By 2d Lt Grant T. Willis, USAF and 2d Lt Brendan H. J. Donnelly, USAF
Battling Bastards of Bataan,
No Mama, No Papa, No Uncle Sam,
No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces,
No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces,
And nobody gives a damn!
—Frank Hewlett, “The Battling Bastards of Bataan”
War Creates the Unforeseen
Frank Hewlett would have known an iron law of warfare:
war indeed creates the unforeseen—for those in command and on the front lines.
As Manila bureau chief for United Press (the news agency known later as UPI),
Hewlett was the last war correspondent to evacuate Corregidor during the
fateful events that led to the destruction and capture of the men of the Provisional
Air Corps Regiment (PACR) on the Bataan Peninsula—one of the US military’s
great defeats.
During desperate times throughout World War II, troops
were compelled to perform actions and duties beyond their training and intended
purpose. Ad hoc battalions of sailors and Marines were ordered to carry out
raids on land. The Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine had to fight under unfamiliar
circumstances to meet the Allied advances toward Germany from east and west.
Before that, Soviet Marines joined Red Army comrades to fend off Hitler’s
invasion, and Soviet sailors fought to the death against the Nazi invaders
despite their lack of training to fight Hitler’s SS or Panzers. In the Pacific,
when Imperial Japanese Navy units fought US Marines and Army formations at
Guadalcanal, Attu, Tarawa, Saipan, Leyte, Luzon, and Okinawa, it did not matter
whether the Japanese soldiers and sailors were front-line combat units or
construction battalions; everyone was expected to take part in the defense. And
at Bataan, American airmen were ordered to move up to the front lines and fight
alongside infantry, tanks, and artillery.
Many airmen today have extensive counterinsurgency
experience fighting on the ground, calling in airstrikes, and rescuing wounded
troops from hostile insurgent strongholds. But there are no incoming aircraft
to strafe their positions, or enemy artillery batteries hammering away at their
trench lines day and night, or frontal assaults by infantry and armor. Supply
is not an issue today, as American troops in the field benefit from secure
routes of communication, supply, and support. Thus, few airmen today can
comprehend the hardship their predecessors endured between December 1941 and
April 1942 on Bataan, a tiny peninsula in the Philippines. Many will recognize
the American struggle in the Philippines as the “Death March.” But that is only
the aftermath of a desperate. In the end, a joint American–Filipino force was
compelled to surrender, and that is the narrative we describe in this article.
War Plans
Before the war, the United States had multiple war
plans, including the Rainbow war plans (the plans for war with Japan were
Orange). In 1939, the Joint Army and Navy war plans were approved; Rainbow 4
was the strategy to secure and control the Western Pacific as rapidly as
possible and maintain the defense. Under Rainbow 4 in 1941, War Plan Orange-3
(WPO-3) was approved, although it was already outdated. Under WPO-3, “American
troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon...
The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay
and deny its use to Japanese naval forces.” WPO-3 was flawed because the plan
called for a tactical withdrawal from Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula by all
Allied divisions to establish a series of defensible lines of resistance
(LORs), utilizing terrain and concentration to create a headache for any
attacking force attempting to push the defenders from the Philippines. A series
of island forts was constructed at the mouth of the bay, directly under the
Bataan Peninsula. The island of Corregidor would become the HQ for MacArthur
and his staff during the campaign. Servicing large shore batteries as large as
14 inches, Corregidor and the surrounding island forts prevented any shipping
from reaching Manila by sea and provided significant fire support to Bataan itself.
WPO-3 was opposed by many in the Army and Navy. Planners saw the island archipelago
as indefensible if invaded by a significant and determined force. Other officers,
including General MacArthur, believed that with the influx and training of new
Filipino reserve divisions and additional supplies from Washington, he could
establish a new war plan that would repel the invaders at the water’s edge and
undertake a more active defense. The general saw WPO-3 as a “defeatist” plan,
and unfortunately the war would come sooner than anticipated. What’s more, the
active defense of Luzon, and a campaign that would be waged with the understanding
that America’s full might would be directed toward Hitler and Europe first,
meant that MacArthur would start the conflict against the Japanese with one
hand tied behind his back. Washington also determined that the defenders in the
Philippines, including the Filipinos, were expendable.
During the Japanese campaign to take the Philippines,
the United States Army introduced a new fighting unit to its Bataan defense:
the Provisional Air Corps Regiment. This new ground infantry formation was
formed from airmen whose jobs were no longer germane to the military situation.
Men were drawn from maintenance, ordnance, communications, intelligence, ground
staff, and aircrew squadrons. The regiment comprised two battalions: 1st
Battalion (Headquarters Squadron of the 20th Air Base Group, 19th Air Base
Squadron, 27th Materiel Squadron, 28th Materiel Squadron, and 7th Materiel
Squadron); 2nd Battalion (2nd Observation Squadron, 48th Materiel Squadron,
Headquarters Squadron of the 27th Bomb Group, 91st Bomb Squadron, and 17th Bomb
Squadron). Each squadron represented roughly a company-sized element in
infantry terms. This formation was extraordinary in concept and something that
American airmen had never been asked to do in mass prior to the Japanese
offensive. To understand how and why this formation was created to defend the
Bataan Peninsula, we must look back.
On Sunday, 7 December 1941, the six carriers of the
Imperial Japanese Navy launched their aircraft for a surprise attack on the US
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The attack destroyed an overvalued portion of
our fleet but failed to locate and destroy the main assets that would determine
victory or defeat in the Pacific—the aircraft carriers. As battleship row and
the many Hawaiian airfields burned, the Japanese blitzkrieg that followed Pearl
Harbor attempted to seize and secure the resources and defense perimeter
necessary to maintain the integrity of the empire. On 8 December, across the
international date line, other Allied installations such as Guam, Wake Island,
Hong Kong, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines were also attacked.
As the bulk of the Imperial Japanese Army was bogged down in heavy combat on
the Chinese mainland, the task of securing this “defense perimeter” and raw
materials would fall to the Imperial Navy.
At
0230 hours on 8 December 1941, Asiatic Fleet HQ in the Philippines received a
radio message that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. The Philippines was 18 hours
ahead of Hawaii time. The first Japanese aircraft took off to hit Davao on Luzon
from the light carrier Ryujo at 0400 hours. At 0500 hours, Gen. Lewis
Brereton, commanding general of all Far East Air Forces (FEAF), the largest
concentration of American aircraft outside the continental United States,
requested permission to launch his B-17 squadrons against Japanese air bases on
Formosa (Taiwan). Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s aid, Gen. Richard Sutherland, told
Brereton that MacArthur did not have time to see him. At 0900 hours, Brereton launched
his available B-17s to conduct naval reconnaissance to spot any potential
landings by the Japanese, the only course of action he could take to get his
air assets off the ground to avoid being attacked while sitting on the tarmacs.
Unfortunately for the FEAF, the launch of the B-17s at this time would be based
on false alarms; the main Japanese attack on Clark Field would not arrive until
1245 hours that day, just as the bombers were being refueled and respotted.
Nearly 10 hours and 15 minutes after being notified that the United States was
at war with Japan, General MacArthur had failed to appreciate one of the most
important principles of modern warfare: time. The advantage in the coming
struggle had been lost. On the morning of 8 December, the FEAF possessed
roughly 277 aircraft. By early afternoon, this robust force was diminished to a
shadow of its former self while inflicting acceptable losses to the Japanese
attacking force. The American forces in the Philippines had effectively lost
air superiority due to MacArthur’s lack of action. The loss of air supremacy so
early in the campaign would prove to create an even more untenable situation
for an already doomed defense. Herein lies the origins of the PACR and the
situation that required its formation as a ground combat unit.
WPO-3 as a concept may have looked well constructed on
paper, but in reality it was far from effective. The first brigade of 3,000
Japanese troops landed on Northern Luzon at Aparri and Vigan. These initial
landings received little opposition from Gen. Jonathan Wainwright’s Northern
Luzon Force. With the loss of critical air cover to attack landing forces,
incoming convoys, and enemy aircraft, the situation quickly spiraled out of
control. MacArthur’s strategy for an active defense had stalled, and after two
weeks of what must have been considerable internal debate and careful calculation,
he decided to call for all available units to fall back to Bataan and establish
and hold a series of defense positions until relieved. The lull in allowing
subordinate corps commanders to take necessary actions to properly prepare the
defenses and logistics required to hold Bataan according to plan had been cut
short. Massive amounts of food stocks, ammunition, medical supplies, and other
material needed to be transported from locations across Luzon and the rest of
the Philippines to the peninsula.
This large and complex logistical operation also required
that most valuable asset in military affairs: time. With the loss of air
superiority or even having a properly contested airspace above the battlefield,
the Allied troops faced overwhelming odds. Several large delaying actions were
needed to block the masses of Japanese units landing at multiple points on
Luzon’s endless coastline. From Northern Luzon to Lingayen Gulf, the Japanese
landed and advanced, squeezing the Allies and pushing them back farther and
farther. This great withdrawal is another key moment to consider for the
formation of the air regiment we are looking back on in this article. The men
who formed the PACR would be forced to travel the packed roads of troops,
trucks, and Filipino civilians back to Bataan to defend themselves while undermanned
and undersupplied. Engineers painfully awaited orders from commanders to blow a
bridge, knowing that a friendly unit was just up the road, across the river,
holding back the tide of Japanese troops to buy precious time for retreat. When
the order was sent down to destroy the bridge, many of these Allied units were
cut off and could no longer retreat. The men retreating to Bataan were aware of
the necessity and held tight to the belief that the US Navy would soon charge
to the rescue at the last moment. This hope of eventual relief and
reinforcements ensured by General MacArthur would also seep into the ranks of
the PACR as they began to experience ground combat on Bataan.
The Beginning of the End
With the war on and the Japanese actively attacking US
forces in the Philippines, logistical and manpower issues became evident
immediately. During the first air raids by the Japanese, barely anyone could
receive medical attention before the next round of Zeros would come in to
finish off anything moving or shooting. Pfc. Lee Davis, a future PACR member,
and 2d Lt. John Posten, a pilot with the 17th Pursuit Squadron, recalled that
aircrews and maintenance workers on the airfields would take cover under
anything available. Fuel trucks and containers were the first targets to explode,
leaving the ground covered in charred bodies. Although most of the aircraft on
the ground were destroyed by bombs or bullets, some pilots would still try to
take off to defend the airfields. Lieutenant Posten stated that, even though he
was able to take off his P-40 Warhawk, eight other aircraft were lost on the
strip.
A month later, at the beginning of January, US forces
were ordered to leave the airfields; the Japanese were pushing through Lingayen
Gulf, so the aircraft, food, and supplies that could be taken to Bataan were
burned. Across the forces retreating to Bataan, such decisions would only
exacerbate the logistical issues and starvation that haunted many troops later
in the war.
Early Reflections
One of the most important lessons to draw on from the
beginning of this campaign is the loss of air supremacy. To lose control of the
air is a painful experience to those who must fight it out on the ground. When
a military force controls the air, it also holds an important tactical advantage
against enemy ground forces. To control the air is to control all who dwell
underneath. The failure to adhere to available signal and physical intelligence
and take decisive and swift action was the first blunder for the United States
Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). In fact, Japanese reconnaissance aircraft had
been spotted over Luzon as early as 5 December! This observation should have
triggered a maximum alert combined with the war warnings that Washington was
sending to all US outposts. Had the information confirmed at 0230 hours on 8
December been acted on, and had the commanding general acknowledged the necessity
to meet with his primary air commander in the region on urgent request, we
might have seen a different start to this “second Pearl Harbor.”
As events unfolded, General Brereton continued to ask
throughout the early morning on 8 December for permission to at least conduct a
reconnaissance flight/sortie of the Formosa bases to update his crews’ target
folders, but he was further delayed. It is fair to say that, short of violating
orders, Brereton did all he could to try and launch the FEAF to make an early
impact, but MacArthur did not appreciate the urgency. The FEAF, after being
notified, could have launched a strike on the Japanese airfields on Formosa
just as the fog lifted later that morning over the island. Some Imperial
Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) aircraft, runways, ammunition, and support
facilities could have been knocked out early in the campaign. Allied dispersion
airfields that were unknown to the Japanese planners could have been utilized
to recover the B-17s after a first strike on Formosa. The large B-17 force in
the Philippines could have been preserved for a longer duration of this battle,
rather than suffering the fate of being struck on the ground and rendered
useless due to lack of preemptive action taken by MacArthur.
The failure to decisively release the airpower under
MacArthur’s command was not the only initial mistake made in December 1941. Due
to the known Japanese assault on multiple heavily contested regions of the
Pacific, any staff would have recognized that the Imperial General Headquarters
could not afford to send an overwhelming mass of forces to the Philippines for
an initial assault. The Allied forces in the Philippines were anything but an
offensive force, and the reserve Filipino division lacked modern equipment and
a standard language to communicate, therefore making them an inferior force
compared to the Japanese. Oftentimes, officers and enlisted personnel could not
understand each other due to the multiple languages spoken on the islands.
The failure to pick a plan and stick to it is relevant
as well. If the generals on the Philippines had been more proactive during the
early morning hours of 8 December—with the clear understanding that the United
States had been attacked by Imperial Japan—the forces in the Philippines could
have begun unloading the warehouses and deploying all units to Bataan. Food
stocks could have been organized, ammunition and supply stationed properly, and
the refugee crisis diminished with an orderly and smooth transition to the
peninsula. All these actions could have taken place with time to spare. Full
units with intact formations would not have had to sacrifice precious lives and
materiel holding back Japanese advances at the last moment. An aggressive
attitude by the air forces and the relocation of all ground forces combined
could have created a serious headache for Gen. Masaharu Homma, the Imperial
14th Army commander, and his troops. Homma knew that his timetable for taking
the Philippines would not rest solely on his ability to take Manila. That
objective would be a breeze, as MacArthur decided not to defend it. If any
Filipino units were to be used before the Bataan defense, it would be in
Manila. A city battle would be the last entanglement that the Japanese would
desire to tackle while attempting to concentrate on the multiple Allied corps
placed in well-prepared defensive positions along a narrow front and a defense
in depth with strong interior lines.
This scenario, however, was only a fantasy in
hindsight. The decisive actions needed to be taken according to the war plan
had been scrapped for two weeks and then reinstated. On 24 December 1941,
MacArthur had changed his mind and committed to the defense of Bataan.
MacArthur was trapped by his vanity, and his inability to estimate the combat
potential of his adversary would cost him his garrison and the Philippines.
The men of the PACR would now be placed at the front
to fight the Emperor’s soldiers face to face. With the loss of the majority of
USAFFE airpower, either destroyed or on the way to safety in Australia, the men
of the air corps were left without a job and no aircraft to support. Once
behind the first defensive line on Bataan, the Mauban–Abucay Line with a
volcano at its center, the PACR began field training as infantry. Some men in
the air regiment had been prior infantry or combat branch personnel before
service in the Air Corps, which would soon come in handy. There would be two
corps-sized units operating in Bataan: I Corps under the command of General Wainwright,
and II Corps under Gen. George Parker. The PACR would be under the jurisdiction
of II Corps on the eastern side of the Bataan front. These two corps would take
direction from General MacArthur, stationed in his bunker on “the Rock” (Corregidor
Island). It must be appreciated that the general officers on Bataan spent much
of their time at the front or close to it. General Wainwright was famous for directing
troops while under heavy air and artillery fire. During the retreat to Bataan,
Wainwright's Northern Luzon Force held the line against Japanese assaults as General
Parker’s Southern Luzon Force made the long and difficult journey to Bataan
from south of Manila.
Formation of the PACR
Airfields were few and hastily constructed on Bataan.
The few remaining aircraft, including a few beat-up P-40s provided the main air
cover for the defenders. The airfields were located at Pilar, Orani, Cabcaban,
Bataan Field, and Mariveles. Available aircraft support personnel were far in
excess to theater requirements. For example, a full squadron of A-24 Banshee
maintainers, ordnance specialists, and aircrews had arrived in the Philippines
before their aircraft could be flown to the islands in time to meet the
Japanese attack. By 6–7 January, all available units had successfully withdrawn
to the peninsula to set up the first line of defense. The Japanese were slow to
pursue the Allied positions and did not make contact with the main LOR until 9
January due to a lack of concentration, as many other Japanese units were still
en route after securing other sections of Luzon. The initial LOR was referred
to as the Abucay Line but was quickly broken and reestablished farther south.
The second and more permanent main line would be referred to as the Orion–Bagac
Line and extended across the peninsula from east to west with a volcano at its
center. Meanwhile, behind the II Corps sector on the western end of the line,
the PACR was under initial formation.
2nd Lt. John Posten, the fighter pilot with 17th
Pursuit Squadron, recalled the start of the PACR, stating that some of the best
crew chiefs (all enlisted men) now had to be a part of squadrons that would
make up infantry units. Cpl. Fred Gifford from the 21st Pursuit Squadron
mentioned that he hated being in the Army as an infantryman. The 21st and 34th
Pursuit Squadrons early on were tasked with flushing out an entire division of
Japanese, but instead they were stuck and had to retreat, forced to give up
ground while taking heavy losses.
As the PACR trained for ground combat, it was
frequently interrupted by attacking aircraft, a result of the miscalculations
early in the campaign. Advanced infantry training is a very difficult course
for modern US military personnel to complete, not to mention while under
constant air and artillery fire while learning the realities of the front. The
regiment was officially formed on the night of 8–9 January outside Barrio
Bilolo, 2 kilometers west of the town of Orion. They were assigned to take
positions along the II Corps front, specifically a 2,000-yard section codenamed
“Subsector B.” On their flanks would be Filipino army elements with the US 31st
Infantry Regiment in reserve to plug any holes or to check infiltration of the
lines by the Japanese. The prepared defensive positions were well constructed
with clear and interlocking fields of fire located on terrain at the foot of
rising ground that merged into a rice paddy.
Their weaponry consisted of a hodgepodge of available
arms taken from crippled bombers and fighters along with assorted small arms.
The standard World War I–era Springfield 1903 bolt-action rifle was a mainstay,
along with Tommy guns and BAR light machine guns. Air-cooled machine guns and
jerry-rigged .50-caliber aircraft machine guns were fitted into defensive positions
and on several vehicles. They had outdated World War I pineapple grenades, and
some men were able to trade their cigarettes for a precious new weapon, the M1
Garand, from the Philippine Scouts. Uniforms consisted of Air Corps variants
with the occasional flyer wearing a flight jacket or cap. World War I–style pot
helmets were standard during the Bataan campaign as well. Many do not remember
that the standard-issue helmet worn by US personnel when World War II broke out
was of relic design and resembled those of our British and Commonwealth Allies.
The regiment had no antitank weapons available and relied on the 192nd or 194th
Tank Battalions to come to their relief when Japanese tanks broke through. The
US forces also possessed several M3 gun motor carriages (half-tracks), mounting
a 105mm gun on a fixed chassis that could knock out armor when employed
properly. These limited armored formations were held in reserve for both corps
fronts to react to any breakthrough and provide an antitank capability, which
all units along the LOR would need at some point during the campaign.
The
approximate strength of the PACR for front-line duty ranged from 1,000 to 1,400
personnel, with some squadrons being recalled to the rear airfields to perform
their primary functions as air support personnel. Capt. John S. Coleman, commander
of the 27th Materiel Squadron, described his men’s equipment and tactical situation
when he stated: “We had 163 men of which an average of about 100 were on the front
lines near Orion. We had about 44 back at PNAD [Philippine Air Depot], some on
crash boat crews, some driving half-tracks, and tanks. We had on the frontline
3 machine guns, of which 2 were water cooled Browning’s and one marlin machine
gun. We had two BARs; the rest of the enlisted men had .30 caliber rifles and
officers had one pistol each. We had 2 grenades each. Some carried 4 each on
patrols. The first battalion had about 34 machine guns. About two-thirds of
them were machine guns taken off wrecked airplanes, of the .50 caliber class
and were too heavy to carry around. Most of these were in frontline trenches
and offsets well concealed and fortified by sandbags and sod.”
Throughout the beginning of the PACR’s front-line
duty, technical advisers from the US 31st Infantry were spread throughout the
squadrons to assist in developing fighting skills and preparing defenses. Along
with their barbed-wire entanglements and prepared defensive positions, tin cans
were secured to the wire in order to trigger the presence of oncoming Japanese
infiltrators at night (flares were in short supply). The PACR positions were
bombed daily by dive-bombers such as the Ki-30 Ann and Aichi D3A Val, which
were consistently striking the lines and producing casualties. As bombers
roamed at will without any presence of Allied aircraft to interdict their
strikes, the morale of the regiment diminished. On 28 January, the regiment was
called for main front-line combat duty when the 51st Filipino Division disintegrated
and a large Japanese force began to infiltrate along the left flank of the II
Corps line. The PACR filled the gap, cut off the infiltrators, and restored the
line. Some units of the regiment were withdrawn to the rear of the line to conduct
offensive combat training, due to speculation that a relief force was making
its way to the Bataan Peninsula.
This further exemplifies the lies told to the troops
fighting tooth and nail to hold fast and await a rescue that would never come.
President Franklin Roosevelt, General MacArthur, and rumor intelligence
continued to provide false hope of rescue, but this hope gradually faded as the
men on Bataan grew more aware of their doomed situation. The regiment’s morale
slightly increased when a convoy with .50-caliber machine guns shot down two
dive-bombers. However, this small victory would not clear the skies above or
stop the bombing. Other than patrols, antiair activity, and static defense, the
regiment settled in for a siege. The Japanese did not launch any air attacks on
the line at night, which helped morale and the ability to get some sleep. If
this brief period of rest had been interrupted, as with the Marine and Army
units on Guadalcanal more than a year later, the men’s ability to function and
maintain their sanity would have decreased.
Starvation and One Final Stand
On Bataan, the PACR and the other forces defending
against the Japanese were not only undermanned and undersupplied but also faced
starvation. By January, all personnel were placed on half-rations, and in March
this amount was reduced to quarter-rations. Their daily two slices of bread
were no longer available, and the calories fell well below 1,000 daily. Two
1-pound cans of salmon were issued to a group of more than 100 men at a time,
and sugar was rarely available at the amount of 2 pounds per squadron. The men
crafted substitutes for their coffee, such as dried leaves of the mango trees.
Some Clark and Nicholas Field personnel had brought stocks of canned and
perishable foods to Bataan, but those were confiscated by the Quartermaster
Corps in January to be redivided among the garrison. These food stocks were
never seen again. It was rumored that rear-echelon and commanding officers were
eating better than the front-line troops, and PACR troops sometimes passed out
in the chow line due to malnutrition. Many diseases such as malaria, scurvy, and
beriberi took root in the ranks and severely diminished the ability to defend
positions. The CO of the 27th Materiel Squadron described his squadron's combat
readiness, reporting that every man but one had malaria before the surrender;
only 47 men were able to walk when surrender came due to starvation and
malaria. Some units issued patrolling troops with one sandwich per man for 36
hours. Sometimes when the artillery and air attacks became intense, baby
monkeys would scurry into the men’s foxholes. Many of these monkeys were eaten
out of desperation, but many men found it impossible to eat them due to their
humanlike appearance at that age.
Malnutrition was destroying the fighting strength of
the PACR troop as well as the garrison on the peninsula. General Parker, the II
Corps commander, on 15 March reported that his combat efficiency was at 20
percent. Antimalarial drugs such as quinine were quickly becoming unavailable,
and overall medical care for the wounded was below standards, with many wounded
men who, under normal circumstances, would be evacuated took their place back
in the lines. As March arrived, Gifford of the Philippine Army and Posten
recalled that the food situation was now at its worst. The men had resorted to
eating monkeys and even lizards. Many reportedly were too weak from hunger to
fight or fly.
The month of April 1942 marked the beginning of the
end for Bataan’s defenders. Bataan was on its last levy, and the Japanese
blitzkrieg down the peninsula began pushing them closer and closer to the
shores of Manila Bay. Airmen acting as infantry had to conduct a fighting retreat
not only through infantry but also armor and air forces. This retreating action
lasted three days, and the Provisional Air Corps Regiment heroically broke out
of pending encirclement. But this small feat of American stubbornness by
unlikely soldiers would not produce a different outcome. On the morning of 9
April, Gen. E. P. King Jr., without the blessing of General Wainwright,
ordered all Allied forces on Bataan to surrender, although Corregidor still
held. After hearing of the surrender, General Wainwright sent a cable to
President Roosevelt, stating “I have done all that could have been done to hold
Bataan, but starved men without air support and with inadequate field artillery
support cannot endure the terrific aerial and artillery bombardment that my
troops were subjected to.”
The Death March
When Americans think of the Philippines during World
War II, they normally refer to the Bataan Death March as if it were the only
source of knowledge associated with the fall of the garrison, but this article
explores more than the horrors following the Allied surrender. The only
situation worse than the five-month campaign was what followed the men who had
thought they lived through hell. Upon the surrender of General King, General
Homma and the leadership of the Japanese 14th Army assured the American general
and his staff that they would be treated humanely by their captors. The orders
from Homma’s General Headquarters, however, would not be carried out by the
lower levels of command responsible for transporting the roughly 75,000
prisoners north into central Luzon. Many of the lower-level commanders allowed
their soldiers to act with extreme brutality against the American and Filipino
prisoners. To surrender in Japanese culture was to bring dishonor upon yourself
and your family. The way of the warrior (the Bushido code) did not allow the
soldier to fall into enemy hands, and to the Japanese such men were a disgrace.
American troops had not faced a surrender to the Japanese before this moment and
found out the hard way what would happen to them and other Allied troops who
decided to surrender to the Imperial Japanese military, which for years had
been brainwashed to take their ancient Samurai traditions to the extreme.
Men were forced to march with little food or water and
subjected to Japanese troop columns thundering south while laying siege to
Corregidor and the final American holdouts. Along the road, crowds of Filipino
civilians would stand on the path and toss the Americans water and food, but
when the troops would reach for them, the Japanese guards would shoot or
bayonet them. They would be subjected to moments of sheer terror as men who
fell out of line due to extreme exhaustion, thirst, or hunger would be killed
by the Japanese. There were many accounts of Japanese troops riding on trucks
or tanks laughing with their swords and bayonets out as they traveled along the
road, slicing into the dazed prisoners as they shuffled north. Thousands of
Americans and Filipinos would die on the march, and many more would perish in
captivity from hunger, disease, and brutality. The mentality of the soldiers
can only be described by someone who lived it. Staff Sgt. Alf Larson told his
story: “One the march started, everything just sort of froze in my mind. I was
pretty numb the whole time. I didn’t think and I didn’t feel. I was like a
robot and just kept moving. Other than daylight or dark, I lost all track of
time. I had to blank everything out and focus straight ahead. I lived from day
to day, in fact, hour by hour. The only thing I thought about was the moment
and ‘The good Lord willing, I’ll get through the day.”
The men of the PACR who remained alive after the
desperate fight on Bataan would endure this road of death alongside their Navy,
Army, Marine, and Filipino comrades. Another account of the march from Cpl.
Hurburt Gater of the 200th Coastal Artillery mentioned that “[o]ccasionally, a
Jap would run out and hit one of us with his rifle. No one slept.” Canteens were
taken from the men and sometimes used to beat the already old, weak, and sick
military forces or civilians in the Death March. Each morning, everyone would
be woken up to start marching; the Japanese soldiers would order the weakest to
start in the front of the two columns, and as the day wore on those at the
front would drift to the back. Some of their comrades would try to hold them in
the middle, pushing them along, because if they reached the back of the line
and could no longer walk, they were shot on the spot.
Concentration Camps
After the Death March, many of the forces still alive
were kept in concentration camps; there the men would have to learn how to
survive and scrape by until either death or liberation. One of these was Camp
O’Donnell, a former American airfield. There, Americans were stripped of
everything they had. One US officer possessed a Japanese fan, which he was
accused of stealing; he was then given a death sentence for stealing items off
of dead Japanese. Those who remained at Camp O’Donnell were put to work; one,
Pfc. Andrew Aquila, was placed on graveyard duty. Aquila reported a death rate
of 40–50 people per day; 1st Lt Mark Herbst stated that on the Filipino side
100 were dying each day, as they were called out as traitors by the Japanese.
In order to survive the killing and disease, many volunteered for detail work.
Capt. Theodore Bigger was placed on detail to rebuild bridges that the
Americans destroyed when retreating to Bataan. Hard labor and volunteering for
detail duty was one of the only ways to survive the hardships while waiting to
be liberated. Anyone caught trying to fight or run suffered grave consequences.
TSgt. James Caire and Captain Bigger recalled how one man successfully escaped.
On 11–12 June, the prisoners heard that Japanese soldiers were shot, and one
man escaped, and for this action the Japanese soldiers rounded up 10 other men
who worked alongside the escapee, stood them in front of the other prisoners,
and shot them, stating that for every one who escapes 10 will die.
Another POW camp was located at Cabanatuan City.
There, prisoners heard of the 10 men executed at Camp O’Donnell. Much of the
same treatment occurred at Cabanatuan, but Private Aquila reports that many had
to deal with dysentery and malaria while enduring hard labor. Some of the men
would even crawl under the huts and die in the excrement. Others learned to
survive by trading within the camp. Due to the unsanitary conditions, rat
colonies were plentiful, and Sgt. Forrest Knox recalled that men would collect
rat carcasses to trade for cigarettes; some men would eat the rats to prevent
starvation.
Many would later be packed like sardines into the dark
bowels of “hell ships” bound for the Japanese home islands or Taiwan. Many of
these ships would be mistaken for regular transport ships by American submarine
wolf packs and sunk during the journey. Many POWs did not survive the rest of
the war.
They had been left behind, but they had not been
forgotten. On 9 January 1945, MacArthur would return to the main island of the
Philippines, which he had considered home for most of his professional life.
Nearly three years after their capture, the few survivors of Bataan and
Corregidor would be liberated—and not a moment too soon. Militarily, the
invasion of the Philippines defied the strategy MacArthur had used in campaigns
throughout the Southwest Pacific, but for him the liberation of the Philippines
was personal. The need to redeem himself for his initial failure and the
presidential-ordered escape from his situation took precedence over the more
efficient Central Pacific strategy of island-hopping and the isolation of large
pockets of Japanese forces by cutting off their supplies. The liberation of the
Philippines was not a linchpin in the surrender of the Japanese home islands,
as were the losses of Tinian, Guam, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. This time, Manila
would not be spared; it would be engulfed in a desperate and fanatical defense
that mirrored Stalingrad.
Legacy and Heritage
The story of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment is one
of desperation and heroism. The airmen who performed their part in America’s
attempt to hold fast in the face of overwhelming odds should be a moment
celebrated across the United States Air Force today. Maintainers, aircrews,
communications, munitions, signals, intelligence, and staff personnel of all
types picked up a weapon and went up to the line. It was a moment rarely
experienced by Americans and was one that likely will never happen again—but
the possibility never fades completely away. This regiment must be remembered,
and lessons provided to us by these men’s actions must not be lost to history.
The PACR will go down as a unit that fought a much better equipped and experienced
enemy, but the overall campaign for Bataan and Corregidor should be studied
intensely by future joint force air war planners. Never in our history has the
lesson of controlling the air been so well instructed.
Lessons
Today in the Pacific we can observe the capability of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to present the Allies with the problem of
defending the sovereignty of a vast area far from American shores. The first
advantage lies with Beijing and time is with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
if it attempted to achieve President Xi Jinping’s stated goal of reuniting the
Chinese mainland with the free and democratic Chinese Nationalist bastion of
Taiwan. The first 12 hours of any move by the PRC to achieve that reunification
will be decisive in the determination of the outcome. Learning from MacArthur’s
hesitation, the US reaction would have to be swift and determined. Hesitation
due to lack of political will and domestic political divisions could create a
disaster. During the decisive first 12 hours, the United States would have to respond
with any allied forces in the Pacific as well. Like the Filipinos assisting the
Americans in World War II, a twenty-first century conflict would require the
South Koreans, the Japanese, the Australians, and possibly the Filipinos to
come together to face the Chinese adversary. Assets that are deployed far from
the arena of battle will be required to respond as quickly as possible to repel
or stem the crossing of the Taiwan Strait by the PLA and Chinese navy. Air
supremacy would be contested in a way not experienced since World War II. The
few main US air bases we possess within range of the first island chain are
pretargeted and could be hit and neutralized on the first day of battle. The
Chinese can also opt to avoid direct combat with the United States and its
allies if they chose not to strike our bases first and only assaulting Taiwan.
This would be their best chance of causing maximum hesitation among the Americans,
because, unlike the Imperial Japanese, the PRC would not gift a Pearl Harbor
first strike to unite American resolve. If the United States attempted a relief
expedition to Taiwan, the PRC could redirect reserve assets to strike forward
bases as well as naval assets making their long voyages across the Central
Pacific and into the Philippine Sea. Many new technologies would be tested for
the first time in a near-peer conflict.
War is a contest of wills and is never certain. In a
war that includes multidomain capabilities, full-spectrum dominance is never
guaranteed. There are great powers with the political will to compete, contest,
and conquer to achieve geopolitical interests. To prepare for the conflict before
the worst-case scenario is crucial, especially in the Pacific theater. Air
defenses and multidomain defense and capabilities do not begin and end with
basic security forces and basic air defense systems. In the twenty-first century,
to prepare for such a conflict the United States should integrate forces with
joint operations and equipment plus combined multinational forces. Air bases as
well as strategic domestic installations should possess all means necessary to
sustain operations in a near-peer environment. This lesson comes from the
Philippines directly: the US forces on Bataan and Corregidor did not have the
necessary equipment to endure a long conflict and instead ran out of supplies.
Instead, the United States should dedicate resources such as surface-to-air
missiles, antimissile defenses, and counter-UAV operators so that coalition
bases can defend against complex attacks in each domain, which is what can be
expected from the Chinese adversary. To balance the scales, a multinational
coalition in the Pacific needs to be formed; combined air defenses should
include the most advanced and capable systems to avoid a worst-case scenario in
the Pacific theater.
In the Pacific, misinterpreting intelligence, or
disregarding intelligence to sustain the status quo, can create the very worst
scenario. As in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor, we may fail to identify
clear signs of a buildup due to a lack of acceptance that the unthinkable is
really taking place. Beijing might bet that the West has no stomach for a
high-end fight or is unwilling to spend lives and treasure necessary to
decisively contest the battlespace. Miscalculations can lead to a war that neither
side wants and can cause unintended disasters that no side could foresee.
If a worst-case scenario takes place, the air bases
that provide the first line of air assets in response would be subject to
attack from cruise missiles or amphibious assaults. This seems
characteristically outrageous to contemplate; however, one mistake that is
regularly made in war planning is not believing that one’s opponent will act
within your own parameters of what you believe possible or likely. If air bases
and installations are attacked by a conventional force, the support personnel
at those locations must be willing and able to supplement the defense of their
positions to hold until relieved. Of course, the battles on Bataan are an
extreme case, but history has a nasty habit of repeating itself. Only the
names, dates, places, and technologies change. The nature of war remains the
same. However unlikely it may seem, the senior airmen working the flight line
at Kadina may find himself or herself loading an M4 rifle or manning a 240
machine gun on a line next to the local Marine Detachment as PLA Marine Corps
units move across the tarmac.
2d
Lt Grant T. Willis
Lieutenant Willis is an RPA pilot candidate currently
stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He is a graduate of the University of Cincinnati
with a Bachelor of Arts and Sciences, majoring in International Affairs, with a
minor in Political Science. The views expressed in this article are the
author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the US
Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government.
2d
Lt Brendan H. J. Donnelly
Lieutenant Donnelly is an intelligence supervisor
currently stationed at Cannon AFB, NM. He is a graduate of Bowling Green State
University, with a Bachelor of Arts of Sciences, majoring in History, with
minors in Political Science and Aerospace Leadership. The views expressed in
this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official
position of the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government.
Published Aug. 25, 2021 in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press.