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| A Diamond M20 truck and its trailer go through a ruined Norman village. |
by Michael W. Cannon
The situation in Normandy after the breakout operations of 1
to 4 August 1944 necessitated a marked departure from the carefully conceived
OVERLORD plan. The sudden collapse of the German military machine opened the
door to a fluid situation where the initiative of subordinate commanders was of
paramount importance. Tactical operations were characterized by a minimum of
control and are described in the official history of the U.S. Army as
resembling a “stampede of wild horses.” The orderly development of a logistical
base was thus subordinated to the need to exploit the tactical and strategic
situation as fully as possible. The requirement to supply units on a daily
basis prohibited the establishment of the normal army depot system. As a
result, by the end of August 1944 around ninety percent of all supplies in
France lay near the invasion beaches. Between these dumps and forward army
depots, often a distance of 300 miles, there were few stockpiles capable of
supporting large units conducting sustained operations.
The Communications Zone (COMZ), an extension of the Services
of Supply in the United Kingdom, was the organization which had been tasked
with the development of the logistics base which was required to support Allied
forces. As operations out-paced the supply buildup, planners began to look for
solutions, however improvised they might have been. At first, the COMZ decided
to place 100,000 tons of supplies (exclusive of POL [Petroleum-Oil-Lubricant]
in the Chartres-La Loupe-Dreux area by the 1st of September. Initial plans
relied heavily on the utilization of the existing French railway system to
transport the majority of the tonnage. But as the Allies advanced, they found
to their chagrin that air attacks and sabotage undertaken by the Maquis, operating
under the control of the London headquarters of the French Forces of the
Interior (FFI), restricted the amount of traffic that the network could be
subjected to. Only a relatively small part (approximately 18,000 tons) of the
desired stockage could be shipped by rail. The remaining 82,000 tons had to be
transported by truck. The resulting centralization and usage of motor transport
on a scale larger than invasion planners predicted came to be immortalized as
“The Red Ball Express.”
The operations along the Red Ball began on 25 August 1944.
On this day, vehicles in seventy-six truck companies out of the 118 companies
allocated to the re-supply effort were in action. All but five companies were
to ultimately be used for the hauling of supplies between the beaches and the
Chartres area. Within five days of its inception, the Red Ball reached its peak
operational level. On 29 August, 132 companies (approximately 5,950 vehicles)
delivered 12,342 tons of supplies, a total which would not be achieved again.
The first phase of the operation came to a close between 1 and 5 September. The
Red Ball was then given a new lease and was expanded to include a route to
Soissons (First Army area) and Sommesous (Third Army area), ultimately covering
686 miles along the Soissons route and 590 miles along the Sommesous route. On
15 November, the Express officially ceased operation. During the next year,
other immediate supply operations had to be improvised, yet none approached the
sheer magnitude of the Red Ball.
A hypothetically normal run on the Red Ball was supposed to
have been conducted along the following lines: Vehicles were to pick up
supplies at the port of Cherbourg and then to proceed to St. Lô. Here they were
organized into convoys and dispatched from a traffic control point which was
tasked with regulating the convoy movement. Ninety to 150 miles later the
convoys would approach the dump areas astride the route. Either here or at the
bivouac sites fresh drivers would take over for the run back to St. Lô. There the
process would begin again.
As with most improvised operations, actual practice was
quite different from what was planned. Convoys were often dispatched even
farther east than the Chartres triangle as the armies advanced. Dumps would
close down and relocate farther forward while convoys were en route, causing
drivers to have to search for a unit which would accept their loads. Both
individual vehicles and entire convoys were often diverted by representatives
from various divisional or army units. Coordination problems such as these
plagued the Red Ball throughout its existence.
Re-supply on such a scale required the marshalling of
tremendous amounts of resources from every corner of Bradley’s army group. Many
combat units arriving in the theater were stripped of their transport as were
units classified as nonessential (such as anti-aircraft and heavy artillery).
To control effectively this gathering, several new control
measures had to be adopted and enforced along the Red Ball route. All roads
traversed by the line were marked with a large red ball to obviate the
necessity for maps and delays caused by map reading mistakes. Traffic on these
marked throughways was to be reserved expressly for vehicles supporting the
logistic effort and was only to move in one direction. Trucks were organized
into convoys which were then divided into serials. All movement was to be
conducted in these groupings at a speed not to exceed 25 miles per hour.
Intervals between each vehicle were to be 60 yards and there was to be no
passing. Stragglers were to get assistance from support units (maintenance
units and engineers) located along the route and then rejoin other convoys
carrying cargoes of the same type. Halts for breaks were permitted only for ten
minutes beginning ten minutes before every even hour. Due to the urgency of the
re-supply mission, the shuttle was to operate through a 24-hour period. The
lack of opposition from the Luftwaffe and dominance of the skies by Allied air
allowed convoys to proceed using full headlights. Delays caused by operating
under blackout conditions were thus avoided.
These measures are only a partial listing of those which
were finally incorporated into a succession of SOPs. The intent behind them was
to force a structure onto a disorganized system. Not all measures were enforced
with the same amount of consistency, enthusiasm, or success.
General Sir Brian Horrocks offers us a more realistic
description of Red Ball operations in his book Corps Commander:
Convoy after convoy of their far more powerful six-wheel lorries,
endowed with far greater acceleration and much better hill-climbing capability
than was possible with our smaller four-wheel Fords and Bedfords, swept past
me, usually being driven by cheerful-looking Negroes with a cigar in their
mouths. They seemed to be made of rubber; as often as not, one leg dangled out
of the driving cab, while the other presumably operated the accelerator pedal.
No such nonsense as vehicle spacing for them; they just raced flat out for
their destination and, in spite of not having the vaguest idea as to where they
were going, they usually, thanks to the indefatigable military police on their
powerful motor bikes, got themselves to their correct destination in the end …
The Red Ball performed wonders in terms of re-supplying the
forward units during the pursuit. However, the debilitating effects it had on
the logistic base were felt for months to come. The Red Ball ultimately
extended over five rear areas which were all tasked with full responsibility
for maintenance and control of specific sections of the route. The commitment
of resources to this responsibility varied according to the temperament of the
section commander involved. As a result, friction between the Advance Section
(responsible for the transport units involved) and the various COMZs which were
traversed increased considerably.
More pronounced in effect was the strain placed on the
vehicles used. Continual usage with little preventive maintenance being
performed brought about a rapid deterioration of equipment and roads.
Additionally, the units along the Red Ball were authorized by the Department of
the Army to overload the vehicles by one-half their listed capacity. As a
result, the number of repairs involving major components skyrocketed, placing
an additional burden on the logistic tail. An average of a hundred trucks per
day were withdrawn from the Red Ball and by November fifteen thousand had been
deadlined. Just as critical as the drain on spare parts was the failure of tire
repair shops to keep up with the demands of using units.
The effect the operation had on the personnel involved was
not as easily quantified but was just as harmful. Continual strain and minimal
supervision led to a slackening discipline and came to be accepted as the norm rather
than the exception. As time progressed, soldiers of less than desirable
character found that the opportunities for malingering, sabotage, and black
marketing abounded. The haste involved in shipping contributed to poor
documentation of shipments and sparse information on supply status. As a
result, supply accountability was lost and units received items they no longer
needed or less than necessary. The complication caused by the Red Ball
permeated all levels of the logistic effort and many were never successfully
resolved.
The Red Ball Express was a hastily improvised expedient
originally conceived as only a temporary measure. It accomplished its mission,
although in the process it exacted a terrible price from the logistic structure
in terms of personnel hardships, disciplinary problems, and equipment
deterioration. What would have been the chances of its success if the Luftwaffe
had had air parity with the Allies? What if the supply routes had to pass
through hostile territory and be subjected to the type of harassment that the
Maquis had inflicted on the Germans? If either of these conditions had been a
reality, the Red Ball effort would have been drastically reduced in
effectiveness and the story of the Allied pursuit may have had quite a
different ending.
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| Red Ball Express Route; August 25, 1944. |
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| Red Ball Express Route; September 10, 1944. |
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| Red Ball and Red Lion Express Routes, September 16, 1944. |
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| Red Ball and Red Lion Express Routes, September 20, 1944. |
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| Red Ball and Red Lion Express Routes, October 10, 1944. |
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| Red Ball, Green Diamond and White Ball Express Routes, October 16, 1944. |
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| Red Ball, Green Diamond, White Ball and ABC Express Routes, November 30, 1944. |
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| Corporal Charles H. Johnson of the 783rd Military Police Battalion, waves on a "Red Ball Express" convoy. |
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| Red Ball Express poster. This French language poster informed civilians not to use roads reserved exclusively for the Red Ball Express. |
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| This sleeve patch was worn by Red Ball Express drivers. The initials signify "Transportation Corps" and "Motor Transportation Service." |
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| Embarkation of jerrycans in a Normandy port in 1944. |
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| A Red Ball Express convoy passes a disabled truck in France in July 1944. |
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| A sign marking the Red Ball Express route and its use for those trucks only. |
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| Some of the Black members of the Red Ball Express: TSgt Serman Hughes, TSGt Hudson Murphy, Pfc Zachariah Gibbs. |
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| African American soldiers load ammunition crates into Red Ball Express CCKW trucks. |
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| A convoy of American trucks stops at a makeshift service station on September 7, 1944 for maintenance and changing drivers near Saint Denis, France. |
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| Soldiers load trucks with combat rations in preparation for a convoy to the front on December 21, 1944, in the European Theater of Operations. |
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| A highway patrol (right) pulls a dump truck to the nearest heavy vehicle maintenance depot along the Red Ball Express route in the European theater of operations. Damaged trucks were immediately repaired and put back into service. If a truck was damaged beyond repair, it was immediately replaced. |
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| Trucks from different units take out drums of gasoline from one of the storage fields of the quartermaster depot. After washing these five-gallon jerrycans, they were refilled from the tankers at the beachheads and returned to the quartermaster's depot. |
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| American drivers take a nap and relax on boxes of ammunition and other equipment on October 10, 1944 during the delivery of supplies to a forward area in France. The supply train is one of the Red Ball convoys that made up an endless chain of trucks that operated to and from the front on one-way roads. The roads were marked with Red Ball priority signs and were reserved for urgent supplies. |
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| Military Policeman waves a Red Ball Express convoy on a one-way highway en route to the front. |
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| Filling jerrycans for transportation by the Red Ball Express. |
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| Jerrycans, and even milk cans, are filled with precious fuel. |
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| Fuel is the black gold of the Battle of Normandy, the priority of supplies. |
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| Departure of convoys in Normandy on the Red Ball Express. |
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| Red Ball Express jerrycans depot; 1944. |
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| A Red Ball Express truck gets stuck in the mud; 1944. |
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| A mechanic carries out tire pressure monitoring during a convoy break. |
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| The drivers check the engine of their truck before going back to driving. |
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| A U.S. Federal truck on the Red Ball Express under the supervision of a MP. |
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| Empty trucks arrive back at the French coast to reload. |
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| From an advertisement in LIFE magazine in July 1944 indicating that behind every GI, 12 tons of baggage was necessary. |
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| Red Ball Express trucks load up ammunition from railroad box cars. |
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| Even soldiers' duffle bags were transported by the Red Ball Express. |
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| Soldiers load trucks with rations bound for frontline troops. From left to right are Pvt. Harold Hendricks, Staff Sgt. Carl Haines, Sgt. Theodore Cutright, Pvt. Lawrence Buckhalter, Pfc. Horace Deahl and Pvt. David N. Hatcher. The troops were assigned to the 4185th Quartermaster Service Company, Liege, Belgium; 1944. |
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| Soldier of Supply pledge poster, Office of War Information. |
