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Soviet troops are greeted by the citizens of Lodz. |
The Vistula–Oder
Offensive was a Red Army operation on the Eastern Front in the European theatre
of World War II in January 1945. The army made a major advance into German-held
territory, capturing Kraków, Warsaw and Poznań. The Red Army had built up their
strength around a number of key bridgeheads, with two fronts commanded by
Marshal Georgy Zhukov and Marshal Ivan Konev. Against them, the German Army
Group A, led by Colonel-General Josef Harpe (soon replaced by Colonel-General Ferdinand
Schörner), was outnumbered five to one. Within days, German commandants
evacuated the concentration camps, sending the prisoners on their death marches
to the west, where ethnic Germans also started fleeing. In a little over two
weeks, the Red Army had advanced 300 miles (483 km) from the Vistula to the
Oder, only 43 miles (69 km) from Berlin, which was undefended. However, Zhukov
called a halt, owing to continued German resistance on his northern flank
(Pomerania), and the advance on Berlin had to be delayed until April.
Background
In the wake of the
successful Operation Bagration, the 1st Belorussian Front managed to secure two
bridgeheads west of the Vistula river between 27 July and 4 August 1944. The
Soviet forces remained inactive during the failed Warsaw uprising that started
on 1 August, though their frontline was not far from the insurgents. The 1st
Ukrainian Front captured an additional large bridgehead at Sandomierz (known as
the Baranow bridgehead in German accounts), some 200 km south of Warsaw, during
the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive.
Preceding the
offensive, the Red Army had built up large amounts of materiel and manpower in
the three bridgeheads. The Red Army greatly outnumbered the opposing Wehrmacht
in infantry, artillery, and armor. All this was known to German intelligence.
General Reinhard Gehlen, head of Fremde Heere Ost, passed his assessment to
Heinz Guderian. Guderian in turn presented the intelligence results to Adolf
Hitler, who refused to believe them, dismissing the apparent Soviet strength as
"the greatest imposture since Genghis Khan". Guderian had proposed to
evacuate the divisions of Army Group North trapped in the Courland Pocket to
the Reich via the Baltic Sea to get the necessary manpower for the defense, but
Hitler forbade it. In addition, Hitler commanded that one major operational
reserve, the troops of Sepp Dietrich's 6th Panzer Army, be moved to Hungary to
support Operation Frühlingserwachen.
The offensive was
brought forward from 20 January to 12 January because meteorological reports
warned of a thaw later in the month, and the tanks needed hard ground for the
offensive. It was not done to assist American and British forces during the
Battle of the Bulge, as Stalin chose to claim at Yalta.
Forces Involved
Red Army
Two Fronts of the Red Army were directly involved. The 1st Belorussian
Front, holding the sector around Warsaw and southward in the Magnuszew and
Puławy bridgeheads, was led by Marshal Georgy Zhukov; the 1st Ukrainian Front,
occupying the Sandomierz bridgehead, was led by Marshal Ivan Konev.
Zhukov and Konev had 163 divisions for the operation with a total of:
2,203,000 infantry, 4,529 tanks, 2,513 assault guns, 13,763 pieces of field
artillery (76 mm or more), 14,812 mortars, 4,936 anti-tank guns, 2,198 Katyusha
multiple rocket launchers, and 5,000 aircraft.
Soviet Deployments
1st Belorussian Front (Marshal Georgy Zhukov)
47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich)
1st Polish Army (General Stanislav Poplavsky)
3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Simoniak)
61st Army (Pavel Alexeyevich Belov)
1st Guards Tank Army (Mikhail Katukov)
2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov)
5th Shock Army (in Magnuszew bridgehead) (Nikolai Berzarin)
8th Guards Army (in Magnuszew bridgehead) (General Vasily Chuikov)
69th Army (in Puławy bridgehead) (Vladimir Kolpakchi)
33rd Army (in Puławy bridgehead) (Vyacheslav Tsvetayev)
1st Ukrainian Front (Marshal Ivan Konev)
21st Army (Dmitry Gusev)
6th Army (Vladimir Gluzdovsky)
3rd Guards Army (Vasily Gordov)
13th Army (Nikolai Pukhov)
4th Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko)
3rd Guards Tank Army (Pavel Rybalko)
52nd Army (Konstantin Koroteyev)
5th Guards Army (Aleksey Semenovich Zhadov)
59th Army (Ivan Korovnikov)
60th Army (Pavel Kurochkin)
Wehrmacht
Soviet forces in this sector were opposed by Army Group A, defending a
front which stretched from positions east of Warsaw southwards along the
Vistula, almost to the confluence of the San. At that point there was a large
Soviet bridgehead over the Vistula in the area of Baranów before the front
continued south to Jasło.
There were three Armies in the Group; the 9th Army deployed around
Warsaw, the 4th Panzer Army opposite the Baranow salient in the Vistula Bend,
and the 17th Army to their south. The force had a total complement of 450,000
soldiers, 4,100 artillery pieces, and 1,150 tanks. Army Group A was led by
Colonel-General Josef Harpe (who was replaced, after the offensive had begun,
by Colonel-General Ferdinand Schörner on 20 January).
German Order Of Battle
Army Group A (Colonel-General Josef Harpe to
20 January; then Ferdinand Schörner)
9th Army (General Smilo Freiherr von Lüttwitz
to 20 January; then General Theodor Busse)
LVI Panzer Corps (General Johannes Block)
XXXXVI Panzer Corps (General Walter Fries)
VIII Corps (General Walter Hartmann)
4th Panzer Army (General Fritz-Hubert Gräser)
XLII Corps (General Hermann Recknagel)
XXIV Panzer Corps (General Walther Nehring)
XLVIII Panzer Corps (General Maximilian
Reichsfreiherr von Edelsheim)
17th Army (General Friedrich Schulz)
LIX Corps (General Edgar Rohricht)
XI Corps (General Rudolf von Bünau)
XI SS Panzer Corps (SS-Obergruppenführer
Matthias Kleinheisterkamp)
German intelligence had estimated that the Soviet forces had a 3:1
numerical superiority to the German forces; there was in fact a 5:1
superiority. In the large Baranow/Sandomierz bridgehead, the Fourth Panzer Army
was required to defend from 'strongpoints' in some areas, as it lacked the
infantry to man a continuous front line. In addition, on Hitler's express
orders, the two German defense lines (the Grosskampflinie and Hauptkampflinie)
were positioned very close to each other, placing the main defenses well within
striking range of Soviet artillery.
Offensive
The offensive
commenced in the Baranow bridgehead at 04:35 on 12 January with an intense
bombardment by the guns of the 1st Ukrainian Front against the positions of the
4th Panzer Army. Concentrated against the divisions of XLVIII Panzer Corps,
which had been deployed across the face of the bridgehead, the bombardment
effectively destroyed their capacity to respond; a battalion commander in the
68th Infantry Division stated that "I began the operation with an
understrength battalion [...] after the smoke of the Soviet preparation cleared
[...] I had only a platoon of combat effective soldiers left".
The initial barrage
was followed by probing attacks and a further heavy bombardment at 10:00. By
the time the main armored exploitation force of the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank
Armies moved forward four hours later, the Fourth Panzer Army had already lost
up to ⅔ of its artillery and ¼ of its troops.
The Soviet units
made rapid progress, moving to cut off the defenders at Kielce. The armored
reserves of the 4th Panzer Army's central corps, the XXIV Panzer Corps, were
committed, but had suffered serious damage by the time they reached Kielce, and
were already being outflanked. The XLVIII Panzer Corps, on the Fourth Panzer
Army's southern flank, had by this time been completely destroyed, along with
much of Recknagel's XLII Corps in the north. Recknagel himself would be killed
by Polish partisans on 23 January. By 14 January, the 1st Ukrainian Front had
forced crossings of the Nida river, and began to exploit towards Radomsko and
the Warthe. The 4th Panzer Army's last cohesive formation, the XXIV Panzer
Corps held on around Kielce until the night of 16 January, before its commander
made the decision to withdraw.
The 1st Belorussian
Front, to Konev's north, opened its attack on the German 9th Army from the Magnuszew
and Puławy bridgeheads at 08:30, again commencing with a heavy bombardment. The
33rd and 69th Armies broke out of the Puławy bridgehead to a depth of 30 km (19
mi), while the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Armies broke out of the Magnuszew
bridgehead. The 2nd and 1st Guards Tank Armies were committed after them to
exploit the breach. The 69th Army's progress from the Puławy bridgehead was
especially successful, with the defending LVI Panzer Corps disintegrating after
its line of retreat was cut off. Though the 9th Army conducted many local
counter-attacks, they were all brushed aside; the 69th Army ruptured the last
lines of defense and took Radom, while the 2nd Guards Tank Army moved on
Sochaczew and the 1st Guards Tank Army was ordered to seize bridgeheads over
the Pilica and attack towards Łódź. In the meantime, the 47th Army had crossed
the Vistula and moved towards Warsaw from the north, while the 61st and 1st
Polish Armies encircled the city from the south.
The only major
German response came on 15 January, when Hitler (against the advice of
Guderian) ordered the Panzerkorps Großdeutschland of Dietrich von Saucken from
East Prussia to cover the breach made in the sector of the 4th Panzer Army, but
the advance of Zhukov's forces forced it to detrain at Łódź without even
reaching its objective. After covering the 9th Army's retreat, it was forced to
withdraw southwest toward the Warthe.
Taking of Kraków and Escape of the XXIV Panzer Corps
On 17 January, Konev was given new objectives: to advance towards
Breslau using his mechanized forces, and to use the combined-arms forces of the
60th and 59th Armies to open an attack on the southern flank towards the
industrial heartland of Upper Silesia through Kraków. Kraków was secured
undamaged on 19 January after an encirclement by the 59th and 60th Armies, in
conjunction with the 4th Guards Tank Corps, forced the German defenders to
withdraw hurriedly.
The second stage of the 1st Ukrainian Front's objective was far more complex,
as they were required to encircle and secure the entire industrial region of
Upper Silesia, where they were faced by Schulz's 17th Army. Konev ordered that
the 59th and 60th Armies advance frontally, while the 21st Army encircled the
area from the north. He then ordered Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army, moving on
Breslau, to swing southwards along the upper Oder from 20 January, cutting off
17th Army's withdrawal.
In the meantime, the shattered remnants of the 4th Panzer Army were
still attempting to reach German lines. By 18 January, Nehring and the XXIV
Panzer Corps found that their intended route northwards had been blocked, so
pulled back to the west, absorbing the remnants of XLII Corps that had escaped
encirclement. Much of the remainder of XLII Corps was destroyed after being
trapped around Przysucha. Screened by heavy fog, the lead elements of XXIV
Panzer Corps reached the Warthe on 22 January, and having linked up with
Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps of von Saucken, were finally able to cross the
Oder, some 350 km (220 mi) from their positions at the start of the Soviet
offensive.
Withdrawal of 17th Army from Upper Silesia
On 25 January, Schulz requested that he be allowed to withdraw his
100,000 troops from the developing salient around Katowice/Kattowitz. This was
refused, and he repeated the request on 26 January. Schoerner eventually
permitted Schulz to pull his forces back on the night of 27 January, while
Konev – who had allowed just enough room for the 17th Army to withdraw without
putting up serious resistance – secured the area undamaged.
On Konev's northern flank, the 4th Tank Army had spearheaded an advance
to the Oder, where it secured a major bridgehead at Steinau. Troops of the 5th
Guards Army established a second bridgehead upstream at Ohlau.
Advance of 1st Belorussian Front
In the northern sector of the offensive, Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front
also made rapid progress, as 9th Army was no longer able to offer coherent
resistance. Its XXXVI Panzer Corps, which was positioned behind Warsaw, was
pushed over the Vistula into the neighboring Second Army sector. Warsaw was
taken on 17 January, as Army Group A's headquarters issued orders for the city
to be abandoned; units of the 2nd Guards and 3rd Shock Armies entering the city
were profoundly affected by the devastation wrought by German forces after the
Warsaw Uprising. Hitler, on the other hand, was furious at the abandonment of
the 'fortress', arresting Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin, head of the Operations
Branch of OKH, and sacking both the 9th Army and XXXVI Panzer Corps commanders;
Generals Smilo Freiherr von Lüttwitz and Walter Fries.
The 2nd Guards Tank Army pressed forward to the Oder, while to the
south the 8th Guards Army reached Łódź by 18 January, and took it by 19
January. The 1st Guards Tank Army moved to encircle Poznań by 25 January, and
the 8th Guards Army began to fight its way into the city on the following day,
though there was protracted and intense fighting in the Siege of Poznań before
the city would finally be taken.
To the northeast of Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, the lead elements
of Marshal Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front taking part in the East Prussian
Offensive had reached the Baltic coast of the Vistula delta by 24 January and
so succeeded in isolating Army Group Centre in East Prussia. On January 27, the
abandoned Wolf's Lair - Hitler's former headquarters on the Eastern Front, was
captured.
Zhukov's Advance to the Oder
After encircling Poznań, the 1st Guards Tank Army advanced deep into
the fortified region around the Obra River against patchy resistance from a
variety of Volkssturm and Wehrmacht units. There was heavier resistance,
however, on the approaches to the fortress of Küstrin.
The German reorganization of command structure that resulted in the
creation of Army Group Vistula was accompanied by the release of a few extra
formations for the defense; the V SS Mountain Corps, with two reserve infantry
divisions, was deployed along the Obra and the prewar border fortifications
known as the Tierschtigel Riegel, while the Panzergrenadier-Division Kurmark
was ordered to reinforce it.
On 16 January 1945 Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin, the Chief of the
Operational Branch of the Army General Staff (Generalstab des Heeres) gave Army
Group A permission to retreat from Warsaw, overruling a direct order from
Hitler for them to hold fast. Three days later von Bonin was arrested by the
Gestapo and imprisoned first at Flossenbürg concentration camp and then Dachau
concentration camp. The officer was eventually liberated along with other
prisoners in South Tyrol by the US Army in May 1945.
The military historian Earl Ziemke described the advance thus:
On the 25th, Zhukov's main force passed Poznań heading due west towards
Kuestrin, on the Oder forty miles east of Berlin. The path of the Soviet
advance looked like the work of a gigantic snow plough, its point aimed on a
line from Warsaw to Poznań, to Berlin. All of Army Group A was being caught up
by the point and the left blade and thrown across the Oder. On the right the German
had nothing except a skeleton army group that Hitler had created some days
earlier and named Army Group Vistula.
On 25 January, Hitler renamed three army groups. Army Group North
became Army Group Courland; Army Group Centre became Army Group North and Army
Group A became Army Group Centre.
The 2nd Guards Tank and 5th Shock Armies reached the Oder almost
unopposed; a unit of the 5th Shock Army crossed the river ice and took the town
of Kienitz as early as 31 January.
Stavka declared the operation complete on 2 February. Zhukov had
initially hoped to advance directly on Berlin, as the German defenses had
largely collapsed. However the exposed northern flank of 1st Belorussian Front
in Pomerania, along with a German counter-attack (Operation Solstice) against
its spearheads, convinced the Soviet command that it was essential to clear
German forces from Pomerania in the East Pomeranian Offensive before the Berlin
offensive could proceed.
Liberation of Nazi
Concentration Camps
In July of 1944, the
Soviet 8th Guards liberated Lublin, and after a brief skirmish with German
forces outside the city, came upon the Majdanek concentration camp. Although
the Soviets invited press from around the world to witness the horrors of the
camp, war news overshadowed the event.
After being caught
off guard at Majdanek, the Nazis realized that the Soviets would end up finding
every camp within Eastern Europe (with all of the prisoners and guards still
present) if something were not to be done. As a result, by mid-January, the SS and
Nazi-controlled police units had begun forcing thousands of camp prisoners from
Poland, East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania to walk westward away from the
advancing Red Army. The death marches, which took place over hundreds of
kilometers in sub-zero conditions without food and medicine, resulted in
thousands of concentration camp prisoners and allied POWs dying en route. It is
estimated that in March and April 1945 at least 250,000 men and women were
marched on foot to the heartland of Germany and Austria sometimes for weeks at
a time.
On 27 January,
troops from Konev's First Ukrainian Front (322nd Rifle Division, 60th Army)
liberated the Auschwitz concentration camp. Despite attempts by retreating SS
units to destroy parts of the camp, the Soviet forces still found graphic
evidence of the Holocaust. The Soviets would also liberate camps such as
Płaszów, Stutthof, and Ravensbrück.
Flight of Ethnic
Germans
In anticipation of
the approaching Red Army, the retreating Wehrmacht left parts of the German
territory largely abandoned. With widespread unchecked chaos erupting, numerous
reports of looting and attacks against ethnic Germans emerged. Nazi propaganda
had furthermore demonized the Soviet Army so much that most Germans attempted
to run. Millions of ethnic German refugees fled west to escape the inevitable
persecutions, seeking relative safety in central or western Germany, or even in
the custody of the American and British west of the Rhine.
Outcome
The Vistula–Oder
Offensive was a major success for the Soviet military. Within a matter of days
the forces involved had advanced hundreds of kilometers, taking much of Poland
and striking deep within the pre-war borders of the Reich. The offensive broke
the back of Army Group A, and much of Germany's remaining capacity for military
resistance. However, the stubborn resistance of German forces in Silesia and
Pomerania, as well as continuing fighting in East Prussia, meant that the final
offensive towards Berlin was delayed by two months, by which time the Wehrmacht
had once again built up a substantial force on this axis.
Aftermath
On 31 January, the
Soviet offensive was voluntarily halted, though Berlin was undefended and only
approximately 70 km (43 mi) away from the Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder
river. After the war a debate raged, mainly between Vasily Chuikov and Georgy
Zhukov whether it was wise to stop the offensive. Chuikov argued Berlin should
have been taken then, while Zhukov defended the decision to stop.
The operation was
followed by a period of several weeks of mopping-up and consolidation on the
part of the Red Army, along with ongoing hard fighting in pockets in the north.
On 16 April, the Red Army jumped off from lines on the Oder and Neisse Rivers,
the opening phase of the Battle of Berlin, which proved to be the culminating
offensive of the war on the Eastern Front. The relatively rapid progress of
this new offensive toward the German heartland seems to illustrate the
cumulative extent of the erosion of the Wehrmacht's capability to defend a
broad front. Nevertheless, they remained dangerous opponents for some weeks
longer, especially when allowed or forced to concentrate in limited areas.
Bibliography
Bahm, Karl (2001).
Berlin 1945: The Final Reckoning. St. Paul: Motorbooks International.
Beevor, A. Berlin:
The Downfall 1945, Penguin Books, 2002
Duffy, C. Red Storm
on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945 Routledge 1991
Glantz, David M.
& House, Jonathan (1995), When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped
Hitler, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas
Hastings, Max
(2004). Armageddon. New York: Macmillan.
Le Tissier, T.
Zhukov at the Oder, Greenwood, 1996
Rees, Laurence
(2005). Auschwitz. London: BBC Books.
Rzheshevsky, Oleg A.
(2002). Берлинская операция 1945 г.: дискуссия продолжается [The Berlin
Operation of 1945: Discussion Continues]. Мир истории [World of History] (in
Russian) (4).
Sims, D; Schilling,
A (October 1990), "Breakout from the Sandomierz Bridgehead (pages
20-24)" (PDF), Field Artillery
Ziemke, Earl (1969).
Battle for Berlin. London: Macdonald.
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Disposition of forces and advance of the Soviet Army. |
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World War II Eastern Front during the 1945 Vistula-Oder offensive. The map also shows the East Prussian Offensive, Lower Silesian Offensive, the East Pomeranian Offensive, and the battles in Courland. |
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Soviet troops enter Łódź, led by an ISU-122 self-propelled gun. |
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Delegation of German officers arriving to negotiate for the capitulation of Festung Breslau, May 6, 1945. |
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The troops of the 10th Tank Corps 5th Guards Tank Army 2nd Belorussian Front occupied city Mühlhausen (now the Polish city Młynary) the city was liberated from the Nazi troops January 24, 1945. |
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Russian ferry, Poland. |
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German refugees from East Prussia, February 1945. |
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Russian troops house fighting, Breslau. |
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Russian 122mm gun, Breslau. |
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Tree carving in Bielinek (Bellinchen), Pomerania, immediately east of the Oder. It reads, in Russian, "March 1945, Death to the Germans." |