Viewing Photographs

Many of the images used in this blog are larger than they are reproduced in the article posts. Click on any image and a list of thumbnails will be displayed and clicking on a thumbnail will display that image in its original size.

Okinawa: The Last Battleground

Published in 1945

The newly announced U.S. Tenth Army launched its invasion of the Ryukyu Islands on 26 March 1945, when the 77th Infantry Division invaded the Kerama Retto group southwest of Okinawa Island. The seizure of these small islands preceded the main invasion of Okinawa made on 1 April.

The invasion was the largest amphibious operation of the Pacific war with more than 1,400 ships involved. The U.S. Fifth Fleet was assisted by a British Navy task force. Carrier-based aircraft and fleet units threw a massive bombardment barrage of Japanese positions on Okinawa for nine days preceding the landings.

When the troops landed on the beaches they met with negligible opposition. Early on the first day of the landing two airfields were seized, and on the second day it was announced that the island had been bisected and that the seized airfields were in operation.

With no breathing spell after the Iwo Jima campaign, the Marine Corps moved on to close in on the enemy in his death throes. Just fourteen days after Iwo was taken, the Marines joined with the Army to land on Okinawa.

Compared with Iwo Jima, the first five days of the Okinawa campaign, which began at 0830 hours Easter Sunday, were as peaceful as Easter back home. Before that action ended on 21 June, however, the Marines had been through the most grueling fight in the Pacific second only to Iwo Jima in Marine casualties.

The lack of resistance did not last long. After the seizure of Yontan airfield by the First and Sixth Marine Divisions, and Katana fighter strip by the Army, the U.S. forces found ambush-studded, mountainous terrain tough going, but secured the entire northern section of the island in record time.

Then both Marine divisions joined the Army to attack the strong enemy defenses stretched across the lower half of Okinawa—entrenchments the Americans dubbed the Pacific’s Siegfried Line.

For days the Japanese line was battered until finally the Marines broke through near the city of Naha, only to be halted at “Sugar Loaf Hill.” Eleven times they assaulted that hill before they were able to take and hold the strategic height.

On 23 May the Sixth Marines waded across the Asato River to lead the drive into Naha, and on 30 May they mopped up the last Japanese resistance in the Okinawa capital.

While the ground action dragged on, Japanese suicide planes roared in to attack the U.S. naval support offshore, to sever the supply lines at any cost. Most of the planes were brought down by the guns of the fleet and Marine and Navy fighter planes, but enough got through to carriers and other fleet units to cause tremendous loss in ships and personnel and provide the Navy its toughest battle of any campaign.

In retaliation, Admiral Halsey sent his Hellcat fighters and Helldiver bombers blasting at known kamikaze sites on Miyazaki, Kokobu, Kushira, Kagoshima, and Chiran airfields, all on Kyushu, southernmost of the Japanese home islands.

The raiders sent their bombs, rockets, and bullets into hangars, barracks, and other airfield targets, destroying everything in their path. Other flyers attacked airfield and industrial installations on Minami Daito Island, some 200 miles east of Okinawa. The island had been hit previously by both carrier planes and naval bombardment.

Not until June did the Navy announce the loss of two destroyers, an auxiliary transport and a landing ship off Okinawa, with 469 killed, missing or wounded. The destroyers were the Longshaw, with 179 casualties, and the Drexler, with 209. The Bates, an auxiliary high-speed transport, suffered sixty casualties, and the LSM-135 (medium landing ship) suffered twenty-one.

Ashore, the First Marines led the drive into Shuri to start disintegration of the Japanese line. The Sixth Marines took Naha Airport in an amphibious “end run,” while the Army troops and other Marine units drove down the center of the island, forcing the Japanese down the Yaeju-Dake escarpment where they faced surrender or annihilation.

In the last five days of organized resistance on Okinawa, Marines who had fought the enemy all the way across the South Pacific were amazed to see Japanese approaching U.S. lines waving surrender leaflets.

For the Marines, victory at Okinawa was a fitting close to the war in the Pacific. They had launched the first offensive at Guadalcanal; they were still fighting four years later and 3,000 miles closer to Japan in the last major campaign of the war. Along that long road the Corps had suffered 79,226 casualties; 19,033 crosses marked the graves of Leathernecks who lost their lives.

The fighting on Okinawa came finally to an end on 22 June 1945. It had been a very bitterly fought campaign, in which the U.S. ground forces have suffered 12,500 dead and 35,500 wounded. The U.S. Navy lost thirty-six ships and 368 damaged, and the aircraft losses reached 763.

The Japanese losses were staggering. At least 120,000 military and 42,000 civilians died during this campaign. The equipment losses are no less formidable—over seven thousand planes were reported to be destroyed. Numerous surface vessels were sunk, including the battleship Yamato, described as the most powerful battleship in the world, and for the first time in the war a record number of Japanese prisoners, some 10,755.

Helping Hand

Navy pilot Kenneth D. Smith was only a guest pilot aboard a certain Essex-class carrier but he was earning his way when last seen. On temporary duty, pending his return to his own carrier, the Texan decided to brush up on his flying; he joined a flight assigned to cover advancing U.S. forces on Okinawa and destroyed one Japanese warplane and chased another into the flak of American ships lying just offshore.

The incident occurred at dusk. Smith became separated from the other planes of his division and spotted two single-engined Japanese “Jills” flying south over Okinawa.

 “I had the advantage of surprise,” he related, “and nailed the first ‘Jill’ with my first burst of fire. His engines flamed and he crashed on the beach. When I turned to attack the second plane he had run away. I started after him on a westerly course out towards the open sea but before I could overtake him he was shot down by a ship’s anti-aircraft fire.”

U.S. troops land on a beach on Okinawa April 1, 1945. 7th Infantry Division was one of several divisions that comprised X Army, the force that landed on the beaches that day.

 
U.S. troops load into landing craft as they prepare for the invasion of Okinawa on April 1, 1945.

Aerial photo of the invasion of Okinawa on April 1, 1945.

Aerial photo of the invasion of Okinawa on April 1, 1945.

7th Infantry Division lands on Okinawa during Operation Downfall on April 1, 1945.

U.S. troops land on Okinawa on April 1, 1945.

Soldiers of the US Tenth Army march inland after securing beachheads following the last amphibious assault landings of World War II as vessels from the Allied fleet patrol the waters off of Okinawa, Japan in April 1945.  

The original caption on this photograph reads "Watching Their Troops—As the Marines drive toward the capital city of Naha, leaders watch the action from an observation post on a rocky ledge. They are (left to right): Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., commanding the Tenth Army; Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, commanding general of the Sixth Marine Division, and his assistant commander, Marine Brigadier General William T. Clement."

Captain Tadashi Kojo, commanding officer of the gun battalion of the 22nd Regiment, which was shipped from Manchuria to Okinawa in June 1944.

Captain Owen Stebbins, commander of Company G, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Regiment, 6th Marine Division, on Guadalcanal before sailing for Okinawa, 1945.

Ernie Pyle, center, chatting with Marines on Okinawa, still wearing their leggings to protect against snakes, on L-Day afternoon.

Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr., with Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell on 7 June 1945. Stilwell was on an inspection mission from Washington. When Buckner was killed eleven days later, Stilwell returned to Okinawa to replace him.

Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, May 1943, as commandant of the Imperial Military Academy.

Colonel Isamu Cho, August 1938, when he was still involved in the Cherry Blossom Society’s ultranationalist activities.

Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, later lieutenant general, commanded the 7th Marine Regiment before and during the assault on Okinawa.

Commander General Lemuel Shepherd Jr., 6th Marine Division, left, and division operations chief Colonel Victor Krulak in front of Sugar Loaf Hill following its capture.

May 1945 Okinawa. Nicknamed “Sugar Loaf Hill” by the commander of the Second Battalion, 22nd Marine Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Horatio C. Woodhouse, the hill was so small (a 300-yard rectangular-shaped mound that rose barely 50 feet) that it didn’t show up on the standard military map with its 10-meter contour interval. Eleven attempts were made over a 12-day period before Sugar Loaf was taken; entire units were decimated in the fight for the key piece of terrain.

Friend or Foe: World War II U.S. Warship and Aircraft Recognition Slides and Manuals

by Matthew M. Peek, Military Collection Archivist, State Archives of North Carolina

Prior to 1941, the U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps was using a system for recognition training of aircraft referred to as the WEFT System, standing for "Wing, Engine, Fuselage, and Tail." It typically used silhouettes of only three-plan views (bottom view, head-on view, side view) for the analysis of features training. This type of training did not test the trainee's ability to identify other views of the aircraft that he might encounter in the natural world during combat.

In 1942, a Recognition School was established at Ohio State University by psychologist Dr. Samuel Renshaw, where his method of identification of aircraft and ships was developed. Initially, Renshaw studied ways to improve reading speed. In his lab, subjects would be exposed to a series of numbers flashed on a screen for increasingly shorter durations of time. After the subjects were trained, Renshaw claimed that they could read faster with the same level of comprehension.

In 1942, a naval officer and former Ohio State University employee named Howard Hamilton came to believe that Renshaw's research could be applied within the U.S. Navy to save lives. The Allied forces were losing hundreds of soldiers and equipment because Navy personnel were either too slow or inaccurate in identifying planes and ships as an enemy or friendly vessel. If Renshaw's techniques could help subjects more quickly recognize reading stimuli, then perhaps the same could be done for naval personnel in recognizing incoming planes or ships.

To find out, Renshaw trained college students on aircraft and ship recognition. He found that they could indeed identify such targets more quickly and with greater accuracy than the Navy's own personnel. Renshaw's method essentially proposed involving presenting the aircraft in a brief flash on the screen until the military trainee was able to identify it accurately.

In June 1942 after a review of Renshaw's work, the Navy established a "recognition school" at the Ohio State University, eventually known as the Renshaw Training System for Aircraft and Ship Recognition. The "Renshaw System" or "Flash System of Instant Recognition" would eventually become the standard recognition training practice during World War I for the U.S. military. Data revealed that Navy officers going through this training had dramatically improved recognition abilities.

In 1943, the U.S. Army Air Corps (later the U.S. Army Air Forces) also accepted a modified version of the Renshaw system. However, the controversy over the merits and deficiencies of each system continued until official recognition and identification requirements for the combat situation and some experimental evidence were applied. During World War II, the Three Dimension Company of Chicago, Illinois, a manufacturer of stereo equipment, slide projectors, and tape recorders, was contracted to create the Navy's recognition training slides. They reported produced millions of such recognition slides for the Navy during the war.

Bibliography

U.S. War Department, FM 30–30: Aircraft Recognition Pictorial Manual 1943.

U.S. Navy Recognition Training Slides, WWII 143, World War II Papers, Military Collection, State Archives of North Carolina, Raleigh, N.C.

"Time Capsule: Spotting the Enemy," Monitor on Psychology, American Psychological Association, March 2010 (Vol 41, No. 3).

Arthur C. Vicory, "A Brief History of Aircraft Identification Training," Professional Paper 27–6, August 1968, George Washington University Human Resources Research Office paper produced for U.S. Department of the Army.

Recognition training page for the Vought F4U Corsair, an American and British fighter aircraft during World War II. Note the angles of the aircraft shown, which would be common views servicemen would see from the ground, from ships, or from the air — particularly the underneath silhouette [from the U.S. War Department's FM 30–30: Aircraft Recognition Pictorial Manual 1943].

 

Page featuring the silhouettes of common U.S. and British World War II military aircraft for studying by U.S. military service individuals [from the U.S. War Department's FM 30–30: Aircraft Recognition Pictorial Manual 1943].

Page from manual FM 30-50: Recognition Pictorial Manual of Naval Vessels.

Page from manual FM 30-50: Recognition Pictorial Manual of Naval Vessels.

Page from manual FM 30-50: Recognition Pictorial Manual of Naval Vessels.

Making model airplanes for the U.S. Navy at the Armstrong Technical High School. Washington, D.C. March 1942.

Official U.S. Navy glass recognition training slide of a U.S. Navy Martin PBM Mariner bomber airplane, taken on June 25, 1943 (Slide No. M 172A) [Slide produced by Three Dimension Company, Chicago, Illinois].

Official U.S. Navy glass recognition training slide of nine U.S. Navy Douglas SBD Dauntless scout and dive bomber airplanes in formation for identifying counterattack by enemy aircraft, taken on June 25, 1943 (Slide No. M 144A) [Slide produced by Three Dimension Company, Chicago, Illinois].

Official U.S. Navy glass recognition training slide of the U.S. Navy battleship USS North Carolina (BB-55) at sea, taken on November 1, 1943 (Slide No. M 1198). Training slides were also created by the U.S. War Department for U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships, so aviators would be able to recognize them from the air or the horizon while flying over water [Slide produced by Three Dimension Company, Chicago, Illinois].

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.

The sheet that provided the identification for this recognition slide was missing from the set acquired by the Editor.