Germany’s Cossack Cavalry

Cossack serving with the Germans on the Eastern Front, 1944.

A number of men from conquered armies fought alongside the Germans during World War II. Known as patriotic traitors many combined items of their national uniform with that of the German Army. One of the more colorful volunteer groups were the Cossack units.

Foreign units attached to the Wehrmacht during the course of World War II varied considerably in strength and fighting capabilities; many of these units were virtually useless as front line soldiers, however, some of these units did achieve some status as an elite and among these were those units comprised of Cossacks.

The XV Cossack Cavalry Corps was raised in March 1943 from Cossack POWs, anti-Communist partisan units, and groups from various Cossack communities. The Cossacks were placed under the overall command of General von Pannwitz who understood them and held them in high esteem. German officers and senior NCOs assigned were selected for their sympathetic handling of the Cossacks and major command positions were held by the Germans until the end of the war.

Regiments were made up from the main Cossack communities. The first regiment organized was the 1st Don Regiment, followed by the 2nd Terek, 3rd Kuban (a regiment made up from Caucasian units), the 4th Kuban and the 5th Don Regiments. Shortly after there was another reorganization when the 2nd Tereks was renumbered 6th, and replaced by the 2nd Siberian Regiment.

The strength of a regiment was about two thousand men, each with its own signals and anti-tank units.

In September 1944, the XV Cossack Cavalry Corps came under the jurisdiction of the SS and was designated the “SS Cossack Cavalry Corps.” The attachment to the SS control was just about in name only, there was no substituting their own or standard Wehrmacht insignia for the SS pattern. Their officers and NCOs remained Wehrmacht and no SS personnel were with them.

At the end of the war, the Cossacks surrendered to the British Army, and were forcibly repatriated back to Russia where many of them were executed. Von Pannwitz, although a German, elected to go back to Russia with them and was tried by the Russians and hanged.

Uniform

In the early days a mixture of both Cossack national dress and standard German Army uniform was worn, which made them one of the most colorful German fighting units.

The Cossacks retained their fur caps (Papacha). The cap was black, the national emblem silver and the crown of the cap in its own distinguishing color — red for the Don and Kuban Cossacks, yellow for the Siberians, and pale blue for the Terek Cossacks.

Decorating this cloth panel was a white cross of tracing braid. The jacket was the normal issue German field service tunic which was field gray, buttons silver with a dark green collar piped in white, with the normal Army “Litzen” collar patch in white.

The national arm shields were worn on either arm according to the division. The patch was roughly divided into thirds from top to bottom. The topmost third bore the title of the unit in Cyrillic script in white. The lower two thirds was quartered into triangles and colored red and blue (red at the top and bottom), with the word “Don” at the top for the Don Cossacks.

The pants were the standard German cavalry breeches in field gray, and down the outside of each pant leg was a red stripe for the Don Cossacks. The boots were the normal issue German brown cavalry boots. The one major fixture that a Cossack would never be without was his saber or “Shasqa.”

German Cossack Cavalry, Russian Front, 1942.

 

A group of cavalrymen from the 1st Cossack Cavalry Division. This unit was formed in 1943 from prisoners of war and the various ad hoc formations of Cossack deserters that had been gathered by Wehrmacht field commanders. It also included men recruited from the short lived autonomous “Cossack District” that was located in the Kuban region south of Rostov-on-Don.

Cossack cavalry unit charging the Crimean Front.

Charge of a Cossack patrol in German service.

German 1st Cossack Cavalry Division soldier with MP 40 submachine gun, 1943.

Two members of the Free Arabian Legion and a Cossack Wehrmacht volunteer, circa 1941-1943.

Cossacks serving with the Wehrmacht, rounded up by the British in Austria, to be returned to the Soviets.

Insignia of the 1st Cossack Cavalry Division.

Flag of the Don Cossacks.

A soldier from the Don Cossacks detachment of the XV SS operating an infantry gun during the Warsaw Uprising.

Collapse in the East: War on the Russian Front (1943-1944)

A panzergrenadier remains concealed in a field as a Soviet tank approaches.

by Robert C. Smith

The Soviet 1943 Summer Counteroffensive and the Soviet Fall/Winter 1943-1944 Offensive had caused disastrous German losses south of the Pripet Marshes, yet north of this area, the offensives had been relatively limited. In fact, the only serious alteration in positions was the Soviet offensive that drove German and Axis troops away from the city of Leningrad.

For the troops of German Army Group Center, the war seemed to be some faraway event. Most of their time was spent in the development of densely fortified positions around strategic towns and cities, and guarding key river crossings. The troops were handicapped by the persistent combing of their ranks to find combat-ready troops to send in as replacements in the south. Everyone assumed that, given enough time, they could make up in strength and tenacity of their fortified positions what they were losing in manpower and equipment, especially mobile units.

The Soviet successes during the preceding summer had imposed yet another constraint on the troops, namely that as the troops on the southern flank of the Army Group were forced to withdraw, the troops from Army Group Center were forced to extend themselves and guard the exposed flank. Fortunately for the Germans, the terrain favored their defense efforts, since they could easily use the Pripet River and its tributaries as terrain reinforcements for their positions. Even so, the 400,000 men of Army Group Center were stretched out thinly, covering a front that extended in a sweeping curve from near Polotosk south around Bobruisk and then along the Pripet River. This amounted to almost 600 kilometers of front for the troops to defend, as well as innumerable salients, strong points, and, above all, the rear areas.

The terrain tended to favor the defense. Virtually all the major rivers in the area ran north-south; only the Pripet ran east-west. Many areas were heavily forested, a factor that favored the defense; but other areas were marsh, a factor that hindered the movement of friend and foe alike and made the cohesive operation of large forces difficult. The Germans had carefully taken advantage of terrain in their development of fortifications. Most fortified localities included a variety of trenches, earth-reinforced pillboxes, dense minefields, and special fighting positions where the turrets of spare or severely damaged tanks were used as the artillery for the area. The problem facing the Germans was not so much the power of the individual fortifications, but the fact that the whole front could not be covered in anything like the desired troop density. The command of Army Group Center hoped that the available panzer and panzergrenadier units would be able to cover the thinly held gaps along the front.

Strategically, the task of Army Group Center was to prevent the advance of Soviet units along the easy campaigning terrain of westernmost Russia and eastern Poland. After taking a leaf from the Soviet book on the defense, it was hoped that the defenses would allow the Germans to hold out indefinitely against the Soviet Summer Offensive, while mobile units were rushed into position to deliver the coup. This decision had been made at the highest political level—by Hitler himself.

Hitler made a careful examination of the front, trying to guess where the Soviets, now with the initiative firmly in their grasp, would strike in their inevitable Summer Offensive. Given the weak hold that the Germans maintained along the Pripet River to the south of Army Group Center, and the fact that any other attack would have to cross numerous defended river lines, it was logical to assume that the Soviets would take the easy way out, the one that offered the greatest advantage for the least cost. It was assumed that the Soviets would attempt to force the Pripet River line, then roll up the southern flank of Army Group Center.

Unfortunately for the troops in Army Group Center, the assumptions were wrong. The Soviets planned to make a head-on assault against Army Group Center and its fortified localities. Although there was considerable evidence that the Soviets were planning a truly massive attack against the face of Army Group Center, a combination of Soviet diversionary operations (that would later develop into offensives in their own right) and careful control of radio traffic preserved both tactical and strategic surprise.

With a fine sense of history and irony, the Soviets launched their attack on 22 June 1944, the third anniversary of the German invasion of the USSR. In manpower alone, the Soviets outnumbered the Germans six-to-one, and they dominated all other categories in the same manner. Massive attacks by Soviet artillery divisions tore huge holes in the weakened German lines, while infantry assaults, backed up by armored units, ripped the gaps wider. Tank and mechanized corps poured through the gaps, plunging deep into the German rear, severing communications everywhere. While portions of the Soviet attackers rolled onward, others curved in behind the Germans in their fortified localities and trapped them.

The huge manpower losses inflicted on Army Group Center, as well as the materiel losses, had so weakened the horse cavalry units, while the river obstacles were bridged by wooden submerged bridges and crossed underwater by sealed tanks. Each of the fortified localities was completely surrounded by the end of the first week, and most had been captured, the troops inside them either killed or captured. The brutal combination of very heavy artillery bombardment and skillful use of combat teams of armor, infantry, engineers, and anti-tank guns made a mockery of the German defenses. With the front collapsing around them, just one thought filled the minds of the German defenders—Escape!

During the first week of the offensive, over twenty German divisions were eliminated totally. Over one hundred thousand German soldiers died, and another forty thousand were captured—at one blow, over a third of the forces of Army Group Center had ceased to exist.

The pursuit that followed was as skillful as it was merciless. Frantic to stop the Soviet hordes, the Germans threw in everything they could scrape together in a series of uncoordinated counterattacks. The Soviets stood firm and allowed the attacks to batter themselves against their hasty defenses, then they counterattacked in turn, destroying the men who tried to block their path. During the third week of the offensive, the Soviet pursuit formed yet another pocket.

German troops, driven back and funneled into the city of Minsk, were surrounded after a fierce series of tank battles that enclosed them in a monstrous pocket—over one hundred thousand German troops were trapped. Within a few days, the soldiers in the pocket had joined their comrades in death or captivity.

The huge manpower losses inflicted on Army Group Center, as well as the material losses, had so weakened the German Army that to resist was suicidal, yet still had to be done, no matter what the cost. The tables of three years before had been turned, and now it was the turn of the German Army to stand and die to protect its homeland. Reinforcements from the west, originally earmarked for the defense of Normandy, were hastily thrown in front of the Soviet offense. Finally, after just more than a month of fighting, the Soviets took a well-deserved rest.

In thirty-two days of heavy fighting, the Soviets had killed more than four hundred thousand German troops (i.e., the original strength of Army Group Center), captured another 150,000 men, and inflicted an immense number of casualties, destroying forever the trained offensive power of nearly thirty German divisions. From now on, the half-trained man- and boy-power of the Reich would suffer needless losses while the enemy still advanced without any serious opposition. Besides the heavy manpower losses, the materiel loss was enormous: huge supply dumps, railroad locomotives and rolling stock, more than 630 aircraft, sixteen thousand pieces of artillery, sixty thousand vehicles of all sorts, and, most important, 2,500 tanks and assault guns—the equipment for five panzer divisions.

What was even more significant for the future was not the fact that the Soviets had effectively emasculated the German Army, but that they had proven, without qualification, that they could conduct a blitzkrieg attack against heavily reinforced positions—and win. To demonstrate the depth of the offensive, along a 400-kilometer front, the Soviets had managed to drive up to 500 kilometers deep into the German rear in thirty-two days, and the Soviets didn’t make the same mistakes the Germans committed in BARBAROSSA.

Besides developing effective tactics that integrated tanks, infantry, engineers, and anti-tank artillery into comprehensive assault groups reminiscent of the units formed for the assaults on the Mannerheim Line in the Winter War, the Soviets had developed adequate air-ground support tactics and massive employment of artillery that shattered even the stoutest defenses. Once the defenses broke, the Soviets plunged deep into the German rear, and when counterattacks struck at their lightly guarded flanks, the Soviets smashed them with ease. The pursuit was conducted over marginally suitable terrain for a large portion of the time, yet was most effective, destroying the German Army everywhere it tried to stand fast.

But most significant of all for the future was the fact that the Soviets demonstrated that they had learned the lessons of the blitzkrieg better than their tutors. When the advance reached the limits of its supply lines, the Soviets stopped, rather than advance in a series of aimless, pointless, strategically insignificant attacks that would only wear out their trained manpower. Contrast this to the German dithering and aimless pursuit of tactical victories in the first few months of the Eastern Campaign.

Before the collapse of Army Group Center, the Soviets had demonstrated their ability as fighters; now they demonstrated their abilities as soldiers, and quite capable soldiers at that.

The Author

Robert C. Smith is a graduate geologist living in Pennsauken, New Jersey, and has written numerous articles on military history, military science, civil defense, and nuclear warfare for a variety of defense-oriented publications.

 

Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation (3-23 August 1943) (aka Fourth Battle of Kharkov)

Churchill Mk IV tank at the fourth battle of Kharkov in 1943.

The Belgorod-Kharkov Strategic Offensive Operation, or simply Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation, was a Soviet strategic summer offensive that aimed to recapture Belgorod and Kharkov (now Kharkiv) [Kharkov is the Russian language name of the city (Kharkiv in Ukrainian); both Russian and Ukrainian were official languages in the Soviet Union], and destroy the German forces of the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf. The operation was codenamed Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev after the 18th-century Field Marshal Peter Rumyantsev and was conducted by the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge. The battle was referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans.

The operation began in the early hours of 3 August 1943, with the objective of following up the successful Soviet defensive effort against the German Operation Citadel. The offensive was directed against the German Army Group South’s northern flank. By 23 August, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had successfully seized Kharkov from German forces. It was the last time that Kharkov changed hands during the Soviet-German War. The operation led to the retreat of the German forces in Ukraine behind the Dnieper River and set the stage for the Battle of Kiev in autumn 1943.

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev had been planned by Stavka to be the major Soviet summer offensive in 1943. However, due to heavy losses sustained during the Battle of Kursk in July, time was needed for the Soviet formations to recover and regroup. Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced on 3 August, with the aim of the defeating the 4th Panzer Army, Army Group Kempf, and the southern wing of Army Group South. It was also hoped that the German 1st Panzer Army and the newly reformed 6th Army would be trapped by an advance of the Red Army forces to the Azov Sea.

The Soviet forces included the Voronezh Front and the Steppe Front, which deployed about 1,144,000 men with 2,418 tanks and 13,633 guns and rocket launchers for the attack. Against this the German army could field 200 000 men and 237 tanks and assault guns.

German Army Group South commander General Erich von Manstein had anticipated that the Soviets would launch an attack across the Dnieper and Mius Rivers in an attempt to reach the Black Sea, cutting off the German forces extended in the southern portion of Army Group South in a repeat of the Stalingrad disaster. When the Soviet Southern Front and the Southwestern Front launched just such an attack on 17 July the Germans responded by moving the II SS Panzer Corps, XXIV Corps and XLVIII Panzer Corps southward to blunt the Soviet offensive. In fact these Soviet operations were intended to draw off German forces from the main thrust of the Soviet offensive, to dissipate the German reserve in anticipation for their main drive.

The Soviet plan called for the 5th and 6th Guards Armies, and the 53rd Army, to attack on a 30-kilometer wide sector, supported by a heavy artillery concentration, and break through the five successive German defensive lines between Kursk and Kharkov. The former two armies had borne the brunt of the German attack in Operation Citadel. Supported by two additional mobile corps, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army, both mostly reequipped after the end of Operation Citadel, would act as the front’s mobile groups and develop the breakthrough by encircling Kharkov from the north and west. Mikhail Katukov’s 1st Tank Army was to form the westward-facing outer encirclement line, while Pavel Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army would form the inner line, facing the city. A secondary attack to the west of the main breakthrough was to be conducted by the 27th and 40th Armies with the support of four separate tank corps. Meanwhile, to the east and southeast, the 69th and 7th Guards Armies, followed later by the Southwestern Front’s 57th Army, were to join the attack.

On 3 August the offensive was begun with a heavy artillery barrage directed against the German defensive positions. Though the German defenders fought tenaciously, the two tank armies committed to the battle could not be held back. By 5 August the Soviets had broken through the German defensive lines, moving into the rear areas and capturing Belgorod while advancing some 60 km. Delivering powerful sledgehammer blows from the north and east, the attackers overwhelmed the German defenders.

German reserves were shifted from the Orel sector and north from the Donbas regions in an attempt to stem the tide and slow down the Soviet attacks. Success was limited to the “Grossdeutschland” division delaying the 40th Army by a day. Seven panzer and motorized divisions making up the III Panzer Corps, along with four infantry divisions were assembled to counterattack into the flank of the advancing Soviet forces but were checked. After nine days the 2nd SS “Das Reich” and 3rd SS “Totenkopf” divisions arrived and initiated a counterattack against the two Soviet Armies near Bogodukhov, 30 km northwest of Kharkov. In the following armored battles of firepower and maneuver the SS divisions destroyed a great many Soviet tanks. To assist the 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army joined the battles. All three Soviet armies suffered heavily, and the tank armies lost more than 800 of their initial 1,112 tanks. These Soviet reinforcements stopped the German counterattack, but their further offensive plans were blunted.

With the Soviet advance around Bogodukhov stopped, the Germans now began to attempt to close the gap between Akhtyrka and Krasnokutsk. The counterattack started on 18 August, and on 20 August “Totenkopf” and “Großdeutschland” met behind the Soviet units. Parts of two Soviet armies and two tank corps were trapped, but the trapped units heavily outnumbered the German units. Many Soviet units were able to break out, while suffering heavy casualties. After this setback the Soviet troops focused on Kharkov and captured it after heavy fighting on 23 August.

The battle is usually referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans and the Belgorod–Kharkov Strategic Offensive Operation by the Soviets. The Soviet operation was executed in two primary axis, one in the Belgorod-Kharkov axis and another in the Belgorod-Bogodukhov axis.

On the first day, the units of the Voronezh Front quickly penetrated the German front-line defenses on the boundary of the 4th Panzer Army and Army Group “Kempf”, between Tomarovka and Belgorod and gained 100 kilometers in a sector along the Akhtyrka-Bogodukhov-Olshany-Zolochev line along the banks of the Merla river. They were finally halted on 12 August by armored units of the III Panzer Corps. On 5 August 1943 XI Corps evacuated the city of Belgorod.

Following its withdrawal from Belgorod on the night of 5/6 August 1943 the XI Army Corps under the command of (Raus) now held defensive positions south of the city between the Donets and Lopan Rivers north of Kharkov. The XI Army Corps consisted of a Kampfgruppe from the 167th Infantry Division, the 168th, 106th, 198th, 320th Infantry Divisions, and the 6th Panzer Division which acted as was the corps reserve. This constituted a deep salient east into Soviet lines and was subject to outflanking attempts on the corps left flank, indeed Soviet armored units had already appeared 20 miles behind the corps front line. XI Army Corps now made a series of phased withdrawals toward Kharkov to prevent encirclement.

Only reaching the final defenses north of the city on 12 August 1943, following breakthroughs by the 57th and 69th Armies in several sectors of the front-line, the disintegration of the 168th Infantry Division and after an intervention by the corps reserve. When its attempts to force a breakthrough in the Bogodukhov-Olshany-Zolochev met with frustration along the Merla River, the Steppe Front directed its assaults towards Korotich, a sector held by 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich to cut the Poltava-Kharkov rail link. Fierce fighting ensued, in which Korotich was captured by the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and subsequently recaptured by grenadiers from 2nd SS then to remain under German control, but the 5th Guards Tank Army (Pavel Rotmistrov) did cut the rail link finally on 22 August 1943.

The loss of this vital line of communication; while not fatal in itself, was a serious blow to the ability of Army Group Kempf, to defend the city from the constant Red Army attacks. This meant critical delays of supplies and reinforcements, and the unit’s position was becoming increasingly untenable. The way to Poltava now remained open, but Vatutin hesitated to push through while the Germans flanking the gap held firm. Instead, he turned his left flank armies; the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army, against the western front of Army Group Kempf where the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions fought to keep the front angled south westward away from Kharkov.

On the weaker east front of Army Group Kempf, the Soviet 57th Army cleared the right bank of the Donets between Chuguyev and Zmiyev, but the army command somehow could not quite bring itself to try for a full scale breakthrough.

These threats had led to a request by General Werner Kempf to abandon the city on 12 August 1943. Erich von Manstein did not object, but Adolf Hitler countered with an order that the city had to be held “under all circumstances”. After a prediction that the order to hold Kharkov would produce “another Stalingrad”, on 14 August 1943 Manstein relieved Kempf and appointed General Otto Wöhler in his place. A few days later, Army Group Kempf was renamed the 8th Army. Kharkov now constituted a deep German salient to the east, which prevented the red army from making use of this vital traffic and supply centre. Following boastful reports made by Soviet radio that Soviet troops had entered the city, when in fact it was still held by XI Army Corps, Joseph Stalin personally ordered its immediate capture. General Raus the officer commanding the city takes up the story:

It was clear that the Russians would not make a frontal assault on the projecting Kharkov salient but would attempt to break through the narrowest part of XI Armeekorps defensive arc west of the city in order to encircle the town. We deployed all available anti-tank guns on the northern edge of the bottleneck, which rose like a bastion, and emplaced numerous 88mm flak guns in depth on the high ground. This antitank defense alone would not have been sufficient to repulse the expected Soviet mass tank attack, but at the last moment reinforcements in the form of the “Das Reich” Panzer Regiment arrived with a strong Panzer component; I immediately dispatched it to the most endangered sector. The ninety-six Panther tanks, thirty-five Tiger tanks, and twenty-five Sturmgeschütz III self-propelled assault guns had hardly taken their positions on 20 August 1943 when the first large scale attack got underway. However the Russian tanks had been recognized while they were still assembling in the villages and flood plains of a brook valley. Within a few minutes heavily laden Stukas came on in wedge formation and unloaded their cargoes of destruction in well-timed dives on the enemy tanks caught in this congested area. Dark fountains of earth erupted skyward and were followed by heavy thunderclaps and shocks that resembled an earthquake. These were the heaviest, two-ton bombs, designed for use against battleships, which were all that Luftflotte 4 had left to counter the Russian attack. Soon all the villages occupied by Soviet tanks lay in flames. A sea of dust and smoke clouds illuminated by the setting sun hung over the brook valley, while dark mushrooms of smoke from burning tanks stood out in stark contrast. This gruesome picture bore witness to an undertaking that left death & destruction in its wake, hitting the Russians so hard that they could no longer launch their projected attack that day, regardless of Joseph Stalin’s order. Such a severe blow inflicted on the Soviets had purchased badly needed time for XI Armeekorps to reorganize.”

The supply situation in Kharkov was now catastrophic; artillerymen after firing their last rounds, were abandoning their guns to fight as infantrymen. The army’s supply depot had five trainloads of spare tank tracks left over from “Zitadelle” but very little else. The high consumption of ammunition in the last month and a half had cut into supplies put aside for the last two weeks of August and the first two weeks of September; until the turn of the month the army would have to get along with fifty percent of its daily average requirements in artillery & tank ammunition. XI Army Corps now had a combat strength of only 4,000 infantrymen, one man for every ten yards of front. General Erhard Raus explains the intensity of the constant Russian attacks:

On 20 August the Russians avoided mass groupings of tanks, crossed the brook valley simultaneously in a number of places, and disappeared into the broad cornfields that were located ahead of our lines, ending at the east-west rollbahn several hundred meters in front of our main battle line. Throughout the morning Soviet tanks worked their way forward in the hollows up to the southern edges of the cornfields, then made a mass dash across the road in full sight. “Das Reich‘s" Panthers caught the leading waves of T-34’s with fierce defensive fire before they could reach our main battle line. Yet wave after wave followed, until Russian tanks flowed across in the protecting hollows and pushed forward into our battle positions. Here a net of anti-tank and flak guns, Hornet 88mm tank destroyers, and Wasp self-propelled 105mm field howitzers trapped the T-34’s, split them into small groups, and put large numbers out of action. The final waves were still attempting to force a breakthrough in concentrated masses when the Tigers and StuG III self-propelled assault guns, which represented our mobile reserve s behind the front, attacked the Russian armor and repulsed it with heavy losses. The price paid by the 5th Guards Tank Army for this mass assault amounted to 184 knocked out T-34’s.

Wöhler, recognizing the hopelessness of the situation, did not prove anymore resolute, in view of the harsh realities facing the defenders of Kharkov, he knew that the depleted Infantry regiments could not hold their positions without copious artillery support. Two days after taking command of 8th Army, Wöhler also asked Manstein for permission to abandon the city. Regardless of Hitler’s demand that the city be held, Wöhler and Manstein agreed that the city could not be defended for long, given the diminishing German strength and the overwhelming size of Soviet reserves.

On 21 August 1943, Manstein gave his consent to withdraw from Kharkov. The largely destroyed Soviet city, which changed hands several times during the war, was about to be recaptured by the Soviets for the last time. During the day of 22 August 1943, the Germans began their exodus from the city under great pressure from the Soviets. The 57th & 69th Armies pushed in from three sides with the coming of daylight. The Soviets sensed that the Germans were evacuating Kharkov, due to the lessening of artillery fire and diminishing resistance in the front lines. Later in the day, thunderous explosions were heard as ammo dumps were blown. Large German columns were then observed leaving the city and the Soviet troops pushed into the town itself. Moving out of Kharkov to the south, the Germans desperately fought to hold open a corridor through which a withdrawal could be made.

All along the corridor through which the 8th Army evacuated Kharkov, Soviet artillery and mortars pounded the withdrawal. Their planes gathered for the kill and attacked the German columns leaving the city, strafing and bombing the men and vehicles. After dark, the 89th Guards and 107th Rifle Divisions broke into the interior of the city, driving the last German rearguard detachments before them. Enormous fires were set by the Germans in hope of delaying the Soviet advance. The city became a hellish place of fire and smoke, artillery fire & desperate combat, punctuated by the explosions of supply dumps.

By 0200 on 23 August 1943, elements of the 183rd Rifle Division pushed into the city center, reached the huge Dzerzhinsky Square and met men from the 89th Rifle Division. The Soviet troops hoisted a red banner over the city once again. By 1100, Kharkov and its outskirts had been taken completely. The fourth and final battle for the city was over.

By re-establishing a continuous front on Army Group South’s left flank, the 4th Panzer Army and the 8th Army had for the moment, blunted a deadly thrust, but to the north and southeast fresh blows had already been dealt or were in the making. Employing the peculiar rippling effect that marked their offensives, the Red Army, thwarted in one place, had shifted to others. For the first time in the war they had the full strategic initiative, and they used it well. The failure of Operation Citadel meant the Germans permanently lost the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front without any hope of regaining it, although Hitler refused to acknowledge it. The large manpower losses of the Wehrmacht in July and August 1943 severely restricted both Army Groups South & Centre to react to future thrusts during the winter and 1944. Operations Polkovodets Rumyantsev, along with the concurrent Operation Kutuzov marked the first time in the war that the Germans were not able to defeat a major Soviet offensive during the summer and regain their lost ground and the strategic initiative.

Losses for the operation are difficult to establish due to large numbers of transfers and missing in action. Soviet casualties in the Belgorod–Kharkov sector during this operation are estimated to be 71,611 killed and 183,955 wounded; 1,864 tanks, 423 artillery guns, and 153 aircraft were lost. German losses were at least 10,000 killed and missing and 20,000 wounded. German tank losses are estimated as several factors lower than Soviet tank losses.

Further Reading

Frieser, Karl-Heinz; Schmider, Klaus; Schönherr, Klaus; Schreiber, Gerhard; Ungváry, Kristián; Wegner, Bernd (2007). Die Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten [The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighboring Fronts]. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg [Germany and the Second World War] (in German). VIII. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Glantz, David (2001). The military strategy of the Soviet Union: A History. London: Frank Cass.

Glantz, David Colossus reborn : the Red Army at war : 1941-1943. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press 2005.

Glantz, David Soviet military deception in the Second World War. London, England: Routledge (1989).

Glantz, David; House, Jonathan (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (2015). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Keitel, Wilhelm and Walter Görlitz. The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel. New York, NY: Stein and Day 1965.

Krivosheev, Grigoriy (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill Books.

Lisitskiy, P.I. and S.A. Bogdanov. Military Thought: Upgrading military art during the second period of the Great Patriotic War Jan-March, East View Publications, Gale Group, 2005.

Manstein, Erich von Lost Victories. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 1982.

Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS and III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996

Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003

Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke Dorset Press 1968

The Road to Berlin by John Erickson Westview Press 1983

Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996

Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.

5 cm PaK 38 gun in action, Kharkiv, Ukraine, mid-Aug 1943.

Advancing on a Soviet position in a thrust in the Orel-Belgorod sector.

 

Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (right) and his chief of staff Hans Speidel.

Tiger I heavy tanks climbing a hill on the front lines near Belgorod, Russia, 13 August 1943.

Soviet T-34/76 medium tanks roll through Moscow Avenue in liberated Kharkov during the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive in August 1943.