U.S. Army Uniforms, Battle of the Bulge

Short on clothing in the bitter Belgian winter, American soldiers enjoy the warmth of a rarely allowed fire.

 

by Philip Katcher

By December 1944, when Hitler made his last desperate bid for victory by sending his troops in through the Ardennes to split the Americans and British, the American Army had evolved good, comfortable combat uniforms.

Unfortunately, not all American soldiers had these uniforms. Instead, because winter uni­form supply had been given such a low priority during the drive across France, most Americans had to make do with a mixture of old and new uniform items.

The basic uniform included a steel helmet, worn in the European Theater of Operations with the chin strap hooked around the helmet’s back. Officers wore their rank insignia on the helmet front. Helmets were painted dark olive green, using a paint which included sand to give the helmet a rough finish. The steel outer liner was worn over a separate fiberglass inner liner, which could be worn separately for ceremonial duties.

An olive green knit wool jeep cap, made with ear flaps which could be folded up, and a visor, was worn under the helmet. Often these caps were worn separately, too, although this practice was usually against regulations.

An olive drab undershirt was worn under a wool olive green shirt. Chevrons and unit shoul­der insignia were worn on the shirt sleeves by enlisted men, while officers wore both unit shoulder insignia and their corps insignia on the left collar and rank insignia on the right. The shirt could be worn without a tie, although a tie was required in certain commands, such as the Third Army.

A hip-length field jacket, made of light olive drab proofed cotton and lined with light wool, was first issued in 1941 and was still widely seen, although it had been officially replaced in 1943 by a longer, darker olive green jacket. The M1941 field jacket had two slit pockets, one on each side, while the M1943 had two large breast pockets and two large pockets below the waist. The M1943 jacket had a draw­string which ran around the waist, allowing the wearer to pull the baggy jacket close to his body. A knit olive green pullover sweater, but­toned at the throat, was issued with the M1941 jacket but was worn with any combination of dress.

Chevrons and shoulder patches were worn on both types of jackets, while officers wore their rank insignia on the jacket shoulder tabs. This insignia could be the metal type worn on dress uniforms, but was often metallic-colored thread woven onto a leather or olive drab cotton base.

Dr. George Snook, who joined the 45th Division as a company aid man in early 1945, recalled, “A new unit going into combat for the first time in this season of the year was equipped with the standard issue field jacket. While these were worn by most of the veterans, there were a few of the older, shorter styles to be seen. The one item which every infantryman desired was the tanker’s lined jacket with knit wrists and collars. Whenever possible, one of these was begged, borrowed, or otherwise requisitioned; by the end of the war, approximately one quar­ter of the men in I Company, 180th Infantry, had tanker’s jackets.”

Tankers and many infantrymen also wore one-piece olive green overalls. The main prob­lem with them, according to Colonel John Elting, 8th Armored Division, was that they lacked, “… strategic zippers or drop buttons—you had to half undress to relieve yourself, which was trouble enough—but you also had to try to keep all that bulky clothing up out of harm’s way.”

Certain troops wore specialized insignia. Military police wore the white letters ‘MP’ on the front, and often the rear, of their helmets, usually with a white strip painted parallel with the helmet edge. They wore a black brassard, some four inches wide, with the letters ‘MP’ in white, on their left arms.

Similar brassards, but in green with white letters, were worn by correspondents; photog­raphers; radio commentators; chauffeurs for correspondents, photographers, and radio correspondents, and messengers for corres­pondents, photographers and radio news men.

Medical personnel also wore brassards, theirs being white with red “Geneva” crosses on them. A brassard was worn on each arm. Their helmets were also marked with red “Geneva” crosses on them; one on the front, one in back and one on each side. The crosses were either outlined in white or painted in the middle of a white circle, the latter being the most common. Some non-commissioned medi­cal personnel wore their chevrons painted on their helmet sides instead of the crosses.

Even these apparently obvious markings seem to have been too subtle for the Germans, who shot a number of medics in the field. In answer to protests they claimed they could not see the red crosses. The Americans’ answer to that was to make large white squares, about the size of a man’s chest from top to waist, with a large red “Geneva” cross in the center of each. These were issued to be worn on the front and back of each medic’s field jacket, coat or over­alls. Most medics also carried two aid kits, often also marked with red “Geneva” crosses, suspended from an infantryman’s cartridge belt suspenders. They also carried two canteens on their issue pistol belts, but many got rid of their personal first aid packets.

Airborne personnel also wore specialized in­signia and uniforms. On their right arms they wore an American flag, either on a brassard or sewn to the sleeve. This served for easy identifi­cation in the field. Otherwise, their uniforms featured steel helmets with large leather chin straps with a cup to be worn under the chin. Their jackets were similar to the M1943 one but the breast pockets were set at an angle different from that of the infantry ones. Their trousers were made with a large patch pocket tucked into tall russet brown boots which were laced all the way to the top, instead of using any form of gaiters. The paratrooper boots were highly popular with everyone in the Army—becoming the standard pattern eventually—and the de­mand meant that many paratroopers did not receive the boots they were supposed to have.

Helmets were marked, among paratroopers, with a horizontal bar for NCOs and a vertical bar for officers on the backs. In the 101st Airborne Division regimental markings, in the shapes of squares, hearts, diamonds, spades, clubs, circles, crosses and triangles, were worn in white on the helmet sides.

Bibliography

Paul Boesch. Road to Hürtgen. Houston, 1962.

Howard P. Davies. United States Infantry Europe, 1942-45. London, 1974.

Brian L. Davis. U.S. Airborne Forces Europe 1942-45. London, 1974.

Roy Dilley. U.S. Army Uniforms, 1939-1945. London, 1977.

Philip Katcher. U.S. 101st Airborne Division, 1942-45. London, 1978.

—. U.S. 1st Division, 1939-45. London, 1978.

Andrew Mollo and Malcolm McGregor. Army Uni­forms of World War 2. London, 1974.

 

  

The Trap that Doomed Kampfgruppe Peiper

Kampfgruppe Peiper during the Ardennes Offensive.

by Alfred J. Palfey

When units are separated from the division, as the 33rd Armored Regiment and Task Force Lovelady was in the Bulge, communications are often lacking. This was the case of our initial action there, therefore I decided to put all the loose ends together with this story.

The tale is more of a summary and omits many interesting events, for example:

Near the end of the engagement, Major George Stallings, like Col. Joachim Peiper of the 1st SS, was running short of supplies. At one time he considered surrendering.

Doctor (Captain) A. Eaton Roberts was changing his radio from his peep to the aid station, when Stallings was attempting to alert him of the German infiltration.

Doc Roberts commandeered a light tank and first reported his dilemma to me at Grand-Coo. It wasn’t until our reunion at Omaha in 1992, when discussing the battle with Aurio J. Pierro that the mystery of a tank missing from his platoon was solved.

A German soldier in a makeshift U.S. Army uniform was killed near our radio relay station at Grand-Coo. While searching him a billfold of our missing reconnaissance officer, Lt. George E. Gray, was found. Gray had been captured. We assumed he was dead. You can imagine my surprise when I met Lt. Gray at the 1991 reunion at St. Louis (dividend for attending reunions).

We devised a unique system to keep Lt. Col. William B. Lovelady informed on the battle at Petit-Coo. We laid a telephone line to the outskirts of town and improvised a telephone system using radio handsets in series with a six-volt dry cell battery.

The action at Petit-Coo was so intense that a light tank crew member could not operate his machine gun with wounded and dangling fingers—so he chewed them off!

Had Peiper decided to retreat on the highway to Trois-Ponts, rather than crossing the Ambléve at La Gleize, my position at Grand-Coo was the first obstacle in his path—and this story probably would not be in our files.

“The Trap”

While browsing through the 3rd Armored (Spearhead) Division files, I found the attached memo written by Colonel William B. Lovelady, my task force commander. The event occurred on our initial thrust into the Belgium Bulge, when Combat Command B (CCB) was attached to the 30th Infantry Division. The Colonel’s item is an incident in what may have been one of the most significant battles of the Belgium Bulge. With reference to the attached map, here is the rest of the story.

The decisive role of the German Ardennes offensive was to be executed by the 1st SS Panzer Division. This division was known as Hitler’s own, having its origins to Hitler’s first bodyguard. More specifically, the offensive was to be spearheaded by the beefed-up (5,800-man) Kampf­gruppe commanded by SS Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper, an experienced hero of the Russian Front. After the initial breakthrough, Peiper’s objective was to cross the Meuse River at Huy, Belgium, between Liege and Namur.

A clause in the Kampfgruppe’s order expressly stated that prisoners of war were to be shot, where the conditions of combat should so require it. This decree was first demonstrated at Baugnez, site of the Malmédy Massacre.[1]

Shortly after breakthrough, the 1111th Engineer Combat Group was ordered to cover the area south of the Ambléve River, to provide a screening force for the 1st Army Headquarter at Spa.

On 18 December, Peiper’s leading elements had reached Stavelot and Trois-Ponts on the north side of the Ambléve. Moments before their arrival, the 291st Engineers had blown three bridges—one over the Ambléve at Trois-Ponts and two on the Salm River south of Trois-Ponts. Peiper was now forced to turn north to La Gleize, rather than to follow his planned crossing of the Ambléve for the most direct route to his objective. To further complicate matters, the river on his left and the high wooded hills on the right limited his route to the valley road to La Gleize.

Combat Command B, now attached to the 30th Infantry Division, was ordered to clear the north bank of the Ambléve River between La Gleize and Stavelot. General Boudinot formed three task forces. Task Force Jordan was to move south to Stoumont, Task Force McGeorge south to La Gleize, and Lovelady’s Task Force, the largest of the group, was to clear the highway between La Gleize and Stavelot.

The attack started on the morning of 20 December, from an area south of Spa. At this time Peiper’s leading elements had passed through La Gleize and reached Stoumont where they were halted by units of the 30th Infantry Division. Both Task Force Jordan and Task Force McGeorge ran head-on into Peiper’s main force, and were stopped about one-quarter mile short of their objective. However, this action changed thoughts Peiper had of turning north to Liege. With his dangerously low fuel supply, his efforts may have been more intense had he known of the vast fuel depot located between the two task forces.

Task Force Lovelady turned left at Grand-Coo. Approaching Trois-Ponts they met a column of German guns, infantry, and supply vehicles which were quickly riddled to pieces. The first of many attempts to reinforce Peiper had failed.

The noose was tightening on Peiper. Although he had found a bridge over the Ambléve intact at Cheneux, his advance in that sector was halted by the 82nd Airborne Division. The 82nd’s front on the south side of the Ambléve extended east to the Salm River.

D Company of Task Force Lovelady advanced to the outer fringe of Stavelot at Parfondruy. Here they witnessed atrocities committed upon Belgian men, women and children by Peiper’s SS troops.

At Trois-Ponts, E Company was engaged in clashes with the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment in their effort to break through to Peiper’s advanced units. The E Company commander, Lt. Hope, was killed and Maj. Stallings assumed command.

Captain “Doc” Robert’s medics, guarded by Lt. Pierro’s platoon of B Company’s light tanks, were stationed at Petit-Coo. Chief Warrant Officer Palfey moved to the railway station at Grand-Coo to relay radio messages to Stallings. The high hills in the area blocked radio communications with Lovelady’s command post at Roanne.

It was during this interval when the young lieutenant from the 82nd Airborne Division made contact with Colonel Lovelady, as written in the attached memo. He informed the Colonel that CCB and the 30th Infantry Division were now attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps, commanded by General Ridgway.

Some elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment infiltrated across the Ambléve over a foot bridge east of Trois-Ponts at Petit-Spai and bypassed Stallings tanks. On the afternoon of 22 December they attacked Captain Roberts’ aid station at Petit-Coo. Fierce fighting raged on into the night. Both D and E Companies were now separated from the task force, however, they continued to resist efforts to reinforce Peiper from the east.

The following morning units of the 30th Infantry Division began clearing the SS from the aid station at Petit-Coo. Later in the day Petit-Coo was cleared and contact was made with D and E Companies. Another attempt to break through to Peiper had failed.

Several efforts by Peiper to break out at Stoumont, Cheneux and in Task Forces Jordan’s and McGeorge’s sector were unsuccessful. Supplies of gasoline, munitions, food and medications were virtually exhausted. Requests to retreat were denied, having been assured that reinforcements were forthcoming.

Finally, on the night of 23 December, after destroying their equipment at La Gleize, Peiper led the remnants, eight hundred men of the kampfgruppe, on a foot retreat. They crossed the Ambléve on a wooden bridge south of La Gleize into the 82nd Airborne Division area. Moving only in darkness, they finally rejoined their division south of Trois-Ponts, after wading the cold and rapid Salm River.

Thus ended the exploits of the once mighty Kampfgruppe Peiper. Starting with about 5,800 men, sixty tanks (some Tiger IIs), three flak tanks, seventy-five half-tracks, fourteen 20mm flak wagons, twenty-seven 75mm assault guns, plus 105- and 150mm self-propelled howitzers, the group was now trimmed down to eight hundred scraggly SS troopers.

Obviously, this situation relieved the pressure on Combat Command B. They then rejoined the division and went on to win other battles.

Peiper was sentenced to death at the war crimes trial. In 1954 his sentence was reduced to thirty-five years. He was paroled in 1956 after serving eleven years. In the summer of 1976 fire bombs destroyed Peiper’s house and killed the former commander of Kampfgruppe Peiper.[2]

The Memo

On 22 December 1944, about 9:30 p.m., a young lieutenant from the 82nd Airborne was brought to my command post. He was wet, cold and his face was all blackened. He had swam, waded or whatever across the Ambléve River to contact one of our outposts. He told them he had information for the commanding officer and asked to be taken there. You can imagine my surprise and gratitude to see him, since we had not been in contact with friendly forces for three days and to learn that the paratroopers were just across the river cheered us. His message was that we were now attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps. He gave me a sketch of the disposition of forces just across the river, and asked me for a similar sketch or diagram of our forces. (Generally, just strung out across the road with the Ambléve River on the right, and a steep wooded hill on our left.)

Just before he left, he asked if we needed anything. We told him that the Germans were dug in on the hill to our left and we needed artillery or mortars. He offered help. He said he would shoot a line across the river at dawn and we could call for and direct the fire from their howitzers. This was done and we soon neutralized the enemy on the hill. This experience was one of the greatest in our five campaigns. We have no record of this incident in our book, regimental or Combat Command “B” logs, and most if not all of the individuals that knew of this have either passed on or are out of contact. Perhaps there is a mention of this incident in the airborne or regimentals journals.

William B. Lovelady, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

1 June 1989

 

 

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[1] Editor’s Note: This implies there was a written order to this effect, and all current historical research indicates there was never any written order to execute prisoners. Some accounts believe a verbal order was given—after being told they should not let anything stop the advance, one officer asked what they should do with any prisoners taken, and the reply being “You know what to do with prisoners.” Many automatically assume this meant to execute them, but those who were there insist it was nothing more than the briefest of instructions to handle the prisoners the way they should be dealt with—but certainly not implying to execute them.

[2] Editor’s Note: Although fire bombs appear to have destroyed Peiper’s home, his body was found outside, alongside a shotgun. He had been killed by gunfire.

 

Follow-up Interview with Joachim Peiper

Joachim Peiper.

U.S. Army

The following is a reprint of ETHINT 11, prepared by the U.S. Army. Copy obtained from the National Archives, Washington, D.C. Answers were re-transcribed by the interviewer.

According to captured maps depicting the axis of advance for 1 and 12 SS Panzer Divisions, the latter is given three routes and the former two. The most southern 12 SS Panzer Division route lies from Losheim to Losheimergraben to Buellingen to Butgenbach, etc. Obst. Peiper has stated that his regiment’s route lay from Scheid to Losheim to Losheimergraben to Huenningen to Honsfeld. This would appear to leave 12 SS Panzer Division two poor “penetration” routes into the Rocherath area through heavily forested terrain from the direction of Hollerath and Neuhof. The map also shows the northern route of 1 SS Panzer Division as springing from Lanzerath, but Obst. Peiper states that this route was taken only after the Losheim – Losheimergraben route proved to be unusable because of resistance and the blown bridge. Can Obst. Peiper explain this further? Was the Losheim – Losheimergraben route taken away from 12 SS Panzer Division and given to 1 SS Panzer Division, thus changing the original plan?

The route from Losheim to Honsfeld was that designated for 1 SS Panzer Division; however, Buellingen was on the route of 12 SS Panzer Division. Due to the conditions of the road west from Honsfeld through Hepscheid to Moder­scheid, Obst. Peiper chose the better route and proceeded through Buellingen to Richelsbusch to Moderscheid. At the time, 1 SS Panzer Regiment was considerably in advance of the elements of 12 SS Panzer Division. Therefore the road would not be congested by two columns, one from each division. In addition, Peiper knew that large stores of gasoline were in the town of Buellingen. In the town they captured some 30,000 gallons (liters?) [In ETHINT 10, Obst. Peiper speaks of capturing 200,000 liters of gasoline in Buel­lingen, or about 52,500 gallons.] of gasoline in cans. Some artillery fire and direct fire was received from the high ground and woods about two kilometers northwest of the town. After refueling, the column continued to the southwest and closed upon its originally designated axis of advance. At the time of the initial assault, the tanks had only enough gas for approximately 50 miles of operation—approximately one-half of the basic load, without any reserve.

Did elements of 12 SS Panzer Division use the Lanzerath route to reach Buellingen after 1 SS Panzer Division had moved on to the west?

The elements of 12 SS Panzer Division were stopped by an American counterattack north of Buellingen, where they were halted and unable to advance. The 12 SS Panzer Division was later withdrawn from the vicinity and sent to follow the axis of the penetration of 1 SS Panzer Regiment. To Peiper’s knowledge, 12 SS Panzer Division did not pass through Buellingen. It circled, instead, and came into the axis of advance of 1 SS Panzer Regiment at Honsfeld. [12 SS Panzer Division did not enter Buellingen from the direction of Rocherath but moved up from Lanzerath to Honsfeld to Buellingen. —First Lieutenant George M. Tuttle]

Did 1 SS Panzer Regiment make any attempt to move up into Butgenbach from Buellingen? If no attempt was made in force, were reconnaissance elements sent from Buellingen in the direction of Butgenbach? In the direction of Wirtzfeld?

No reconnaissance was sent toward Butgenbach from Buellingen, as they [1 SS Panzer Regi­ment?] were receiving heavy resistance from that direction. Peiper’s orders were to penetrate as far as possible and exploit his breakthrough. There­fore, he did not attempt to smash resistance on his flanks, as he expected 12 SS Panzer Division to move up and cover his northern flank. Peiper lost one Royal Tiger [King Tiger] tank west of Buellingen.

Was the bulk of 3 Fallschirmjäger Division left to hold the front between Waimes and Butgenbach? Did it follow immediately in the path of 1 SS Panzer Division? (It is understood that small elements of 3 FS Division were with 1 SS Panzer Regiment.) Where was the rest of 3 FS Division?

The 3 FS Division was responsible for holding the north flank behind the advancing armored columns. The 10 FS Regiment [5, 8 and 9 FS Regiments were organic to 3 FS Division. How­ever, this division was engaged in the Ardennes Offensive, and 4 FS Division, to which 10 FS Regiment was assigned, was not; therefore the regiment in question must have been one from 3 FS Division], 3 FS Division, was attached to follow 1 SS Panzer Regiment. The remainder of the division moved northward after the armor had passed to the west and held a line generally between Butgenbach and Waimes. The 3 FS Divi­sion had been annihilated in previous cam­paigns in Normandy and at the time of the Ardennes attack was composed of a large number of air force personnel who were former ground and flight crews. [Paratroopers in the Wehrmacht were a part of the Luftwaffe; thus much of the personnel did not have suitable infantry training.] The commanding officer of 10 FS Regiment was a Luftwaffe staff obst. with little if any ground force experience. Obst. Peiper was an obstlt. at the time and was more or less outranked. The new result was that the armored column did not obtain efficient cooperation with the infantry. One battalion of infantry, however, worked in close cooperation with the tanks in the capture of Honsfeld, and elements amounting to about a reinforced company were still riding the tanks when Peiper’s forces reached Stavelot. The remainder of 3 FS Division moved up to hold the line on the north flank, as previously stated.

Was any attempt made to return to the Losheim–Losheimergraben road after moving north out of Lanzerath on the night of 16/17 December 1944? If it had been possible to cross the railroad and move up into Losheimergraben, the possi­bility of withdrawal for 99th Infantry Division (U.S.) elements would have been seriously interfered with, if not completely eliminated. (It is understood that this was not the mission of 1 SS Panzer Division.) Was this known at the time? Did the possibility, if known, enter into Obst. Peiper’s plans?

Peiper was aware of the fact that he could have cut off a battalion, approximately one thousand men, of 99th Infantry Division (U.S.), in the woods east of Lanzerath. However, he did not do so because it was of prime importance to exploit his breakthrough and drive on for gasoline. Therefore, Peiper did not deviate from his axis of advance.

In the move to the west, did any elements of 1 SS Panzer Division, reconnaissance or otherwise, enter Faymonville or Waimes? What information on his northern flank did Obst. Peiper have at the time?

Reconnaissance was not sent into Faymonville or Waimes because no resistance was received from the northern flank, and Peiper, who was out of contact with 12 SS Panzer Division, believed that his right flank would be covered by 12 SS Panzer Division. In addition, insufficient gasoline pro­hibited any needless reconnaissance.

Can Obst. Peiper remember what elements were supposed to have stopped the regiment of 3 FS Division three times in its attempt to attack from Lanzerath toward Honsfeld on 16 December 1944? (Only elements of 3rd Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment [U.S.], were north of Lanzerath, and being in a supposedly safe reserve position, they could not have been occupying well organized positions; Honsfeld was being used as a rest center by 99th Infantry Division [U.S.].) Who was there to stop them (3 FS Regiment)?

Obst. Peiper said the FS regiment supporting his unit was repulsed three times by elements of 99th Infantry Division (U.S.), consisting of what he thought was a battalion. The unsuccessful attack was due in his opinion to the lack of experience and infantry training of the commanding officer of the regiment a great many of his men, as mentioned in answer to one of the previous questions. Obst. Peiper’s tanks met no resistance when they pushed through 10 FS Regiment in the attack.

Just what method was used to move the German armored columns forward from Lanzerath on the night of 16/17 December 1944? Were vehicles led into Honsfeld by an enlisted man carrying a flashlight? (The night was exceptionally dark, according to an interview with one of the Honsfeld defenders who also claims that German tanks entered the town in this manner before any firing took place by other defenders positioned outside of the town on the Lanzerath road.) Under what conditions was the night march from Lanzerath to Honsfeld conducted?

Obst. Peiper moved out of Lanzerath at approximately 2400 on the night of 16 December 1944 and went through the woods towards Honsfeld, without encountering any opposition. Approximately one battalion of paratroopers provided flank protection on either side of the road, as the tanks moved through the woods. During the night some interdiction fire fell in the woods; however, none was effective. Some artillery fire came close as the tanks emerged from the woods toward Honsfeld. It was daylight, about 0500 or 0600, when this column reached Honsfeld. The occupants of the town were taken by complete surprise. The march was conducted under normal blackout conditions, with guides leading each tank holding a white handkerchief for identification, and flanking infantry on either side to protect the tanks from ambush. The march was made without incident except for sporadic artillery fire, which was not effective.

Obst. Peiper speaks of only one route having been used by 1 SS Panzer Division, i.e., the one which he took stemming from Lanzerath to Stavelot. We believe that there is evidence to conclude that this division had planned and did use another route also, i.e., one which had its origin in the vicinity of Krewinkel and whose axis of advance led through Wereth, Heppenbach, Mirfeld, Ambléve, Diedenberg, Born, Recht, and Trois Ponts. Does Obst. Peiper agree that a part of 1 SS Panzer Division took this route? If not, can he offer any explanation for the appearance of armor generally along this axis of advance?

The route mentioned: Wereth – Heppenbach – Mirfeld – Ambléve – Diedenberg – Born – Recht – and Trois Ponts was taken by other elements, which comprised the infantry regiment of 1 SS Panzer Division and the assault gun battalion. Other foot elements of the division followed this route to avoid congestion on the main axis of advance. The southern group met considerable resistance, losing eight or nine of their assault guns; however, it knocked out thirty American tanks. This group eventually was to reinforce Oberst Peiper but was held up and never made contact with him.

Oberst Peiper also mentioned that 2 Panzer Division was on his southern flank. It is known that this division was in the southern part of First (U.S.) Army zone, and that it crossed the Our River at Dasburg, due east of Clerf and 40 kilometers south of Malmédy. Who was on Oberst Peiper’s flank?

At Trois Ponts Oberst Peiper was out in front with no one on either flank. He was out of communication with his own division and due to technical difficulties with his radios and terrain could not communicate with all elements of his own columns, which was some 25 kilometers long.

Just what was known of the gas installations immediately south of Spa, and was there any intention to move north from Stoumont to capture these dumps? (Oberst Peiper denied that any of his men moved toward these dumps, but small columns went up both the valley and the ridge road from La Gleize toward these dumps, and one group actually hit the south edge of the dump.)

Before the start of the offensive Oberst Peiper was given a map marked with known American headquarters and supply installations. He knew of the gas in the one dump near Spa and also of the gasoline at Buellingen. He did not know of the presence of the other dump south of Francorchamps.

Why was no reconnaissance sent by Oberst Peiper’s group into Malmédy? Ordinarily wouldn’t flank reconnaissance be sent, even though the town was not in 1 SS Panzer Division zone of action?

Gas was getting low as Oberst Peiper’s column approached Stavelot. This reason and the fact that 12 SS Panzer Division was expected to move along the right flank, plus the fact that no resistance was being received from the north, made reconnaissance unnecessary. Heavy resistance from the towns of Ligneuville and Stavelot was the focus of Peiper’s attention. Later, the tanks were practically out of gas at Stoumont.

Give more detail on the column which crossed south of L’Ambléve River and headed for Werbomont, especially about the blowing of the bridge at Habiemont, the size of the force south of the river, and what alternate route was taken to cross the Lienne River.

The bridge over the Ambléve River was blown just in front of the leading tank. Reconnaissance was sent both north and south of the position. Small bridges were found; however, it was reported that they were too small for the 72-ton Royal Tiger tanks. The size of the force used was one reconnaissance company supported by several assault guns. The same force was sent to cross the Lienne River. It found a bridge which was too narrow to accommodate the heavy tanks; however, it crossed with its half-tracks and ran into a minefield in the area west of Chevron. This force also met heavy resistance from infantry and was annihilated. Only a few men from the force returned. The exact route taken by the reconnaissance was not known to Peiper, since he received negative information from the leaders of the unit.

Why did your columns even try to continue northwest from Stoumont up the valley road toward Aywaille, when it was obviously such a narrow road with steep gorges, which meant that even several tanks could stop you if placed at the right points?

The northwest route from Stoumont to Aywaille was chosen simply because it was the shortest route. The shortage of gasoline did not permit the selection of any alternative. Though the terrain was unfavorable for armor in view of all considerations, the shortage of gasoline pro­hibited any other choice. In addition, Peiper wanted to capture the bridge at Aywaille, which was one of the prime objectives in his original mission.