Operation Atlantic (Caen 18–21 July 1944)

Cromwell A27M tanks of C Squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry of the 7th Armored Division leaving for Verrières in the early afternoon of July 20, 1944 (Operation Atlantic).

Operation Atlantic (18–21 July 1944) was a Canadian offensive during the Battle of Normandy in the Second World War. The offensive, launched in conjunction with Operation Goodwood by the Second Army, was part of operations to seize the French city of Caen and vicinity from German forces. It was initially successful, with gains made on the flanks of the Orne River near Saint-André-sur-Orne but an attack by the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, against strongly defended German positions on Verrières Ridge to the south was a costly failure.

Background

Operation Overlord

The capture of the historic Norman town of Caen, while "ambitious", was the most important D-Day objective assigned to British Lieutenant-General John Crocker's I Corps and its component British 3rd Infantry Division, which landed on Sword on 6 June 1944. "The quick capture of that key city Caen and the neighborhood of Carpiquet was the most ambitious, the most difficult and the most important task of Lieutenant-General J.T. Crocker's I Corps". Wilmot states "The objectives given to Crocker's seaborne divisions were decidedly ambitious, since his troops were to land last, on the most exposed beaches, with the farthest to go, against what was potentially the greatest opposition." However Miles C. Dempsey, commanding the British Second Army, always considered the possibility that the immediate seizure of Caen might fail. Operation Overlord plans called for British Second Army to secure the city and form a line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, thus acquiring ground for airfields and protecting the left flank of the U.S. First Army, under Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, as it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give Second Army jumping-off points to attack southwards and capture Falaise, which would in turn act as a pivot for a swing right to advance on Argentan and then the Touques River. The terrain between Caen and Vimont was open, dry and conducive to swift offensive operations. Since the Allied forces greatly outnumbered the Germans in tanks and mobile units, a mobile battle was to their advantage.

On D-Day the 3rd Division was unable to assault Caen in force and was brought to a halt north of the city. Follow-up attacks failed as German resistance solidified. Operation Perch, a pincer attack by I and XXX Corps, began on 7 June, with the intention of encircling Caen from the east and west. I Corps, striking south out of the Orne bridgehead, was halted by the 21st Panzer Division and the attack by XXX Corps bogged down in front of Tilly-sur-Seulles due to stout resistance by the Panzer-Lehr-Division. In an effort to force the Panzer-Lehr to withdraw or surrender, and to keep operations fluid, the British 7th Armoured Division pushed through a recently created gap in the German front line to capture the town of Villers-Bocage. The resulting day-long battle saw the vanguard of the British 7th Armoured Division withdraw from the town, but by 17 June Panzer-Lehr had been forced back and XXX Corps had taken Tilly-sur-Seulles. Further offensive operations were postponed on 19 June, when a severe storm wracked the English Channel for three days, delaying the Allied build-up.

On 26 June the British launched Operation Epsom, an attempt by Lieutenant-General Richard O'Connor's VIII Corps to outflank Caen's defenses by crossing the River Odon to the west of the city then circling eastward. The attack was preceded by Operation Martlet, which secured VIII Corps' line of advance by capturing the high ground on their right. The Germans managed to contain the offensive but were forced to commit all their armor, including two panzer divisions newly arrived in Normandy, which forced them to cancel a planned offensive against British and American positions around Bayeux. Several days later Second Army launched a new offensive, codenamed Operation Charnwood, against Caen. Charnwood incorporated a postponed attack on Carpiquet, originally planned for Epsom as Operation Ottawa but now codenamed Operation Windsor. In a frontal assault on 8–9 July the northern half of the city was captured. German forces still held part of the city on the southern side of the Orne river, including the Colombelles steel works, a vantage point for artillery observers.

Prelude

Plan

On 10 July General Bernard Montgomery, commander of all Allied ground forces in Normandy, held a meeting with Lieutenant-Generals Miles Dempsey and Omar Bradley, respectively the commanders of British Second Army and the United States First Army, at his headquarters to discuss the next attacks to be launched by 21st Army Group following the conclusion of Operation Charnwood and the failure of the First Army's initial breakout offensive. Montgomery approved Operation Cobra, a major break out attempt to be launched by the First Army on 18 July, and ordered Dempsey to "go on hitting: drawing the German strength, especially the armor, onto yourself - so as to ease the way for Brad[ley]".

Detailed planning for Operation Goodwood began on Friday 14 July. On 15 July Montgomery issued a written order to Dempsey scaling back the operation. These new orders changed the operation from a "deep break-out to a limited attack". The intention of the operation was now "to engage the German armor in battle and "write it down" to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans", and to improve the Second Army's position. The orders stated that "a victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank" but warned that operations must not endanger Second Army's position, as it was a "firm bastion" that was needed for the success of American operations. It was stressed that II Canadian Corps' objectives were now vital, and only following their completion would VIII Corps be free to "crack about" as the situation demands".

Lt. Gen. Guy Simonds' II Canadian Corps would launch an attack, codenamed Operation Atlantic, on the western flank of VIII Corps to liberate Colombelles and the remaining portion of Caen south of the Orne river. Following the capture of these areas, the Corps was to be prepared to capture Verrières Ridge. The Atlantic–Goodwood operation was slated to commence on 18 July, two days before the planned start of Operation Cobra.

Preparations for Atlantic were delegated to General Simonds, in his first action as the commander of II Canadian Corps. He planned the operation as a two-pronged assault, relying on the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions to capture Vaucelles, Colombelles, and the opposite banks of the Orne River. On the morning of 18 July, Gen. Rod Keller's 3rd Division would cross the Orne near Colombelles, and then proceed south towards Route Nationale 158. The 3rd Division would then move to capture Cormelles. The 2nd Division, under the command of Gen. Charles Foulkes, would attack from Caen to the south-east, crossing the Orne to capture the outskirts of Vaucelles. They would then use Cormelles as a jumping-off point for an attack on the high ground near Verrières Ridge three miles to the south.

Battle

On the morning of 18 July, with heavy air support, advance elements of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division were able to capture Colombelles and Faubourg-de-Vaucelles, a series of industrial suburbs just south of Caen along the Orne River. By mid-afternoon, two companies of the Black Watch had crossed the Orne River, with 'A' Company taking fewer than twenty casualties. Additional Battalions from 5th Brigade managed to push southward to Saint-André-sur-Orne. With the east bank of the Orne River secured, the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades moved into position for the assault on Verrières Ridge.

The German High Command (OKW) had not missed the strategic importance of the ridge. Though nowhere more than 90 ft (27 m) high, it dominated the Caen–Falaise road, blocking Allied forces from breaking out into the open country south of Caen. The 1st SS Panzer Corps (Sepp Dietrich) and parts of the 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, defended the area, amply provided with artillery, Nebelwerfer and tanks.

Units of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, supporting the South Saskatchewan Regiment of the 2nd Division, were able to secure a position in St. André-sur-Orne in the early hours of 20 July but were soon pinned down by German infantry and tanks. A simultaneous direct attack up the slopes of Verrières Ridge by the South Saskatchewans fell apart as heavy rain prevented air support and turned the ground to muck, making it difficult for tanks to maneuver. Counterattacks by two Panzer divisions forced the South Saskatchewans back past their start line and crashed into their supporting battalion, the Essex Scottish, who lost over 300 men as they struggled to hold back the 1st SS Panzer Division. Meanwhile, to the east, the remainder of I SS Panzer Corps fought the largest armored battle of the campaign, with British forces involved in Operation Goodwood. By the end of the day, the South Saskatchewan Regiment had taken 282 casualties and the ridge was still in enemy hands.

Simonds remained determined to take the ridge. He sent in two battalions, the Black Watch and the Calgary Highlanders, to stabilize the situation, and minor counterattacks by both, on 21 July, managed to contain Dietrich's armored formations. By the time the operation was called off, Canadian forces held several footholds on the ridge, including a now secure position on Point 67. Four German divisions still held the ridge. In all, the actions around Verrières Ridge during Operation Atlantic accounted for over 1,300 Allied casualties.

Aftermath

Analysis

Caen south of the Orne was captured, but the failure to seize Verrières Ridge led Montgomery to issue orders on 22 July for another offensive, this time to be a "holding attack", within a few days, in conjunction with Operation Cobra. As a result, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds formulated the plans for Operation Spring. The contemporaneous Battle of Verrières Ridge claimed over 2,600 Canadian casualties by the end of 26 July.

Casualties

The Canadian Official Historian, C. P. Stacey, gave Canadian casualties in all services of 1,965 men, 441 of whom were killed or died of wounds. Copp recorded from 1,349–1,965 Canadian casualties in Operation Atlantic, the majority in the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades.

References

Books

Bercuson, D. (2004) [1996]. Maple leaf Against the Axis. Markham Ontario: Red Deer Press.

Jarymowycz, R. (2001). Tank Tactics, from Normandy to Lorraine. Lynne Rienner.

van-der-Vat, D. (2004). D-Day, the Greatest Invasion, a People's History. London: Bloomsbury.

Zuehlke, M. (2001). The Canadian Military Atlas. Toronto: Stoddart.

Journals

Copp, T. (1992). "Fifth Brigade at Verrières Ridge". Canadian Military History. 1 (1–2): 45–63.

Copp, T. (1999). "The Toll of Verrières Ridge". Legion Magazine. Ottawa: Canvet Publications (May/June 1999).

Jarymowycz, R. "Der Gegenangriff vor Verrières: German Counter-attacks during Operation "Spring", 25–26 July 1944". Canadian Military History (PDF). Waterloo Ontario: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies. 2 (1).

Further Reading

Stacey, C. P.; Bond, Major C. C. J. (1960). The Victory Campaign: The operations in North-West Europe 1944–1945 (PDF). Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Vol. III. The Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery Ottawa.

The Battle for Caen.

 

The Battle of Bourguébus Ridge.

A German patrol moves towards the Colombelles factory area. Some of the tall chimneys used by German observers are visible in the distance. July 1944.

Canadian soldiers from the Queen’s Own Rifles regiment pose at the entrance to the city of Caen, Summer, 1944.

Infantrymen of The Regina Rifle Regiment inside a damaged building, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Private Steve W. Buttee of The Highland Light Infantry of Canada talking with M. Albert Collett, who is showing a photograph of his son Paul Collett, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Personnel of the Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.) placing demolition charges, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Infantrymen of The Regina Rifle Regiment and a despatch rider firing into a damaged building, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Riflemen of The Regina Rifle Regiment holding a position in a damaged storefront, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Infantrymen of The Regina Rifle Regiment armed with a Bren gun watching for snipers, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Infantrymen of The Highland Light Infantry of Canada having a rest, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Canadian personnel celebrating the liberation of Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Private J. Thomas of The Highland Light Infantry of Canada, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Canadian soldiers relaxing outside their dugout, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Signalman A. McNeil entering Caen in a captured German halftrack vehicle, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Unidentified sappers of the Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.) examining an unexploded German 15.5 cm. shell, Caen, France, 10 July 1944.

Corporal J.R. Pelletier of the 17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars, who is riding in a Universal Carrier, passing out cigarettes to French civilians, Caen, France, 10 July 1944. 

Lieutenant George Cooper, Canadian Army Film and Photo Unit, talking with Captain R.T. Miller, his brother-in-law, who is aboard a Humber light reconnaissance car, Caen, France, 11 July 1944.

A Sherman tank of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment, Caen, France, 11 July 1944.

Sapper Bob Cheesman, Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.), Caen, France, 11 July 1944. 

Brigade Major N. Kingsmill (left) presenting Brigadier D.G. Cunningham, who is relinquishing command of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade, with the first Canadian flag that was raised in Caen during the liberation of that city. Caen, France, 11 July 1944.

Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Malone (left) helping to erect the sign at the editorial office of the Maple Leaf newspaper, Caen, France, 11 July 1944. 

Infantrymen of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division marching through Caen during Bastille Day celebrations, Caen, France, 13 July 1944.

Band of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division playing during Bastille Day celebrations, Caen, France, 13 July 1944.

French civilians who were evacuated from Caen arriving in Bayeux, France, 13 July 1944.

A French boy standing between two members of the Canadian guard of honor at a church service on Bastille Day, Caen, France, 14 July 1944.

Personnel of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa on motorcycles near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

Members of the Regimental Aid Party of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa treating a wounded soldier near Caen, France, 15 July 1944. 

H/Captain John M. Anderson, Chaplain of the Highland Light Infantry of Canada, talking with Private Lawrence Herbert in his trench near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

H/Captain Robert Seaborn, Chaplain of the 1st Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment, giving absolution to an unidentified soldier of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

H/Major John W. Forth, Chaplain, presiding at a Holy Communion service for the Mortar Platoon of The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.) near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

H/Major John W. Forth, Chaplain of The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.), displaying his field Communion set near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

H/Captain Robert L. Seaborn, Chaplain of the 1st Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment, distributing New Testaments near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

Regimental Sergeant-Major L.D. Burnet and Pipe Major Samuel Cott, both of The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.), near Caen, France, 15 July 1944. 

H/Major J.W. Forth, chaplain of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, assisting the Regimental Aid Party of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa in loading a wounded soldier onto a jeep near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

H/Major John W. Forth, Chaplain of The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.), helping the unit's Regimental Aid Party to treat a wounded soldier near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

H/Captain John M. Anderson, Chaplain of The Highland Light Infantry of Canada, with members of the unit's Regimental Aid Party listening to a gramophone, Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

Lieutenant-Colonel P.C. Klaehn (center), Commanding Officer of The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.), holding a map session with officers of the regiment near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

Infantrymen of the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders crossing the Orne River on a Bailey bridge built by the Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.) en route to Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of The Highland Light Infantry of Canada passing Sherman tanks en route to cross the Orne River near Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade advancing to attack the factory area of Caen. Ranville, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of The Highland Light Infantry of Canada resting alongside the Orne River en route to Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of The Highland Light Infantry of Canada resting on the Orne River near Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade advancing into the industrial area of Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade passing a Sherman tank while advancing to attack the industrial area of Caen. Ranville, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders crossing the Orne River on a Bailey bridge built by the Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.) en route to Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders crossing the Orne River on a Bailey bridge built by the Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.) en route to Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Infantrymen of the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders crossing the Orne River on a Bailey bridge built by the Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.) en route to Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Brigadier D.G. Cunningham, Commander of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade, crossing the Orne River on a Bailey bridge built by the Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.) en route to Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Petch, Commanding Officer, leading The North Nova Scotia Highlanders across London Bridge, a Bailey bridge across the Odon River south of Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

Personnel of The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry having a quick meal en route to Caen, France, 18 July 1944.

A Universal Carrier of the 4th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA), Vaucelles, France, 18 or 20 July 1944. 

Troopers of the 12th Manitoba Dragoons playing cards near Caen, France, 19 July 1944.

Personnel of the Canadian Provost Corps outside "The Pop Inn", the new Navy, Army and Air Force Institute (N.A.A.F.I.) canteen, Caen, France, 27 July 1944.

Captains Alan Duckett and Seth Halton censoring copy to be printed in the first issue of the Maple Leaf newspaper, Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Private Ed Pauzé setting type to print the first issue of the Maple Leaf newspaper, Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Lance-Corporal Frank Dubois casting a printing plate of the first issue of the Maple Leaf newspaper to be printed in Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Lance-Corporal Frank Dubois casting a plate during the printing of the first issue of the Maple Leaf newspaper, Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Corporal Henry Choquette oiling the press during the printing of the first issue of the Maple Leaf newspaper, Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Private Tom Hunter putting a plate on the press during the printing of the first issue of the Maple Leaf newspaper, Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Generator providing electricity for the press printing the first issue of the Maple Leaf newspaper, Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Personnel of the Calgary Highlanders reading the first issue of the Maple Leaf newspaper, Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Photographer Eddie Worth of the Associated Press taking a rest in Caen, France, 28 July 1944.

Personnel of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (R.C.A.S.C.), Caen, France, 29 July 1944. 

Personnel of the 23rd Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers (R.C.E.), pulling down destroyed buildings, Caen, France, 4 August 1944.

Red Ball Express

A Diamond M20 truck and its trailer go through a ruined Norman village.

by Michael W. Cannon

The situation in Normandy after the breakout operations of 1 to 4 August 1944 necessitated a marked departure from the carefully conceived OVERLORD plan. The sudden collapse of the German military machine opened the door to a fluid situation where the initiative of subordinate commanders was of paramount importance. Tactical operations were characterized by a minimum of control and are described in the official history of the U.S. Army as resembling a “stampede of wild horses.” The orderly development of a logistical base was thus subordinated to the need to exploit the tactical and strategic situation as fully as possible. The requirement to supply units on a daily basis prohibited the establishment of the normal army depot system. As a result, by the end of August 1944 around ninety percent of all supplies in France lay near the invasion beaches. Between these dumps and forward army depots, often a distance of 300 miles, there were few stockpiles capable of supporting large units conducting sustained operations.

The Communications Zone (COMZ), an extension of the Services of Supply in the United Kingdom, was the organization which had been tasked with the development of the logistics base which was required to support Allied forces. As operations out-paced the supply buildup, planners began to look for solutions, however improvised they might have been. At first, the COMZ decided to place 100,000 tons of supplies (exclusive of POL [Petroleum-Oil-Lubricant] in the Chartres-La Loupe-Dreux area by the 1st of September. Initial plans relied heavily on the utilization of the existing French railway system to transport the majority of the tonnage. But as the Allies advanced, they found to their chagrin that air attacks and sabotage undertaken by the Maquis, operating under the control of the London headquarters of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), restricted the amount of traffic that the network could be subjected to. Only a relatively small part (approximately 18,000 tons) of the desired stockage could be shipped by rail. The remaining 82,000 tons had to be transported by truck. The resulting centralization and usage of motor transport on a scale larger than invasion planners predicted came to be immortalized as “The Red Ball Express.”

The operations along the Red Ball began on 25 August 1944. On this day, vehicles in seventy-six truck companies out of the 118 companies allocated to the re-supply effort were in action. All but five companies were to ultimately be used for the hauling of supplies between the beaches and the Chartres area. Within five days of its inception, the Red Ball reached its peak operational level. On 29 August, 132 companies (approximately 5,950 vehicles) delivered 12,342 tons of supplies, a total which would not be achieved again. The first phase of the operation came to a close between 1 and 5 September. The Red Ball was then given a new lease and was expanded to include a route to Soissons (First Army area) and Sommesous (Third Army area), ultimately covering 686 miles along the Soissons route and 590 miles along the Sommesous route. On 15 November, the Express officially ceased operation. During the next year, other immediate supply operations had to be improvised, yet none approached the sheer magnitude of the Red Ball.

A hypothetically normal run on the Red Ball was supposed to have been conducted along the following lines: Vehicles were to pick up supplies at the port of Cherbourg and then to proceed to St. Lô. Here they were organized into convoys and dispatched from a traffic control point which was tasked with regulating the convoy movement. Ninety to 150 miles later the convoys would approach the dump areas astride the route. Either here or at the bivouac sites fresh drivers would take over for the run back to St. Lô. There the process would begin again.

As with most improvised operations, actual practice was quite different from what was planned. Convoys were often dispatched even farther east than the Chartres triangle as the armies advanced. Dumps would close down and relocate farther forward while convoys were en route, causing drivers to have to search for a unit which would accept their loads. Both individual vehicles and entire convoys were often diverted by representatives from various divisional or army units. Coordination problems such as these plagued the Red Ball throughout its existence.

Re-supply on such a scale required the marshalling of tremendous amounts of resources from every corner of Bradley’s army group. Many combat units arriving in the theater were stripped of their transport as were units classified as nonessential (such as anti-aircraft and heavy artillery).

To control effectively this gathering, several new control measures had to be adopted and enforced along the Red Ball route. All roads traversed by the line were marked with a large red ball to obviate the necessity for maps and delays caused by map reading mistakes. Traffic on these marked throughways was to be reserved expressly for vehicles supporting the logistic effort and was only to move in one direction. Trucks were organized into convoys which were then divided into serials. All movement was to be conducted in these groupings at a speed not to exceed 25 miles per hour. Intervals between each vehicle were to be 60 yards and there was to be no passing. Stragglers were to get assistance from support units (maintenance units and engineers) located along the route and then rejoin other convoys carrying cargoes of the same type. Halts for breaks were permitted only for ten minutes beginning ten minutes before every even hour. Due to the urgency of the re-supply mission, the shuttle was to operate through a 24-hour period. The lack of opposition from the Luftwaffe and dominance of the skies by Allied air allowed convoys to proceed using full headlights. Delays caused by operating under blackout conditions were thus avoided.

These measures are only a partial listing of those which were finally incorporated into a succession of SOPs. The intent behind them was to force a structure onto a disorganized system. Not all measures were enforced with the same amount of consistency, enthusiasm, or success.

General Sir Brian Horrocks offers us a more realistic description of Red Ball operations in his book Corps Commander:

Convoy after convoy of their far more powerful six-wheel lorries, endowed with far greater acceleration and much better hill-climbing capability than was possible with our smaller four-wheel Fords and Bedfords, swept past me, usually being driven by cheerful-looking Negroes with a cigar in their mouths. They seemed to be made of rubber; as often as not, one leg dangled out of the driving cab, while the other presumably operated the accelerator pedal. No such nonsense as vehicle spacing for them; they just raced flat out for their destination and, in spite of not having the vaguest idea as to where they were going, they usually, thanks to the indefatigable military police on their powerful motor bikes, got themselves to their correct destination in the end …

The Red Ball performed wonders in terms of re-supplying the forward units during the pursuit. However, the debilitating effects it had on the logistic base were felt for months to come. The Red Ball ultimately extended over five rear areas which were all tasked with full responsibility for maintenance and control of specific sections of the route. The commitment of resources to this responsibility varied according to the temperament of the section commander involved. As a result, friction between the Advance Section (responsible for the transport units involved) and the various COMZs which were traversed increased considerably.

More pronounced in effect was the strain placed on the vehicles used. Continual usage with little preventive maintenance being performed brought about a rapid deterioration of equipment and roads. Additionally, the units along the Red Ball were authorized by the Department of the Army to overload the vehicles by one-half their listed capacity. As a result, the number of repairs involving major components skyrocketed, placing an additional burden on the logistic tail. An average of a hundred trucks per day were withdrawn from the Red Ball and by November fifteen thousand had been deadlined. Just as critical as the drain on spare parts was the failure of tire repair shops to keep up with the demands of using units.

The effect the operation had on the personnel involved was not as easily quantified but was just as harmful. Continual strain and minimal supervision led to a slackening discipline and came to be accepted as the norm rather than the exception. As time progressed, soldiers of less than desirable character found that the opportunities for malingering, sabotage, and black marketing abounded. The haste involved in shipping contributed to poor documentation of shipments and sparse information on supply status. As a result, supply accountability was lost and units received items they no longer needed or less than necessary. The complication caused by the Red Ball permeated all levels of the logistic effort and many were never successfully resolved.

The Red Ball Express was a hastily improvised expedient originally conceived as only a temporary measure. It accomplished its mission, although in the process it exacted a terrible price from the logistic structure in terms of personnel hardships, disciplinary problems, and equipment deterioration. What would have been the chances of its success if the Luftwaffe had had air parity with the Allies? What if the supply routes had to pass through hostile territory and be subjected to the type of harassment that the Maquis had inflicted on the Germans? If either of these conditions had been a reality, the Red Ball effort would have been drastically reduced in effectiveness and the story of the Allied pursuit may have had quite a different ending.

Red Ball Express Route; August 25, 1944. 

 

Red Ball Express Route; September 10, 1944.

Red Ball and Red Lion Express Routes, September 16, 1944.

Red Ball and Red Lion Express Routes, September 20, 1944.

Red Ball and Red Lion Express Routes, October 10, 1944.

Red Ball, Green Diamond and White Ball Express Routes, October 16, 1944.

Red Ball, Green Diamond, White Ball and ABC Express Routes, November 30, 1944. 

Corporal Charles H. Johnson of the 783rd Military Police Battalion, waves on a "Red Ball Express" convoy.

Red Ball Express poster. This French language poster informed civilians not to use roads reserved exclusively for the Red Ball Express.

This sleeve patch was worn by Red Ball Express drivers. The initials signify "Transportation Corps" and "Motor Transportation Service."

Embarkation of jerrycans in a Normandy port in 1944.

A Red Ball Express convoy passes a disabled truck in France in July 1944.

A sign marking the Red Ball Express route and its use for those trucks only.

Some of the Black members of the Red Ball Express: TSgt Serman Hughes, TSGt Hudson Murphy, Pfc Zachariah Gibbs.

African American soldiers load ammunition crates into Red Ball Express CCKW trucks.

A convoy of American trucks stops at a makeshift service station on September 7, 1944 for maintenance and changing drivers near Saint Denis, France.

Soldiers load trucks with combat rations in preparation for a convoy to the front on December 21, 1944, in the European Theater of Operations.

A highway patrol (right) pulls a dump truck to the nearest heavy vehicle maintenance depot along the Red Ball Express route in the European theater of operations. Damaged trucks were immediately repaired and put back into service. If a truck was damaged beyond repair, it was immediately replaced.

Trucks from different units take out drums of gasoline from one of the storage fields of the quartermaster depot. After washing these five-gallon jerrycans, they were refilled from the tankers at the beachheads and returned to the quartermaster's depot.

American drivers take a nap and relax on boxes of ammunition and other equipment on October 10, 1944 during the delivery of supplies to a forward area in France. The supply train is one of the Red Ball convoys that made up an endless chain of trucks that operated to and from the front on one-way roads. The roads were marked with Red Ball priority signs and were reserved for urgent supplies.

Military Policeman waves a Red Ball Express convoy on a one-way highway en route to the front.

Filling jerrycans for transportation by the Red Ball Express.

Jerrycans, and even milk cans, are filled with precious fuel.

Fuel is the black gold of the Battle of Normandy, the priority of supplies.

Departure of convoys in Normandy on the Red Ball Express.

Red Ball Express jerrycans depot; 1944.

A Red Ball Express truck gets stuck in the mud; 1944.

A mechanic carries out tire pressure monitoring during a convoy break.

The drivers check the engine of their truck before going back to driving.

A U.S. Federal truck on the Red Ball Express under the supervision of a MP.

Empty trucks arrive back at the French coast to reload.

From an advertisement in LIFE magazine in July 1944 indicating that behind every GI, 12 tons of baggage was necessary.

Red Ball Express trucks load up ammunition from railroad box cars.

Even soldiers' duffle bags were transported by the Red Ball Express.

Soldiers load trucks with rations bound for frontline troops. From left to right are Pvt. Harold Hendricks, Staff Sgt. Carl Haines, Sgt. Theodore Cutright, Pvt. Lawrence Buckhalter, Pfc. Horace Deahl and Pvt. David N. Hatcher. The troops were assigned to the 4185th Quartermaster Service Company, Liege, Belgium; 1944.

Soldier of Supply pledge poster, Office of War Information.