. Then he was visited in his home on Shikoku by a staff captain from Navy Regional Headquarters in Kagawa.

“How would you like to get back in the service?”

“But that isn’t possible,” Yoshikawa said. “I still couldn’t pass the physical requirements for combat service.”

“Not combat service,” he was told. “Naval intelligence!”

Yoshikawa jumped at the chance. Sent to Tokyo, he was assigned to the highly secret 3rd Division, an intelligence corps made up of only twenty-nine officers. Here he was given the American Desk, and ordered to study the U.S. Pacific Fleet and its bases at Guam, Manila, and Pearl Harbor. There was relief for all his twenty-eight brother officers in tours of sea and shore duty. But for four years Yoshikawa burned the midnight oil at the American Desk unrelentingly, becoming an expert on the U.S. Navy.

He poured over millions of words in obscure American newspapers, trade magazines, military and scientific journals, unclassified brochures, popular periodicals and naval memoirs. He visited regularly at the offices of foreign naval attaches, picking up their available publications.

Reports from naval attaches in Japanese embassies and consulates abroad found their way to Yoshikawa’s desk. He kept up on changes in U.S. naval armament and equipment through the reports and photos of Japanese agents in foreign ports who boarded American ships under commercial pretexts.

So skillfully did he put together all pieces of this involved jigsaw that by 1940 he knew every U.S. warship and aircraft type by name, hull number, configuration and technical characteristics. He was also Japan’s top expert on U.S. naval bases in the Pacific. His superior officer summoned him and declared, “Yoshikawa, you are ready now.”

“Hai,” he asserted happily with a low bow. He knew that he would soon be serving Japan as an espionage agent.

“Although I was by then twenty-five years old and had ten years' service in the Navy,” Yoshikawa recalls, “I had given no thought to marriage and little to social life. My whole being was dedicated to the mission on which I would shortly be sent.”

During the winter of 1940 he was given his official cover—an appointment as a junior diplomat in the Foreign Ministry. He worked there mornings, continuing his studies afternoons and evenings. He also attended functions in other embassies to pick up missing pieces of his jigsaw in seemingly innocent bits of social conversation.

While with the ministry he intercepted a short wave radio broadcast in English from Australia, revealing that seventeen Australian troop transports had cleared Fremantle for England. He relayed this information to the German Embassy. Shortly afterwards he received a personal letter of appreciation from Adolf Hitler.

In January 1941 Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet, conceived of the plan of a carrier-based air attack on Pearl Harbor, and put his staff to work on scheming it out. Ironically, it was a poorly-kept secret; America had its first warning as early as 27 January 1941—practically a full year before the disaster at Pearl.

“A member of my embassy,” Ambassador Joseph C. Grew radioed Washington in code, “was told by my Peruvian colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of ‘trouble’ between Japan and the United States.”

In April Yoshikawa was called into his chief’s office and told: “You are going to Honolulu as vice-consul. Your name will be Ito Morimura, and your task will be to report on the daily readiness of the American fleet and bases. Do not use secret short wave radio transmitters because these would quickly be spotted by radio direction finders. Instead, use the consulate’s regular short wave communication in diplomatic code.

“You will be our only agent in Honolulu. Trust absolutely no one you don’t have to, and remember this: the fate of Japan is likely to rest in your hands!”

Flying out of Tokyo, Yoshikawa stared, for what he was convinced would be the last time, at the beloved cone of Mount Fuji and the multi-colored farm patches of Honshu. He was not afraid of the death that inevitably awaited him at the end of his dangerous assignment, or before. But it made him sad to think that he would never again see his homeland.

Landing in Honolulu, he was driven at once through the palm-lined avenue leading to the Japanese Consulate, a stately-pillared building lined with taro trees. He was shown immediately into the airy office of Consulate General Nagao Kita, an amiable bachelor. Yoshikawa liked and trusted him at once.

“You’re aware of my mission?” Yoshikawa asked tactfully.

Kita nodded. “I know you will be reporting directly to Tokyo. You need not worry about any interference from me. I’ve arranged for you to have full use of the consulate code room for transmission of your reports.”

Yoshikawa bowed correctly and politely declined a drink Kita offered him. Then the spy was told, “By the way, photo exposures are considerably different here than in Tokyo. If you’d like me to, I can brief you for the most satisfactory camera results.”

“You are kind. But it won’t be necessary. My field trips will usually be made without photographs or sketches.”

Kita looked surprised.

“I’ve trained my memory,” the spy explained. “I prefer to keep any details of installations I observe in my head until I return to the consulate. If the Americans arrest me on suspicion, they will never be able to find any evidence on me which could embarrass or compromise the consulate.”

Kita nodded, pleased. Lighting an American cigarette, he asked, “Do you plan to use any Hawaiian Japanese as agents?”

“No. I cannot afford to trust anyone. Except you.”

Kita nodded again. “Hono­lulu is full of Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines, Japanese papers and schools. You’ll even see funds raised for our forces in China, and the Imperial Army’s relief fund. But don’t be deceived. Most Hawaiian Japanese are also strongly pro-American. In fact, lots of them come to the consulate to renounce their Japanese nationality.”

“How much freedom will I have to move around?”

“Plenty.” Kita chuckled. “The Americans are so confident that Pearl Harbor is impregnable that they hardly take any security precautions. Your diplomatic status will get you just about anywhere. If you prefer to dress inconspicuously, you’ll simply be taken for one of Hawaii’s several hundred thousand Japanese or Filipinos.”

Yoshikawa quickly learned how true this was. He first oriented himself to Honolulu by walking through its streets and outskirts, familiarizing himself with the gathering places of American sailors and restaurants with commanding views of the harbor and coastline. He roamed the Iwilei red-light district, the crowded Oriental quarter around Aala Park, the hills of Alewa and Maunalani Heights.

Disguising himself as a Filipino laborer, unshaven, barefoot and in an aloha shirt he walked along the entrance to Pearl Harbor near Fort Kamehameha until challenged and turned back. He tried getting through on several occasions, making sure first that each time a different guard was on duty. Frustrated, Yoshikawa vowed the secrets of Pearl Harbor would not remain secret much longer.

One morning a U.S. Army anti-sabotage guard stopped walking his beat near the harbor entrance. His gaze inched suspiciously along the rolling breakers. Something had flashed out there. Probably a fish jumping. It was hardly likely that anyone would be swimming in the heavy surf.

He started to resume his patrol. But just as he was turning away, he saw the man’s head break the surface. The swimmer took a deep breath, then plunged again.

The guard wheeled, whipping out his revolver. He waited for the swimmer to surface again. When the man did, about ten yards further on toward the Pearl Harbor entrance, the guard aimed his gun and yelled for the swimmer to come out of the water. The man promptly dove again.

Lips set, the guard kept his revolver aimed at the breakers. His hand quavered. He had never shot anyone before, but he knew his orders. It seemed an eternity before the swimmer surfaced again. The guard squeezed off a shot.

The bullet missed. However, the roar of the gun seemed to scare the wits out of the man in the water. He turned his head toward the beach, mouth open in surprise. The guard furiously waved him in with the gun, then re-aimed it grimly.

The swimmer hastily raised his right arm and shook it in a gesture that obviously meant “Don’t shoot!” In a few powerful strokes he coasted over the breakers into the beach shallows. Rising, he ran in hastily toward the guard. He carried a spear, and around his waist was tied a string of butterfly fish, awelas, laipalas and zebra fish.

“Whassamatta me?” he quavered in Hawaiian pidgin. He was an exceptionally good-looking man of about twenty-seven, taller than most of the Filipino fishermen who haunted the beaches.

“This place kapu!” roared the guard, pointing his gun to Army warnings posted behind him. “Kapu, sabe? Keep out! You come again pilikia! Plenty trouble!”

“No pilikia!” the fisherman squealed in alarm. “Me go!”

In a feeble attempt to placate the glowering American soldier, he unhooked one of the butterfly fish from his string and held it out hopefully. The GI made a wry face and snarled, “Get the hell out of here—quick!”

The fisherman hastened to obey, grateful at not being detained for questioning. He had, of course, plenty of reason to be grateful. As Japan’s master spy Vice-Consul “Mori­mura”—really Yoshikawa—had been making a study of underwater obstructions, tides, beach gradients and other vital navigational facts which later were to let midget Japanese subs sneak into the harbor during the big attack. He had also been hoping to find out whether there were anti-sub nets stretched across the harbor entrance.

If the American guard patrolling the harbor entrance that morning had taken Yoshikawa into custody, there might never have been a Pearl Harbor disaster.

Yoshikawa’s other acts of espionage were more fruitful. High in the heights of Alewa, beyond Pearl, he discovered the Shunch-ro Restaurant, a perfect observatory. Here, from a private Tokyo-style dining room overlooking the harbor, he studied U.S. fleet movements. Uncle Sam helpfully kept his ships lighted at night. They were also highly visible in the Hawaiian dawn.

To find out where the carriers went when they left Pearl, Yoshikawa frequently gave sailors a lift in his car. Posing as a Japanese playboy fond of Americans, he also stood drinks for servicemen in the bars of Waikiki. He asked no questions until his affability had inspired an answering warmth. Then, during conversational chitchat, he would drop a casual, seemingly harmless question or two.

Most Americans were prudent, or didn’t know the answers. Occasionally one of them, too much liquor under his belt, would boastfully tell Yoshikawa what he wanted.

Yoshikawa also observed geishas when they entertained American sailors or fliers fresh off the ships. Afterwards he would engage the girls for his own “entertainment.” He never revealed his true identity. Only an idiot confided important state secrets to women! With the geishas unaware that he was pumping them, he often extracted bits of valuable information they had gleaned from the Americans.

His weekly reports to Tokyo helped bring naval operations at Pearl Harbor into sharp focus for Admiral Yamamoto. By August, Yamamoto was able to present a completed operation plan to the Naval General Staff. It was tested in “table-top maneuvers” at Tokyo Naval War College between 10 and 13 September.

The exercise showed that a Pearl Harbor strike was practicable. But many of Yamamoto’s colleagues felt it was too risky. that the U.S. Pacific Fleet might not be in port on the day of the attack. and that the danger of discovery during the long voyage to Hawaii was too great.

“My intelligence in Honolulu,” Yamamoto replied coldly, “is such that I can guarantee the success of the operation. I can only tell you that if you do not respect my judgment in this matter, I will feel compelled to offer my resignation.”

That sealed the doom of Pearl Harbor.

On 24 September Yoshikawa received a coded message from Tokyo ordering him to concentrate on reporting information of immediate tactical significance. His reports of shipping in the harbor now had to pinpoint the ships’ grouping in five distinct mapped areas.

Yoshikawa increasingly spent his time walking around Pearl City and Hospital Point, to observe every new development in Battleship Row and the various lochs. He kept a careful eye on any unusual movement of lighters which might indicate provisioning the fleet for combat.

To avoid the possibility of calling attention to himself by being seen too often in the same places, he also strolled through the hills of Aiea beyond Pearl Harbor, and on Tantalus Mountain above Honolulu. Both heights offered excellent vantage points to observe the practice sorties of the fleet’s units through field glasses.

He wound up his vigils on most evenings by dining at the Shuncho-ro, where the Japanese management reserved for him a room with a magnificent view of the harbor. Here, sitting on rice-straw tatmi mats with a geisha, he would play at relaxing as he kept ship movements in the lochs under sharp observation. He often stayed past dawn, when most sorties usually began.

In addition to what he could see for himself, Yoshikawa paid careful attention to news items concerning the U.S. forces in garrison. These appeared liberally in the Honolulu press and on local broadcasts. Piecing together a scrap here and a scrap there, he was able to develop shrewd guesses as to which U.S. air and sea forces were outward or inward bound.

It was during this period that he warned Yamamoto of the U.S. Navy’s practice of mooring battleships in pairs, a stratagem designed to save fifty percent of the big wagons from torpedo attack.

To check the number of aircraft present on the military fields in the main Hawaiian islands, and their dispersal patterns, Yoshikawa simply rented planes from the John Rodgers Airport in Honolulu. He flew freely and frequently around the islands, taking aerial photographs, and even flying low enough to study structural detail on the hangars at Hickam and Wheeler Fields.

His flight also provided Tokyo with a bonus in the form of comprehensive maps Yoshikawa sketched showing the location of all the fuel and ammunition depots on the islands.

On 11 November, ten long-range “I”-type Japanese submarines from Yokosuka set a course toward Hawaii, planning to arrive off Pearl Harbor not later than the evening before the attack. Five of them carried two-man midget subs on their backs, to be launched in a suicidal attempt to get through the harbor entrance. The big subs would lie outside the harbor to torpedo the surviving American ships as they fled from the planned air attack.

On 20 November, Yoshikawa received this message at the consulate: “Strictly Secret. Please investigate comprehensively the fleet, bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation.” He hastened to comply and sent them off a full report within twenty-four hours. Tokyo then demanded: “Send exact report on ships anchored in area N, Pearl Harbor.” Once more Yoshikawa delivered the goods promptly.

But unknown to him or to Tokyo, U.S. intelligence had cracked the top Japanese diplomatic code. Every coded message broadcast by Tokyo was being monitored, flashed to Washington, and decoded. Had Admiral Yamamoto realized this, the Pearl Harbor operation would undoubtedly have been called off.

Unfortunately, however, the Army and Navy cryptanalytic divisions in Washington were so swamped with work that translations of the messages to Yoshikawa did not reach the desks of U.S. intelligence brass until 5 December. That still would have given them forty-eight hours to press the panic button for an instant Hawaii-wide alert, and to get the battleships steaming out of the harbor.

Incredible as it seems, Washington did not even bother to notify Oahu of these intercepted messages. Army and Naval Intelligence were convinced that the Japanese were mounting an attack against Indochina.

Yoshikawa, realizing that “The Day” was rapidly approaching, stepped up his reports on shipping in the harbor to once every three days. He knew Admiral Yamamoto would try to spring his surprise on the Americans at a time when he could catch as much of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the harbor as possible.

On 24 November, Admiral Harold E. Stark, chief of Naval Operations, finally became alarmed at the rapid deterioration of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. He rushed a warning to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor:

“This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.”

Admiral Kimmel still didn’t think it meant him. Two days later the Japanese Pearl Harbor Striking Force left its assembly area in the remote, snowbound Kuriles and sailed due east on its way to sunny Hawaii. It consisted of six carriers with 360 planes, two battleships, three cruisers and nine destroyers.

All counting on one man: Takeo Yoshikawa.

On Oahu, meanwhile, Admiral Kimmel’s staff assured General Walter C. Short, in charge of the Army garrison, that there was no chance of a surprise attack on Honolulu. Short decided not to issue any all-out alert, or an alert against air attack, but simply to issue an alert against sabotage.

He did this on 27 November. Ironically, on the same day the Japanese liner Taiyo Maru arrived in Honolulu, bringing a “ship’s steward” who called on Consul-General Kita for some advice on sight-seeing. During the course of the chat, Suzuki slipped a tiny ball of crumpled rice paper into Kita’s hand.

Lieutenant Commander Suguru Suzuki—for that was his correct name and rank—was taking no chances that any Japanese employed at the consulate might also be picking up a second paycheck from American intelligence.

When Suzuki left, Kita passed the rice paper to Yoshikawa. It contained no less than ninety-seven questions, giving Japan’s master spy exactly one day to come up with detailed answers, along with maps, sketches, and photographs—the very latest possible information on which Admiral Yamamoto would base his strike.

Yoshikawa got busy. Most questions he could answer without stirring from the consulate. For example: “How many large seaplanes patrol from Pearl at dawn and sunset?” He wrote confidently, “About ten both times.” He’d anticipated this question by spending many nights on the consulate lawn at dawn and sunset—the usual times when patrols went out and returned—observing the size of the flights and their vectors.

When he’d finished replying to most of the questions, he scouted the harbor once more from Pearl City and Hospital Point for a late report on ship groupings, and to make sure they were not being made battle-ready. He was standing on a pier at Pearl City, the peninsula which juts southward into the middle of the anchorage, when he felt a pistol pressed into the small of his back. A quiet voice said, “FBI. Come with us.”

Fright paralyzed Yoshikawa. Face ashen, he turned and saw two stern-lipped Americans in civilian clothes.

“There must be some mistake,” he stammered.

“Maybe,” one of the men said dryly. “If you can explain why you went to the expense of making a transocean phone call to Tokyo two days ago, to talk about flying conditions in Oahu, and the number of troops and sailors in the streets.”

Yoshikawa was genuinely bewildered. “You… you must have the wrong person!” he sputtered. “Just whom do you want?”

“You’re Doctor Mori, aren’t you?”

“Mori? Oh, no, sir! Morimura. Ito Morimura. I’m the Japanese vice-consul.” He took out his wallet and showed his credentials. “If you prefer further proof, gentlemen, come with me to the consulate. They will identify me.”

The two FBI men looked at each other. The man with the gun returned it to his shoulder holster. “Sorry, Mr. Morimura,” he said curtly. “I’m afraid the wrong man was pointed out to us.”

“Quite all right, gentlemen. Mistakes will happen!”

Trembling with relief, Yoshikawa watched them go. He was amazed by the incident because it suggested that Tokyo had another spy in Honolulu beside himself. The fact was a Japanese dentist named Doctor Mori had made an oceanic phone call to someone in Tokyo. The call had been monitored and translated, and the gist of the conversation had R. L. Shivers, local head of the FBI, suspicious; he had ordered Doctor Mori located and questioned at once.

It turned out later that the call had been an innocent one. Ironically, it had almost resulted in the arrest of the real master spy, whose assumed name had been confusingly similar to the dentist’s.

Returning to the consulate, Yoshikawa hastily finished his report for Commander Suzuki. He added last-minute maps and sketches, along with aerial photographs, then offered his opinion that Sunday would be the ideal day to destroy the most ships in Pearl Harbor.

Consul-General Kita saw to it that this all-important blueprint of the impending Pearl Harbor attack was discreetly delivered to Commander Suzuki aboard the Taiyo Maru.

On 29 November Tokyo notified Yoshikawa in code: “We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you also report even when there are no movements.”

This message, too, was intercepted and decoded by U.S. Naval Intelligence on 5 December. But even such an obvious red flag failed to alert Washington or arouse any suspicions.

Yoshikawa had no way of knowing that a Japanese task force was already at sea; that on 2 December it received the code order to attack Pearl Harbor: “Climb Mount Nitaka”; or that the date had been set for the morning of 7 December. “To entrust knowledge of such a vital decision to an expendable espionage agent,” he said years later, “would have been foolish.”

On 5 December, the master spy reported that the carrier Lexington, accompanied by three heavy cruisers and a division of destroyers, had steamed out of Pearl Harbor. Departure of the carrier-based planes, he estimated, reduced the air defense of Oahu to under a hundred operative fighters.

On 6 December Yoshikawa visited the harbor and counted thirty-nine U.S. warships. What a bag full, he thought with a thrill. It was the first time since the Fourth of July that all nine American battleships were tied up in port together.

He hurried back to the consulate to notify Tokyo. At the end of the message he added: “No barrage balloons sighted. Battleships are without crinolines. No indications of air or sea alert wired to nearby islands.”

Pressing his desk buzzer for the radio room clerk, Yoshikawa felt a sense of deep weariness. The eight months at Pearl had been a great strain. He had never allowed himself more than a few hours’ sleep a night. Yet even now his devotion to duty was so rigid that he felt impelled to ride up to the Shuncho-ro Restaurant for a final study of harbor movements.

“Remain on duty until I return,” he told the code clerk.

Several hours later, he hurried back through the clear, balmy tropical night. Slumping at his desk in exhaustion he wrote what was to be his final message to Tokyo: “Enterprise and Lexington have both sailed from Pearl Harbor.”

Then the catalyst of the tremendous drama about to take place took his usual stroll about the consulate grounds before turning in. The bright haze in the distance told him the lights were on at the Pearl Harbor naval base. No patrol planes droned overhead. Just another Saturday night, he thought with a sigh, and wearily went to bed.

Startling things happened as he slept.

At 3:30 a.m. an American minesweeper, the Condor, thought she spotted a submerged submarine a mile or two south of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy. She notified the nearby patrolling destroyer Ward, which went to general quarters and searched the area. When no trace of the sub could be found, the sighting was considered dubious, and neither ship reported the incident.

At 7:00 a.m. Opana Radar Station shut down their training operation. But Private George Elliott wanted practice operating the oscilloscope, and Private Joseph Lockard agreed to teach him until the breakfast truck came for them. At 7:02 Lockard was stunned at the sight of a blip flashing on the screen bigger than anything he had ever seen in radar before. The privates excitedly phoned the information through to a bored lieutenant, who told them to forget it. “Unques­tion­ably a friendly flight.”

As the minutes ticked off to 7:55, both the Ward and a Navy patrol PBY sighted subs and sank them. Both of these messages were reported to shore in code. By the time they were encoded, deliberated over, and passed up the ladder of command, the first twenty-seven dive bombers with red ball markings were plunging toward Ford Island and Hickam, and the first forty torpedo planes were swinging into position for their turn at the big ships.

Takeo Yoshikawa was having breakfast at the consulate when the first bombs fell on Pearl Harbor. It was exactly 7:55 a.m. After rushing to his office to watch the holocaust of flame and black smoke rising over the harbor, he eagerly switched on the short wave radio. Consul Kita—who also had been kept in the dark about the impending attack—hurried in, his eyes glowing.

They tuned in the 8:00 a.m. news from Tokyo. The broadcast was routine except for a single phrase, twice repeated. Giving the weather, the announcer carefully forecasted, “East wind, rain.” That was the code message to notify all embassies and consulates that the Imperial Council of Japan had declared war against the United States.

“At last,” Yoshikawa murmured. “At last!”

“Quickly,” Kita said, “there is work to be done.”

The two men hurried to the consulate offices, where they worked feverishly at burning code books and secret diplomatic and intelligence instructions. The growing, deafening thunder of bombs and the wailing of sirens told them that they didn’t have a moment to lose.

Yoshikawa noticed that the consulate grounds were already surrounded by volunteer soldiers. But the evidence had already been destroyed. And thanks to the skillful espionage of Takeo Yoshikawa, eighteen American warships were either sunk or seriously damaged in the harbor; 2,403 American servicemen were killed, almost half of them when the Arizona blew up; and 188 planes were destroyed on the ground at Hickam, Kaneohe, and Ewa.

At 8:30 a.m. the Honolulu police arrived and put everyone in the consulate under guard. FBI men searched the offices and living quarters for evidence of espionage. They found nothing except a half-finished sketch of Pearl Harbor in Yoshikawa’s wastebasket. He had forgotten it in the urgency of burning the secret code books.

He stiffened, stoically ready to pay for the slip with his life as his last measure of devotion to the Emperor.

But the FBI did not consider this one item of evidence incriminating, especially in view of Yoshikawa’s diplomatic status. The two consular officials and their staff were taken into custody. Ten days later a U.S. Coast Guard ship took them from Honolulu to San Diego. From there the Gripsholm brought them back to Tokyo in August 1942 in a diplomatic exchange.

Yoshikawa returned to duty with the 3rd Division of the Naval General Staff, ending the war as a staff intelligence officer. When the war was lost, and the Navy no longer held any future for him, Yoshikawa went home to Ehime and entered private business. His secret remained undisclosed for twelve years, until an ex-officer of the Imperial Japanese Navy revealed it in an interview published in the Ehime Shimbun, a weekly newspaper.

Yoshikawa still refused to talk for another seven years, until most of his old comrades were dead. He then revealed the truth about his astonishing top secret assignment to Lieutenant Colonel Norman Stanford, our Assistant Naval Attaché in Tokyo, for publication in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine.

“It is my hope that in telling it now I will harm no one still alive,” Yoshikawa declared, “and perhaps contribute something to the naval history of the war in the Pacific. So it was that I, who was reared as a naval officer, never came to serve in action, but look back on my single top-secret assignment as the raison d’être of the long years of training in my youth and early manhood.”

Thanks to what was perhaps the most amazing job of one-man espionage in history, aided by appalling bumbling and fumbling of the American generals and admirals he outwitted, the United States has good reason to long remember Takeo Yoshikawa—and Pearl Harbor.