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| A panzergrenadier remains concealed in a field as a Soviet tank approaches. |
by Robert C. Smith
The Soviet 1943 Summer Counteroffensive and the Soviet Fall/Winter 1943-1944 Offensive had caused disastrous German losses south of the Pripet Marshes, yet north of this area, the offensives had been relatively limited. In fact, the only serious alteration in positions was the Soviet offensive that drove German and Axis troops away from the city of Leningrad.
For the troops of German Army Group Center, the war seemed to be some faraway event. Most of their time was spent in the development of densely fortified positions around strategic towns and cities, and guarding key river crossings. The troops were handicapped by the persistent combing of their ranks to find combat-ready troops to send in as replacements in the south. Everyone assumed that, given enough time, they could make up in strength and tenacity of their fortified positions what they were losing in manpower and equipment, especially mobile units.
The Soviet successes during the preceding summer had imposed yet another constraint on the troops, namely that as the troops on the southern flank of the Army Group were forced to withdraw, the troops from Army Group Center were forced to extend themselves and guard the exposed flank. Fortunately for the Germans, the terrain favored their defense efforts, since they could easily use the Pripet River and its tributaries as terrain reinforcements for their positions. Even so, the 400,000 men of Army Group Center were stretched out thinly, covering a front that extended in a sweeping curve from near Polotosk south around Bobruisk and then along the Pripet River. This amounted to almost 600 kilometers of front for the troops to defend, as well as innumerable salients, strong points, and, above all, the rear areas.
The terrain tended to favor the defense. Virtually all the major rivers in the area ran north-south; only the Pripet ran east-west. Many areas were heavily forested, a factor that favored the defense; but other areas were marsh, a factor that hindered the movement of friend and foe alike and made the cohesive operation of large forces difficult. The Germans had carefully taken advantage of terrain in their development of fortifications. Most fortified localities included a variety of trenches, earth-reinforced pillboxes, dense minefields, and special fighting positions where the turrets of spare or severely damaged tanks were used as the artillery for the area. The problem facing the Germans was not so much the power of the individual fortifications, but the fact that the whole front could not be covered in anything like the desired troop density. The command of Army Group Center hoped that the available panzer and panzergrenadier units would be able to cover the thinly held gaps along the front.
Strategically, the task of Army Group Center was to prevent the advance of Soviet units along the easy campaigning terrain of westernmost Russia and eastern Poland. After taking a leaf from the Soviet book on the defense, it was hoped that the defenses would allow the Germans to hold out indefinitely against the Soviet Summer Offensive, while mobile units were rushed into position to deliver the coup. This decision had been made at the highest political level—by Hitler himself.
Hitler made a careful examination of the front, trying to guess where the Soviets, now with the initiative firmly in their grasp, would strike in their inevitable Summer Offensive. Given the weak hold that the Germans maintained along the Pripet River to the south of Army Group Center, and the fact that any other attack would have to cross numerous defended river lines, it was logical to assume that the Soviets would take the easy way out, the one that offered the greatest advantage for the least cost. It was assumed that the Soviets would attempt to force the Pripet River line, then roll up the southern flank of Army Group Center.
Unfortunately for the troops in Army Group Center, the assumptions were wrong. The Soviets planned to make a head-on assault against Army Group Center and its fortified localities. Although there was considerable evidence that the Soviets were planning a truly massive attack against the face of Army Group Center, a combination of Soviet diversionary operations (that would later develop into offensives in their own right) and careful control of radio traffic preserved both tactical and strategic surprise.
With a fine sense of history and irony, the Soviets launched their attack on 22 June 1944, the third anniversary of the German invasion of the USSR. In manpower alone, the Soviets outnumbered the Germans six-to-one, and they dominated all other categories in the same manner. Massive attacks by Soviet artillery divisions tore huge holes in the weakened German lines, while infantry assaults, backed up by armored units, ripped the gaps wider. Tank and mechanized corps poured through the gaps, plunging deep into the German rear, severing communications everywhere. While portions of the Soviet attackers rolled onward, others curved in behind the Germans in their fortified localities and trapped them.
The huge manpower losses inflicted on Army Group Center, as well as the materiel losses, had so weakened the horse cavalry units, while the river obstacles were bridged by wooden submerged bridges and crossed underwater by sealed tanks. Each of the fortified localities was completely surrounded by the end of the first week, and most had been captured, the troops inside them either killed or captured. The brutal combination of very heavy artillery bombardment and skillful use of combat teams of armor, infantry, engineers, and anti-tank guns made a mockery of the German defenses. With the front collapsing around them, just one thought filled the minds of the German defenders—Escape!
During the first week of the offensive, over twenty German divisions were eliminated totally. Over one hundred thousand German soldiers died, and another forty thousand were captured—at one blow, over a third of the forces of Army Group Center had ceased to exist.
The pursuit that followed was as skillful as it was merciless. Frantic to stop the Soviet hordes, the Germans threw in everything they could scrape together in a series of uncoordinated counterattacks. The Soviets stood firm and allowed the attacks to batter themselves against their hasty defenses, then they counterattacked in turn, destroying the men who tried to block their path. During the third week of the offensive, the Soviet pursuit formed yet another pocket.
German troops, driven back and funneled into the city of Minsk, were surrounded after a fierce series of tank battles that enclosed them in a monstrous pocket—over one hundred thousand German troops were trapped. Within a few days, the soldiers in the pocket had joined their comrades in death or captivity.
The huge manpower losses inflicted on Army Group Center, as well as the material losses, had so weakened the German Army that to resist was suicidal, yet still had to be done, no matter what the cost. The tables of three years before had been turned, and now it was the turn of the German Army to stand and die to protect its homeland. Reinforcements from the west, originally earmarked for the defense of Normandy, were hastily thrown in front of the Soviet offense. Finally, after just more than a month of fighting, the Soviets took a well-deserved rest.
In thirty-two days of heavy fighting, the Soviets had killed more than four hundred thousand German troops (i.e., the original strength of Army Group Center), captured another 150,000 men, and inflicted an immense number of casualties, destroying forever the trained offensive power of nearly thirty German divisions. From now on, the half-trained man- and boy-power of the Reich would suffer needless losses while the enemy still advanced without any serious opposition. Besides the heavy manpower losses, the materiel loss was enormous: huge supply dumps, railroad locomotives and rolling stock, more than 630 aircraft, sixteen thousand pieces of artillery, sixty thousand vehicles of all sorts, and, most important, 2,500 tanks and assault guns—the equipment for five panzer divisions.
What was even more significant for the future was not the fact that the Soviets had effectively emasculated the German Army, but that they had proven, without qualification, that they could conduct a blitzkrieg attack against heavily reinforced positions—and win. To demonstrate the depth of the offensive, along a 400-kilometer front, the Soviets had managed to drive up to 500 kilometers deep into the German rear in thirty-two days, and the Soviets didn’t make the same mistakes the Germans committed in BARBAROSSA.
Besides developing effective tactics that integrated tanks, infantry, engineers, and anti-tank artillery into comprehensive assault groups reminiscent of the units formed for the assaults on the Mannerheim Line in the Winter War, the Soviets had developed adequate air-ground support tactics and massive employment of artillery that shattered even the stoutest defenses. Once the defenses broke, the Soviets plunged deep into the German rear, and when counterattacks struck at their lightly guarded flanks, the Soviets smashed them with ease. The pursuit was conducted over marginally suitable terrain for a large portion of the time, yet was most effective, destroying the German Army everywhere it tried to stand fast.
But most significant of all for the future was the fact that the Soviets demonstrated that they had learned the lessons of the blitzkrieg better than their tutors. When the advance reached the limits of its supply lines, the Soviets stopped, rather than advance in a series of aimless, pointless, strategically insignificant attacks that would only wear out their trained manpower. Contrast this to the German dithering and aimless pursuit of tactical victories in the first few months of the Eastern Campaign.
Before the collapse of Army Group Center, the Soviets had demonstrated their ability as fighters; now they demonstrated their abilities as soldiers, and quite capable soldiers at that.
The Author
Robert C. Smith is a graduate geologist living in Pennsauken, New Jersey, and has written numerous articles on military history, military science, civil defense, and nuclear warfare for a variety of defense-oriented publications.
