The Japanese Conquest of the Philippines, 1941-42

 Japanese landing at Lingayen Gulf, 22 December 1941. (Naval History and Heritage Command NH73488)

Published in 1949

About the same time that the Japanese were attacking Hawaii, Midway, Wake, and Guam, they were also beginning their assault on the Philippines. That was Monday, 8 December 1941 (7 December, Pearl Harbor time). Two squadrons of bombers struck at Clark Field almost simultaneously with the bombing of Baguio, the Philippine capital in the mountains of northern Luzon. About the same time enemy planes were bombing the island of Mindanao, some 600 miles south of Manila.

Before proceeding to a recital of the Japanese conquest of the Philippines, it is fitting to mention at some length two, of the many, great Americans on whose shoulders fell the full weight of responsibility for the defense of those islands.

General Douglas MacArthur

Douglas MacArthur, son of Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur, graduated from West Point at the head of his class in 1903. In the First World War he advanced to the rank of brigadier general, and led the 84th Infantry Brigade, after which he commanded the 42nd (Rainbow) Division. He was made a major general in 1918, the youngest officer of that rank in the U.S. Army. From 1928 to 1930 he commanded the Department of the Philippines. On 21 November 1930, President Hoover appointed him Chief of Staff of the Army with the rank of general. He retired from the U.S. Army in October 1935, and became military adviser to the Philippine government, and on 19 June 1936 was elevated by President Manuel Quezon to the rank of Field Marshal of the Philippine Army. From this position he retired on 31 December 1937. On the insistence of President Quezon, MacArthur then became head of all Filipino military and constabulary forces.

On 26 July 1941, MacArthur was called back into the service of the U.S. Army and was placed in command of all American and native forces in the Philippine area, with the rank of lieutenant general. On the same date the Philippine Army was incorporated into the Armed Forces of the United States. From 1935 up to 8 December 1941, MacArthur’s chief responsibility was to create and train a defensive force for the Philippine Commonwealth, so that when the islands should become independent in 1946, and the American forces be withdrawn, the Philippine Army could take over the defense of the Filipino people.

General Jonathan M. Wainwright

Brigadier General Jonathan M. Wainwright arrived in the Philippines in November 1940 and was assigned to command the Philippine Division, stationed at Fort McKinley. He found some 7,500 men in his command, the majority of them being Filipinos who had been accepted into the American Army. The units of his command in 1940 and 1941 consisted of the 45th and 57th Infantry Regiments; the 24th Field Artillery; one battalion of the 23rd Field Artillery; the 14th Engineers; the 15th Medical Regiment; the 12th Quartermaster Battalion; and the 31st Infantry (an all-American regiment).

As the tenseness of the Pacific situation increased in 1941, other military units were added to the defenses of the Philippines. In the spring of 1941, in further recognition of the international situation, the War Department ordered all families and dependents of military personnel to be evacuated from the islands; this was completed on 14 May 1941, with the sailing of the S.S. Washington from Manila.

When the Japanese struck on 8 December 1941, the defensive strength of the Philippines, as estimated, was as follows: On the island of Luzon there were about 100,000 Filipinos, newly mobilized and only partly trained; 12,000 members of the Philippine Scouts, who were efficient and ready; the U.S. 31st Infantry Regiment, on the alert; and the 4th Marine Regiment, which had arrived from Shanghai, China, in November and was in garrison. In addition, there were about 8,000 Army Air Force personnel, with 250 aircraft including thirty-five Flying Fortresses and 107 P-40 fighters.

Of ground troops there were National Guard units from New Mexico, California, Kentucky, Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Mississippi, Washington, and Illinois. In addition to these, during the final clashes on Bataan and Corregidor there were about 1,000 sailors without ships, 18,000 civilians evacuated from other areas, and some 6,000 civilian laborers.

On the island of Mindanao, Brigadier General William F. Sharp commanded a small group of American soldiers, but they had insufficient small arms to supply the 30,000 Filipinos who could have been called into service. On the island of Cebu only 1,500 obsolete rifles were available for the native troops and for the few Americans assigned to lead them. During the first two months of the war every effort was made to run ammunition and supplies through the Japanese blockade to the troops in the Philippines, but two ships were lost for every one getting through.

There were, besides the above, four small regiments of harbor defense troops on the four fortified islands (Fort Drum, Fort Hughes, Fort Frank, and Corregidor) at the entrance to Manila Bay; and there was the 26th Cavalry, which was later to make a record on Bataan never surpassed by a cavalry unit, forced finally to shoot their own horses for food to sustain life in those Americans that survived that terrific ordeal.

Major General George Gruener was Commander of the Philippine Department and stationed in Manila. In late July 1941 General Gruener called all senior officers to Department Headquarters and communicated to them as follows: “Major General Douglas MacArthur, retired, is placed upon active duty in the grade of lieutenant general and is assigned command of all United States forces in the Far East. The induction of the Philippine Army into the services of the United States is authorized.”

General Gruener was returned to the U.S. in September 1941, and General MacArthur designated General Wainwright as senior field commander and placed him in command of the North Luzon force, with headquarters at Stotsenburg, and with General Edward P. King as chief of staff. On 25 November, Wainwright closed his Fort McKinley office. MacArthur directed Wainwright to continue with the organization and training of the Philippine Army units, and said: “Jonathan, you’ll probably have until about April 1942 to train those troops.” From this we can infer that General MacArthur felt at that time, twelve days before Pearl Harbor, that war was imminent, but that the Japanese would not begin the attack for four or five months.

On arriving at Fort Stotsenburg on the evening of 25 November 1941, General Wainwright noted the poverty of the situation. All he had with which to organize a field army was General King, the chief of staff; a post adjutant who must also serve as adjutant general of the new field forces; a supply officer; and a surgeon. Little ammunition was on hand: hand grenades, .50 caliber machine gun, infantry mortar ammunition, and a few shells for 295 mm howitzers, which model was already obsolete.

This new field army, which was destined in two short weeks to receive the blow of almost a quarter million Japanese, had practically no transportation—only a few trucks and a very few automobiles. The only means of communication with the various divisions composing this new field army was by public telephone lines, and the great majority of the soldiers were untrained, undisciplined, and were led by inexperienced Filipino officers. Of this situation General Wainwright later said: “The Philippine Army units with the North Luzon force were doomed before they started to fight. That they lasted as long as they did is a stirring and touching tribute to their gallantry and fortitude. They never had a chance to win.”

The four divisions of this force were scattered, but an inspection was ordered to begin on 6 December 1941, and on that day General Wainwright inspected the 26th Cavalry, a battery of the 23rd Field Artillery, and a pack train, which units were stationed at Fort Stotsenburg. This was Saturday, and the inspection of the other units of the field army was set to begin on the following Monday.

Such was the situation when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 (8 December, Manila time). General MacArthur’s assistant chief of staff, Colonel Irvin, phoned General Wainwright about 4:35 a.m. on that morning that “Admiral Hart [whose Asiatic Fleet lay in Manila Bay] has just received a radio dispatch from Admiral Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, informing him that Japan has initiated hostilities.”

Initial Japanese Attacks on the Philippines

Just before 9 a.m., 8 December 1941, Wainwright was notified by MacArthur’s headquarters that the Japanese had bombed Baguio, the Philippine’s summer capital, some ninety-five miles north of Stotsenburg, and directed General Wainwright to protect Clark Field, which lies close to Stotsenburg. The 26th Cavalry under command of Colonel Clinton Pierce was deployed to the east of the field, and a battery of pack artillery was placed at the western end. No infantry units were available. Not long after midday, about eighty Japanese planes, mostly bombers with some dive bombers and fighters, swept over Stotsenburg and dropped their heaviest bombs on Clark Field, most of whose bombers were on the ground in plain sight. The raid lasted only about fourteen minutes, but left Clark Field in a shambles. Most of the B-17s that had just come in were totally destroyed. Barracks and quarters, machine shops and hangars were leveled to the ground. In this attack, ninety-three were killed outright and seven died that night, leaving ninety-three wounded.

On that day our fighting planes were not at Clark Field but at a new field at Iba, about forty miles north of Olongapo, but they did not escape. The Japanese destroyed them at the same time they were raiding Clark Field. The enemy lost only two planes at Clark Field, these being shot down by the 200th Coast Artillery’s anti-aircraft battery.

Wainwright had only the public telephone and telegraph system for communications, and none were available from General Aiken, MacArthur’s chief signal officer. He had little transportation except for a few borrowed buses and trucks. He had no navy and no air force, except reconnaissance P-40s, and besides, all five of his divisions were still in process of mobilization.

The beach defenses of the Lingayen Gulf were manned by the 11th and 21st Divisions. On 10 December the Japanese bombers wrecked most of the installations at Fort Stotsenburg and destroyed a large part of the men and horses of the 26th Cavalry.

Recession of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet

In addition to these land and air forces, the small Asiatic Fleet of the U.S. Navy had Manila as its home base and was under the command of Admiral Thomas C. Hart. The Asiatic Fleet consisted of two cruisers (the heavy cruiser Houston and the light cruiser Marblehead), twelve overage destroyers, the tender Langley, twenty-three Catalina patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing 10 (Patwing 10), about twenty-nine submarines, and a few gunboats and auxiliaries, which could not be counted on for combat. The cruiser Boise happened to be in Asiatic waters at the time. With these ships we attempted to hold the Japanese in check until we could muster sufficient strength to make a real resistance.

Late in November 1941, when the Japanese “creeping advance” down the coast of China indicated an approaching crisis, Admiral Hart sent the Marblehead and eight destroyers to Borneo. The Houston, Boise, and the destroyer tender Blackhawk were also dispatched to operate in southern waters. This left only a skeleton organization in Manila Bay when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, and the larger ships still remaining in Manila Harbor left at once for southern waters, in compliance with standing orders to depart as soon as hostilities began.

The part played by our Navy in the defense of the Philippines must be accorded recognition. While the Navy’s part may not have been as spectacular as that of the Army, its work was effective and was characterized by many instances of heroic daring and wise judgment.

On 8 December 1941, the Japanese struck first at the island of Mindanao and attempted to destroy our naval defenses in that area. Early in the morning of 8 December, Japanese bombers attacked our two seaplanes (our others being out on patrol) and the seaplane tender Preston on location in the Gulf of Davao. The planes were destroyed but the Preston escaped after shooting down one enemy plane. Four Japanese destroyers entered the Gulf of Davao at once.

On 10 December, the third day of the war, the Japanese planes came to Cavite in Manila Bay and practically wiped it out. Some of our ships escaped to improvised places along the Manila waterfront, the supplementary naval base facilities at Mariveles Bay being still under construction and of no present value, but the submarine Sealion was damaged, as was the destroyer Peary. We had to sink the Sealion to prevent its capture by the enemy.

Since our Navy could not operate in or near Manila Bay without danger from enemy aircraft, Admiral Hart ordered the remaining vessels to move south to safer waters. On 11 December, Admiral Hart also advised all merchant shipping to leave the Manila area; thus 200,000 tons of merchant shipping, some of it very valuable, cleared to the southward, and all but one of the ships escaped via the Sulu Sea and Makassar Strait. After the major portion of our fleet had gone south, and the cargo ships had retreated, only a few submarines and motor boats were left to render what aid they could to our forces as well as to harass the enemy as much as possible.

While Cavite was undergoing attack, enemy troops landed at several places on Luzon, from shallow draft vessels of the Japanese fishing fleet. These shallow craft were difficult for our submarines to hit. But December 1941 marked the beginning of a continuous, extensive, and effective submarine campaign in all Japanese and nearby waters—a gallant fight that continued throughout the war.

Admiral Hart moved his headquarters from Manila to the Netherlands East Indies about 21 December, and Admiral F. W. Rockwell, in command of our naval defense forces in Manila Harbor, moved to Corregidor on 26 December. Manila Bay by this time was under constant bombing attacks. By 31 December, all our submarines had, under orders, retired to the Malay Barrier in the south. Rear Admiral Rockwell as senior naval officer remained on Corregidor. By the end of December 1941 our Asiatic Fleet had been pushed out of the Philippines and had taken refuge in the waters of the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese already were preparing bases at Davao on Mindanao and at Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago.

The Navy proceeded to reorganize in the south. It was realized that even the Malay Barrier might not be able to withstand enemy assault, and it was decided to develop a major naval base at Port Darwin on the north coast of Australia. But its facilities were not adequate, and the distance was too great to be of much service for some time to come. So it was that operational command was set up at Surabaya on the north coast of Java.

The Japanese objective was to capture and occupy and exploit all the rich area of the Malay Barrier and the South China Sea. By January the Japanese had overrun the Philippine Islands, and the greater part of our naval strength was in the Netherlands East Indies, toward which the Japanese were headed. Our submarines and motor torpedo boats were engaged in slowing down as much as possible the advance of the enemy, so as to give us time to get organized for the surface action that was in prospect.

Japanese Landings in the Philippines

The Japanese Army began to land at several places in the Philippines on 10-12 December, first at Aparri and Vigan on the northern tip of the island of Luzon, and on the far southeastern coast off the Bicol Peninsula at Legaspi. The Japanese landing at Aparri proved to be a feint, some 3,000 men trying without success to pull General Wainwright’s forces away from the Lingayen Gulf.

The enemy struck in full force at Vigan, just up from Lingayen Gulf, with a task force of warships and some eighty-four jammed-to-the-rails transports landing troops. The only air protection Wainwright’s army had was one P-40 reconnaissance plane, and the Navy’s motor torpedo boats were far away to the south. In the face of such a wave of enemy troops, Wainwright maneuvered for position in order to delay the Japanese as much as possible, hoping he soon would have reinforcements sufficient for a counterattack.

The first land skirmish which really started the long, tedious days and almost endless nights of killing, being killed, and withdrawing, began on 16 December. General MacArthur ordered Wainwright to hold a line running across, east to west, the narrow coastal plain fifty miles below Vigan at San Fernando La Union. The Japanese came down the coastal plain on 21 December, where they were met by one battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment, and one battalion of the 12th Regiment, near San Juan, five miles north of San Fernando. Being outflanked by the enemy, our forces scattered into the mountains and were filtering back to our command for a period of two weeks.

The Fall of Manila

By this time enemy landings had been made at Davao on Mindanao Island, some 600 miles south of Manila. The Japanese also landed in Lamon Bay below Manila and closed in on that city from the north and south. Before the end of December 1941, due to the recession of the fleet, the Arm’ position in Manila had become precarious. Manila Bay by this time was under constant air bombardment. Seeing the impending danger of being encircled, General MacArthur began evacuating Manila and declared it an “open city” withdrawing all his forces into the mountainous peninsula of Bataan and to the island fortress of Corregidor. Manila, however, was bombed by the Japanese in violation of international law and was finally occupied by them on 2 January 1942.

A first-hand account of the fall of Manila comes from war correspondents Carl and Shelley Mydans, who wrote in Time Magazine:

January 2nd, 1942, nearly 3,500 Americans were hauled to the campus of the University of Santo Tomas in Manila. This was to serve as one of the Japanese prison camps for the duration. We were housed in two large buildings, with no provision for food, water, sewage, garbage disposal, or medical care. For a week the only food came from Filipino friends who were allowed to throw it over the fence to us. It was six months before the Japanese began to feed us. On 12 September 1942, 125 of us were removed from Santo Tomas to Shanghai.

The withdrawal of our troops from Manila and the consolidation of the defense forces on the peninsula of Bataan on a very much shortened front constituted a most important and dramatic phase of the Philippine Campaign. On 3 January 1942, the siege of Bataan began.

Withdrawing to Bataan

On the Bataan Peninsula our defensive operations resolved themselves into delaying of the Japanese advance toward inner Bataan and nearby Corregidor and making that advance as costly as possible. Successively retreating lines of defense were carefully drawn, and heroically defended as long as possible.

In General Wainwright’s North Luzon army, Lieutenant Colonels Moses and Noble commanded the 13th Infantry Regiment, and Major Ganahl commanded the 12th Regiment, all of whom disappeared from the picture.

Our forces suffered a setback, but they held on as best they could. On the night of 21 December, sixteen more enemy transports landed troops just south of Bauang and along the shores of Lingayen Gulf, as far down as Agoo. Here they met our 11th Division, which was not able to stand the onslaught of superior numbers. Neither was the 71st Infantry and the battalion of field artillery under Colonel David Bonnett. Bonnett was ordered to retire to a better position. The 26th Cavalry also had to withdraw from the death trap at Damortis. The reason was the enemy had planes, we did not. A company of sixteen tanks from the command of Brigadier General R. N. Weaver was requested, but only five were sent, and they were not adequate to hold the enemy in check. Many incidents of valor marked the withdrawal of our soldiers to Bataan before the avalanche of Japanese troops.

Wainwright’s new field headquarters were established at Alcala on the Agno River. The 26th Cavalry had lost about 150 men killed and wounded in the fighting from Damortis to Bued. On 23 December, Wainwright withdrew behind the Agno River. When General MacArthur ordered General Wainwright to withdraw his troops to Bataan, Wainwright’s still scattered forces numbered about 28,000, of whom 25,000 were still only partly trained for warfare. Before he could withdraw the 150 miles necessary, he had to round up and consolidate his forces as much as possible, so that his rear guard could delay the Japanese advance as he retreated. He ordered that the line of the Rio Grande de Pampanga be held fast, so as to enable General Jones’s command of the South Luzon forces to withdraw north from the Japanese attacking in the south, and to swing around Manila Bay and come into Bataan about the same time that Wainwright’s North Luzon forces arrived there.

The Filipino and American forces on Bataan at first made an effort to defend our secondary naval base at Subic Bay. An increasingly large number of enemy troops being thrown into the line, our forces were compelled to fall back to the main line of defense running across the peninsula. In fox holes, trenches and dugouts, our forces fought on from the middle of January to early April, waging a fight so gallant that it inspired the American people to unceasing endeavors to achieve a successful outcome of the war.

After Malaya, Singapore, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies had fallen to the Japanese, more troops were released to reinforce the Japanese armies in the Philippines. General Yamashita, who had commanded the Malaya offensive, was put in command for a final and overwhelming drive against our troops in the Philippines.

Our men were worn out by exposure, weakened by short rations, and many of them were ill from malaria and other tropical diseases; yet they fought on. In their desperation they at times were compelled to eat carabao, monkeys, and even horses and mules. It is estimated that 20,000 of them were disabled by malaria of a malignant type, and no quinine was available with which to combat the disease. The only air protection they had was a few Curtiss P-40s flying from emergency air strips carved out of the jungle. Tanks and heavy guns—they had none. Under these conditions even the most valiant soldiers could not hold out indefinitely.

Brigadier General Clyde A. Settick commanded the 71st Division at the time. It was a difficult task to round up thousands of inexperienced and bewildered men and organize them for withdrawing before the enemy. On 24 December some elements of the enemy got behind our forces and between them and Bataan. The 26th Cavalry, under Colonel Pierce, was busy trying to protect the retreat of the 71st to Agno. Checking up on 24 December, the 26th had been reduced by casualties to about 450 men. At Binalonan the 26th held off the Japanese in overwhelming numbers.

According to a report from General MacArthur, American air defense was almost impotent: on Luzon we had thirty-five B-17s, thirty medium and eight light bombers, 220 fighters, and twenty-three other planes. At the end of the first day of fighting, we had left only seventeen heavy bombers and about seventy fighters. Fourteen of the B 17s reached Australia after a short time, but all our fighters were destroyed.

Wainwright’s withdrawal toward Bataan was in five phases: D1, D2, D3, D4, and D5. Wainwright’s forces were to delay the Japanese advance as long as possible to permit General Jones’s South Luzon force to clear around Manila Bay and get into Bataan; also to enable Major General George M. Parker to prepare the Bataan defenses.

The withdrawal into Bataan was not exactly a retreat, for we fought delaying actions all the way. It was hard for an American, even at that. The withdrawal toward Bataan began on 23 December and ended 31 December 1941. At Cabanatuan on 27 and 28 December, the 91st Division had to fight the Japanese tanks, cavalry, and infantry. Late on 29 December, the 91st was attacked again and routed with heavy losses and was forced to retire toward the south. About a thousand troops of the 12th and 13th Infantry Regiments that had been trapped two weeks before, broke through and joined the 11th Division at D5. The 91st Division reformed its broken forces and started on its retreat toward Bataan.

The South Luzon forces under General Jones, withdrawing north to reach the only road leading to Bataan, had to cross the Pampanga River by means of the Calumpit bridge. The bridge was known to the Japanese and to us as a bottleneck. The 500 men left of the 91st Division plus a regiment of the 71st Division and a battalion of field artillery took position along the Pampanga at 11:00 p.m. on 30 December to protect the crossing of the South Luzon forces. During the night a company of the 192nd Tank Battalion was added to the defense.

The Japanese struck at 10:30 a.m. on 31 December, while General Jones’s Southern Luzon forces were crossing the bridge under heavy fire, being protected by the 11th and 21st Divisions. Most of them were across on the road to Bataan by midnight. New Yea’ Day, 1942, the last elements of the 91st Division had crossed, just as the advance Japanese guard rushed the bridge. At 6:15 a.m. our forces blew up the bridge. The Japanese now had before them the wide, deep, and unfordable Pampanga River.

Wainwright’s and Jones’s North and South Luzon forces reached Bataan on 6 January—Bataan that was to be the scene of unspeakable suffering and humiliation. During the withdrawal to Bataan, Wainwright’s North Luzon forces had been cut down from 28,000 to about 16,000, and they were in poor shape to undertake the defense of Bataan. The march into Bataan was costly and depressing, but at that it was only a suggestion of the march out of Bataan, the “Death March” some three months later.

Our men walked into Bataan, many of them shoeless, stumbling, feeling that Bataan was or might be a death trap awaiting them.

About 7 January, General Wainwright was designated by MacArthur as commander of the I Philippine Corps, to defend the western side of the Bataan Peninsula, while Major General George M. Parker was to command the II Corps of Philippine troops to protect the east side of the Bataan Peninsula.

Between these two corps, the Silanganan Mountains, running north and south, divided Wainwright from Parker, and steep jungle walls of the mountains made it difficult for them to maintain contact and liaison with each other. Besides, this situation favored Japanese penetration between the forces of the two American commanders.

On arriving and taking up position on Bataan, it was necessary to put all men on half rations, and these were Filipino rations, not sufficient for the Americans. To supplement the shortened rations, soldiers were sent out to shoot and bring in every carabao they could find, and veterinary supervision was given when these animals were killed and issued for meat. Even young carabao is not any too palatable, and the old carabao had to be soaked in salt water overnight, and then beaten to a pulp before it could be eaten.

On 19 January, General MacArthur came to Bataan and inspected the I and II Corps. Just after MacArthur had returned to Corregidor the Japanese penetrated down Mount Silangayan, hugging the slopes on both sides, and this threatened to separate the I Corps from the II Corps. So Wainwright’s 31st was assigned to Parker’s II Corps, to attempt to hold the enemy.

By 16 January, fresh Japanese troops had landed from the sea at Port Binanga on the northwestern coast of Bataan, then marched through the jungle and attacked the 1st Philippine Division. The 26th Cavalry, aided by units of the 1st Division, drove the Japanese back across the Moron River. Meanwhile, Parker’s II Corps was deteriorating rapidly, and Wainwright’s I Corps was threatened on three sides, west, north and east. This situation made it necessary for the American line to be so extended that they were in great peril.

By 21 January the Japanese had infiltrated through our lines and had taken possession of the Moron-Bagac Road. The 1st Philippine Division was in a trap and had to fight its way south along the narrow beaches of the China Sea on the west and the Moron-Bagac Road on their east, which was controlled by the Japanese. In this escape all heavy guns had to be destroyed, and all transportation equipment also. Carrying their wounded by hand, the survivors worked their way back. On orders from General MacArthur, all forces withdrew to the reserve battle position at the waistline of Bataan Peninsula.

The withdrawal was completed by 26 January and gave the I and II Corps the advantage of less rugged terrain in which to fight. This put the Americans and Filipinos in possession of the lower end of Bataan Peninsula, including the Bay of Mariveles. Our troops had now fallen back to their last position on Bataan, and it was do or die. No food, and little hope of getting any. No letup of the steaming jungle heat by day or night. No quinine to stop the malaria that was killing our men. No cessation of the moans of the wounded. Altogether it was a soul-racking thing to go through. Our men had to shoot the horses of the 26th Cavalry and eat them to keep themselves alive.

And now the Japanese landed at four points along the southern and western extremity of Bataan. At Longaskaway they were met by the 45th Infantry of Philippine Scouts and by about 450 sailors, under command of Commander Bridgett of the U.S. Navy. They also landed at Quinaun Point, where they were met by a group of Air Corps engineers, and the 3rd Battalion of the 45th Infantry under command of Major Dudley H. Strickler.

The Japanese also landed at Agloloma Point. In their landing operations they were shelled and machine-gunned by our few P-40s and ground troops, and those not exterminated were scattered. They also landed at a small peninsula between the Anyasan and Salaiian Rivers, and this landing proved most dangerous, for if the enemy succeeded in landing, he might cut the road south to Mariveles, the take-off point from which our forces might escape to Corregidor. The miscellaneous troops guarding this point were thrown back by superior numbers and fierceness of the attack.

The battle at Quinaun Point lasted twelve days, the 3rd Battalion of Major Strickler doing heroic fighting. As no troops could be spared to aid them, the battalion fought alone. When it went into action, the battalion had a major, four captains, eight or ten lieutenants, and 600 men. Twelve days later, after having driven the Japanese into the China Sea, the battalion was commanded by a second lieutenant, with only 212 men, the rest of the battalion having been killed or wounded.

Many of the Japanese troops took cover in caves along the shores of the China Sea. They would not surrender. A small American gunboat was called into action to shell the caves, while our engineers crept in from the land side and lowered electric mines into the mouths of the caves and blew the cliffs to pieces.

A strong Japanese force attacked our forces on the center of the 11th Division and penetrated a mile in depth and a mile in width, while a smaller Japanese force infiltrated down the gorge of the Cotar River, attempting to link up with the first-mentioned force, which coordinated action resulted in cutting off a large number of our men. But the tables were turned when, after a week of fighting, the 1st Philippine Division encircled the smaller enemy force.

The 11th Division, plus a battalion of the 2nd Philippine Constabulary, two battalions of the 91st Division, and a battalion of the 45th Infantry Scouts under Lieutenant Colonel Lathrop, encircled the other Japanese force. Both Japanese forces dug in, in fox holes and tunnels, and it required twelve days to exterminate them. It was a fierce fight, much of it being underground. By 17 February our forces held every foot of ground they had occupied on their arrival at the reserve battle position.

In this intense fighting our losses were heavy. The land was dotted with crosses of our dead, and our improvised hospitals near Mariveles were crowded with the wounded. Two of the best native generals, Brigadier General Segundo and Brigadier General Vinconte Lim, of the 41st Division, suffered at the hands of the Japanese. General Lim was murdered in the most horrible way the Japanese General Yamashita could devise. Segundo, as well as many other Filipino officers, were also murdered by Yamashita.

The Japanese were now preparing for an all-out attack. Their forces outnumbered ours six, to eight, to ten to one. Many of our patrols were composed of loyal Filipino Igorots, whose ability to move Indian-like through mountains and jungles proved that they were our best and often our only means of reconnaissance.

MacArthur Ordered to Australia

On 10 March 1942, General Wainwright was summoned to headquarters on Corregidor, where he was informed that twice in recent weeks the President had strongly suggested that General MacArthur retire to Australia to command the newly-created Southwest Pacific Area, preparatory to a counterattack. MacArthur had just as strongly protested leaving the Philippines. But now, explicit orders had come from Washington and MacArthur was to go at once.

Wainwright was placed in command of all American troops in the Philippines. On Luzon he had the I Corps under command of General Jones, the II Corps under command of General Parker, all service troops, and the troops scattered in the Cagayan Valley and the mountain provinces in the north. General Moore was to command the Manila Harbor defenses, General Chenoweth to command the troops on the Visayan Islands, and General Sharp to command the troops on Mindanao. These subcommands were to be under the supreme command of General MacArthur from Australia.

On that day, 10 March 1942, MacArthur is reported to have said: “If I get through to Australia… I’ll come back as soon as I can.”

General Wainwright now had under his command only about 70,000 men, a small proportion of them being combat troops. Meanwhile, a new Japanese landing under General Homma had brought the enemy total to around a quarter of a million men.

At 7 p.m. on 11 March, four MTBs under command of Lieutenant Bulkeley started south with General and Mrs. MacArthur, their son Arthur, a nurse, and the personnel of the general’s staff. It was a hazardous journey through the enemy mine fields at the entrance to Manila Bay, ever in danger of being spotted by enemy surface ships or aircraft.

By dawn on the 12th the party reached the Cuyo Islands, where they hid from sight for the day. By now one of the four MTBs was out of fuel and had to remain at Cuyo. Clearing the Cuyos at 6:30 p.m., running in sight of enemy ships and through a rough sea, the party reached Cagayan in the Mindanao Sea early on the 13th. Four Flying Fortresses had been ordered from Australia to carry the party on the last lap of their journey to Australia, but these airplanes had been delayed and would not be available for five days.

While waiting at Cagayan, two of the MTBs went to Negros Island and brought over President Manuel Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth, who would accompany the party to Australia. General MacArthur arrived at Melbourne, Australia, on 17 March and assumed command of all American Army forces in the Southwest Pacific area.

General MacArthur’s official entourage on his trip to Australia consisted of the following members of his staff: Major General Sutherland, chief of staff; Brigadier General Richard J. Marshall, deputy chief of staff; Colonel Charles P. Stivers, assistant chief of staff, G-1; Colonel Charles A. Willoughby, assistant chief of staff, G-2; Captain Joseph MacMicking, Air Corps, assistant chief of staff, G-2; Brigadier General Spencer B. Aiken, signal officer; Lieutenant Colonel Joe R. Scherr, assistant signal officer; Brigadier General William S. Marquat, anti-aircraft officer; Brigadier General Harold H. George, air officer; Brigadier General Hugh J. Casey, engineer; Lieutenant Colonel Sidney L. Huff, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Wilson, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Colonel Legrande A. Dillar, aide-de-camp; Major Charles H. Morehouse, Medical Corps; Master Sergeant Paul P. Rogers, secretary.

Back on Bataan, the enemy contemplated a continuous assault regardless of losses, thinking that by numerical superiority he could crush the defenders, but every bit of ground was fiercely contested by our troops, with heavy losses on both sides. Bataan became a hell of bombs and fox holes and destruction, with enemy infiltrations along the beaches on the west coast, savage hand-to-hand fighting in the underbrush, infantry skirmishes, sharp artillery duels, aggressive patrol duty on both sides, relentless air raids, bloody attacks, and fierce counterattacks.

The Japanese resorted to propaganda leaflets, urging Filipino soldiers to give up their arms and go home. The fighting Filipinos paid no attention; they fought on. Enemy attempts to land troops were broken by deadly artillery fire. Those who reached the shore were quickly mopped up. But fresh enemy reinforcements kept coming in, and the enemy was able, through the prodigious use of aircraft, tanks, and artillery fire, to keep the weary defenders under constant harassment day and night. With each man subsisting on only fifteen ounces of food a day for several weeks, exhausted by the ceaseless fighting, outnumbered in both men and materiel, the defenders were pushed back and back.

The months of fighting on Bataan were heart-breaking ones. Ever since the surprise air attack on the first day of the war, which destroyed most of their planes on the ground, the Americans had fought valiantly against impossible odds. They had retreated foot by foot through Luzon and Bataan until their backs were to the sea. There, with a small trickle of supplies, makeshift defenses, and magnificent bravery, they withstood the Imperial Army of Japan. Day after day they held their ground, at times even attacking the enemy and forcing him to retreat. So tenaciously did they hold that one Japanese general was reported to have killed himself in humiliation.

The I Corps under General Jones had about 25,000 men; the II Corps, under General Parker, about 35,000 men. Among these troops were about 10,000 service corpsmen, some quartermaster troops, and about one hundred American nurses. Two guerrilla bands of about 2,000 men were operating in the far north of the island. On Corregidor and the three smaller islands in the bay, Fort Drum, Fort Frank, and Fort Hughes, were about 10,000 men. Most of these were commanded by Major General George F. Moore. All the navy that was available to us at the time was four motor torpedo boats, commanded by Lieutenant John Bulkeley, a few small minesweepers, and a few miscellaneous craft. The air force was now reduced to one P-40, and it was in poor condition. Our other three P-40s had cracked up after a raid on a concentration of Japanese ships in Subic Bay.

General Wainwright moved his headquarters twenty miles south, just east of Mariveles Bay, where General MacArthur had had his advance headquarters. General Beebe on Corregidor was in charge of supply, and on 15 March he announced that a lack of supplies made it necessary to further reduce the ration from one-half Filipino rations by another one-third, if our men were to be able to keep alive another month.

On 20-21 March General Wainwright was notified that he had been advanced to the rank of lieutenant general, and that all the forces in the Philippines were to be called the U.S. Forces in the Philippines, with him as commander in chief, as of 21 March. General Wainwright thereupon took up his headquarters at Corregidor.

On 22 March the Japanese served their first demand for surrender, dropping it from a plane over Bataan: “If you do not reply to this by special messenger within three days we will feel free to act in any way at all.” This demand for surrender was signed by “the Commanders in Chief, Imperial Japanese Army and Navy Forces in the Philippines.”

General Wainwright made no reply.

Food was rapidly playing out, and the men on Bataan were famished, sick, war-weary, hollow-eyed, yet they fought on. The Japanese, having established long-range 105 mm guns six miles away at Cavite, began to bomb Forts Drum, Hughes, Frank, and Corregidor, wreaking great havoc.

The Japanese commander, General Yamashita, issued a demand for the surrender of the American troops, a demand which General Wainwright rejected. Then during the first two weeks of April the enemy, with superior numbers of troops, was able to penetrate our lines and turn back our flanks, until we became powerless to sustain the delaying action on Bataan much longer. From the air the enemy dropped bombs in ever increasing number. On 22 March, our Bataan forces were confronted with the main Japanese Army, aided by more and more warships that had come into Manila Bay.

By 24 March the intensity of the bombing of Corregidor made it necessary for our personnel to take to the tunnels, especially Malinta Tunnel. On 25 March and again on 28 and 29 March the Japanese made furious assaults on Bataan.

The Fall of Bataan

On 29 March 1942, the Japanese bombers hit a plainly marked base hospital on south Bataan, killing men on stretchers and nurses and doctors, who were standing by their patients. Bataan was now receiving in mounting fury the Japanese assault from warships, from the air, and from land troops. On 4 and 5 April the Japanese had mounted 75 mm guns on the barges and had struck General Parker’s line from his rear.

Late on 7 April 1942, General Parker sent word to General Wainwright that he might have to surrender because of Japanese pressure on his malaria-ridden, half-starved forces. General Wainwright’s orders were for General Parker’s II Corps to hold out, and for both him and General Jones’s I Corps to attack again. But it was futile, as man after man dropped in his tracks utterly exhausted, as he attempted to move forward.

On 8 April the Bataan nurses, what remained of them, were put on a barge and taken to Corregidor. They were disheveled, many of them were wounded, they were fatigued, but they were a gallant lot. After weeks of waiting, two submarines brought food on 9 April for the men on Bataan, but few of them lived to receive any of it, many dying of starvation.

On 9 April General King was compelled to surrender. After noon on that day of 9 April 1942 there was silence on Bataan, but it was the silence of death. For it was on 9 April 1942 on Bataan that a small open car displaying a white flag could be seen rolling along the highway toward the Japanese lines in the vicinity of Limay, thus signaling the surrender of the American-Filipino forces on the Bataan Peninsula. In addition to the soldiers surrendering, there were also many civilians. Our stand was gallant but hopeless. Our men had the courage but not enough food. At last, weakened by malaria and dysentery, with the enemy bombing them day and night and pushing forward by the overwhelming weight of numbers, they surrendered because of sheer exhaustion.

Bataan had fallen. But the noble defenders, both American and Filipino, had written an imperishable page on the scroll of fame.

The Death March from Bataan

The humiliation of defeat was bad enough, but worse was yet in store for our heroic defenders of the Philippines: the Death March of Bataan and the unspeakable atrocities of Japanese prison camps. Many of these men were to die of starvation and malnutrition, all of them to bear in their bodies for life the scars of one of the most inhuman experiences that men were ever called upon to suffer.

By 15 April the Death March from Bataan had begun, up the peninsula toward Camp O’Donnell. From reports since available, we find that the Japanese rounded up our defeated men and put them in groups of about 1,000 each. The first stage of the march was about sixty miles, to San Fernando Pampanga, a continuous march of a day and night. Then they were herded into railway boxcars and shipped to Capan in the province of Tarlac. They were then taken out of the boxcars and marched seven miles more to Camp O’Donnell. Their only food en route was a small amount of rice, and scarcely any water.

Camp O’Donnell was the home cantonment of the 71st Philippine Army Division before the war started, and water and sanitary systems had not been installed, except for a few pumps. The only water available was three miles away, the muddy Bampan River. No transportation was available, and the Japanese having taken all of the prisoners’ canteens away, there were no containers with which to get water. These thousands of starving and thirst-crazed prisoners were in torment.

According to Captain Reeder, American medical officer in Camp O’Donnell, from about 20 April to the end of July, at least 20,000 of the 45,000 Filipino and 1,400 American troops there died of starvation, disease, and torture. Men who were craving water and stopping to lap a little from muddy creeks were shot or bayoneted while drinking. The principal diseases were malaria and dysentery, and no medicine was allowed the men.

Sergeant Carl A. Carlsson: From his own memories of the Death March of Bataan, Sergeant Carl A. Carlsson relates: “I’ll never forget it. What hell! No words ever could describe it—cold, brutal, and all unnecessary. They’ll shove a man in a hole and bury him alive if he was too weak to walk. Some of the men would fall back out of line, and we’d hear a shot or a scream and the next thing we knew, a Nip would come up the road wiping off his bayonet, and you knew there was one less.”

Among these wearied, hunger-stricken marchers, were two American chaplains, Colonel John K. Borneman and Colonel Alfred C. Oliver. Both of these chaplains managed to survive the horrors of the prison camps. Colonel Borneman says that he witnessed twelve murders of U.S. Army officers at Cabanatuan, murders following sadistic beatings for twenty-four hours. Colonel Borneman also tells what happened to Colonel Oliver, who was beaten pitilessly for days, and then suffered a broken neck. He in some way survived the ordeal, but he must go the rest of his life with his head in a high leather collar. Colonel Oliver lived to tell the story of his experience, but never once mentioned his own sufferings as he portrays for us in a later section of this article the sufferings of his comrades in the Japanese prison camps.

Last Days on Corregidor

Bataan having fallen, the Japanese now concentrated their attacks on Corregidor, using surface ships, air bombs, and long-range artillery. We had at Corregidor about 11,000 men, opposed to about 250,000 enemy troops, advancing on us like a mighty torrent. Some 2,000 men and women were able to cross the two-mile wide water from Bataan and found refuge for the time being on Corregidor, on the night of 8 and 9 April. About 300 survivors of the 31st Infantry (American) and a number of Filipino troops, some Navy men from Mariveles, about four survivors of the 26th Cavalry, and the nurses—these also escaped Bataan.

By this time all hospital facilities on Corregidor were crowded, with hundreds more waiting to be hospitalized. The sick and wounded were laid out on the beaches.

In order to defend Corregidor every available man was used, including some 1,500 Marines recently from China, commanded by Colonel Sam Howard, and the 300 survivors of the 31st Infantry.

The enemy began to bomb Corregidor from the shores of Bataan, two miles away, with 240 mm howitzers. This, added to the incessant bombing by 105 mm guns from Cavite and with continuous air bombardment, made Corregidor a living hell. On top of the 4,700-foot Mariveles Mountains, the Japanese observation posts gave their gunners correction of fire. The shelling of Corregidor did not entirely cease at any moment during the twenty-seven days our troops were under attack. There was no escape from the enemy fire except in the deep recesses of the Malinta Tunnel, and it could hold only a small part of our forces.

On 9 April about a dozen planes commanded by Brigadier General Ralph Royce raided the enemy installations at Nichols Field, and then returned to Mindanao. On 13-14 April, a squadron of American bombers from somewhere in the south successfully attacked Japanese installations and shipping in the Philippine area. Then came two weeks of even more intensive enemy bombardment by planes, ships, and artillery. On 5 May the Japanese avalanche buried many of our shore batteries under a landslide, and under cover of darkness the enemy crossing the narrow channel from Bataan, were able to make a landing on the North Point of Corregidor. The shattered defenses were unable to check the enemy tide; our depleted and exhausted troops were in danger of being overwhelmed.

Late on 9 April, General Wainwright received from President Roosevelt an assurance of confidence, giving him freedom of action to do as he thought best, and hoping that he would still be able to hold Corregidor. General Wainwright replied: “The American flag still flies on this beleaguered island fortress.”

On 16 April, a week after the fall of Bataan, the enemy landed in force at Iloilo on North Panay Island, and prepared for a mass attack on Mindanao.

On 18 April, General Marshall sent the following message to General Wainwright: “The continuing demonstration that you and the members of your command are giving to the world of courage and devotion is worthy of the finest traditions of American and Filipino soldiers. We are immeasurably proud of every man serving in the fortifications of Manila Bay. Please convey the special commendation and gratitude of the War Department to the nurses on Corregidor, whose service is an inspiration to all of us.”

First Bombs on Japan

On 18 April 1942, the world was electrified at the news that a squadron of American planes under command of General James H. Doolittle, accompanied by seventy-nine other aviators, had raided the Japanese mainland, striking Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagoya, and Osaka, flying at low altitude in broad daylight.

By 25 April the Malinta Tunnel hospital was treating 1,000 wounded men each twenty-four hours and blood-stained doctors and nurses worked day and night, most of the 150 nurses being veterans of Bataan. On 28 April, the Japanese barrage increased in fury. A 240 mm shell exploded near General Wainwright, bursting his left eardrum.

On the night of 29 April, two U.S. Navy rescue planes succeeded in landing at Corregidor. Fifty men and women, thirty of them nurses, were put on board, and started south. One plane reached Australia; the other was marooned on Mindanao, and the occupants were captured and made prisoners of war by the Japanese. The rest of our people on Corregidor remained to fight off as long as possible the hour of doom.

Because of damages to the water and electric system, damages caused by the enemy guns, those facilities began to play out. For a few weeks only, an occasional two-seater plane would reach Corregidor with medicine, and took away about a dozen more of our people.

On 3 May they managed to evacuate from Corregidor by submarine a fairly good number of nurses, and officers that were key men or who were in desperate physical condition. Some of the nurses, from a sense of duty to the wounded, refused to leave on that first submarine; among them was Captain Mieler, chief nurse of the Malinta Tunnel hospital.

On 4 May the Japanese bombing reached an all-time high from 7:00 a.m. until 12:00 noon. It is estimated that a 500-pound bomb hit Corregidor every five seconds during that five-hour period, twelve every minute, or 3,600 shells in five hours, enough to fill six hundred trucks, and all this in addition to thirteen air raids on that same day.

Codes and Treasures

As the war in the Philippines waxed ever more furious, more and more American and Filipino treasure was moved to Corregidor for safekeeping. Just before Corregidor fell, $140,000,000 in Philippine currency and $15,000,000 in silver were locked in Corregidor. The gold reserve of the Philippines had in the early days of the war been sent to the U.S. for safekeeping. Following MacArthur’s instructions, Wainwright put down the serial numbers of the bank notes and radioed them to the Treasury Department at Washington. Then he cut up and burned the money and destroyed the lists. The $15,000,000 in silver was sealed in wooden boxes, towed into Manila Bay, and sunk at locations that were radioed to Washington, and all records and codes were destroyed.

By 5 May it was evident the enemy was ready to invade Corregidor, and surrender would be inevitable. At 8 p.m. on 5 May, the Japanese began a furious bombardment preparatory to landing, and at 11:15 on the night of 5 May, the landing began.

The night of 5 May and the following day was to be their last stand. The first wave of Japanese came in landing boats and motor boats. Our beach forces gave them the strongest fight that was in them, but the enemy, by sheer weight of numbers, broke through our defenses and advanced toward the Rock. At 4 a.m. on 6 May General Wainwright received the following message by radio from President Roosevelt: “In spite of all the handicaps of complete isolation, lack of food and ammunition, you have given the world a shining example of patriotic fortitude and self-sacrifice. You and your devoted followers have become the living symbols of our war aim and the guarantee of victory.”

Our men continued to fight the Japanese at every step. About 10 a.m. on 6 May the Japanese landed more men and tanks and headed for the tunnel. At this moment our troops on Corregidor faced these appalling facts: All beach defenses had been blown to dust; all barriers had been wrecked; machine gun emplacements had been pulverized; seacoast guns and fire control instruments, destroyed; forty-six out of forty-eight of our 75 mm guns had been knocked out; communications had been severed. The landing of the enemy could not be stopped by what we had.

At 10:15 a.m. on 6 May 1942, General Wainwright announced his momentous decision, that in order to save the sick and wounded and starving men and women, he would cease firing at 12 o’clock noon. At 10:30 General Beebe went on the radio: “Message for General Homma: For reasons which General Wainwright considers sufficient, and to put a stop to further sacrifice of human life, the Commanding General will surrender to Your Excellency today the four fortified islands at the entrance to Manila Bay, together with all military and naval personnel. At 12:00 noon, 6 May 1942, all firing will cease, unless a landing by Japanese troops in force is attempted without flag of truce.”

But the Japanese continued the attack; at 11:00 a.m. General Beebe repeated the message, and at 11:45 a.m. the fighting had not stopped.

Between 10 a.m. and 12 noon, 6 May 1942, General Wainwright sent a radio message to President Roosevelt saying: “With broken heart and head bowed in sadness, but not in shame, I report to Your Excellency that today I must ask for terms of surrender of the fortified islands of Manila Bay. There is a limit of human endurance, and that limit has long since been passed. Without prospect of relief, I feel it is my duty to my country and to my gallant troops to end this useless effusion of blood and human sacrifice.”

Promptly at noon the white flag went up and all firing by the Corregidor defenders came to an end, but the Japanese continued to maul us without let up. At 12:30 p.m. General Beebe went on the radio again, and a Marine officer with a white flag went to the enemy forward positions, now within a few hundred feet of the entrance to Malinta Tunnel, to request the senior Japanese officer to come into the tunnel and meet with General Wainwright. For nearly an hour the Japanese guns were firing on our troops continuously. When the Marine officer returned, he reported that the Japanese senior officer would not come to see Wainwright but insisted that Wainwright come to see him.

General Wainwright, Major General George F. Moore and his aide Major Bob Brown, Wainwright’s aide Colonel Johnny Pugh, and Major Tom Dooley started for the enemy lines. Japanese planes swooped low and sprayed machine gun bullets upon them as they approached the Japanese lines. More than two hours after our white flag had been raised, the enemy bombers were still attacking our troops, and continued to bombard Corregidor until late in the afternoon.

The Japanese officer was a dudhead, so General Wainwright insisted upon seeing General Homma. After long delay, Wainwright and his staff were ferried to Bataan, where finally they met General Homma. After vain attempts by Wainwright for justice and fair play for his troops on Corregidor, Homma refused, and announced that fighting would go on until Corregidor’s personnel had been destroyed and all of the Philippines had been surrendered. Being taken back to Corregidor, Wainwright found that large parties of Japanese had landed and now were overrunning everything. It was close to midnight before the surrender papers were completed. General Wainwright and all personnel were made prisoners of war. But any further continuation of resistance would have meant utter annihilation to all on Corregidor.

The next day, 7 May, Wainwright was taken to Manila, where at 1 a.m., 8 May, he was required to go on the radio and broadcast that he had surrendered and give the terms which he had been compelled to sign. General Wainwright, against his will, was forced to surrender all troops in the Philippines wherever stationed. This was almost impossible to effect, owing to lack of communications, however, orders were sent out in the expectation they might be received. On 11 May Wainwright was informed that Major General William F. Sharp had surrendered in Mindanao, the Japanese having completely overrun the island. Our troops on Palawan and at Legaspi also had surrendered. Other groups, mostly natives in scattered positions, chose to become guerrillas rather than surrender. And of these guerrillas, representing the masses of the people of the Philippines, it can be said: “The Philippines never surrendered.”

While our campaign of Bataan and Corregidor resulted in an inglorious defeat, yet as a delaying action, to further the interests of the Allies in the Southwest Pacific, it has been pronounced a success, a triumph of American and Filipino courage that gave a promise that would inspire their brother Americans to transform defeat into victory before the war should end.

And after Corregidor fell, General MacArthur spoke as follows: “Corregidor needs no comment from me. It has sounded its own story at the mouth of its guns. It has scrolled its own epitaph on enemy tablets. But through the bloody haze of its last reverberating shot, I shall always seem to see the vision of its grim, gaunt, and ghostly men still unafraid.”

The only three-star general in the war to suffer the bitterest experience in a soldier’s life, Jonathan M. Wainwright stood up and surrendered in the Philippines after directing some of the fanciest holding tactics of that desperate, drawn-out struggle. Already holding the Distinguished Service Medal for staff work against the Germans in World War I, he received the Distinguished Service Cross “for extraordinary heroism in action” against the Japanese, awarded after his capture and imprisonment.

In defending the Philippine Islands, our troops had fought a gallant delaying action designed to slow down the Japanese advance into the South Pacific. It was well understood in Washington that the islands, almost surrounded as they were by Japanese-controlled areas, could not hold out for long against a strong and determined enemy attack. But a delaying action would facilitate our plans, already considered, for building up supply lines to Australia so as to have in the Southwest Pacific a base for developing a counterattack.

Wainwright and his staff were kept under guard at the University Club in Manila. In one of the last days they had the heartbreaking experience of seeing a long column of ragged Americans and Filipinos trudging down the street. They were the men of Corregidor being marched through the streets of Manila to let the thousands of native Filipinos know that the Japanese were a superior people. At Bilibid prison the Americans were separated from the Filipinos, the Americans to be sent to Cabanatuan, while the Filipinos were to be sent to Camp O’Donnell.

One of General Wainwright’s last acts before being carried away to Tarlac prison camp was to write a letter to General Homma of the Japanese Army, requesting him to radio President Roosevelt asking that a ship be dispatched to the Philippines with food, clothing, and medical supplies for the American and Filipino prisoners of war, who were dying at the rate of three hundred a day. This request was ignored by the Japanese officer.

General Wainwright and his staff arrived at Tarlac prison camp on 9 June 1942, where about 180 other American officers were already imprisoned. They were crowded, all 180 of them, into a building designed to hold just eighty. Thus began the years of torture and suffering, as these valiant Americans were shuttled back and forth from prison camp to prison camp—Tarlac, Formosa, Japan, Manchuria—covering a period of more than three years. Heroes, all of them.

Indicating the valiant spirit of General Wainwright and the troops under his command, the general wrote in a letter just before Corregidor fell the following words: “As I write this we are subjected to terrific air and artillery bombardment, and it is unreasonable to expect that we can hold out for long. We have done our best, both here and on Bataan, and although beaten, we are still unashamed.”

Losses in American and Filipino personnel at Bataan and Corregidor have officially been set as follows: On Bataan, 36,853; and on Corregidor, 11,574; making a total of 48,427 killed or taken prisoner by the Japanese.

The defense of Corregidor lasted from 9 April to 6 May 1942. In the other islands of the Philippine Archipelago approximately all our troops surrendered and were made prisoners of war. On 8 April, 15,000 Japanese troops captured the island of Cebu and the capital by the same name. The enemy hurriedly occupied every city and port.

Quite a number of American officers and men escaped to the mountains of the various islands where they were hidden and protected from the enemy by the native Filipinos, and then organized and conducted an underground and guerrilla movement to harass the enemy and prepare the way for the return of General MacArthur and his liberating American forces; for General MacArthur, in leaving the Philippines for Australia, had said: “I shall return.”

Philippine Incidents

Before bringing this article to a close, we wish to invite the reader’s attention to certain personal experiences and observations that have found a lasting place in history. No one’s pen is capable of portraying all the incidents of bravery connected with our defeat in the Philippines. The story of many a hero is buried with him in the silent halls of death, and innumerable instances of the highest valor may never be revealed. However, the picture of this epic battle would be too incomplete without a reference to certain known incidents and personalities.

Experiences at Japanese Prison Camps O’Donnell and Cabanatuan

From the report of Colonel Alfred C. Oliver, Chaplain Emeritus of the National Sojourners, and formerly Chief of Chaplains of the U.S. Army.

Colonel Oliver was on duty in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war and was taken prisoner by the Japanese. The statements given below, taken from the National Sojourners Magazine for August 1945, give his observations and experiences in Japanese prison camps. This is perhaps one of the most scathing indictments of the inhumanity of the Japanese soldiers ever written.

According to Colonel Oliver, the Japanese do not react like normal civilized human beings; whenever they are stripped of the veneer of their present-day civilization, they always act as savages. These opinions are based on years of experience, of association with and observation of the Japanese.

The general attitude of the Japanese soldier toward all Filipinos was cruel and domineering, and toward all Americans, one of deepest hatred. The Filipino people have always shown friendship for the Americans and often risked their lives to supply them with water or some dainty like sugar or rice. Because of these acts of mercy, Colonel Oliver saw young girls and old women beaten cruelly by the Japanese guards with the butts of their rifles. One woman, large with child, was bayoneted through the abdomen and left along the road writhing in horrible death agony.

When the Japanese guards wished to severely punish one of the American prisoners of war, they would strip him to only a “G string” and then tie him up by his wrists outside one of their guard houses which was located at the main prison camp gate alongside the public road. Here, as the Filipino country women came walking by on their way to market, balancing baskets of garden stuff on their heads, the Japanese guards would require them to stop, remove their baskets, bow, and then compel them to beat the American prisoners hanging there. For this purpose, they provided a four-foot long, two-inch thick, green bamboo cudgel. And if a woman refused to beat the American severely, she was herself severely beaten.

There is one other phase of Japanese barbarism which Colonel Oliver feels should be presented: namely, their treatment of helpless, sick prisoners of war. He ran into this at Camp O’Donnell where the survivors of the Bataan Death March were imprisoned. When these thousands of American soldiers arrived, there was only one faucet available to them for water. Desperately dehydrated men got in line and stood there sometimes twenty-four hours to obtain a drink. Later, the strongest carried water a mile and a half from a polluted river. During the first six weeks, when 1,700 men died, there was never sufficient water except for cooking and drinking.

The American Army doctors had no medicines or surgical equipment. Fifty percent of the prisoners had malaria, ninety percent had beri beri, and at least ninety-five percent had dysentery. Practically everyone in camp was burning up with fever from one or the other of these diseases. Prisoners in rags, without blankets, lay on the bare hospital floors, on bamboo slats in the barracks, or on the ground. Hundreds were too weak to go to the latrines, and the stench from fecal matter was sickening. Clouds of big blue flies arose from around the feces and bodies of those to whom Chaplain Oliver tried to give a drink. Desperately sick men crawled down by the latrine and under the buildings to die, sometimes remaining there for days before they were found and buried.

Soon after arriving in Camp O’Donnell, the senior American Army doctor and the chaplain wrote a joint letter to the Japanese camp commander pointing out the above conditions and requesting help under the Articles of the Geneva Convention. These two officers were called before the Japanese commander who categorically refused each and every request made. These officers then begged the privilege of sending out those Americans who needed emergency operations to either Japanese or Filipino hospitals. This was also denied. The Japanese commander became more and more furious as other requests were made, until finally he said: “Japan did not sign the Geneva Convention. I hate you Americans and will always hate you. The only thing I am interested in is, when one of you dies, then I’ll see you bury him.” This closed the interview.

During the period described above by Chaplain Oliver, the Red Cross tried to deliver two truckloads of medicines and other needed supplies, but this same Japanese commander would not permit them to be unloaded. Colonel Oliver believes that the Japanese have great possibilities for development; but we in America must ever keep in mind that it will take not only years but generations for the Japanese people to acquire the ingrained characteristics of gentleness which are now the passion of civilized people and acquired after centuries of trial and error.

For months after the Bataan and Corregidor survivors were assembled at Camp No. 1 near Cabanatuan, the treatment by the Japanese of the sick American prisoners of war was as criminally culpable as at Camp O’Donnell. Some 2,700 American prisoners of war lie buried at Camp No. 1. During July 1942, over 750 died here. Practically every death was the result of Japanese starvation and failure to provide the sick with the medicine needed. The most pitiful incident of this period was the death of 135 Americans of diphtheria. American doctors had to stand impotently by and watch these helpless men choke to death. They died in horrible agony because the Japanese refused to supply the necessary anti-toxin, although it was in a storehouse about one hundred yards away. This was equally true in the hundreds of malaria deaths due to the lack of quinine, which the Japanese had on hand and refused to supply to our doctors.

Colonel Oliver closed his report with a call to Americans to be on their guard, because the Japanese do not react like civilized human beings. And the world is in danger until they do.

New Mexico’s 200th Coast Artillery

Among the National Guard units on Bataan were two tank battalions coming from many states of the west and south. There was a whole regiment of anti-aircraft from New Mexico: Deming, Carlsbad, Clovis, Silver City, Gallup, Taos, Roswell, Hobbs, Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and the A and M College at Masilla Park. They belonged to the 200th Coast Artillery whose fantastic marksmanship made news day after day as they shot down enemy planes by the score and prevented others from flying low enough to deliver accurate fire. Of them Helena Huntington Smith, writing in Collier’s for 29 August 1942, said:

They stood up without complaint under constant furious fire for more than three months. They were besieged by land, blockaded by sea, cut off from all sources of help in the Philippines and America, and they knew it. But they only fought the harder.

Again:

The men of Bataan have done all that human beings could do to the limits of endurance. They were sustained every day of their fight by something more than physical strength. I knew the men out in Bataan, and I knew they were thinking of their people and their country and of freedom and dignity and pride. It was no ordinary fight.

Early in 1940 this regiment, originally cavalry, was converted into anti-aircraft, and was inducted into the Federal service in January 1941. Being trained at Fort Bliss, this regiment was chosen for Philippine service because it was efficient, and for the further reason that a large percentage of its members had knowledge of the Spanish language. At the end of August 1941, the regiment was headed west, destination unknown to its members. And when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, these eighteen- to twenty-two-year-old boys were on Bataan. They fought on through February, March, and into April, giving devastating blows to the enemy planes and ships. They pushed back wave after wave of enemy troops, who outnumbered them by many times, and on 5 April frustrated a landing attempt, with heavy losses to themselves. Weary, hungry, sick, they came to their limit on 6 April, and on the 9th from “complete physical exhaustion” they were compelled to surrender: “In such a fight as this, the flesh must yield at last, endurance must melt away, and the end of the battle must come. Bataan has fallen but its spirit stands, a beacon to the liberty-loving peoples of the world.”

Three officers and 104 enlisted men of the 200th escaped to Corregidor, and there fought on until the surrender of that island fortress.

Philippine Islands.

 

Japanese troops on Bataan during the spring of 1942.

Mortar squad assembling an 81 mm Mortar M1 during training in the Philippine Islands in 1941. In 1936 a program for national defense was initiated in the Philippine Islands. A military mission of U.S. officers was charged with the organization and training of Filipino regular troops. In July 1941 the Philippine Army was ordered into the service of the Army of the United States and U.S. troops were sent to the islands from the United States.

New recruits are given instruction in use of the Browning .30-caIiber machine gun M1917A1.

Filipino troops training with a 37 mm antitank gun M3. As a result of the war warning to all overseas garrisons on 27 November 1941, the U.S. forces in the Philippines went on a full war alert.

Filipino troops training with a 37 mm antitank gun M3. Over a period of years the Japanese had collected a valuable store of information about the Philippines and planned to occupy the Philippine Islands, eliminating all U.S. troops there.

Loading a bamboo raft before crossing a river during maneuvers.

Troops and mules preparing to swim a river. By December 1941 U.S. ground forces in the Philippines numbered about 110,000, of which a little over 10,000 were U.S. personnel. The remainder were Philippine scouts, constabulary, and Philippine Army troops. As in the Hawaiian garrison, the hastily mobilized army lacked training and modern equipment.

Engineer troops stand ready to place sections of a ponton bridge in position during a river-crossing maneuver in the Philippines, 1941.

Troops crossing the newly constructed ponton bridge.

Cavite Navy Yard, Luzon, during a Japanese aerial attack.

Residents of Cavite evacuating the city after the Japanese bombing raid of 10 December.

Medium bombers, B-18s of the U.S. Far East Army Air Force attack infantry troops during 1941 maneuvers in the Philippines.

Pursuit planes, P-36s of the U.S. Far East Army Air Force attack infantry troops during 1941 maneuvers in the Philippines.

Japanese advancing during the drive on Manila. The medium tank is a Type 94 (1934), with a 57 mm gun with a free traverse of 20 degrees right and left. It had a speed of 18 to 20 miles an hour, was manned by a crew of 4, weighed 15 tons, and was powered by a diesel engine.

Camouflaged 155 mm Gun M1918 (GPF) parked on the Gerona-Tarlac road, December 1941.

Aerial view of Corregidor Island off the tip of Bataan. On 25 December, Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, was established on Corregidor. Manila was declared an open city on the following day and the remains of the naval base at Cavite were blown up to prevent its supplies from falling into enemy hands.

Tank obstacles and barbed wire strung to delay the enemy advance on Bataan.

Members of an antitank company in position on Bataan.

Japanese prisoners, captured on Bataan, being led blindfolded to headquarters for questioning.

Japanese soldiers firing a machine gun Type 92 (1932) 7.7 mm heavy machine gun, gas-operated and air-cooled. This was the standard Japanese heavy machine gun.

Japanese firing a 75 mm gun Type 41 (1908), normally found in an infantry regimental cannon company. Called a mountain (infantry) gun, it was replaced by a later model. Light and easily handled, it was very steady in action. When used as a regimental cannon company weapon it was issued on the basis of four per regiment.

Gun crew with a 3-inch Antiaircraft Gun M2.

U.S. prisoners on Bataan sorting equipment while Japanese guards look on. Following this, the Americans and Filipinos started on the Death March to Camp O'Donnell in central Luzon. Over 50,000 prisoners were held at this camp. A few U.S. troops escaped capture and carried on as guerrillas.

Soldiers in Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor, April 1942. With food, water, and supplies practically exhausted and no adequate facilities for caring for the wounded, and with Japanese forces landing on Corregidor, the situation for the U.S. troops was all but hopeless. The commander offered to surrender the island forts on Corregidor to the Japanese. When this was refused and with the remaining troops in danger of being wiped out, all the U.S. forces in the Philippines were surrendered to the enemy on 6 May 1912. Couriers were sent to the various island commanders and by 17 May all organized resistance in the Philippines had ceased.

Coastal defense gun on Corregidor.

12-inch mortars on Corregidor. Corregidor's armament comprised eight 12-inch guns, twelve 12-inch mortars, two 10-inch guns, five 6-inch guns, twenty 155-mm. guns, and assorted guns of lesser caliber, including antiaircraft guns. The fixed gun emplacements were in open concrete pits and exposed to aerial attack and artillery shelling. The Japanese kept up strong concentrations of fire against the defenses on Corregidor until most of the defending guns were knocked out.

Captured American and Filipino troops after the surrender on Corregidor. The 11,500 surviving troops on Corregidor became prisoners of war and on 28 May 1942 were evacuated to a prison stockade in Manila. The fall of Corregidor on 6 May marked the end of the first phase of enemy operations. The Japanese had bases controlling routes to India, Australia, and many islands in the Central and South Pacific and were preparing for their next assaults against the Allies. (This picture is reproduced from an illustration which appeared in a captured Japanese publication.)