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| Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov. |
by David M. Glantz
After enduring months of bitter and costly defensive combat
at Stalingrad, on 19 November 1942, Red Army forces struck a massive blow
against the hitherto triumphant German Army. To the Germans' utter
consternation, within one week Soviet forces encircled German Sixth Army in the
deadly Stalingrad cauldron. Ten weeks later, the army's tattered remnants
surrendered, ending the most famous battle of the German-Soviet War.
History states the titanic Battle of Stalingrad altered the
course of war on the German Eastern Front and set the Wehrmacht and German
Reich on its path toward utter and humiliating defeat. History accorded
enduring fame to the victors of Stalingrad. The victorious Red Army seemingly
never again suffered strategic or significant operational defeat. The
architects of the Stalingrad victory entered the annals of military history as
unvanquished heroes who led the subsequent Soviet march to victory. Foremost
among them was Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov, the
hero of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin.
History, however, has misinformed us. The muses of history
are fickle. They record only what was reported and ignore what was not. The
adage, "To the victors belong the spoils," applies to history as well
as war. As a spoil of war, history also exerts a powerful influence over future
generations. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the case of Germany's
war on the Eastern Front. The victorious Germans proudly recounted the
triumphant course of the war to late 1942. Thereafter, the victorious Soviets
proclaimed their martial feats, and few Germans disputed them.
The place names of 1941 and 1942 fame, such as Minsk, Kiev,
Smolensk, and Khar'kov, properly evoke images of German triumph, while the
names Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussia, and Berlin resound as unqualified
Soviet victories. These images, however, are deceptive and flawed. For example,
despite the impressive German advances in 1941 and 1942, German Operations
Barbarossa and Blau [Blue] failed, Moscow and Leningrad remained in Soviet
hands, and catastrophic German defeats followed, which culminated in the
destruction of the German Reich.
Likewise, the history of the later war years has misled U.S.
to an even greater extent by failing to qualify seemingly unending Soviet
battlefield success. Understandably, the Soviets were quite reluctant to
tarnish their record, and the Germans often avoided the unpleasantness by
simply attributing defeat to a demented Hitler and overwhelming Soviet
strength. The resulting Soviet combat record thus resembled a seamless, unblemished
march to inevitable victory. This flawed historical mosaic has perverted the
war's history by masking numerous Soviet failures and defeats which punctuated
the Red Army's admittedly victorious march. It has also elevated the
reputations of certain victorious Soviet commanders such as G. K. Zhukov and I.
S. Konev to almost superhuman proportions, covering up the fact that, after
all, they too were human and, as such, demonstrated characteristic human
weaknesses.
This article begins the process of correcting the historical
record of this most terrible war by identifying the flaws and by placing those
famous battles which have already been recorded and extolled in their proper
context. This is an impartial process, for almost as much has been forgotten about
the period of German victory before late 1942 as has been forgotten about the
Soviet triumphant march after late 1942.
Soviet Operation Mars is the most glaring instance where the
historiography of the German-Soviet War has failed U.S. Originally planned for
late-October 1942, but postponed until 25 November, Operation Mars was intended
to be a companion piece to Operation Uranus, the code-name for the Soviet's
Stalingrad strategic counteroffensive. By conducting Operations Mars and
Uranus, the Soviet Stavka [Headquarters of the High Command] sought to regain
the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front and set the Red Army on the path
to total victory. Planned and conducted by Marshal G. K. Zhukov and a host of
other famous Soviet generals and appropriately named for the God of War,
Operation Mars formed the centerpiece of Soviet strategic designs in Fall 1942.
Its immense scale and ambitious strategic intent made Operation Mars at least
as important as Operation Uranus and likely more important. In its fickleness,
however, history has forgotten Operation Mars because it failed, while it has
extolled Operation Uranus because it succeeded.
Today, sufficient German and Soviet archival materials are
available to permit correction of this historical mistake and to commemorate
properly the sacrifices of the half million Red Army soldiers and the many
Germans who fell during the operation, a figure which exceeds the military
death toll of the United States Armed Forces throughout the entire war.
In late September 1942, key Stavka political and military
leaders formulated a strategy to reverse the fortunes of war. Their plans
reflected the bitter experiences of the prior 18 months of war and the military
realities they confronted. During the tragic initial period of war in 1941, the
ambitious German Operation Barbarossa had propelled German forces to the gates
of Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov before stiffened Soviet resistance and the
effects of the Soviet Union's vast territorial expanse combined to bring exhausted
German forces to a halt. German overextension and a desperate Soviet
counteroffensive inflicted unprecedented, but temporary, defeat on Blitzkrieg
at the very gates of Moscow in December 1941. Despite subsequent Soviet
successes in the harsh winter which followed, however, German forces remained
menacingly close to the Soviet capital.
Undeterred by their Moscow setback and inspired by the
disastrous defeat of twin Soviet offensives in May 1942 at Khar'kov and in the
Crimea, in June 1942 the German Army unleashed Operation Blau in an attempt to
regain the strategic initiative and win the conflict. Replicating their
ambitious 1941 operations, although on a lesser scale, in summer 1942 German
forces plunged eastward across the endless steppes of southern Russia to the
banks of the Volga River at Stalingrad and toward the oil-rich Caucasus region.
After spectacular gains, the headlong German offensive reached the banks of the
Volga in September but ground to a halt in October in the ruins of Stalingrad
city and along the treacherous northern slopes of the imposing Caucasus
Mountain barrier. Once again, German planners and operators alike had
underestimated the resilience of the Red Army, the imposing challenges of the
immense theater of operations, and the stoic resolution of their foes. Once
again, in fall 1942 the Wehrmacht faced the inevitable wrath of a Soviet winter
counteroffensive. The only question was, Where?
Marshal Zhukov played a significant role in September and
October 1942 Stavka planning sessions. This was so because he had earned Stalin's
trust by proving to be a tenacious and often victorious fighter. A former
cavalry officer, Zhukov had earned much of his reputation as a fighter in
action against the Japanese in August and September 1939. Forces under his
command had utterly routed Japanese forces at Khalkhin Gol in eastern Mongolia,
a defeat which later contributed to the critical Japanese decision to remain
aloof from the German-Soviet War. Few now recall, however, the ruthlessness of
Zhukov's assaults along the Khalkhin Gol [River], which had cost him about
forty percent of his attacking force and had prompted sharp criticism from the
Red Army General Staff.
After beginning the war as Chief of the Red Army General
Staff, Zhukov received field command and was instrumental in bloodying the
German's nose in the terrible battles around Smolensk in July and August 1941.
In September Stalin relieved Zhukov of his command along the Western axis and
dispatched him to Leningrad, ostensibly because Zhukov disagreed with Stalin's
disastrous decision to defend Kiev. After stabilizing Soviet defenses around
Leningrad, in October Stalin summoned Zhukov to Moscow, where he needed a
fighter to halt the German juggernaut. Zhukov answered Stalin's call by planning
and leading the victorious Soviet Moscow counteroffensives in winter 1942.
Subsequently, in spring and summer 1942, he commanded Soviet forces along the
Moscow axis. While the Germans were advancing on Stalingrad, Zhukov
orchestrated several offensives against German forces in the central sector of
the front, including a major attack on the Rzhev salient in August, which was a
virtual rehearsal for Operation mars.
Based on his own strategic analysis and personal combat
experiences, Zhukov believed in a "northern" strategy for winning the
war. Frustrated over his failure to destroy German forces at Moscow in winter
1941-42 and in lesser operations during the German advance across southern
Russia during 1942, Zhukov believed that the Soviet Union could best achieve
strategic victory by smashing German forces along the Moscow axis. In short,
Zhukov considered that German Army Group Center, whose forces were lodged in
the Rzhev salient menacingly close to Moscow, posed the most serious threat to
Moscow and the Soviet war effort In his view, the Rzhev salient, a legacy of
the chaotic fighting of winter 1941-42, which measured 150 x 150 kilometers and
which contained Army Group Center's powerful German Ninth Army, represented a
dagger aimed at Moscow. Therefore, argued Zhukov, the Soviet Union could best
achieve strategic victory in 1942 by smashing German Ninth Army in the salient
and, thereafter, all of German Army Group Center.
From his earlier combat experiences, Zhukov well understood
that this would be no easy task. General Walter Model's German Ninth Army had
erected strong defenses around the salient and had fortified all cities and
towns along the salient's periphery, including the key cities of Rzhev, Belyi,
and Sychevka. The Germans had fortified the rivers flanking the salient and had
cleared timber from the main north-south and east-west roads and rail lines
which traversed the salient. Zhukov and Model both understood that whoever
controlled the roads would control the salient. Although heavy forests and
swamps dominated the terrain in the salient's western and central regions, the
Germans had cleared sufficient terrain to permit both firm defense and the
maneuver of mobile tactical and operational reserves within it. In addition, by
late October, the dirt roads and many rivers criss-crossing the salient should
be frozen or close to frozen.
Zhukov also realized that General Model would be a
formidable opponent, for he too was a fighter. Model had delivered a stinging
rebuff to Soviet forces in the region in winter 1941, and combat in 1942
provided Model's forces with a keen appreciation of literally every inch of
terrain in the region. Nevertheless, Zhukov was convinced that his forces,
together with the massive strategic reserves which the Stavka had assembled at
near-frenzied pace in summer 1942, were strong enough to permit the Red Army to
deliver two major, mutually supporting strategic counteroffensives, one, which
he advocated, against German Army Group Center and the other, which others supported,
against overextended German Army Group South at Stalingrad.
During the Stavka's deliberations, Zhukov emphasized Soviet
force superiority in the decisive central sector of the front. Here the Soviet
Kalinin and Western Fronts, supported by the Moscow Defense Zone, numbered
almost 1,900,000 men with over 24,000 guns and mortars, 3,300 tanks, and 1,100
aircraft. On the other hand, in the southern Soviet Union, the 3 Soviet fronts
in the Stalingrad region fielded over 1 million men with about 15,000 guns and
mortars, 1,400 tanks, and over 900 aircraft. Admittedly, the Rumanian, Italian,
and Hungarian forces deployed in the south added to German vulnerability, and
their presence there undoubtedly improved Soviet chances for success. However,
Zhukov argued, eradication of the German threat to Moscow would inevitably
contribute to success in the south as well. Should either Soviet offensive
falter, Stavka reserves could develop and exploit the other offensive. Stalin
accepted Zhukov's recommendations, for he too still seethed over previous
failures to defeat German Army Group Center.
On the evening of 26 September, the Generalissimo ordered
major strategic counteroffensives be conducted at both Rzhev and Stalingrad.
Appropriately, Zhukov would command the former, and his contemporary, General
A. M. Vasilevsky, would command the latter. Vasilevsky, then Chief of the
General Staff and Deputy Minister of Defense, was a penultimate staff officer
and a prot‚g‚ of former Chief of the General Staff, marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov.
At the outbreak of war, Vasilevsky had been chief of the General Staff's
Operations Directorate, and, because of his obvious talents, he rose from
colonel to colonel general in only four years. His wartime accomplishments as
key General Staff planner and "fireman" in key operational sectors
had won Stalin's confidence and appointment in July 1942 as Chief of the
General Staff. Vasilevsky's calm demeanor and keen intelligence tended to
moderate both Stalin's and Zhukov's excesses.
With Stalin's formal approval, the General Staff, Zhukov,
and Vasilevsky planned the twin two-phased strategic offensives and assigned
each of four planned operations with the code name of a planet. In Operation
mars, planned to commence in late October, forces of the Kalinin and Western
Fronts would encircle and destroy German Ninth Army in the Rzhev salient. Two
to three weeks later, in Operation Jupiter, the Western Front's powerful 5th
and 33rd Armies, supported by 3rd Guards Tank Army, would attack along the Viaz'ma
axis, link up with the victorious mars' force, and envelop and destroy all
German forces east of Smolensk. Vasilevsky's initial operation, code-named
Uranus and tentatively timed for mid-November, was to envelop German Sixth Army
in the Stalingrad region. In Operation Saturn, set to begin in early December,
Vasilevsky's forces would seize Rostov, envelop German Army Group B, pin its
remnants against the Sea of Azov, and cut off the withdrawal of German Army
Group A from the Caucasus.
The Stavka dispatched
the directive for Operation mars to the Western and Kalinin Fronts on 28-29
September, and participating fronts issued orders to their armies on 1 October.
Although the offensive was slated to begin on 28 October, rainy weather delayed
the usual October freeze and forced postponement of the operation until late
November, less than a week after Vasilevsky launched Operation Uranus. A
revised Stavka directive, dispatched to Army General I. S. Konev's Western
Front on 10 October, left the original objectives intact, stating: "The
forces of the Western Front's right wing and Kalinin Front's left wing are to
encircle the enemy Rzhev Grouping, capture Rzhev, and free the rail road line
from Moscow to Velikie Luki." The directive required Western Front's 20th
and 31st Armies, supported by 29th Army, to make the main attack against German
defenses along the Osuga and Vazusa Rivers northeast of Sychevka. Once these
armies had penetrated German tactical defenses, a cavalry-mechanized group (6th
Tank and 2d Guards Cavalry Corps) was to exploit through 20th Army, capture
Sychevka, roll up the German Rzhev defenses from the south, and link up with
41st Army forces attacking eastward from the Belyi region. 20th and 31st Armies
would then mop up German forces in the salient in conjunction with supporting
armies and prepare to attack southward toward Viaz'ma with 6th Tank and the
fresh 5th Tank Corps.
Army General M. A. Purkaev's Kalinin Front was to conduct
its main attack south of Belyi with 41st Army and along the Luchesa River north
of Belyi with 22nd Army, while 39th Army, at the northern extremity of the
Rzhev salient, would launch a secondary assault southward across the Molodoi
Tud River toward Olenino. The crack Stalin 6th Volunteer Rifle Corps would
spearhead 41st Army's attack. Once German defenses had been penetrated, 1st and
2nd Mechanized Corps would exploit eastward to link up west of Sychevka with
20th Army's cavalry-mechanized group. Kalinin Front's 22nd Army, spearheaded by
3rd Mechanized Corps, would advance eastward up the Luchesa River valley,
pierce German defenses, assist in the capture of Belyi, and encircle German
forces around Olenino in conjunction with 39th Army. After the main attacks had
succeeded, other Soviet armies around the flaming circumference of the Rzhev
salient would join the offensive, destroy German Ninth Army, and regroup to
participate in Operation Jupiter.
In Operation Jupiter, Western Front's heavily reinforced 5th
and 33rd Armies, deployed astride the Moscow-Viaz'ma road, would penetrate
German defenses east of Viaz'ma. The 9th and 10th Tank Corps, followed by 3rd
Guards Tank Army, would then exploit to capture Viaz'ma, link up with Kalinin
Front forces, and, if possible, continue the attack toward Smolensk. To insure
success the Stavka provided extraordinary armor, artillery, and engineer
support for Zhukov's two attacking fronts. In fact, Zhukov's over 2,300 tanks
and 10,000 guns and mortars exceeded the firepower the Stavka allocated to
Vasilevsky to carry out Operation Uranus.
The long delay in the launch of the operation provided more
than adequate time for Zhukov and the front commanders to assemble their
imposing host and prepare the troops for combat. As usual, to insure the
secrecy of the operation, troops were notified of the attack only days before
it commenced. Typical of last minute preparations was this order to the 20th
Army's 8th Guards Rifle Corps:
To the commanders of 8th Guards Rifle Corps formations.
20.11.42
…the corps orders:
1. Fully occupy jumping-off positions by dawn on 23.11.42 … Carefully
conceal movement of personnel and equipment…
2. [Move] infantry in small groups and tanks, vehicles, and transport
individually…
3. Eliminate squads and platoons made up of "nationals"
[ethnic non-Russians] by dividing them up among subunits. For camouflage
purposes, whitewash all guns and transporters…
4. During the day on 22.11.42 conduct study of the attack axes with
command personnel....
5m…
a).
Provide personnel with a chance for a good sleep and, without fail, feed [the
troops] with warm food and distribute the required vodka norm before the
attack…
b).
Provide all personnel with a bath and a pair of clean clothes…
c).
Obtain white camouflage overalls and felt boots…
8th Guards Rifle Corps chief of staff, Guards Colonel Posiakin
Chief of the corps' operation section, Guards Colonel Andrianov
The plan for Operation mars bore all the characteristics of
a Zhukov-style offensive operation. To maximize pressure on the Germans, his
forces would attack simultaneously in all sectors. By launching his main
attacks against the base of the Rzhev salient from both east and west, Zhukov
sought to envelop German forces in the salient with frontal assaults without
having to conduct complex maneuver with his mobile forces across the difficult
terrain and in the harsh weather conditions. To achieve quick success in his
attack sectors, Zhukov ordered his front commanders to mass their forces and
commit all of their armor early in the battle. By doing so, he hoped that the
Soviet armored spearheads could sever vital German communications routes, the
key road and rail lines along the flanks of the Rzhev salient. By late November
the long-awaited cold weather finally arrived, and area rivers, streams, and
swamps froze, thus permitting operations to commence. The ensuing constant
snowy weather, however, hampered mobile operations, hindered artillery
observation, and grounded supporting aircraft on both sides.
Zhukov's offensive began early on 25 November simultaneously
against the eastern, western, and northern flanks of the German Rzhev salient.
Preceded by vicious artillery preparation, infantry and supporting tanks of
Western Front's 20th and 31st Armies' struck hard at the defensive positions of
German XXXIX Panzer Corps along and north of the Vazusa and Osuga Rivers
northeast of the vital German rail head of Sychevka. Although the Germans
expected an attack soon, the assault caught the defenders at an awkward moment,
when their 78th Infantry Division was in the midst of conducting a
relief-in-place of 5th Panzer Division forces along the Vazusa. Numbering well
over 200,000 men and 500 tanks, the 2 Soviet armies faced about 40,000 German
defenders. Despite this numerical superiority and initial German confusion, the
violent attack achieved only mixed results since German forces occupied strong
defenses, and Soviet forces had to assault across generally open and rolling
terrain at a time when incessant fog and driving snow showers reduced the
effectiveness of the Soviet artillery preparation.
North of the Osuga River, the German 102nd Infantry Division
successfully repelled repeated assaults by 20,000 infantry and over 100 tanks
of 3 Soviet 31st Army divisions. Soviet infantry clad in winter white advanced
in echelon, their ranks interspersed with supporting tanks. German artillery,
machine guns, and small arms fire tore gaping holes in the ranks of the
assaulting infantry as antitank weapons picked off the accompanying tanks. For
three days and at a cost of more than half of their riflemen and most of their
tanks,, the Soviets hurled themselves in vain at the 102nd Division's prepared
defenses. Faced with this determined resistance, the 31st Army's assault
collapsed, and, despite Zhukov's and Konev's exhortations, it could not be
revived. Three 20th Army rifle divisions attacking between the Vazusa and Osuga
Rivers met the same grisly fate. Despite strong armored support, their attacks
stalled after suffering frightful losses. Undeterred by the initial failures,
the carnage increased as Zhukov and Konev insisted the attacks continue to
support operations further south.
To the south, along the banks of the frozen Vazusa River, a
single rifle division of Major General N. I. Kiriukhin's 20th Army achieved
signal, if limited success. Taking advantage of the Germans' temporary
confusion, Major General G. D. Mukhin's 247th Rifle Division, supported by tank
brigade of about 50 tanks, lunged across the frozen Vazusa River, tore through
forward German positions, and seized 2 German fortified villages on the river's
western bank. Exploiting the opportunity, General Kiriukhin quickly moved
Colonel P. F. Berestov's 331st Rifle Division across the river and into the
breach. Fierce fighting raged all day in the rolling open country west of the
river as Soviet infantry struggled to overcome pesky German village strong
points and expand the bridgehead. It was critical they do so, for Konev and
Kiriukhin planned to commit their second echelon 8th Guards Rifle Corps and
their mobile group, the 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, into the breach
to enlarge the bridgehead and exploit the operation westward. All day,
exhorting, cursing, and cajoling, Zhukov, Konev, and Kiriukhin urged their men
on. By day's end, although the bridgehead was still too small, Konev decided to
accept the risk and ordered Kiriukhin's second echelon and mobile group to
advance the next morning.
This decision, however, turned out to be premature and
ill-advised because the hard-pressed German forces offered stubborn and
desperate resistance. Caught midst their complex regrouping, both 5th Panzer
and 78th Infantry Division troops fought with grim abandon. Small ad hoc German
combat groups [kampfgruppen] of infantry, tanks, and artillery in company and
battalion strength fiercely defended their hedgehog defenses around the
numerous log and stone villages that dotted the generally open, rolling, and
snow-covered fields west of the Vazusa River. Attacking Soviet forces lapped
around these defenses, overcame some, but left many as deadly obstacles strewn
throughout their rear area. Beset by command, control, and communications
problems, the German XXXIX Panzer Corps could not appreciate the chaos their
fragmented resistance was causing in Soviet ranks. Nevertheless, the corps took
desperate measures to shore up its sagging defenses and ordered its reserve 9th
Panzer Division, then in camp west of Sychevka, to march to the sounds of the
guns and plug the developing breeches.
The Soviet command also appreciated the gravity of the
situation. On the night of 25-26 November, while Mukhin's and Berestov's
riflemen strained to expand their tenuous bridgehead, Soviet second echelon and
exploitation forces struggled forward. Under constant German artillery fire,
over 200 tanks, 30,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalrymen, with their accompanying
logistical trains, moved inexorably forward through the murky darkness along 2
frozen dirt roads through the light forests to the east bank of the river.
Since both roads had been unmercifully chopped up by artillery fire, and too
many forces were using them at the same time, the consequences were predictable.
Chaos ruled supreme. The reinforcing infantry and tanks of the 8th Guards Rifle
Corps clogged the crossing sites over the Vazusa as harried front and army
staff officers tried in vain to clear the way for the advancing armor and
cavalry of 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. It was an impossible task.
Although the rifle corps made it across the river, the tank and cavalry corps
could not. It was mid-day on 26 November before the 170 tanks of Colonel P. M.
Arman's tank corps could go into action, and the mounted troopers of Major
General V. V. Kriukov's 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps remained east of the river
until 27 November. To Zhukov's and Konev's utter frustration, offensive
momentum was already flagging. Furthermore, reinforcing forces had already
suffered light casualties and were disorganized after the chaotic night march.
The defending Germans experienced the full impact of
Kiriukhin's assault on 27 November. While German reserves from the 9th Panzer
Division maneuvered into blocking positions along the open terrain either side
of the critical Rzhev-Sychevka road, German front-line forces desperately, but
skillfully defended their fortified village strong points, severely disrupting
the attempted Soviet armored and cavalry exploitation. After noon Colonel Arman's
6th Tank Corps, attacking in brigade columns of about 50 tanks each with
infantry riding on the tanks, lunged between and, in some cases, over the
German strong point defenses, followed on horseback by the troopers of 2nd
Guards Cavalry Corps. The German fortified village defenses atomized the Soviet
attack into fragments. Nevertheless, three of Colonel Arman's brigades ran the
gauntlet and crossed the vital Rzhev-Sychevka road, while one could not.
General Kriukov's more fragile cavalry suffered frightening losses as elements
of three of his divisions raced through withering German fire across the road
into the German rear, leaving the corps headquarters and logistical trains
isolated in the small bridgehead far to the rear. The Germans responded by
counterattacking from north and south along the Rzhev-Sychevka road against the
exposed flanks of the exploiting Soviet forces. . All the while, reinforced
Soviet infantry struggled painfully to expand the bridgehead against
undiminished German resistance.
A German eyewitness account captured the ferocity of the
action, writing that the commander of the 78th Infantry Division's 215th
Grenadier Regiment:
…was ordered to gather all of the units in the threatened sector into
one combat group under his command, to close the gap, and, while ignoring the
enemy who had already broken through, to prevent further breakthroughs. In his
sector, [he] was able to assemble around him, in a blocking position at
Lopotok, the division training company and whatever assault guns and stragglers
were available. As he was organizing them, about five Cossack squadrons
galloped down upon them, trying to break out to the southeast. Everyone who had
a weapon, whether infantryman, artilleryman, and even the assault guns and a
light battery, engaged them in direct fire. By chance, a Ju 88 was circling
over the village, discovered the Russians, and joined in battle with its bombs
and on-board weapons. All of the Cossacks were killed by this conglomerate of
fire...After this episode...he formed three sectors out of splinter groups and
stragglers and actually succeeded in closing the gap and repulsing all attacks.
A Soviet account laconically confirmed the terrible carnage:
The commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was not able to assign
his divisions' penetration missions in timely fashion on 28 November and did
not provide for their timely commitment into combat. Having received its
mission in timely fashion and, while operating skillfully and decisively, two
regiments of the 20th Cavalry Division successfully penetrated between enemy
strong points , but, having been cut off from the main force, the third
regiment was unsuccessful and suffered heavy losses.
Having received its penetration order two hours after the 20th
Cavalry Division, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Division attacked an already prepared
and alerted enemy, fell under his concentrated cross-fire, and suffered heavy
losses, including almost all of its artillery and the entire 10th Guards
Cavalry Regiment.
In two days of fierce fighting, the 5th Panzer Division had
suffered over 500 casualties, and the 78th Infantry Division reported, "All
units severely weakened and great losses in equipment and weapons." The
cost to the Russians was obviously higher, for the Germans counted at least 50
destroyed Russian tanks, and the snow-covered fields in front of their
positions were littered with brown-and white-clad Russian dead.
By nightfall on 28 November, it was clear to all that the
Soviet attack had faltered. Although the bulk of Colonel Arman's tank corps and
three of General Map 4 - Situation in the Sychevka sector, 28 November 1942.
Kriukov's cavalry divisions had reached the forests across
the Rzhev-Sychevka road, the attrition in armor and cavalry had been
staggering, and German counterattacks along the Rzhev road had slammed the door
on their withdrawal. Worse still, the exploiting tankers and cavalrymen were no
longer within the range of supporting artillery, since there was no room for it
in the bridgehead. Zhukov and Konev, however, remained undeterred. They ordered
their beleaguered tankers to organize a breakout to the west during the night
of 28-29 November, while exhorting their forces in the bridgehead both to
support the breakout and widen the breech in German lines. Zhukov's continued
grim optimism was conditioned, in part, by his stubborn refusal to admit defeat
and by the striking success Soviet forces seemed to be achieving to the west.
There, in the Belyi and Luchesa River sectors along the
western flank of the Rzhev salient, Major General F. G. Tarasov's 41st and
Major General V. A. Iushkevich's 22nd Armies had made striking progress in the
first three days of battle and appeared close to reaching deep into the
defending Germans' rear area. Once they had done so, thought Zhukov, the
temporary difficulties along the Vazusa River would become irrelevant.
The 90,000 men and over 300 tanks of General Tarasov's 41st
Army struck at 0900 hours on 25 November after an artillery preparation had
smashed German forward defenses south of the fortified town of Belyi. Advancing
in a driving snowstorm across the frozen, forested, and snow-covered swamps
into the more open terrain along the main Belyi-Dukhovshchina dirt road which
traversed the western flank of the salient, the riflemen of Major General I. I.
Popov's 6th Stalin Volunteer Rifle Corps, supported by tank detachments from
General M. D. Solomatin's 1st Mechanized Corps, easily overcame forward German
defenses and lunged into the villages along the road and Vishenka River in the
German tactical rear area.
Heartened by the first day's successes, at dawn the next
day, General Tarasov ordered his entire mechanized corps into action. Marching
in brigade column with his 65th and 219th Tank Brigades in the lead, the 15,200
man and 224 tank-strong 1st Mechanized Corps, commanded by the experienced
General M. A. Solomatin, made spectacular initial progress. Moving painfully
through the heavy and virtually roadless forests, by nightfall General
Solomatin's tank force had torn a hole 20 kilometers wide and nearly 30
kilometers deep in the German defenses. His lead brigades proudly announced
their arrival along the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road astride vital German communications
routes into Belyi.
Solomatin later described the difficult advance, writing:
There were no roads which would permit free movement of transport
vehicles. The enemy had destroyed all bridges during his withdrawal. The deep
snow cover and poor visibility in the falling snow strongly inhibited movement.
The corps had no special vehicles for clearing snowdrifts and constructing
column routes. We employed T-34 tanks for that purpose. They traveled in
echelon, one after the other, so as to blaze a trail for the infantry vehicles
and the towed artillery. In some instances motorized infantry followed the
tanks on foot, which exhausted them and limited any form of combat maneuver.
The absence of roads, the dense forest, and the poor
visibility in snowfall made orientation on the ground difficult. The tank
subunits, especially those in the in the lead, collided with one another.
Advancing units often found themselves on the routes of their neighbor, which
made it exceedingly difficult to control the force and slowed the rate of
advance.
Despite the difficulty encountered in keeping some sort of
order during the advance through the forest depths, Solomatin's tank brigades
succeeded in reaching the key communications road linking Belyi with the German
rear area.
The German XXXXI Panzer Corps intelligence report that
evening recognized the gravity of the situation, accurately noting:
The Red Army... broke through in the sector of the 352nd Grenadier
Regiment...on a front of 15-20 kilometers wide and to a depth of 30-40
kilometers. The first assault wave consisted of 22 Red infantry battalions,
supported by up to 100 T-34 tanks. About 24 infantry battalions followed,
supported by another 200 tanks to enlarge the breakthrough to the east and to
tie up German forces on the autobahn.
The further news that "another 20 Red battalions and 100 tanks
were attacking further north in the Lushesa valley," prompted a German
commander to note that, "The situation in the Szytschewka-Rzhew-Belyi area
was exciting enough."
Despite General Solomatin's seemingly dramatic success, the
attack plans of General Tarasov's 41st Army almost immediately went awry.
Although ordered to avoid a prolonged struggle for the city of Belyi, Tarasov
was inexorably drawn to the enticing target. The success of the initial Soviet
assault seemed to indicate that Belyi was available for the taking. Drawn like
a magnet to the city, Tarasov first committed Colonel N. O. Gruz's 150th Rifle
Division against the city's southern defenses, and, when they did not prevail,
he reinforced Gruz's division with a mechanized brigade from Solomatin's
exploiting mechanized corps. Despite Tarasov's exertions and fierce fighting on
the southern approaches to the city, Belyi could not be taken.
The credit for defending Belyi belonged to the commander of
German XXXXI Panzer Corps, Colonel General Joseph Harpe, who decided to hold
the city and relied on fate, luck, and anticipated German operational reserves
to save the situation in the German rear. Harpe directed the infantry of his
246th Infantry Division to establish a strong point defense south of the city.
He then requested and received a kampfgruppe each from Panzer Grenadier
Division Grossdeutschland and 1st Panzer Division, which were located in
reserve positions northeast and southwest of Belyi, respectively. Racing
forward across the frozen snow-covered roads, 1st Panzer Division's Kampfgruppe
von Weitersheim reached Belyi on late morning of 26 November, and
Grossdeutschland Division's Kampfgruppe Kassnitz arrived several hours later.
Together, the two groups began a bloody, but successful struggle to hold the
city.
Meanwhile, an increasingly frustrated General Solomatin
attempted to sever the crucial Belyi-Vladimirskoe road running northwest into
Belyi, which was the only available German resupply route into the city. Now
opposed by company and battalion combat groups from 1st Panzer Division, which
were deployed along and forward of the critical supply artery, Solomatin
urgently asked Tarasov to reinforce his flagging attack with two mechanized
brigades in army reserve. However, after demurring for a day, on 28 November
Tarasov denied Solomatin's request and instead committed his two reserve
brigades to the battle for Belyi. Colonel I. F. Dremov's fresh 47th Mechanized
Brigade attacked northward east of Belyi in yet another attempt to envelop the
city. Although Dremov's brigade severed the Belyi-Vladimirovka road, it ended
up unsupported in an exposed position northeast of the city. All the while,
Solomatin's overextended mechanized force fought a bitter day-long struggle
along a 30 kilometer sector of the key Belyi-Vladimirovskoe road. Solomatin's
frustration increased when, on 29 November, his forward forces announced the
arrival of fresh German armored reserves. Solomatin then knew what Tarasov did
not. The fortunes of battle were clearly turning, and initial Soviet success
had been squandered in the futile battle for Belyi. Consequently, Solomatin
consolidated his positions, went over to the defense, and awaited the German
counterstroke, which he knew was inevitable.
Solomatin was correct. The fresh German forces were the
advanced elements of a force which General Harpe was frantically assembling to
contain and, ultimately, defeat the Soviet offensive. Relying on 1st Panzer
Division to hold the Belyi strong point and the thin defenses along the
Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, Harpe requested all available reserves from higher
headquarters. General Alfred Model, the Ninth Army commander, and Field marshal
Guenther von Kluge, the Army Group Center commander, responded quickly by
ordering the 12th, 20th, and 19th Panzer Divisions to march to the sound of the
guns. To reach the battlefield, however, these divisions had to march long
distances over difficult routes in the harshest of winter conditions. Until
they arrived, both XXXXI Panzer Corps and Ninth Army's fate hung in the
balance.
Model at Ninth Army had other worries. Although the
situation along the Vazusa River seemed to be under control, further north his
front lines along the Luchesa River had been breached, and his defensive
positions along the Molodoi Tud River were under assault and seriously sagging.
German headquarters across the front were also transfixed by the great battle
playing out around Stalingrad. The knowledge that all was not well at
Stalingrad lent urgency to their grim task.
Model's growing concern was justified. Early on 25 November,
General Iushkevich's 22nd Army, with over 50,000 men and 270 tanks of Major
General M. E. Katukov's 3rd Mechanized Corps, assaulted eastward up the Luchesa
River valley. Attacking along a narrow corridor flanked by forests and frozen
swamps, Soviet forces tore a gaping hole through German defenses and drove
German forces eastward up the valley. General Iushkevich's attack was
spearheaded by Colonel I. V. Karpov's 238th Rifle Division and two regiments of
Colonel M. F. Andriushenko's 185th Rifle Division, supported by a tank brigade
of General Katukov's mechanized corps. The combined force routed a regiment of
the German 86th Infantry Division and punctured the German front at the
junction of the XXXXI Panzer Corps' 86th Infantry and the XXIII Army Corps'
110th Infantry Division. During the next two days Iushkevich committed Katukov's
full corps and drove German forces further up the valley.
The German XXIII Army Corps responded by committing
Grossdeutschland Division's Grenadier Regiment into the fray to slow the Soviet
advance. Heavy fighting raged for possession of the key village of Starukhi as
Soviet forces drove inexorably toward the Olenino-Belyi road in an attempt to
support 41st Army's advance further south. Although the Germans were unable to
close the yawning gap created by 22nd Army's attack, the often impenetrable
terrain, deteriorating weather, and skillful German defense took a heavy toll
on the advancing Soviets and halted them short of their goal. By 30 November
the Soviets occupied a salient 8 kilometers wide and almost 15 kilometers deep
in the German defenses. But, try as they did, Iushkevich's army could not
overcome German resistance and reach the key Olenino-Belyi road.
A German participant later recorded the ferocity of the
fighting, stating, "It was indescribable, what the infantrymen, engineers,
the artillerymen, and the forward observers had to endure in the snow and ice
of the forward combat line. Alert units had to be formed from convoy and supply
units to close some of the developing gaps." Another remarked, "There
were attacks everywhere!. Crises rose by the hours!." Nevertheless, the
German defenses bent but did not break.
The tense situation along the Luchesa River was only
exacerbated by unrelenting Soviet pressure against the northern extremity of
the German Rzhev salient. There, on a broad front along the Molodoi Tud River,
on 25 November the 80,000 men and over 200 tanks of Major General A. I. Zygin's
Soviet 39th Army launched Zhukov's secondary attack with three rifle divisions
and several rifle brigades, supported by two tank brigades and three separate
tank regiments. Since Zygin's attack was intended to be secondary, he was
unable to exploit several opportunities for success which arose on the first
day of combat. Although Soviet forces achieved some initial success in the
snow-covered, rolling, and partially wooded countryside, they were unable to
exploit it because of skillful action by German tactical reserves from the 14th
Motorized Division and the Grossdeutschland Division's Grenadier Regiment.
By 30 November this struggle too had degenerated into a
series of grinding Soviet attacks, which achieved only limited gains. The
German XXIII Army Corps' defending 206th Infantry and 14th Motorized Divisions
were forced to conduct some tactical withdrawals but, nevertheless, maintained
a continuous defense line, which denied General Zygin's forces access to their
objective, the Olenino-Rzhev road and rail line.
Zhukov, Konev, and Purkaev alternated between elation and
frustration over the results of the first five days of operations. The Western
Front's main attack in the Sychevka sector had clearly faltered. Although 20th
Army's infantry had secured a foothold over the Vazusa River and its mobile
forces occupied precarious positions astride the critical Rzhev-Sychevka road,
the 31st Army's attack had utterly failed, and the 29th Army had not yet joined
the assault. Nevertheless, both the 41st and 22nd Armies had made significant
gains, and Konev still had significant reserves, including the almost 200 tanks
of the 5th Tank Corps , which he could commit in the 20th Army's sector.
Consequently, on Zhukov's instructions Konev reinforced the 20th Army with the
31st Army reserve divisions and ordered Kiriukhin to withdraw his exploiting
armor and cavalry from their exposed position west of the Rzhev-Sychevka road.
After regrouping, Kiriukhin was to continue his assault. Meanwhile, General
Purkaev's two Kalinin Front armies west of the Rzhev salient would develop
their attacks in support of the 20th Army. What Zhukov did not know was that
the German command was preparing to strike back in the very sector where Zhukov's
forces had achieved their greatest success.
Having failed to exploit their opportunities west of the
Rzhev-Sychevka road and now starved of ammunition and logistical support,
Colonel Arman's 6th Tank Corps and cooperating cavalry had no choice but to
attempt a breakout to the east. On the night of 29-30 November, the force
launched a desperate breakout attempt in coordination with fierce Soviet
attacks from within the Vazusa River bridgehead. In bitter and chaotic fighting
which cost Arman nearly all of his remaining 100 tanks, the bulk of the corps'
personnel broke out of encirclement. The more fragile cavalry fared even worse
and were mercilessly slaughtered by withering German fire. Many of the
cavalrymen made it out of the encirclement, but some did not. The Tadzhik
cavalrymen of Colonel Kursakov's 20th Cavalry Division could not, and for weeks
they fought alongside Soviet partisans within the salient before the remnants
of the force finally reached Soviet lines in the Luchesa River valley in early
January.
A German eyewitness of the costly breakout recorded that, at
day's end, "The battlefield was spotted with dead and wounded, a view
which the oldest veteran cannot forget." The Soviet 6th Tank Corps
commander reported, "Tens of our soldiers suffered heroic deaths in this
heavy combat, among whom were the commanders of the 200th Tank Brigade and 6th
Motorized Rifle Brigade...who died leading the attack." The intense combat
took its toll on the Germans, as described by a 5th Panzer Division
participant, who wrote:
Again, a heavy day of fighting had come to an end. All enemy
attacks had been repulsed. But there was no doubt that the limits of our
soldiers' load-bearing capability had been reached, and, in many cases, it had
already been exceeded. The kampfgruppe [combat group] leaders reported that
soon there would be complete apathy perceptible in soldiers of all ranks due to
the severe over stress caused by the lack of sleep, severe cold, insufficient
supplies and incessant combat activity.
Zhukov was bitterly disappointed. General Kiriukhin's 20th
Army had lost over 30,000 men and 200 tanks in 5 days of vicious combat. Losses
in the 31st Army were just as severe, and little had been gained by the effort.
Even more disconcerting, on the west side of the salient, the 41st Army's
seemingly certain victory soon degenerated into catastrophic rout, and 22nd
Army soon faced frustrating stalemate.
South of Belyi, General Solomatin's worst fears
materialized. Not only were the Germans able to hold on to Belyi, but they were
also able to orchestrate an effective counterstroke. The situation began
deteriorating after 1 December, after Solomatin had shortened his corps' front
and gone on the defense. First, between 2 and 6 December, the German XXXXI
Panzer Corps' 1st Panzer Division and the newly arrived 12th Panzer Division
regained firm control of the Belyi-Vladimirskoe road, cut off and destroyed
Colonel Dremov's isolated 47th Mechanized Brigade northeast of Belyi, and began
applying unremitting pressure to Solomatin's defense lines southeast of the
city. Even more devastating for the Soviets, the German XXX Army Corps, with
the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions, began concentrating south of the Soviet
Belyi salient. It was no mean task, since every German movement was contested
by the terrible weather conditions, the abysmal roads, and intense resistance
by Soviet partisans. Despite these difficulties, by 6 December XXX Corps units
were in a position to strike back at the Soviet 41st Army. They did so on the
morning of 7 December against the 41st Army's southern flank, while the 1st
Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland Division's Fusilier Regiment attacked
southward from Belyi.
In three days of intense fighting, the combined German force
slashed through the 41st Army's rear area and encircled the bulk of Tarasov's
army southeast of Belyi. The glorious Soviet thrust had degenerated into an
inglorious trap. General Solomatin, who was assigned command of all encircled
Soviet forces, did what he could to organize a breakout, but all initial
attempts to escape failed. Abandoned by his army commander, Solomatin ordered
the troops of his and Colonel Popov's 6th Rifle Corp to dig in, organize
all-round defense, and wait until help could reach them.
Soviet progress further north in the Luchesa River valley
promised no relief. Despite strenuous efforts, General Iushkevich's forces in
that sector could achieve little more. Having lost about half of its initial
manpower and even more of its tanks, his 22nd Army lacked the strength to
expand its sizable penetration. Nor could the Germans eliminate it. Although
intense fighting ebbed and flowed for days, the stalemate endured. Further
north, General Zygin's 39th Army continued its slow progress at the northern
apex of the Rzhev salient against stout German resistance with little prospect
for significant victory.
Zhukov responded to the depressing news from the Belyi
sector with characteristic resolution. Unwilling to admit defeat, he
orchestrated a massive build-up of forces in the 20th Army's sector along the
Vazusa River. Between 2 and 10 December, he reinforced Kiriukhin's army with
the fresh 5th Tank Corps and with several divisions transferred from the 31st
Army, he hastily reconstituted Colonel Arman's 6th Tank Corps with tanks
received from the Stavka reserve, and he reinforced Lieutenant General M. S.
Khozin's adjacent 29th Army to twice its original strength. While the fighting
raged on at Belyi, Zhukov ordered the 20th and 29th Armies to resume their
assaults on 11 December in concert with a fresh drive in the north by General
Zygin's 39th Army, which he reinforced with a stream of divisions from the 30th
Army in the Rzhev sector.
The new act in the developing drama began playing out in the
Vazusa River bridgehead on the morning of 11 December. At 1010 hours massed
Soviet infantry from the 20th and 29th Armies, supported by all remaining
infantry support tanks, resumed their attacks from and south of the Vazusa
River bridgehead. Despite withering German fire, Konev and Kiriukhin committed
the almost 350 tanks and 20,000 men of his new 5th and refurbished 6th Tank
Corps into combat. So hastily organized was the attack that many of the new
tanks had not received their coat of white camouflage paint. Attacking with
abandon across a 4-kilometer sector into the teeth of reinforced German
antitank defenses, the desperate assault cost Soviet 20th Army about 300 tanks
lost in 2 days of incessant and deadly combat. A Soviet 5th Tank Corps account
captured the grim and futile nature of the combat:
A rocket rising into the air signaled the attack. All those
around came to life. The cries of "Forward!" and "For the
Fatherland!" resounded across the field. It was 1010 hours on 11 December
1942. The first to rush forward were the regiments of the 20th Army's 243d and
247th Rifle Divisions. Soon, however, their forward ranks were forced to take
cover against the heavy enemy fire. A fierce, bloody battle began, which lasted
all day.
The attack misfired almost along the entire extent of the
penetration front. Then, the brigades of the 5th Tank Corps were committed into
battle. They began literally to chew their way through the enemy defense. The
tank assaults gave way to furious enemy counterattacks. Individual heights and
the most key positions changed hands several times. The entire battlefield was
covered with destroyed and burning tanks and smashed guns—both sides suffered
heavy losses.
Although the carnage was frightful in the attack sectors of
both the 20th and 29th Armies, Zhukov and Konev urged their forces on. The
assaults continued for three days before collapsing in utter exhaustion on 15
December. . The German Ninth Army's situation report for 15 December recorded
the last agonies of the Soviet 20th Army, stating:
…along the eastern front, the enemy has once again launched a
large-scale attack. Disappointed by failure in all front sectors and with an
almost limitless application of force, the enemy wanted, once more, to try to
find a weakness on the eastern front and force a decision. This attack was spearheaded
by even greater massed use of tanks. Executed in a narrow area..., he tried to
collapse our front with superior human efforts. However, in such a short period
and in such a narrow region, it caused enemy tank losses that exceeded those of
the heavy tank battles at Rzhev during the summer. Within 48 hours 300 tanks
were shot up in a sector only 4 kilometers wide.
By that time, all from the lowliest private to Zhukov
himself realized that defeat was at hand. If the carnage along the Vazusa River
did not confirm that reality, then the fate of Solomatin's force at Belyi
would.
The 41st Army's encircled force of about 40,000 men
commanded by General Solomatin held out southeast of Belyi for as long as
humanly possible. Finally, the absence of any support from the 41st Army, the
unrelenting pressure by the four encircling German panzer divisions, and the
dwindling logistical stocks forced Solomatin to act, lest his isolated force be
entirely destroyed. Solomatin orchestrated his breakout on the night of 15-16
December. Shrinking his perimeter defense, he destroyed his remaining armor and
heavy weapons and thrust westward with his remaining infantry. Running the
fiery gauntlet, Solomatin saved what he could of his corps and the accompanying
forces of Popov's 6th Rifle Corps. The cost, however, was devastating. The
German 1st Panzer Division alone counted over 102 Soviet armored vehicles
destroyed, and Solomatin reported over 8, 000 of his 12,000 troopers killed and
wounded and most of the corps' over 200 tanks destroyed or abandoned. The toll
in the remainder of Tarasov's 41st Army was equally grim, totaling over 200
tanks and 10s of 1,000s of riflemen.
Even the twin catastrophic Soviet defeats along the Vazusa
River and at Belyi did not totally destroy Zhukov's resolve, for, despite being
thwarted on the flanks of the Rzhev salient, Zhukov continued to attack with
the 39th Army in the north until mid-December. Despite Zhukov's stubborn
defiance of reality, by 15 December Operation mars was a shambles. Stalin, the
Stavka, and perhaps even Zhukov himself knew well that mars was at an end.
Furthermore, long before, Stalin had abandoned any hopes of launching Operation
Jupiter. By early December 1942 the bulk of Stavka reserves were already en
route southward to reinforce Vasilevsky's successful Operation Uranus at
Stalingrad.
Zhukov conducted Operation mars in characteristic fashion.
The Soviet assaults were massive and unsparing in manpower and material.
Discounting the harsh terrain and weather conditions, he relied on pressure
across the entire front and simple maneuver by his powerful mechanized corps
and tank corps to achieve victory. Neither did. Skillful German tactical
defense by relatively small but tenacious combat groups, which exploited
terrain and man-made obstacles to maximum, bottled up attacking Soviet mobile
forces before they reached key objectives in the German operational rear area.
In the process the Germans inflicted maximum Soviet casualties by separating
attacking Soviet infantry from their supporting mobile forces. Avoiding panic
and holding only where necessary, the German command slowly assembled the
reserves necessary to counterattack and achieve victory. Nevertheless, German
victory was a "close thing." While causing catastrophic Soviet
casualties, the German divisions themselves were fought to a frazzle. It was no
coincidence that several months later Model asked for and received permission
to abandon the Rzhev salient. He and his army could ill afford another such
victory.
Operation Mars cost the Red Army nearly half a million men
killed, wounded, or captured. Individual Soviet combat units were decimated in
the operation. The Soviet 20th Army lost 58,524 men out of its original
strength of over 114,000 men. General Solomatin's 1st Mechanized Corps lost
8,100 of its 12,000 men and all of its 220 tanks, and the accompanying 6th
Stalin Rifle Corps lost over 20,000 of its 30,000 men. At lower levels the cost
was even higher. The 8th Guards Rifle Corp's 26th Guards Rifle Division emerged
from combat with 500 of its over 7,000 combat infantrymen intact, while the
4,500 man 148th and 150th Rifle Brigades had only 27 and 110 "fighters,"
respectively, available at the end of the operation.
Soviet tank losses, correctly estimated by the Germans as
around 1,700, were equally staggering, in as much as they exceeded the total
number of tanks the Soviets initially committed in Operation Uranus at
Stalingrad. In Western armies losses such as these would have prompted the
removal of senior commanders, if not worse. In the Red Army it did not, for
when all was said and done, Zhukov fought, and the Red Army needed fighters.
Although far less severe than those of the Soviets, the
Germans too suffered grievous losses in the operation, losses which they could
ill afford given their smaller manpower pool and the catastrophe befalling them
at Stalingrad. For example, the 1st Panzer Division suffered 1,793 casualties,
and the 5th Panzer 1,640, while losses in the infantry divisions (the 78th,
246th, 86th, 110th, and 206th) along the Soviet main attack axes were even
greater. The overall Soviet casualty toll, however, was at least 10-fold
greater that the total German loss of around 40,000 men.
Zhukov said little about the defeat on his memoirs, and what
he did say was grossly distorted. He mentioned only the December operation,
and, without revealing its code name, he called it simply a diversion for the
Operation Uranus. Among the many thousands of Soviet memoirs and unit
histories, only a handful mention the operation, and these do so without
revealing its full scope. Even formerly classified accounts avoid covering the
operation in its entirety. Archival materials, however, do cover the operation
in greater detail, but only in selective sectors.
In assessing blame for the failure, none of the few
available Soviet accounts mention the role of key commanders such as Zhukov or
Konev. For example, General Getman, commander of the 6th Tank Corps, who was
ill in November and did not participate in the attack, wrote:
The offensive was conducted against fortified positions occupied by
enemy tank forces and in swampy-forested terrain in complex and unfavorable
weather conditions. These and other conditions favored the enemy. We lacked the
required coordination with the infantry and reliable artillery and aviation
support. The organized suppression of enemy strong points was inadequate,
especially his antitank means by artillery fire and aviation strikes. This led
to the tank brigades suffering great losses.
Other formerly classified Soviet sources and archival
materials candidly critiqued the problems, and German reports echoed those
critiques. A 15 December German Ninth Army report judged that the Russian
operation had sustained a heavy defeat and "bled itself out," adding:
The enemy leadership, which demonstrated skill and adaptability in the
preparation and initial implementation of the offensive, ... once again
displayed its old weaknesses as the operation progressed. Indeed, the enemy has
learned much, but he has again shown himself to be unable to exploit critical
unfavorable situations. The picture repeats itself when operations which began
with great intent and local successes degenerated into senseless, wild
hammering at fixed front-line positions once they encounter initial heavy
losses and unforeseen situations. This incomprehensible phenomenon appears
again and again. But, even in extremis, the Russian is never logical; he falls
back on his natural instinct, and the nature of the Russian is to use mass, steamroller
tactics, and adherence to given objectives without regard to changing
situations.
The manner in which Operation mars was fought and the
carnage the operation produced has few parallels in the later war years. In its
grisly form, its closest peer was the famous Soviet frontal assault on the
Zeelow Heights during the April 1945 Berlin operation. Not coincidentally, it
too was orchestrated by Zhukov. Unlike the case in 1942, however, the
victorious conclusion of the Berlin operation required no alteration of the
historical record to preserve Soviet pride or commanders' reputations.
The legacy of Operation mars was silence. Stalin and history
mandated that Vasilevsky's feat at Stalingrad remained unblemished by the Rzhev
failure. Stalin recognized Zhukov's greatest quality—that he fought—and, at
this stage of the war and later, Stalin needed fighters. Therefore, Zhukov's
reputation remained intact. Stalin and Soviet history mandated that he share
credit with Vasilevsky for the Stalingrad victory. Zhukov gained a measure of
revenge over German Army Group Center at Kursk in summer 1943 and in Belorussia
in summer 1944. Ironically, however, it would be Vasilevsky who, as key Stavka
planner, would play an instrumental role in finally crushing that German Army
Group in East Prussia in January 1945. Such is the fickleness of history.
Soviet
military history ignored other notable Soviet defeats during the later war
years. Among those notable operations, which, like mars, endured obscurity and
silence, were the failed Soviet Central Front offensive of February-March 1943
in the region west of Kursk, the abortive Soviet Belorussian offensive of fall
1943, and futile Soviet attempts to invade Rumania in May 1944 and East Prussia
in fall 1944. This silence was possible because each of these defeats occurred
at the end of a major Soviet strategic advance, when victorious context masked
the failure to vanquished Germans and history alike and shrouded the events in
a cloak of anonymity, which has endured for more than fifty years. That cloak
is finally being lifted.
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| Operation Mars, 25 November-21 December 1942. |
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| German forces fighting in the town of Belyi during Operation Mars. |
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| General Georgi Zhukov in 1941. |
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| Field Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, Red Army. |
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| German soldiers move past a Russian building completely engulfed in flames during Operation Mars. |
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| Collective farmers from the Moscow suburbs handing over tanks manufactured on their money to Soviet servicemen. |
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| Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge. |
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| Troops of 2nd Luftwaffe Field Division in Operation Mars. |
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| Troops of 2nd Luftwaffe Field Division in Operation Mars. |
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| Soviet Il-2 Sturmoviks during Operation Mars. |
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| Soviet partisans caught and hanged after Operation Mars. |
