by Senator Edwin Dorn
Under Secretary of Defense
4000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000
[Stamped: 15 December 1995]
This review was undertaken in response to a commitment that
former Deputy Secretary Deutch made to Senator Thurmond in April l995. You
assigned me to conduct it. In essence, you asked me to advise you whether
actions taken toward General Short and Admiral Kimmel some fifty years ago were
excessively harsh, and if so, whether posthumous advancement to three- and
four-star rank is the appropriate remedy.
These issues are immediate and highly emotional to the
descendants of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Family members feel that the
Pearl Harbor commanders were scapegoats for a disaster that they could neither
prevent nor mitigate, and that others who were blameworthy escaped both
official censure and public humiliation. They argue that advancement (or, as
they put it, restoration to highest rank held) is the best way to remove the
stigma and obloquy.
[On 7 December 1941 Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was Commander
in Chief, United States Fleet and Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet—the Navy’s second-highest officer after the Chief of Naval Operations.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short was Commander of the Army’s Hawaiian
Department.]
More is at stake here than the reputations of two officers
and the feelings of their families. The principle of equity requires that
wrongs be set right. In addition, we owe it to posterity to ensure that our
history is told correctly.
With support from a small team of Department of Defense
civilians and military officers, I studied the performance of the two
commanders, the procedures that led to their relief and retirement and the
reports of the several Pearl Harbor investigations. I also tried to understand
the basis for the families’ claim that General Short and Admiral Kimmel were
unfairly denied restoration to three-star and four-star rank when that action
became legally possible in 1947. The team reviewed thousands of pages of
documents, read a number of secondary sources, visited Pearl Harbor and
interviewed members of the families.
My findings are:
Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall
solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be
broadly shared.
The United States and Japan were pursuing policies that were
leading inexorably to war. Japan had occupied Manchuria, was threatening much
of Asia and had joined in a tripartite alliance with Italy and Germany. The
U.S. reaction was to stop selling Japan strategically important materials
including oil (Japan bought most of its oil from the U.S.) and, in the summer
of 1941, to freeze Japanese assets in the U.S. Negotiations in the summer and
fall of 194l failed to break the impasse. By late November 1941, civilian and
military leaders in the U.S. had concluded that conflict was imminent; the only
questions were when and where it would occur.
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both sent “war
warning” messages on November 27. They were advised that negotiations were
stalemated and that Japan might take hostile action at any moment. Admiral
Kimmel was ordered to execute a “defensive deployment” consistent with the U.S.
war plan in the Pacific; General Short was ordered to undertake “reconnaissance
and other measures…”, but his instructions were muddied somewhat by advice to
avoid actions that would “alarm [Hawaii’s] civil population or disclose
intent.”
Admiral Kimmel and General Short discussed the November 27
war warning, but concluded that an attack would occur in the Western Pacific,
not in Hawaii. Indeed, the November 27 messages had mentioned the likelihood
that the attack would occur in “the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or …
Borneo.” Washington also did not expect Hawaii to be attacked. Further, it
appears that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were depending on timely tactical
warning from Washington, should Hawaii become a target. Military leaders in
Washington, on the other hand, appear to have felt that the November 27 war
warning would lead Admiral Kimmel and General Short to heighten their
vigilance, and failed to examine closely what they actually were doing.
Officials in Washington did not send Admiral Kimmel and
General Short other information, derived from the Magic project that broke the
Japanese code, that might have given them a greater sense of urgency and caused
them to surmise that Hawaii was a likely target. For example, Washington did
not tell them that Japanese agents in Hawaii had been instructed to report on
the precise location of ships at Pearl Harbor. (The Japanese attacked Hawaii,
the Philippines and several other targets on the same day.)
Information-sharing and operational cooperation were
hampered by bureaucratic rivalries. The Army and Navy were separate executive
departments reporting directly to the President, and only the President could
ensure that they were working together. Admiral Kimmel and General Short had
cordial personal relations, but felt it inappropriate to inquire into one
another’s professional domains. This apparently was the standard at the time.
General Short’s mission was to defend the fleet in Hawaii; Admiral Kimmel
apparently never asked in detail about General Short’s plans. Admiral Kimmel’s
mission was to prepare for offensive operations against Japan. Early in 1941
the Navy also had assumed from the Army responsibility for conducting
long-range aerial reconnaissance. Even after receiving the war warning, General
Short apparently did not ask Admiral Kimmel whether the Navy actually was
conducting long-range air patrols. Nevertheless, General Short assumed that he
would receive the advance warning needed to launch Army Air Corps fighters,
which were on four-hour alert, and to ready his antiaircraft guns, whose
ammunition was stored some distance from the batteries. Just as Washington did
not provide the Hawaii commanders with all the intelligence that was derived
from Magic, so it also appears that Admiral Kimmel had more intelligence than
he chose to share with General Short. For example, Admiral Kimmel learned on
December 2 that several Japanese carriers were “lost” to U.S. intelligence;
their radio signals had not been detected for more than two weeks. He did not
tell General Short.
The run-up to Pearl Harbor was fraught with
miscommunication, oversights and lack of follow-up. In his 27 November war
warning message, Army Chief of Staff Marshall directed General Short to
“undertake such reconnaissance ant other measures as you deem necessary…”
General Short assumed this order was mis-worded, because he believed General
Marshall knew that the Navy had taken over the reconnaissance responsibility
from the Army. He also assumed that the Navy was doing it. General Short’s
response to General Marshall described plans to defend against sabotage, but
said nothing about reconnaissance. Apparently, no one in the War Department
took note of the omission. The 27 November war warning from Admiral Stark, the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), instructed Admiral Kimmel to undertake a
“defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46;
[the war plan].” Exactly what Admiral Stark intended is not clear. Admiral
Kimmel interpreted the CNO’s guidance to mean that he (Admiral Kimmel) should
continue what he had been doing for several weeks—sending submarines and planes
to patrol around Wake and Midway, and patrolling outside Pearl Harbor for
Japanese submarines. Carrier task forces en route to Wake and Midway were doing
aerial reconnaissance as part of their normal training, thus covering a portion
of the Pacific west and southwest of Hawaii. “Deployment” also could have meant
to sortie the fleet from Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel did not do that. Instead,
he kept his ships in port, but pointed their bows toward the entrance so that
they could leave quickly if the need arose. Moving several dozen warships
through Pearl Harbor’s narrow channel and into fighting posture on the high
seas would have taken several hours. No one in the Department of Navy took
issue with Admiral Kimmel’s interpretation of the CNO’s instructions.
Resources were scarce. Washington didn’t have enough
cryptologists and linguists to decode all the Japanese message traffic, so the
analysts gave priority to diplomatic traffic over military traffic. The Navy in
Hawaii was short of planes and crews. The Army in Hawaii was short of
munitions.
Finally, the Japanese attack was brilliantly conceived and
flawlessly executed. It involved a bold new use of carriers. It required
crossing four thousand miles of ocean undetected, which meant taking the
storm-tossed northern route where there was little commercial shipping. It
required new technology—torpedoes that could be used in the shallow, narrow
confines of Pearl Harbor. And the attack required extraordinarily well trained
air crews with commanders capable of coordinating more than 150 planes in each
wave of attack. U.S. Naval exercises during the 1930s and the British Navy’s
1940 raid on the Italian fleet at Taranto had demonstrated the feasibility of
carrier-based attacks. But the scale and complexity of the Japanese attack
greatly exceeded anything envisioned before. American military experts
underestimated Japanese capability.
To say that responsibility is broadly shared is not to
absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short of accountability.
Military command is unique. A commander has plenary
responsibility for the welfare of the people under his or her command, and is
directly accountable for everything the unit does or fails to do. When a ship
runs aground, the captain is accountable whether or not he/she was on the
bridge at the time. When a unit is attacked, it is the Commander and not the
intelligence officer or the sentry who is accountable. Command at the three-
and four-star level involves daunting responsibilities. Military officers at
that level operate with a great deal of independence. They must have
extraordinary skill, foresight and judgment, and a willingness to be
accountable for things about which they could not possibly have personal
knowledge. Today, for example, the senior Commander in Hawaii is responsible
for U.S. military operations spanning half the world’s surface—from the West
coast of the United States to the east coast of Asia. His fleets sail the
Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the China Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Arctic and the
Antarctic. This, in the understated language of military law, is “a position of
importance and responsibility.”
It was appropriate that Admiral Kimmel and General Short be
relieved. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, their relief was occasioned
by the need to restore confidence in the Navy and Army’s leadership, especially
in the Pacific, and to get going with the war. Subsequently, investigations concluded
that both commanders made errors of judgment. I have seen no information that
leads me to contradict that conclusion.
The intelligence available to Admiral Kimmel and General
Short was sufficient to justify a higher level of vigilance than they chose to
maintain. They knew that war was imminent, they knew that Japanese tactics
featured surprise attacks, and Admiral Kimmel (though not General Short) knew
that the U.S. had lost track of Japan’s carriers. Further, they had the
resources to maintain a higher level of vigilance. Admiral Kimmel believed that
the optimum aerial reconnaissance would require covering 360 degrees around
Hawaii for a sustained period. The Navy clearly did not have enough planes for
that. This does not mean, however, that Admiral Kimmel had to choose between
ideal aerial reconnaissance and no aerial reconnaissance. The fleet also had
cruisers and destroyers that could have been used as pickets to supplement air
patrols, but were not.
Different choices might not have discovered the carrier
armada and might not have prevented the attack, but different choices -- a
different allocation of resources -- could have reduced the magnitude of the
disaster. The Navy and the Army were at a low level of alert against aerial
attack. Shipboard anti-aircraft guns were firing within five minutes. The Army
was not able to bring its batteries into play during the first wave of the
attack and only four Army Air Corps fighters managed to get airborne. U.S.
losses included 2,403 dead (1,177 of whom are entombed in the Arizona), 1,178
wounded, eight battleships, ten other vessels and more than one hundred
aircraft. Japanese losses were twenty-nine aircraft, one large submarine and
five midget submarines.
The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short
was substantively temperate and procedurally proper.
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the objects of public
vilification. At least one Member of Congress demanded that they be summarily
dismissed, stripped of rank and denied retirement benefits. They received hate
mail and death threats. The public and Congress were clamoring for information
about Pearl Harbor. The news media went into a feeding frenzy, gobbling up
tidbits of blame and punishment. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising
that information very hurtful to Admiral Kimmel and General Short—information
implying that they would be court-martialed, for example—was given to the
press. These things happen, often not for the most honorable of reasons. This
does not mean, however, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were victims of a
smear campaign orchestrated by government officials.
In contrast to their treatment by some of the media, their
official treatment was substantively temperate. They were relieved, they
reverted to two-star rank, and under the laws in force at the time, their
retirements were at the two-star Level. Although there was mention of court
martial, no charges were brought. Indeed, official statements and investigations
seemed purposely to avoid wording that would lead to court martial. For
example, the Roberts Commission used the phrase “dereliction of duty”—a
stinging rebuke, but at the time not a court martial offense. The Roberts
Commission avoided other phrases, such as “culpable inefficiency” and neglect
of duty”, that were court martial offenses. Later investigations such as the
Joint Congressional Committee report eschewed “dereliction” in favor of “errors
of judgment.”
Admiral Kimmel requested a court martial in order to clear
his name, but the request was not acted on. There is an allegation that the
government feared bringing charges because a court martial would have put other
senior military and civilian leaders in a bad light. This is possible. But it
is equally possible that there simply were not sufficient grounds to sustain a
successful prosecution. A court marital almost certainly would have revealed
the existence of Magic, a key U.S. intelligence asset.
I do not find major fault with the procedures used in the
investigations. Family members have complained that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short were denied “due process”; that is, they were not allowed to call their
own witnesses or to cross-examine witnesses. But the calling and
cross-examination of witnesses is characteristic of trials, not of
investigations. Some of the investigations may have been more thorough than
others, but I do not see a convincing basis for concluding that Admiral Kimmel
and General Short were victims of government scapegoating or of a
government-inspired smear campaign.
History has not been hostile to Admiral Kimmel and General
Short.
None of the official reports ever held that Admiral Kimmel
and General Short were solely responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster,
although the Roberts Commission came close. Later reports eschewed the stinging
“dereliction of duty” rebuke in favor of “errors of judgment.”
Historians who write about Pearl Harbor seem to be divided
into three camps: those who hold Admiral Kimmel and General Short partly (but
not solely) responsible; those who believe they were scapegoats; and those who
lay much of the blame on bureaucratic factors such as the lack of coordination
between the Army and the Navy. National Park Service guides at the Arizona Memorial,
for example, focus on the factors that led to war and on the tactics used in
the attack, not on individual military leaders. A thirty-minute film produced
exclusively for use at the Arizona Memorial mentions Admiral Kimmel and General
Short only once, and not at all disparagingly. Admiral Kimmel and General Short
are not discussed prominently or disparagingly in history classes at West
Point, Annapolis and the Air Force Academy. Of eight U.S. history texts in use
at the service academies today, one is critical of Admiral Kimmel. Thus, while
their reputations may have been damaged in the years immediately following
Pearl Harbor, the passage of time has produced balance.
There is not a compelling basis for advancing either officer
to a higher grade.
Their superiors concluded that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short did not demonstrate the judgment required of people who serve at the
three- and four-star level. That conclusion may seem harsh, but it is made all
the time. I have not seen a convincing basis for contradicting it in the
instant case. It also is important to keep in mind that retirement at the
two-star grade is not an insult or a stigma. Very few officers rise to that
level of distinction.
Retirement at three- and four-star level was not a right in
1947 and is not today. Officers are nominated for retirement at that level by
the President at the President’s discretion and based on his conclusion that
they served satisfactorily at the temporary grades. His nomination is subject
to the advice and consent of the Senate. A nominee’s errors and indiscretions
must be reported to the Senate as adverse information.
In sum, I cannot conclude that Admiral Kimmel and General
Short were victims of unfair official actions and thus I cannot conclude that
the official remedy of advancement on the retired list in order. Admiral Kimmel
and General Short did not have all the resources they felt necessary. Had they
been provided more intelligence and clearer guidance, they might have
understood their situation more clearly and behaved differently. Thus,
responsibility for the magnitude of the Pearl Harbor disaster must be shared.
But this is not a basis for contradicting the conclusion, drawn consistently
over several investigations, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short committed
errors of judgment. As commanders, they were accountable.
Admiral Kimmel and General Short suffered greatly for Pearl
Harbor. They lost men for whom they were responsible. They felt that too much
of the blame was placed on them. Their children and grandchildren continue to
be haunted by it all. For all this, there can be sadness. But there can be no
official remedy. I recommend that you provide a copy of this memorandum and
attachment to Senator Thurmond, the failies of Admiral Kimmel and General
Short, the secretaries of Army and Navy and other interested parties.
