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War Warnings: Deliberately Confused Messages

To General Short

Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.”

To Admiral Kimmel

“Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.”

Analysis

One message says negotiations have ended and the other says they may continue.

The Navy message emphasizes conflict and the Army message avoiding conflict.

The Navy message points attention away from Hawaii and mentions sabotage. The Army message says not to alarm the civilian population which means the lowest level of alert.

The Navy plan implements War Plan WPL-46 only, which forced Kimmel to use the few long-range patrol planes he had to scout the Marshall Islands to the southwest.

The Army message forbids the first overt act. Those are the words of FDR. They are also words that denote knowledge of the coming attack, because Hawaii wasn’t about to attack Japan.

The sabotage fig leaf was to distract the Hawaiian commanders from understanding the meaning of ‘overt act.’ But no one could allow sabotage, so it cannot have referred to that. What ‘overt act’ do you think FDR was referring to? Since attacking Japan and sabotage were impossible, that leaves only one possibility—Japan attacking Hawaii. The words “overt act” prove that FDR knew Japan would attack Hawaii.

The President’s own commission on Pearl Harbor declared that the Hawaiian commanders needed to “consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings” because they were so confusing. These messages were held by the Roosevelt administration as sufficient warning to Hawaii both before and after 7 December. No other defense was raised for denying IQ and not sending warnings to Hawaii. The Navy Court and Army Board found them totally inadequate, as indeed they are.

 

Radar Plot from Station Opana, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, ca. 1941.

General Short.

Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, seen here in his Pearl Harbor headquarters in 1941, would spend the rest of his life in a quixotic quest for exoneration. The historical debate continues as to the level of blame he should shoulder for the disaster.

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet, (center) confers with his Chief of Staff, Captain William W. Smith, (right) and his Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain Walter S. DeLany (left), at Pearl Harbor, 1941.

Browning .50-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun, water-cooled, flexible, on a runway at Wheeler Field, Oahu, in the Hawaiian Islands. Early in December 1941 all the U.S. troops, including anti-aircraft batteries, were returned to their stations from field maneuvers to await the signal for riot duty.

Infantrymen during a field inspection in the Hawaiian Islands, January 1941. From 1935 on the U.S. garrison in the Hawaiian Islands was larger than any other American overseas outpost. However, by 1940 there was a shortage of modern equipment and trained personnel, and not until February 1941 did troop reinforcements and up-to-date equipment begin to arrive in Hawaii. The United States was not prepared for war and the men and equipment did not meet the necessary requirements.

4.2-inch chemical mortar crew in action during maneuvers in Hawaii. As in all U.S. military commands, the Hawaiian Department was faced with the problem of training the largely inexperienced forces available at the time.

A 75-mm gun M1917A1 in a camouflaged position in Hawaii.

Coast Artillery battery training in Hawaii. Man at left is placing a round in the manual fuse setter of a 3-inch anti-aircraft gun M1917M2. A plan for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands had been set up and joint maneuvers (land, air, and naval forces) were held periodically to test the various security measures.

Rear Admiral Patrick L. Bellinger, Pearl Harbor's Air Defense officer, who predicted the Japanese attack.

An aerial photograph of Pearl Harbor taken in May 1940. Visible are the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (lower left), ten battleships, 17 cruisers, two light cruisers, and more than 30 destroyers. [US Navy/National Archives]

Aerial view of the U.S. Naval Operating Base, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii, looking southwest on 30 October 1941. Ford Island Naval Air Station is in the center, with the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard just beyond it, across the channel. The airfield in the upper left-center is the U.S. Army's Hickam Field. Paired cruisers in the immediate foreground, nests of destroyers to the right. The white ship is the hospital ship Solace. [Official U.S. Navy photograph 80-G-182874, now in the collections of the U.S. National Archives. Also U.S. Navy National Museum of Naval Aviation photo No. 1996.488.029.051]

Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, October 30, 1941. Cropped version of previous photo with notations. Many Japanese torpedo planes flew along the East Loch to get the longest possible straight runs for dropping their torpedoes. This put the battleships USS Oklahoma and USS West Virginia in an almost direct line. Of the 40 torpedoes dropped by Japanese aircraft, approximately 14 hit these two ships.

Ford Island, October 10, 1941.

An aerial view of Battleship Row after the attack.

Out of the Loop: Japan’s Envoys Unaware of Pearl Harbor Attack

From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, Exhibits of the Joint Committee, pages 213-14

While Secretary Hull may have berated Nomura and Kurusu after reading the “Fourteen-part Message” on 7 December, this document shows that they weren’t really “in the know” about Japan’s plans. (Italics added.)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple) #1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders’ meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727 JD-1: 7055 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

United States Note to Japan, 26 November 1941

From Department of State Bulletin, Volume V Number 129, 13 December 1941

The text of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on 26 November 1941, which consists of two parts, one an oral statement and one an outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, reads as follows:

Oral

Strictly confidential

November 26, 1941

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measure to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussion with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of view in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment

November 26, 1941

Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan

Section I: Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Section II: Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggres­sion pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including right in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.