War Warnings: Deliberately Confused Messages

To General Short

Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.”

To Admiral Kimmel

“Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.”

Analysis

One message says negotiations have ended and the other says they may continue.

The Navy message emphasizes conflict and the Army message avoiding conflict.

The Navy message points attention away from Hawaii and mentions sabotage. The Army message says not to alarm the civilian population which means the lowest level of alert.

The Navy plan implements War Plan WPL-46 only, which forced Kimmel to use the few long-range patrol planes he had to scout the Marshall Islands to the southwest.

The Army message forbids the first overt act. Those are the words of FDR. They are also words that denote knowledge of the coming attack, because Hawaii wasn’t about to attack Japan.

The sabotage fig leaf was to distract the Hawaiian commanders from understanding the meaning of ‘overt act.’ But no one could allow sabotage, so it cannot have referred to that. What ‘overt act’ do you think FDR was referring to? Since attacking Japan and sabotage were impossible, that leaves only one possibility—Japan attacking Hawaii. The words “overt act” prove that FDR knew Japan would attack Hawaii.

The President’s own commission on Pearl Harbor declared that the Hawaiian commanders needed to “consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings” because they were so confusing. These messages were held by the Roosevelt administration as sufficient warning to Hawaii both before and after 7 December. No other defense was raised for denying IQ and not sending warnings to Hawaii. The Navy Court and Army Board found them totally inadequate, as indeed they are.

 

Radar Plot from Station Opana, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, ca. 1941.

General Short.

Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, seen here in his Pearl Harbor headquarters in 1941, would spend the rest of his life in a quixotic quest for exoneration. The historical debate continues as to the level of blame he should shoulder for the disaster.

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Pacific Fleet, (center) confers with his Chief of Staff, Captain William W. Smith, (right) and his Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain Walter S. DeLany (left), at Pearl Harbor, 1941.

Browning .50-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun, water-cooled, flexible, on a runway at Wheeler Field, Oahu, in the Hawaiian Islands. Early in December 1941 all the U.S. troops, including anti-aircraft batteries, were returned to their stations from field maneuvers to await the signal for riot duty.

Infantrymen during a field inspection in the Hawaiian Islands, January 1941. From 1935 on the U.S. garrison in the Hawaiian Islands was larger than any other American overseas outpost. However, by 1940 there was a shortage of modern equipment and trained personnel, and not until February 1941 did troop reinforcements and up-to-date equipment begin to arrive in Hawaii. The United States was not prepared for war and the men and equipment did not meet the necessary requirements.

4.2-inch chemical mortar crew in action during maneuvers in Hawaii. As in all U.S. military commands, the Hawaiian Department was faced with the problem of training the largely inexperienced forces available at the time.

A 75-mm gun M1917A1 in a camouflaged position in Hawaii.

Coast Artillery battery training in Hawaii. Man at left is placing a round in the manual fuse setter of a 3-inch anti-aircraft gun M1917M2. A plan for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands had been set up and joint maneuvers (land, air, and naval forces) were held periodically to test the various security measures.

Rear Admiral Patrick L. Bellinger, Pearl Harbor's Air Defense officer, who predicted the Japanese attack.

An aerial photograph of Pearl Harbor taken in May 1940. Visible are the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (lower left), ten battleships, 17 cruisers, two light cruisers, and more than 30 destroyers. [US Navy/National Archives]

Aerial view of the U.S. Naval Operating Base, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii, looking southwest on 30 October 1941. Ford Island Naval Air Station is in the center, with the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard just beyond it, across the channel. The airfield in the upper left-center is the U.S. Army's Hickam Field. Paired cruisers in the immediate foreground, nests of destroyers to the right. The white ship is the hospital ship Solace. [Official U.S. Navy photograph 80-G-182874, now in the collections of the U.S. National Archives. Also U.S. Navy National Museum of Naval Aviation photo No. 1996.488.029.051]

Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, October 30, 1941. Cropped version of previous photo with notations. Many Japanese torpedo planes flew along the East Loch to get the longest possible straight runs for dropping their torpedoes. This put the battleships USS Oklahoma and USS West Virginia in an almost direct line. Of the 40 torpedoes dropped by Japanese aircraft, approximately 14 hit these two ships.

Ford Island, October 10, 1941.

An aerial view of Battleship Row after the attack.