by Robert Emmet, Second Lieutenant, USMCR
This is a reprint of the World War II portion of the booklet A Brief History of the 11th Marines published by the Historical Section, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., in 1968.
After disbanding in 1929, the 11th Regiment disappeared for over a decade. It did not return until the Marine Corps, living up to its reputation as a force in readiness, began to greatly increase its strength in 1940. On 1 September 1940, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, was organized at Marine Barracks, Quantico.[1] On 10 October, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, left Quantico and sailed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, arriving there on 21 October. On 1 January 1941, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, was activated at Guantanamo, and three weeks later, on 23 January, the 3rd Battalion was organized there.[2] On 1 February, the 1st Marine Brigade was officially re-designated as the 1st Marine Division, and, on 1 March, Headquarters and Service Battery, 11th Marines, Colonel Pedro A. del Valle commanding, was activated in Cuba. The organization of the 11th Marines was then complete, although two more battalions were added at various times later. The 3rd Battalion was temporarily disbanded at Parris Island on 1 June 1941, but it was reorganized on 24 January 1942.
The 11th Marines had now become the artillery regiment of the 1st Marine Division. From 1940 to the present, this has been its role. There were a few, scattered instances when units of the 11th were used as infantry for short periods of time, but the 11th was no longer an infantry regiment as it had been in World War I and Nicaragua. At Guantanamo Bay, the 11th began its artillery training, starting with 75mm pack howitzers, which were used by the 1st Battalion throughout the war and by the 2nd Battalion for most of the war. The 3rd Battalion used 105mm howitzers at Guadalcanal and afterwards.
On 22 October 1941, a fourth battalion was added to the 11th Marines as a 105mm howitzer battalion at Marine Barracks, Parris Island.[3] The 4th Battalion moved to New River, North Carolina, in January 1942. The 11th Marines was completely assembled there along with the rest of the 1st Marine Division, which underwent intensive combat training until June 1942. During this time, the 11th exercised with its howitzers and took part in various training exercises learning to coordinate its fire to support the infantry. On 21 March 1942, the 1st Battalion was attached to the 3rd Marine Brigade, and it went to Samoa with the 7th Marines, but the rest of the 11th stayed together, and on 9 June it entrained at New River for a transcontinental ride to San Francisco, where it arrived on 14 June. By this time, the 5th Battalion had been activated as one more 105mm howitzer unit. On 22 June, the 11th boarded the U.S.S. John Ericsson at San Francisco and sailed for Wellington, New Zealand, with the other units of the 1st Marine Division.
Shortly after arriving at Wellington, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, received word that his Marines were to conduct an amphibious operation against the Japanese at Guadalcanal-Tulagi with a tentative landing date of 1 August 1942.[4] The initial objective was the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal. General Vandegrift was understandably surprised that he had to get his division ready in such a short time because he had expected six months of training in New Zealand. As a result, Wellington was the scene of much hard work and more than a little confusion. The main problem was to get the transports and supply ships unloaded at the docks of Wellington and then combat loaded. General Vandegrift was disturbed at the slowness of the New Zealand dock workers, but he passed down the word to organize the Marines into working parties, and, eventually, the job of unloading and reloading the vessels was accomplished. The general, in reviewing what he had to do and planning his time accordingly, decided that he needed one extra week to get his division ready to assault Guadalcanal. He asked for and received an extension of D-Day to 7 August.
On 22 July, the 1st Division left Wellington. On the way to Guadalcanal, General Vandegrift had planned to rehearse the amphibious landings at Koro in the Fiji Islands. Upon arriving, he found that the coral surrounding the islands would tear the bottoms out of the landing craft. As a result, the Marines practiced "wet-net" drills, and the landing craft practiced their maneuvers up to the reef but no further. The Marines were never able to land on the shore. On 7 August, the 1st Marine Division arrived off Guadalcanal, ready for its first taste of combat in World War II.
The landing itself was handled smoothly and professionally. There was very little initial resistance from the Japanese, most of whom had pulled back into the interior of Guadalcanal conceding the Marines a landing but preparing to fight hard once the Marines attempted to move inland and threaten the airfield. Most of the initial defenders were simply the airfield garrison, but many Japanese reinforcements entered Guadalcanal during the course of the campaign by way of the "Tokyo Express." This large influx of Japanese troops after the entry of the Marines enabled the enemy to resist strongly for six months. For all the Marines except the "salts" who were veterans of the "Banana Wars," this was their first taste of jungle combat. Many of the Marines who survived contracted malaria. Not only was sickness a problem but also, from the very start, the Marines were plagued with logistical troubles. They had not been able to pack as many supplies in the ships going to Guadalcanal as they had thought necessary, and in addition, many of the supplies that were initially packed never reached the beach because the transports and cargo ships were forced to leave the area on 9 August under pressure of Japanese naval and air strength. The initial superiority of the Japanese on the sea kept the supply situation extremely critical, and not until the U.S. Navy rallied and drove the Imperial Navy from the area were the Marines adequately supplied. The only solution to this problem at the beginning was to capture Japanese rations, which is what the Marines did.
The artillerymen of the 11th, in their battery positions, were not quite as exposed as the infantry to numerous banzai charges by the Japanese, but they were constantly harassed by naval gunfire and air attacks. The mission of the 11th Marines was to support the infantry of the 1st Marine Division with as much artillery fire as it could muster, and Colonel del Valle was able to draw the most possible from his troops and equipment in accomplishing that mission. There were two battles in which the 11th played an especially significant part on Guadalcanal, the Battle of the Tenaru and the Battle of Edson's Ridge.
The Battle of the Tenaru was one of the most desperate attempts made by the Japanese to evict the Marines from Guadalcanal. Assaulting over the Tenaru River in massive, human waves, the Japanese attacked the Marine positions to no avail. One of the main reasons that the Japanese assaults were not more successful was that the artillery of the 11th, accurate and in great volume, killed many Japanese before they ever reached the Marine positions. General Vandegrift gave a very concise account of the battle. He said, "After laying down a heavy mortar barrage, enemy infantry stormed across the river, struck our wire, and were decimated from enfiladed machine gun fire and del Valle's artillery."[5] There was no question that the Marines of the 11th knew their job and were performing it to the best of their ability.
The Battle of Edson's Ridge (12-13 September 1942) was the other battle at Guadalcanal in which the 11th Marines played a starring role. In this case, it was specifically the 3rd Battalion that delivered most of the artillery fire in support of the combined 1st Raider and Parachute Battalions, commanded by Colonel Merritt A. Edson. From approximately 0200 hours, 12 September, to dawn, 13 September, Edson's Raiders were defending a ridge, later named Edson's Ridge in honor of the colonel for his defense of it. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, pumped rounds from its 105mm howitzers at a rapid rate. The Raiders were forced to fall back to a series of different positions under the ferocity of the Japanese onslaught, but the enemy was never able to break Edson's force, and each assault produced more and more Japanese casualties. Many of the enemy fell to the fire provided by the 3rd Battalion, over 2,000 rounds, many at ranges closer than 1,600 yards. general Vandegrift later stated, "Throughout the night the 11th Marines supported the Raiders and Parachutists by nine hours of almost constant artillery fire of the greatest accuracy and effectiveness, and greatly assisted them in standing off the attacks of the enemy."[6] He labeled the effort of the 11th Marines at Edson's Ridge, "a tremendous contribution to the victory brought by dawn."[7] Colonel Edson was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor for his defense of the ridge.
Aside from these two major battles, the batteries of the 11th were involved in firing missions at scattered targets, supporting infantry units any time that they needed artillery support. These fires were augmented on 18 September when the 1st Battalion, as part of the 7th Marines (Reinforced), rejoined the 1st Division from Samoa. With five batteries now, the regiment was continually firing in support of the many patrols that had made contact with the enemy. On 1 October, Colonel del Valle became Brigadier General del Valle. General Vandegrift was highly impressed with the outstanding leadership that del Valle gave to the Marines of the 11th, and he retained del Valle as commanding general of the 11th Marines. This was the only time that the 11th Marines had a general at its head.
Until December, the fight for Guadalcanal was a matter of finding and destroying the remaining pockets of Japanese resistance on the island. Relief for the 1st Marine Division finally began to arrive in November 1942, and, in December, the Marines began to depart. Their physical condition was such that many were unable to climb the cargo nets to get back into the transports. The 11th Marines left Guadalcanal on 15 December aboard the U.S.S. Hunter Liggett and arrived at Camp Cable, Queensland, Australia, on 20 December.
Camp Cable was not an ideal area for rest and rehabilitation, but the 11th Marines celebrated Christmas of 1942 there.[8] Shortly after Christmas, the 11th sailed aboard the U.S.S. West Point to Melbourne, Australia, where it arrived on 12 January 1943. While on board the West Point, the 5th Battalion was disbanded.
Unlike the detestable Camp Cable, Melbourne proved to be almost a paradise for the battle-weary veterans of Guadalcanal. The first week there (12 to 18 January 1943) was spent getting squared away in the new camp and organizing training schedules. The men were given as much liberty as possible. The people of Melbourne were hospitable, the weather was good, and the whole atmosphere around the camp was conducive to restoring the health of those still sick from malaria. The 11th was finally able to relax. Training did not begin until 18 January, and then the program was purposely geared to start slowly, allowing the sick men to regain their strength. The 1st Marine Division embarked upon a training cycle which began with squad tactics and then expanded to the regimental level throughout the summer of 1943. The '03 rifle, which had been carried by the Marines at Guadalcanal, was replaced by the M1, and training was conducted in the care and use of this weapon. The 11th continued its artillery training with 75mm pack howitzers and 105mm howitzers. A program of physical training was also implemented for all Marines. This consisted of daily calisthenics and distance runs and was supplemented by a series of conditioning hikes with full combat gear that reached distances of 80 miles. On 1 May, the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, was once again reactivated, employing 105s.
The 7th Marines with the 1st and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines, departed from Melbourne on 19 September 1943 and sailed to Cape Sudest, New Guinea, where it arrived on 2 October. The remainder of the 11th reached there on 24 October to prepare for the upcoming Cape Gloucester landing. Staging areas for the 1st Marine Division were at Milne Bay, Oro Bay, Goodenough Island, and Cape Sudest. Headquarters of the 1st Marine Division was at Goodenough Island, and the 11th Marines completed its training at Cape Sudest.
The initial mission for the 1st Division at Cape Gloucester was to take a Japanese airdrome. A light but accurate naval gunfire bombardment preceded the amphibious assault on D-Day, 26 December 1943. Light opposition met the 11th Marines, commanded by Colonel Robert H. Pepper, as it landed on its assigned Yellow Beach area. The 1st Battalion provided close artillery support for the 7th Marines while the 4th Battalion similarly supported the 1st Marines. It quickly became evident that the terrain at Cape Gloucester was very poor for rapid displacement of the artillery. Landing the 105mm howitzers and the 75mm pack howitzers and moving to good firing positions was very difficult. The mud was often thigh-deep, and fallen trees did not make the job any easier. In fact, one of the characteristics of the fighting on New Britain was that once the artillery was set up, it was very seldom moved anywhere. The 4th Battalion never displaced from its initial position in a kunai grass patch throughout its whole stay on New Britain. LVTs were used to clear paths for the movement of artillery and often used to move the guns themselves.
Immediately upon landing, the Marines moved out to take the airdrome. The men of the 4th Battalion crossed 400 yards of swamp and mud to set up their 105s in the kunai grass patch. The first battery of the 4th Battalion was ready to fire by 1330 hours on D-Day in support of the 1st Marines. All batteries of the 4th Battalion were in place and registered by nightfall on D-Day. Meanwhile, the artillerymen of the 1st Battalion moved their 75mm pack howitzers to Silimati Point in order to support the 7th Marines. The 2nd Battalion landed at 1325 hours on D-Day. As the infantry pressed closer to the airdrome, which was believed to be defended by two Japanese battalions, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battalions massed their fires on the enemy. It was finally taken on 29 December by the 1st Marines, minus the 2nd Battalion, and the 5th Marines.
On D-Day, Landing Team 21 landed at Green Beach. LT 21 amounted to the 2nd Battalion reinforced with Lieutenant Colonel James M. Masters, Sr., in command. Included in LT 21 was Battery H, 11th Marines, organized as three platoons of infantry. The mission of LT 21 was "to cut the main coastal track to prevent the Japanese from escaping from the airdrome or to prevent reinforcement of the Japanese garrison at the airdrome, to discover and control important subsidiary trails, to create a diversion, and to destroy any Japanese encountered."[9] There was no initial need for artillery at Green Beach, and Masters felt that the men of H Battery could be better put to work as infantrymen. The Japanese attacked the Green Beach perimeter at 0155 hours, 30 December, in an action that came to be known as the Battle of Coffin Corner. By 0700 hours, the enemy attack was broken. On 31 December, Masters returned H Battery to its artillery role, firing in support of patrols.
While the 1st and 5th Marines were attacking the airdrome, well-entrenched Japanese at Suicide Creek, a small stream just inland from the Yellow Beaches, held up elements of the 7th Marines on 27 December and forced them to dig in on the opposite bank. Banzai charges across the creek by the enemy failed to push back the 7th Marines, and artillery fire from the 1st Battalion was very useful in breaking the Japanese assaults.
The next mission for the 1st Division, after taking the Cape Gloucester airdrome, was to push on to Borgen Bay and to destroy all Japanese resistance in its path. On 4 January, the 7th Marines was finally able to cross Suicide Creek with the support of armor and artillery and join the attack on the next pieces of key terrain—Hill 150, Aogiri Ridge, and Hill 660, which was the key to the whole Cape Gloucester operation. If the Japanese organized on it, they could fire artillery all over the area at the Marines, and the hold on the airdrome would never be secure.
The first attack was against Hill 150, and it began at 1100 hours, 6 January. The units involved were Weapons Company, 7th Marines, and 1st and 2nd Battalions, 7th Marines, and 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. All infantry units used tank support. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, fired 15 minutes of preparation fire on Hill 150, which was taken after a short battle.
Next in line was the attack on Aogiri Ridge led by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. On 9 January, 1st and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines, pounded Aogiri Ridge with artillery fire. The ridge was very heavily defended, and the slopes were steep and muddy. The infantry slowly slogged up the hill and took it after a bitter fight. The Japanese attempted a banzai counterattack at 0115 hours, 10 January, and they tried four more during the night, but each one was driven back. The 4th Battalion fired 105mm rounds within 50 yards of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, during the night to help repulse the enemy.
Hill 660, which was the most important objective, proved also to be the toughest to take. This attack began at 0800 hours, 13 January, and it was spearheaded by the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. As at Aogiri Ridge, the 1st and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines, prepared the hill for the infantry. The 105s of the 4th Battalion alone fired 1,200 rounds in preparation. The attack on Hill 660 bogged down on 13 January because of the strength of the Japanese defense and the constant rain turning the steep slope into almost untrafficable mud. The Marines dug into the slope of Hill 660 for the night only to resume the attack at 0900 hours the following morning. During the day, the infantry made slow but steady progress through the slime as the 1st and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines, rained fire on the Japanese positions. The Marines finally made it to the top at 1830 hours, 14 January, and consolidated on the ridge expecting the inevitable banzai counterattack, but this time it did not come immediately because a torrential downpour prevented the Japanese from sufficiently reorganizing themselves that night. The heavy rain gave the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, time to consolidate effectively, and not only was the battalion dug in with interlocking fields of fire but also plenty of 81mm mortar fire and artillery fire from the 11th was called on the Japanese when they finally returned. At 0530 hours, 16 January, the Japanese threw all their reserves at Hill 660 in an attempt to expel the 3rd Battalion. The attack was a disaster for the enemy and marked the end of strong Japanese resistance in the Cape Gloucester area.
The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, supported the 5th Marines in the Natamo Point operations in late January 1944 while the 5th was trying to cut off Japanese withdrawal routes. In the Volupai-Talasea operation (6 to 11 March 1944), two batteries of 75mm pack howitzers from the 2nd Battalion landed at Red Beach on D-Day (6 March). The 11th took its worst casualties of the New Britain fighting here. The batteries of the 2nd Battalion had to set up their howitzers on the exposed beach because there was no other place to go, and they took a tremendous pounding from 90mm mortars. Out of a total of 13 Marines killed in action during this operation, nine were from the 2nd Battalion. Also, the 2nd Battalion sustained 29 wounded in action, more than one-third of the total Marines wounded in the operation.
An interesting and amusing sidelight to the participation of the 11th on New Britain came out of the story of the Gilnit Patrol, a battalion-size patrol led by Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller. Artillery had nothing to do with this patrol in terms of fire support, but some individuals from the 11th participated. Puller had little patience with anyone, especially junior officers who did not keep themselves in good physical condition, and fat artillery lieutenants were fair game for his wrath. Puller ordered one bulbous artillery lieutenant from the 11th to go on the patrol because he thought "the walk would do the artilleryman's girth some good."[10]
In summary, it must be said that the dense rain forest of New Britain greatly reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire on well dug-in Japanese troops. Many rounds exploded harmlessly high in the trees. During all the various landings, the 11th showed outstanding speed and proficiency in moving its howitzers over bad terrain. The proficiency of the 11th at doing this earned it the Navy Unit Commendation, the only unit award issue for the New Britain fighting. Counterbattery fire by the 11th was excellent and succeeded in suppressing Japanese artillery. The Army relieved the Marines at New Britain on 25 April. The cannoneers of the 11th hoped that they would go back to Australia, but this idea was shattered when they found themselves on Pavuvu in the Russell Islands.
The Marines could not have been more disappointed when they arrived at their next camp. Training camps in the FMF have always been known for their spartan conditions, but few could match Pavuvu in the Russell Islands. It was here that not only the 11th Marines, but the whole 1st marine Division, found itself following the rigorous fighting on New Britain. Sick troops who needed some rest were unable to get it. No preparations had been made on the island for the division. There would be no time for relaxation because camps had to be built, and, when that was done, it was necessary to begin training again. Health and morale were at an all-time low for the whole division.[11]
Training was very difficult on Pavuvu. One basic problem was that the area of the island was too small for large-scale training and exercises. The terrain of Pavuvu was not at all like that of Peleliu, which was the next target for the 1st Marine Division. As far as the 11th Marines was concerned, artillery was "reduced to the pitiful expedient of firing into the water with the observers out in a boat or DUKW."[12] Artillery also had very little time to practice loading and unloading the 75mm pack howitzers and the 105mm howitzers in LVT-4s and DUKWs. The division was very short of equipment to practice amphibious phases of training. The summer of 1944 was chaotic and uncomfortable for the 1st Marine Division. The training program culminated in two full-scale rehearsals of amphibious landings in preparation for the Peleliu operation at Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal, on 27-29 August. After returning to Pavuvu and conducting a few, long conditioning hikes, the 1st Marine Division was ready for Peleliu. D-Day at Peleliu was 15 September 1944. At Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester, the Japanese had not seriously challenged the division on the beaches, and the landings were relatively easy compared to the fighting following the landings. At Peleliu, however, the Japanese strongly opposed the assault force, especially in that portion of beach where the 1st Marines landed. Before long, the beach was littered with blazing amphibian tractors. The 1st Marines landed on the division's left, the 5th Marines in the centers, and the 7th Marines on the right.[13] As a general rule, the further to the left a Marine was, the greater his chances were of being killed on the beach because that was where the Japanese had placed their greatest strength. The 1st Marines took extremely heavy casualties, but it dug in and did not lose ground.
The artillery group for the landing was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William H. Harrison, commanding officer of the 11th Marines. The group consisted of two battalions of III Amphibious Corps artillery, the 3rd 155mm Howitzer Battalion and the 8th 155mm Gun Battalion, in addition to the 11th Marines.[14] The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, was in direct support of the 1st Marines. It came ashore with the 7th Marines, but its mission was not altered. The 2nd Battalion, the other 75mm pack howitzer battalion, supported the 5th Marines. The 3rd Battalion was originally supposed to be in general support, but its mission was changed to support the 7th Marines with its 105s. The other 105mm howitzer battalion, the 4th, was employed in general support along with the two artillery battalions from the III Amphibious Corps. The 5th Battalion had been disbanded again at Pavuvu. All units of the 11th Marines were ashore and registered by dark on D-Day.[15] The III Amphibious Corps artillery was unable to land on D-Day, but the 3rd 155mm Howitzer Battalion landed on 16 September, and the 8th 155mm Gun Battalion came ashore the following day.
After one week on Peleliu, Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith remarked:
Seven days after landing, all of the southern end of Peleliu was in our possession as well as the high ground immediately dominating the airfield. All of the beaches that were ever used were in use.
There was room for the proper deployment of all the artillery, including the corps artillery. Unloading was unhampered except by the weather and hydrographic conditions. The airfield was available and essential base development work was underway.[16]
In other words, although the 1st Marine Division, especially the 1st Marines, was taking heavy casualties, the fighting was going well.
For the first two weeks, all artillery support was handled in a strictly conventional way. There was a lot of massed preparatory, harassing, and interdicting fire.[17] On 28 September, for instance, all of the artillery battalions except 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, concentrated intensive preparatory fire on Ngesebus Island in preparation for the shore-to-shore movement to take that island. After the first two weeks, however, the artillery was no longer massed. The enemy resistance was in small pockets, and massed fire was generally more dangerous to friendly troops than to the enemy in that situation. The 105s and the 155s were used effectively firing directly into the mouths of caves where the Japanese were hiding.
Artillerymen not needed on the guns became infantrymen and were quickly dubbed "Infantillery." This campaign indicated the usefulness of training every Marine to be an infantryman regardless of what his normal line of work turns out to be. The Marines of the 11th proved themselves to be competent infantrymen, filling gaps where the infantry units were taking heavy casualties. The fighting on Peleliu after a couple of weeks became an infantryman's campaign, almost, but not quite, to the exclusion of supporting arms.
After securing southern Peleliu, the division turned its attention to the conquest of the northern part of the island. There were three main tactical considerations involved in the drive against northern Peleliu. The first was to bypass and isolate the pocket of resistance which had effectively held up both the 1st and 7th Marines in the early fighting and to gain better approaches to this pocket. The second consideration was to gain good ground from which to launch a shore-to-shore assault on Ngesebus Island where there was an unfinished Japanese fighter strip, one of the original objectives of the campaign. The final consideration was to halt the Japanese reinforcement of the Peleliu garrison by reserves coming from islands in the north.[18]
By 30 September, northern Peleliu was secured, but, by this time, the fitness of the 1st Marines for further combat in this campaign was questionable. Also, the 75mm pack howitzers had not proven to be effective against enemy taking cover in caves, and so it was decided that the 75s would no longer be needed. A convoy containing the 1st Marines, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 11th Marines, and the 1st Tank Battalion, departed from Peleliu for the Russell Islands on 2 October. The shortcomings of the 75mm pack howitzers at Peleliu had a great bearing on the subsequent decision to use 105mm howitzers in three artillery battalions instead of only in two. After Peleliu, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, joined the ranks of the 105mm howitzer battalions, and the 1st Battalion was the only 75mm howitzer battalion remaining in the 11th Marines.
The fighting for the remainder of the 1st Marine Division was far from over because there were still some tenacious Japanese defenders prepared to fight to the death in a region called the Umurbrogol, which proved to be one of the toughest areas to fight in that the Marines ever encountered. There is a good geological explanation for its amazing terrain. Peleliu was pushed above the surface of the ocean by the great pressure exerted by subterranean, volcanic action. Where the pressure was strongest, "the ground had buckled and cracked to form a maze of ridges and defiles, the whole littered with jagged boulders and rubble which had been torn adrift by the violent action."[19] The intense pressure accounted for the broken nature of the terrain and for many underground faults which had eroded into many natural caves. The Japanese exploited these caves skillfully in their defense. They were eventually driven from the Umurbrogol, but only at great cost in American lives and equipment. This Japanese last-ditch defense on Peleliu was a great deal more devastating, even in failure, than the most ferocious banzai charge. Massed artillery fire was not effective in the Umurbrogol because it was too dangerous to friendly troops, who, of necessity, had to be very close to the enemy, and it did not hurt the Japanese except to keep them pinned down and to reduce their visibility. Direct fire of the 105s was effective when it could be employed, but often the cannons could not be placed in the right position because of the difficulties presented by the jagged terrain. When it could be done, the effect on the defenders of a 105mm howitzer pumping high explosive rounds into a cave from 200 yards away was devastating.
The 1st Marine Division was on Peleliu for one month, and it wrested the island from the Japanese, but it did not entirely finish the job. There were still many Japanese for the Army to mop up after the 1st Marine Division departed. All the Marine infantry regiments took a great number of casualties with the 1st Marines at the head of the list. The Army permanently relieved the Marines on 15 October, exactly one month after D-Day, and by 20 October all the Marines were on their way back to the Russells. The 3rd and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines, joined the first two battalions at Pavuvu.
Pavuvu was no better place to train during the winter of 1944-45 than it had been in the summer of 1944. There was still as much mud as before, and there was still not enough room to maneuver. Pavuvu was so small that "eventually units were forced to skirmish down company streets."[20] The difficulties of training the 11th in artillery at Pavuvu were the same as they had been earlier in the year. During this time, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, was converted to a 105mm howitzer battalion. The 1st Marine Division made the best of what little training area it had until March 1945 when it left Pavuvu for its final combat operation of World War II, Okinawa.
When the 1st Marine Division left the Russells on 15 March 1945, Major General Pedro A. del Valle, commander of the 11th Marines at Guadalcanal, was the new commanding general of the division. New Navy transports were used to carry the men from Pavuvu to Okinawa, and this was a welcome change. They were in much better condition than the ships used to transport Marines earlier in the war. First, the division sailed to Ulithi and arrived there on 21 March. It anchored there from 21 to 27 March, grouping and organizing with the rest of the naval expeditionary forces headed for Okinawa. L-Day at Okinawa was 1 April.
The Okinawa operation was a unique one for the 1st Marine Division in World War II in that it was "the first time it was landing as an integral part of a much larger landing force, and matters of coordination and control not met in previous campaigns had to be considered."[21] The main point to be made was that the Okinawa landing, far from being solely a Marine and Navy effort, included a great number of Army troops. The 1st and 6th Marine Divisions provided the assault elements of the III Amphibious Corps, which, together with the Army XXIV Corps, formed the Tenth Army under the command of Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, USMC. The 1st Marine Division was to land right in the center of the Tenth Army beaches between Yontan and Kadena airfields. Most of the Marines anticipated that the landing would be heavily opposed at the beachhead. There was a seawall that had to be scaled, and there was not a man in the assault who did not worry about getting over that wall.
At 0830 hours, 1 April, the first assault troops hit the beach. They simply stood up and moved quickly across it. There was a little, ineffective, sniper fire, nothing more. The Yontan airfield was secured at 1130 hours before any unit of the 11th Marines reached the shore. Securing this airfield was expected to take four or five days, not three hours. What was even more remarkable was that the airfield was undamaged, and so were most of the Japanese planes on the runway. Colonel Wilburt S. Brown was the commanding officer of the 11th at Okinawa, and his first battalion to land was the 4th, which hit the beach at 1200 hours. Almost all the artillery was ashore by 1530 hours. Because the enemy was not resisting as strongly as anticipated, the infantry moved out fast putting a great strain on communications and making it almost impossible for forward observers to register their batteries.[22] The infantry was moving up too quickly for the artillery to keep up.
By 2 April, displacement was necessary for all four battalions of the 11th, especially the 1st. The supported units of the 1st Battalion were beyond effective range of its 75mm pack howitzers. Displacement on 2 April was impossible, however, because of a lack of transportation. Two battalions, including the 1st, displaced on 3 April, and the other two displaced the following day. The infantry of the 1st Marine Division was moving so fast through its zone of action that it could not have had artillery support in the first days if it had needed it. On 2 April, General del Valle said, "I don't know where the Japs are, and I can't offer you any good reason why they let us come ashore so easily."[23] The zone of action of the 1st Marine Division, which stretched across Okinawa, was secured in four days. Only a very few Marines had been killed or wounded, and only a few Japanese had been killed because almost none had been seen. There were two reasons for the lack of resistance encountered by the division. First, enemy strength in the division's zone of action had been greatly overestimated by the United States military authorities. The Japanese were critically short on supplies of every kind, and, not wanting to waste what little they had, they were lying low, hoping that the Kamikazes would cripple the American effort. Secondly, and even more important, the bulk of the Japanese Thirty-second Army was holding defensive positions concentrically ringed about Shuri Castle. The remainder of the enemy force was located off the Minatogawa beaches in the southeast. The XXIV Corps, therefore, encountered the real strength of the Japanese.
The first days on Okinawa for XXIV Corps were not as easy as they were for III Amphibious Corps, and, on 9 April, the 11th Marines moved south to join the XXIV Corps and to provide artillery support for the Army divisions there. The battalions of the 11th fired supporting missions for the Army, and they helped the Army to slowly push back the enemy in the south. On 27 April, the rest of the 1st Marine Division was attached to XXIV Corps in order to aid the Army in the south. The 1st Marine Division relieved the 27th Infantry Division, which had taken a heavy beating.
One important operation in May was the seizure of Dakeshi Ridge. On 8 May, the 1st Marine Division returned to III Amphibious Corps control, but it remained in the south where it was needed. The attack on Dakeshi Ridge was scheduled for the early morning of 11 May, but the Japanese attacked the Marines just before the Marine attack was scheduled to begin. The Japanese assault was repelled largely because of a heavy volume of accurate fire from the 11th Marines. The attack on Dakeshi Ridge started on schedule, and, by nightfall of 12 May, after two days of bitter fighting, the 7th Marines, which led the attack, had a hold on the ridge. The 11th had expended many rounds in support. On 13 May, the 7th Marines was routing the Japanese out of the town of Dakeshi, and, on 16 May, the 7th again was in the lead attacking Wana Ridge. After the 7th took Wana, the enemy returned with a vicious counterattack and drove back some of the more badly battered units of the 7th. The 11th ceaselessly hurled high explosive on the ridge and helped the 7th to eventually bend back the Japanese effort. The exhausted 7th was finally relieved there on 19 May.
It was really the great effectiveness of the Marine tank-infantry team that meant success in the 1st Marine Division zone of action. As it had done at Peleliu, the artillery often used direct fire to rout the Japanese out of the caves in which they were hiding. The howitzers neutralized the enemy and kept him pinned down, but even the most ardent artilleryman would have to admit that it was the tanks, grinding and crawling right up to the mouths of the caves, firing high explosive or spewing flame, that furnished the most effective support for the infantry in this type of fighting. On 28 May, a Marine patrol entered Shuri Castle itself. Japanese resistance in that area was broken.
One of the greatest victories for the supporting arms of artillery and naval gunfire came on 26 May. A naval gunfire air observer spotted a few hundred Japanese soldiers walking down a road. This proved to be part of a skillfully planned Japanese withdrawal. Naval vessels pumped rounds into the area, and all available artillery, including every unit of the 11th Marines, fired on that area and on the towns of Zahana, Gisushi, and Dakiton, where enemy troops were sheltered. This pummeling resulted in the loss of 3,000 to 4,000 Japanese lives.
Japanese resistance in the III Amphibious Corps zone next centered around the town of Itoman and Kunishi Ridge. Itoman was quickly secured, and then Kunishi Ridge was divided, the 7th Marines taking the west and the 1st Marines attacking the east end. The west end was taken in two night attacks by the 7th Marines. The first occurred at 0330 hours, 12 June, at which time two companies from 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, made it to their objectives. The rest of the 7th Marines reached their objectives on the following night. The commanding officer of the 7th Marines said, "I do not believe I would have attempted the night attack without the sure knowledge that the artillery could have blunted any serious counterattack. Without artillery, without the excellent artillery we had in support, the night attack would have been too risky."[24] One battalion commanding officer of the same regiment said, "It [artillery] gave them [infantry] a real sense of security at Okinawa. If the tank-infantry team was the offensive weapon, our artillery was our best defense. Not since Guadalcanal had the average infantryman realized how important it was to him."[25] After effectively supporting the attack led by the 7th on the west end of Kunishi Ridge, the 11th hit the east end with its cannon in support of the 1st Marines, which gained its objective on 15 June.
The 11th was really most important in a defensive role at Okinawa, steadily suppressing all Japanese attempts to counterattack objectives won by the infantry of the 1st Marine Division or units of the various Army divisions that it at times supported. The 11th was also effective in counterbattery fire. The Japanese were very strong in 70mm guns, 75mm and 150mm howitzers, and 5-inch coast defense guns. This Japanese artillery was often silenced by the 11th. The batteries of the 11th supported many attacks by infantry battalions, and the fire that they provided was more than useful, but, in a role of offensive support, they had to take second place behind the tanks. Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, commanding the 6th Marine Division, said, "If any one supporting arm can be singled out as having contributed more than any others during the progress of the campaign, the tank would certainly be selected."[26]
The number of artillery rounds fired on Okinawa was extraordinary and indicated in itself the vast importance of artillery as a supporting arm in that campaign. For example, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, alone fired 100,300 rounds as compared with the 120,000 round total of the whole 11th Marines on Peleliu.[27] The fact that the 1st Battalion fired almost as many rounds with its 75mm pack howitzer on Okinawa as the 11th Marines fired on Peleliu was indicative of the great amount of work accomplished by the artillerymen in this campaign because the 75s were used only very sparingly against enemy in caves. The other batteries fired many more rounds than the 1st in this capacity.
When the fighting on Okinawa was over, a rumor circulated that the 1st Marine Division was going to Hawaii. Like most other hopeful words, this was false. The division had to remain on Okinawa, where it constructed its own camp on Motobu Peninsula. The Marines turned to the new task with an attitude of, "Well, dammit, if they can dish it out, I can take it."[28] The division figured prominently in the plans for the invasion of Japan, but these were unnecessary because, on 14 August, the cease-fire was proclaimed. The next step for the 11th Marines and the rest of the 1st Marine Division was North China.
On 26 September 1945, the 1st Marine Division departed Okinawa for North China. Arriving at the mouth of the Hai River, the 11th Marines disembarked and moved to Tientsin, where it was billeted in the East French Arsenal. The Marines received a hearty welcome from the Chinese populace, and the Japanese garrison that was to be relieved was docile and polite. The mission of all the Marines in North China, according to James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, was "to accomplish the disarmament of the Japanese and to provide for their repatriation up to the point where General Wedemeyer considers that the Chinese Nationalist government troops can alone carry out this mission."[29] Officially, the Marines were to take no part in the struggle for power going on in China between the Nationalists and the Communists. They were simply supposed to assist the Nationalists in solving the problem of relieving and repatriating the Japanese soldiers who remained in China following the surrender. The Marines, nevertheless, found themselves involved in many activities necessary to allow the Nationalist government to bring about at least some vestige of control over the people in the countryside. The Chinese Communists in late 1945 were conducting guerrilla warfare effectively among the peasantry. They were not strong enough yet to face the Chinese Nationalist Army in a pitched battle, but they were adept at harassment.
The 1st and 11th Marines initially took responsibility for the bivouacking and repatriation of the Japanese soldiers at Tientsin. Units from the 11th and other regiments of the 1st Marine Division were sent out along the railroads to Peiping and Chinwangtao in order to suppress the numerous Communist attempts to disrupt rail traffic. They guarded all lines of communication around Tientsin, the coal fields, and the coal shipments on the railroad. Without the Marines to guard all of this, the Nationalists would have been unable to keep utilities or factories running. In handling this guard duty, the Marines became involved in many incidents with the Chinese Communists.
The personal situation for the Marines, as well as for the rest of the 1st Marine Division, was very poor. Because of a demobilization effort conducted by all the services following the end of the war, the Marine Corps suffered a large cutback of personnel. It was not long before many Marines of the 1st Division were eligible to go home under the point discharge and rotation plans. By December 1945, there was a large decrease of Marines in China. There were some replacements for the veterans who were sent home, but these were little more than "boots," who were young and still had much to learn in basic military subjects.[30]
By January 1946, the Marines were no longer responsible for the custody of Japanese personnel and equipment, or Japanese subsistence and repatriation, a job that they had efficiently carried on throughout the fall of 1945. They still continued to aid and advise the Chinese on this project, and, by the mid-summer of 1946, all the Japanese except for a small group of technicians had been repatriated. The Marines then increased their concentration on protecting the railways to Chinwangtao and Peiping and the coal fields in the area, since the Communists were becoming increasingly bold in their attacks. During August and September, however, the Chinese Nationalist Army took over full responsibility for the security of the coal fields and the railway between Peiping and Chinwangtao.
In September 1946, the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, moved from Tientsin to barracks in the Peitaiho-Chinwangtao area joining the 7th Marines. The rest of the 11th remained at Tientsin. Many of the Marines who had been spread out along the railways were pulled back into the city of Tientsin, and the Chinese Nationalist Army undertook greater responsibility for security against the Communists. On 1 October, Colonel Eugene F. C. Collier relieved Colonel Brown, who had led the 11th since the start of the Okinawa campaign, as commanding officer. On 20 December, the 4th Battalion left Tientsin and joined the 3rd Battalion and the 7th Marines at Chinwangtao. On 2 January 1947, the 3rd and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines, and the 7th Marines departed from Chinwangtao for the United States, arriving at San Diego on 22 January. The 4th Battalion was disbanded on 17 February. The rest of the 11th Marines left North China for Guam, joining the 3rd Marine Brigade. They remained in Guam just long enough to construct a camp of Quonset huts before going home.
Commanding Officers
Regiment activated 1 March 1941.
Colonel Pedro A. del Valle: 1 March 1941 to 30 September 1942
Brigadier General Pedro A. del Valle: 1 October 1942 to 28 March 1943
Colonel Robert H. Pepper: 29 March 1943 to 31 January 1944
Colonel William H. Harrison: 1 February 1944 to 3 November 1944
Colonel Wilburt S. Brown: 4 November 1944 to 30 September 1946
Colonel Eugene F. C. Collier: 1 October 1946 to 2 July 1947
Honors of the 11th Marines
Presidential Unit Citation with One Silver Star and One Bronze Star: Guadalcanal—7-9 August 1942; Peleliu—15-29 September 1944; Okinawa—1 April-21 June 1945
Navy Unit Commendation with One Bronze Star: New Britain—26 December 1943-30 April 1944
American Defense Service Streamer with One Bronze Star: 1 March—7 December 1941
Asiatic Pacific Campaign Streamer with One Silver and One Bronze Star: Guadalcanal-Tulagi landings—7-9 August 1942; Capture and defense of Guadalcanal—10 August-22 December 1942; New Guinea—15 October-25 December 1943; New Britain—26 December 1943-1 March 1944; Palau Islands—15 September-14 October 1944; Okinawa—1 April-30 June 1945
World War II Victory Streamer
Navy Occupation Service Streamer with Asia Clasp: 2 September-26 September 1945
China Service Streamer: 30 September 1945-24 January 1947
National Defense Service Streamer with One Bronze Star
[1] Subject Files, 11th Marines, 1st Battalion, Historical Reference Section, Historical Branch, G‑3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
[2] Ibid., 3rd Battalion.
[3] Ibid., 4th Battalion.
[4] General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Once A Marine, Norton, New York, 1964, page 105.
[5] Ibid., page 141.
[6] Ibid., page 158.
[7] Ibid., page 155.
[8] Grady Gallant, On Valor's Side, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1963, page 350.
[9] Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough and Major John A. Crown, The Campaign on New Britain, Historical Branch, G‑3 Division, Headquarters, USMC, Washington, D.C., 1952, page 82.
[10] Ibid., page 165.
[11] Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough, The Assault on Peleliu, Historical Branch, G‑3 Division, Headquarters, USMC, Washington, D.C., 1950, page 25.
[12] Ibid., page 28.
[13] Ibid., page 94.
[14] Ibid., page 98.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., page 99.
[17] Ibid., page 103.
[18] Ibid., page 104.
[19] Ibid., page 136.
[20] Major Charles S. Nichols and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific, Historical Branch, G‑3 Division, Headquarters, USMC, Washington, D.C., 1955, page 33.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., page 69.
[23] George McMillan, The Old Breed: A History of the 1st Marine Division in World War II, Infantry Journal Press, Washington, D.C., 1949, page 362.
[24] Ibid., page 418.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Nichols and Shaw, op.cit., page 271.
[27] McMillan, op.cit., page 372.
[28] Ibid., page 424.
[29] Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The United States Marines in North China, 1945‑1949, Historical Branch, G‑3 Division, Headquarters, USMC, Washington, D.C., 1962, page 7.
[30] Ibid., page 13.
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| 75 mm pack howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 11th U.S. Marine Regiment fire in support of the U.S. Marine and Army operation against Japanese forces around Koli Point on Guadalcanal in November 1942. |
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| Guadalcanal, August 1942. A 75 mm pack howitzer section of the 11th Marines occupies a former Japanese emplacement in the Lunga perimeter. |
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| Members of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines operate an anti-aircraft gun. |
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| Colonel Pedro del Valle, the commanding officer of 11th Marine Regiment (center, standing), Gen. Thomas Holcomb, commandant of the Marine Corps (center, sitting), and Gen. Alexander Vandegrift (right), the commanding general of 1st Marine Division inspect 11th Marines aboard Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 1942. |
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| Marines of the 11th Regiment manning a 75 mm pack howitzer, hurl shells at enemy ridge positions on Peleliu, from hastily-dug emplacements. |
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| A 75mm pack howitzer of the 11th Marines fires in support of the advance on the Cape Gloucester airfields. |
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| A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the 11th Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy on Guadalcanal. |
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| Marines on Guadalcanal sight their 75mm pack howitzer. |
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| The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, fires in support of the 7th Marines. |
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| Artillerymen of the 11th Marines swabbing the barrel of their pack howitzer during the Okinawa campaign. |
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| Aboard USS Wakefield (AP-21), Col. Pedro Del Valle, Commanding officer of the 11th Marine Regiment, scans the ocean, June 1942. Colonel DelValle spent the entire war in the Pacific, and went on to command the First Marine Division on Okinawa. He retired as a LtGen in 1948 and passed away in 1978. |
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| October 29, 1942: U.S. Marines man a 75mm pack howitzer on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomon Islands. |
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