Battle of Savo Island

Japanese war art entitled “Night Operations of the Battle of Savo Island” (8-9 August 1942). Burning American warships, illuminated by searchlights, take additional fire.

The Battle of Savo Island, also known as the First Battle of Savo Island and, in Japanese sources, as the First Battle of the Solomon Sea, and colloquially among Allied Guadalcanal veterans as The Battle of the Five Sitting Ducks, was a naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied naval forces. The battle took place on August 8–9, 1942 and was the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign, and the first of several naval battles in the straits later named Ironbottom Sound, near the island of Guadalcanal.

The Imperial Japanese Navy, in response to Allied amphibious landings in the eastern Solomon Islands, mobilized a task force of seven cruisers and one destroyer under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. The task forces sailed from Japanese bases in New Britain and New Ireland down New Georgia Sound (also known as “the Slot”), with the intention of interrupting the Allied landings by attacking the supporting amphibious fleet and its screening force. The Allied screen consisted of eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers under British Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley VC, but only five cruisers and seven destroyers were involved in the battle. In a night action, Mikawa thoroughly surprised and routed the Allied force, sinking one Australian and three American cruisers, while suffering only light damage in return. The battle has often been cited as the worst defeat in a fair fight in the history of the United States Navy.

After the initial engagement, Mikawa, fearing Allied carrier strikes against his fleet upon daybreak, decided to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to locate and destroy the Allied invasion transports. The Japanese attacks prompted the remaining Allied warships and the amphibious force to withdraw earlier than planned (prior to the unloading of all supplies), temporarily ceding control of the seas around Guadalcanal to the Japanese. This early withdrawal of the fleet left the Allied ground forces (primarily United States Marines), which had landed on Guadalcanal and nearby islands only two days before, in a precarious situation, with limited supplies, equipment, and food to hold their beachhead.

Mikawa’s decision to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to destroy the Allied invasion transports was primarily founded on the high risk of Allied carrier strikes against his fleet upon daybreak. In reality, the Allied carrier fleet, similarly fearing Japanese attack, had already withdrawn beyond operational range. This missed opportunity to cripple (rather than interrupt) the supply of Allied forces on Guadalcanal contributed to Japan’s inability to later recapture the island. At this early critical stage of the campaign, it allowed the Allied forces to entrench and fortify themselves in sufficient strength to successfully defend the area around Henderson Field until additional Allied reinforcements arrived later in the year.

The battle was the first of five costly, large scale sea and air-sea actions fought in support of the ground battles on Guadalcanal itself, as the Japanese sought to counter the American offensive in the Pacific. These sea battles took place every few days, with increasing delays on each side to regroup and refit, until the November 30, 1942 Battle of Tassafaronga (sometimes referred to as the Fourth Battle of Savo Island or, in Japanese sources, as the Battle of Lunga Point—after which the Japanese, eschewing the costly losses, attempted resupplying by submarine and barges. The final naval battle, the Battle of Rennell Island, took place months later on January 29–30, 1943, by which time the Japanese were preparing to evacuate their remaining land forces and withdraw.

Background

Operations at Guadalcanal

On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S. Marines) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Island in the eastern Solomon Islands. The landings were meant to deny their use to the Japanese as bases, especially the nearly completed airfield at Henderson Field that was being constructed on Guadalcanal. If Japanese air and sea forces were allowed to establish forward operating bases in the Eastern Solomons they would be in a position to threaten the supply shipping routes between the U.S. and Australia. The Allies also wanted to use the islands as launching points for a campaign to recapture the Solomons, isolate or capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul, and support the Allied New Guinea campaign, which was then building strength under General Douglas MacArthur. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.

The overall commander of Allied naval forces in the Guadalcanal and Tulagi operation was U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. He also commanded the carrier task groups providing air cover. U.S. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the amphibious fleet that delivered the 16,000 Allied troops to Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Also under Turner was British Admiral Victor Crutchley’s screening force of eight cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and five minesweepers. This force was to protect Turner’s ships and provide gunfire support for the landings. Crutchley commanded his force of mostly American ships from his flagship, the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia.

The Allied landings took the Japanese by surprise. The Allies secured Tulagi, nearby islets Gavutu and Tanambogo, and the airfield under construction on Guadalcanal by nightfall on August 8. On August 7 and August 8, Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport ship George F. Elliott (which sank later) and heavily damaging the destroyer USS Jarvis. In these air attacks, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, including 14 carrier fighter aircraft.

Concerned over the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships’ fuel levels, Fletcher announced that he would be withdrawing his carrier task forces on the evening of August 8.

Some historians contend that Fletcher’s fuel situation was not at all critical but that Fletcher used it to justify his withdrawal from the battle area. Fletcher’s biographer notes that Fletcher concluded that the landing was a success and that no important targets for close air support were at hand. Being concerned over the loss of 21 of his carrier fighters, he assessed that his carriers were threatened by torpedo-bomber strikes, and, wanting to refuel before Japanese naval forces arrived, withdrew as he had previously forewarned Turner and Vandegrift. Turner, however, believed that Fletcher understood that he was to provide air cover until all the transports were unloaded on August 9.

Even though the unloading was going slower than planned, Turner decided that without carrier air cover he would have to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal. He planned to unload as much as possible during the night and depart the next day.

Japanese Response

Unprepared for the Allied operation at Guadalcanal, the initial Japanese response included airstrikes and an attempted reinforcement. Mikawa, commander of the newly formed Japanese Eighth Fleet headquartered at Rabaul, loaded 519 naval troops on two transports and sent them towards Guadalcanal on August 7. However, when the Japanese learned that Allied forces at Guadalcanal were stronger than originally reported, the transports were recalled.

Mikawa also assembled all the available warships in the area to attack the Allied forces at Guadalcanal. At Rabaul were the heavy cruiser Chōkai (Mikawa’s flagship), the light cruisers Tenryū and Yūbari and the destroyer Yūnagi. En route from Kavieng were four heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 under Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto: Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa.

The Japanese Navy had trained extensively in night-fighting tactics before the war, a fact of which the Allies were unaware. Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of August 8 and August 9, when he could employ his night-battle expertise while avoiding attacks from Allied aircraft, which could not operate effectively at night. Mikawa’s warships rendezvoused at sea near Cape St. George in the evening of August 7 and then headed east-southeast.

Battle

Prelude

Mikawa decided to take his fleet north of Buka Island and then down the east coast of Bougainville. The fleet would pause east of Kieta for six hours on the morning of August 8. (This would avoid daytime air attacks during their final approach to Guadalcanal.) They would then proceed along the dangerous channel known as “The Slot,” hoping that no Allied plane would see them in the fading light. The Japanese fleet was in fact sighted in St George Channel, where their column almost ran into USS S-38, lying in ambush. She was too close to fire torpedoes, but her captain, Lieutenant Commander H.G. Munson, radioed: “Two destroyers and three larger ships of unknown type heading one four zero true at high speed eight miles west of Cape St George” The warnings, however, were considered vague and the size of the force reported did not suggest an attack was pending.

Once at Bougainville, Mikawa spread his ships out over a wide area to mask the composition of his force and launched four floatplanes from his cruisers to scout for Allied ships in the southern Solomons.

At 10:20 and 11:10, his ships were spotted by Royal Australian Air Force Hudson reconnaissance aircraft based at Milne Bay in New Guinea. The first Hudson misidentified them as “three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders.” (Note: Some accounts state that the first Hudson’s crew identified the enemy ships correctly, but the composition of enemy forces was changed from the aircraft crews’ report by intelligence officers in Milne Bay.) The Hudson’s crew tried to report the sighting to the Allied radio station at Fall River, New Guinea. Receiving no acknowledgment, they returned to Milne Bay at 12:42 to ensure that the report was received as soon as possible. The second Hudson also failed to report its sighting by radio, but completed its patrol and landed at Milne Bay at 15:00. It reported sighting “two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one unknown type.” For unknown reasons, these reports were not relayed to the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal until 18:45 and 21:30, respectively, on August 8. U.S. official historian Samuel Morison wrote in his 1949 account that the RAAF Hudson’s crew failed to report the sighting until after they had landed and even had tea. This claim made international headlines and was repeated by many subsequent historians. Later research has discredited this version of events, and in 2014, the U.S. Navy’s Naval History and Heritage Command acknowledged in a letter to the Hudson’s radio operator, who had lobbied for decades to clear his crewmates’ name, that Morison’s criticisms were “unwarranted.”

Mikawa’s floatplanes returned by 12:00 and reported two groups of Allied ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. He reassembled his warships and began his run towards Guadalcanal, entering the Slot near Choiseul by 16:00 on August 8. Mikawa communicated the following battle plan to his warships: “On the rush-in we will go from S. (south) of Savo Island and torpedo the enemy main force in front of Guadalcanal anchorage; after which we will turn toward the Tulagi forward area to shell and torpedo the enemy. We will then withdraw north of Savo Island.”

Mikawa’s run down the Slot was not detected by Allied forces. Turner had requested that U.S. Admiral John S. McCain, Sr., commander of Allied air forces for the South Pacific area, conduct extra reconnaissance missions over the Slot in the afternoon of August 8. But, for unexplained reasons, McCain did not order the missions, nor did he tell Turner that they were not carried out. Thus, Turner mistakenly believed that the Slot was under Allied observation throughout the day.

To protect the unloading transports during the night, Crutchley divided the Allied warship forces into three groups. A “southern” group, consisting of the Australian cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Canberra, cruiser USS Chicago, and destroyers USS Patterson and USS Bagley, patrolled between Lunga Point and Savo Island to block the entrance between Savo Island and Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal. A “northern” group, consisting of the cruisers USS Vincennes, USS Astoria and USS Quincy, and destroyers USS Helm and USS Wilson, conducted a box-shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo Island to defend the passage between Savo and Florida Islands. An “eastern” group consisting of the cruisers USS San Juan and HMAS Hobart and two U.S. destroyers guarded the eastern entrances to the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands. Crutchley placed two radar-equipped U.S. destroyers to the west of Savo Island to provide early warning for any approaching Japanese ships. The destroyer USS Ralph Talbot patrolled the northern passage and the destroyer USS Blue patrolled the southern passage, with a gap of 12–30 kilometers (8–20 mi) between their uncoordinated patrol patterns. At this time, the Allies were unaware of all of the limitations of their primitive ship-borne radars, such as the effectiveness of the radar could be greatly degraded by the presence of nearby landmasses. Chicago’s Captain Bode ordered his ship’s radar to be turned off in the mistaken belief it would reveal his position. He allowed a single sweep every half hour with the fire control radar, but the timing of the last pre-engagement sweep was too early to detect the approaching Japanese cruisers. Wary of the potential threat from Japanese submarines to the transport ships, Crutchley placed his remaining seven destroyers as close-in protection around the two transport anchorages.

The crews of the Allied ships were fatigued after two days of constant alert and action in supporting the landings. Also, the weather was extremely hot and humid, inducing further fatigue and, in Morison’s words, “inviting weary sailors to slackness.” In response, most of Crutchley’s warships went to “Condition II” the night of August 8, which meant that half the crews were on duty while the other half rested, either in their bunks or near their battle stations.

In the evening, Turner called a conference on his command ship off Guadalcanal with Crutchley and Marine commander Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift to discuss the departure of Fletcher’s carriers and the resulting withdrawal schedule for the transport ships. At 20:55, Crutchley left the southern group in Australia to attend the conference, leaving Captain Howard D. Bode of Chicago in charge of the southern group. Crutchley did not inform the commanders of the other cruiser groups of his absence, contributing further to the dissolution of command arrangements. Bode, awakened from sleep in his cabin, decided not to place his ship in the lead of the southern group of ships, the customary place for the senior ship, and went back to sleep. At the conference, Turner, Crutchley, and Vandegrift discussed the reports of the “seaplane tender” force reported by the Australian Hudson crew earlier that day. They decided it would not be a threat that night, because seaplane tenders did not normally engage in a surface action. Vandegrift said that he would need to inspect the transport unloading situation at Tulagi before recommending a withdrawal time for the transport ships, and he departed at midnight to conduct the inspection. Crutchley elected not to return with Australia to the southern force but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location.

As Mikawa’s force neared the Guadalcanal area, the Japanese ships launched three floatplanes for one final reconnaissance of the Allied ships, and to provide illumination by dropping flares during the upcoming battle. Although several of the Allied ships heard and/or observed one or more of these floatplanes, starting at 23:45 on August 8, none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an actionable threat, and no one reported the sightings to Crutchley or Turner.

Mikawa’s force approached in a single 3-kilometer (1.9 mi) column led by Chōkai, with Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Tenryū, Yūbari, and Yūnagi following. Sometime between 00:44 and 00:54 on August 9, lookouts in Mikawa’s ships spotted Blue about 9 kilometers (5.6 mi) ahead of the Japanese column.

Action South of Savo

To avoid Blue, Mikawa changed course to pass north of Savo Island. He also ordered his ships to slow to 22 knots (41 km/h), to reduce wakes that might make his ships more visible. Four minutes later, Mikawa’s lookouts spied either Ralph Talbot about 16 kilometers (10 mi) away or a small schooner of unknown nationality. The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 guns at Blue, ready to open fire at the first indication that Blue had sighted them. When Blue was less than 2 kilometers (1 mi) away from Mikawa’s force, she suddenly reversed course, having reached the end of her patrol track, and steamed away, apparently oblivious to the long column of large Japanese ships sailing by her. Seeing that his ships were still undetected, Mikawa turned back to a course south of Savo Island and increased speed, first to 26 knots (48 km/h), and then to 30 knots (56 km/h). At 01:25, Mikawa released his ships to operate independently of his flagship, and at 01:31, he ordered, “Every ship attack.”

At about this time, Yūnagi detached from the Japanese column and reversed direction, perhaps because she lost sight of the other Japanese ships ahead of her, or perhaps she was ordered to provide a rearguard for Mikawa’s force. One minute later, Japanese lookouts sighted a warship to port. This ship was the destroyer Jarvis, heavily damaged the day before and now departing Guadalcanal independently for repairs in Australia. Whether Jarvis sighted the Japanese ships is unknown, since her radios had been destroyed. Furutaka launched torpedoes at Jarvis, which all missed. The Japanese ships passed as close to Jarvis as 1,100 meters, close enough for officers on Tenryū to look down onto the destroyer’s decks without seeing any of her crew moving about. If Jarvis was aware of the Japanese ships passing by, she did not respond in any noticeable way.

Two minutes after sighting Jarvis, the Japanese lookouts sighted the Allied destroyers and cruisers of the southern force about 12,500 meters away, silhouetted by the glow from the burning George F. Elliott. Several minutes later, at about 01:38, the Japanese cruisers began launching salvos of torpedoes at the Allied southern force ships. At this same time, lookouts on Chōkai spotted the ships of the Allied northern force at a range of 16 kilometers (10 mi). Chōkai turned to face this new threat, and the rest of the Japanese column followed, while still preparing to engage the Allied southern force ships with gunfire.

Patterson’s crew was alert because the destroyer’s captain had taken seriously the earlier daytime sightings of Japanese warships and evening sightings of unknown aircraft, and told his crew to be ready for action. At 01:43, Patterson spotted a ship, probably Kinugasa, 5,000 meters dead ahead and immediately sent a warning by radio and signal lamp: “Warning! Warning! Strange ships entering the harbor!” Patterson increased speed to full, and fired star shells towards the Japanese column. Her captain ordered a torpedo attack, but his order was not heard over the noise from the destroyer’s guns.

At about the same moment that Patterson sighted the Japanese ships and went into action, the Japanese floatplanes overhead, on orders from Mikawa, dropped aerial flares directly over Canberra and Chicago. Canberra responded immediately, with Captain Frank Getting ordering an increase in speed, a reversal of an initial turn to port, which kept Canberra between the Japanese and the Allied transports, and for her guns to train out and fire at any targets that could be sighted. Less than one minute later, as Canberra’s guns took aim at the Japanese, Chōkai and Furutaka opened fire on her, scoring numerous hits within a few seconds. Aoba and Kako joined in with gunfire, and within the next three minutes Canberra took up to 24 large caliber hits. Early hits killed her gunnery officer, mortally wounded Getting, and destroyed both boiler rooms, knocking out power to the entire ship before Canberra could fire any of her guns or communicate a warning to other Allied ships. The cruiser glided to a stop, on fire, with a 5- to 10-degree list to starboard, and unable to fight the fires or pump out flooded compartments because of lack of power. Since all of the Japanese ships were on the port side of Canberra, the damage to the ship’s starboard side occurred either from shells entering low on the port side and exiting below the waterline on the starboard side, or from one or two torpedo hits on the starboard side. If torpedoes did hit Canberra on the starboard side, then they may have come from a nearby Allied ship, and at this time the U.S. destroyer Bagley was the only ship on that side of the Australian cruiser and had fired torpedoes moments earlier.

The crew of Chicago, observing the illumination of their ship by air-dropped flares and the sudden turn by Canberra in front of them, came alert and awakened Captain Bode from “a sound sleep.” Bode ordered his 5 in (127.0 mm) guns to fire star shells towards the Japanese column, but the shells did not function. At 01:47, a torpedo, probably from Kako, hit Chicago’s bow, sending a shock wave throughout the ship that damaged the main battery director. A second torpedo hit but failed to explode, and a shell hit the cruiser’s mainmast, killing two crewmen. Chicago steamed west for 40 minutes, leaving behind the transports she was assigned to protect. The cruiser fired her secondary batteries at the trailing ships in the Japanese column and may have hit Tenryū, causing slight damage. Bode did not try to assert control over any of the other Allied ships in the southern force, of which he was still technically in command. More significantly, Bode made no attempt to warn any of the other Allied ships or personnel in the Guadalcanal area as his ship headed away from the battle area.

During this time, Patterson engaged in a gun duel with the Japanese column. Patterson received a shell hit aft, causing moderate damage and killing 10 crew members. Patterson continued to pursue and fire at the Japanese ships and may have hit Kinugasa, causing moderate damage. Patterson then lost sight of the Japanese column as it headed northeast along the eastern shore of Savo Island. Bagley, whose crew sighted the Japanese shortly after Patterson and Canberra, circled completely around to port before firing torpedoes in the general direction of the rapidly disappearing Japanese column; one or two of which may have hit Canberra. Bagley played no further role in the battle. Yūnagi exchanged non-damaging gunfire with Jarvis before exiting the battle area to the west with the intention of eventually rejoining the Japanese column north and west of Savo Island.

At 01:44, as Mikawa’s ships headed towards the Allied northern force, Tenryū and Yūbari split from the rest of the Japanese column and took a more westward course. Furutaka, either because of a steering problem, or to avoid a possible collision with Canberra, followed Yūbari and Tenryū. Thus, the Allied northern force was about to be enveloped and attacked from two sides.

Action North of Savo

When Mikawa’s ships attacked the Allied southern force, the captains of all three U.S. northern force cruisers were asleep, with their ships steaming quietly at 10 knots (19 km/h). Although crewmen on all three ships observed flares or gunfire from the battle south of Savo or else received Patterson’s warning of threatening ships entering the area, it took some time for the crews to go from Condition II to full alert. At 01:44, the Japanese cruisers began firing torpedoes at the northern force. At 01:50, they aimed powerful searchlights at the three northern cruisers and opened fire with their guns.

Astoria’s bridge crew called general quarters upon sighting the flares south of Savo, around 01:49. At 01:52, shortly after the Japanese searchlights came on and shells began falling around the ship, Astoria’s main gun director crews spotted the Japanese cruisers and opened fire. Astoria’s captain, awakened to find his ship in action, rushed to the bridge and ordered a ceasefire, fearful that his ship might be firing on friendly forces. As shells continued to cascade around his ship, the captain ordered firing resumed less than a minute later. Chōkai, however, had found the range, and Astoria was quickly hit by numerous shells and set afire. Between 02:00 and 02:15, Aoba, Kinugasa, and Kako joined Chōkai in pounding Astoria, destroying the cruiser’s engine room and bringing the flaming ship to a halt. At 02:16, one of Astoria’s remaining operational main gun turrets fired at Kinugasa’s searchlight, but missed and hit Chōkai’s forward turret, putting the turret out of action and causing moderate damage to the ship.

Quincy had also seen the aircraft flares over the southern ships, received Patterson’s warning, and had just sounded general quarters and was coming alert when the searchlights from the Japanese column came on. Quincy’s captain gave the order to commence firing, but the gun crews were not ready. Within a few minutes, Quincy was caught in a crossfire between Aoba, Furutaka, and Tenryū, and was hit heavily and set afire. Quincy’s captain ordered his cruiser to charge towards the eastern Japanese column, but as she turned to do so Quincy was hit by two torpedoes from Tenryū, causing severe damage. Quincy managed to fire a few main gun salvos, one of which hit Chōkai’s chart room 6 meters (20 ft) from Admiral Mikawa and killed or wounded 36 men, although Mikawa was not injured. At 02:10, incoming shells killed or wounded almost all of Quincy’s bridge crew, including the captain. At 02:16, the cruiser was hit by a torpedo from Aoba, and the ship’s remaining guns were silenced. Quincy’s assistant gunnery officer, sent to the bridge to ask for instructions, reported on what he found:

When I reached the bridge level, I found it a shambles of dead bodies with only three or four people still standing. In the Pilot House itself the only person standing was the signalman at the wheel who was vainly endeavoring to check the ship’s swing to starboard to bring her to port. On questioning him I found out that the Captain, who at that time was laying [sic] near the wheel, had instructed him to beach the ship and he was trying to head for Savo Island, distant some four miles (6 km) on the port quarter. I stepped to the port side of the Pilot House, and looked out to find the island and noted that the ship was heeling rapidly to port, sinking by the bow. At that instant the Captain straightened up and fell back, apparently dead, without having uttered any sound other than a moan.

Quincy sank, bow first, at 02:38.

Like Quincy and Astoria, Vincennes also sighted the aerial flares to the south, and furthermore, actually sighted gunfire from the southern engagement. At 01:50, when the U.S. cruisers were illuminated by the Japanese searchlights, Vincennes hesitated to open fire, believing that the searchlight’s source might be friendly ships. Shortly thereafter, Kako opened fire on Vincennes which responded with her own gunfire at 01:53. As Vincennes began to receive damaging shell hits, her commander, U.S. Captain Frederick L. Riefkohl, ordered an increase of speed to 25 knots (46 km/h), but shortly thereafter, at 01:55, two torpedoes from Chōkai hit, causing heavy damage. Kinugasa now joined Kako in pounding Vincennes. Vincennes scored one hit on Kinugasa causing moderate damage to her steering engines. The rest of the Japanese ships also fired and hit Vincennes up to 74 times, and, at 02:03, another torpedo hit her, this time from Yūbari. With all boiler rooms destroyed, Vincennes came to a halt, burning “everywhere” and listing to port. At 02:16, Riefkohl ordered the crew to abandon ship, and Vincennes sank at 02:50.

During the engagement, the U.S. destroyers Helm and Wilson struggled to see the Japanese ships. Both destroyers briefly fired at Mikawa’s cruisers but caused no damage and received no damage to themselves.

At 02:16, the Japanese columns ceased fire on the northern Allied force as they moved out of range around the north side of Savo Island. Ralph Talbot encountered Furutaka, Tenryū, and Yūbari as they cleared Savo Island. The Japanese ships fixed the U.S. destroyer with searchlights and hit her several times with gunfire, causing heavy damage, but Ralph Talbot escaped into a nearby rain squall, and the Japanese ships left her behind.

Mikawa’s Decision

At 02:16 Mikawa conferred with his staff about whether they should turn to continue the battle with the surviving Allied warships and try to sink the Allied transports in the two anchorages. Several factors influenced his ultimate decision. His ships were scattered and would take some time to regroup. His ships would need to reload their torpedo tubes, a labor-intensive task that would take some time. Mikawa also did not know the number and locations of any remaining Allied warships and his ships had expended much of their ammunition.

More importantly, Mikawa had no air cover and believed that U.S. aircraft carriers were in the area. Mikawa was probably aware that the Japanese Navy had no more heavy cruisers in production, and thus would be unable to replace any he might lose to air attack the next day if he remained near Guadalcanal. He was unaware that the U.S. carriers had withdrawn from the battle area and would not be a threat the next day. Although several of Mikawa’s staff urged an attack on the Allied transports, the consensus was to withdraw from the battle area. Therefore, at 02:20, Mikawa ordered his ships to retire.

Aftermath

Allied

At 04:00 on August 9 Patterson came alongside Canberra to assist the cruiser in fighting her fires. By 05:00, it appeared that the fires were almost under control, but Turner, who at this time intended to withdraw all Allied ships by 06:30, ordered the ship to be scuttled if she was not able to accompany the fleet. After the survivors were removed, the destroyers USS Selfridge and USS Ellet sank Canberra which took some 300 shells and five torpedoes.

Later in the morning of August 9, General Vandegrift advised Admiral Turner that he needed more supplies unloaded from the transports before they withdrew. Therefore, Turner postponed the withdrawal of his ships until mid-afternoon. In the meantime, Astoria’s crew tried to save their sinking ship. Astoria’s fires, however, eventually became completely out of control, and the ship sank at 12:15.

On the morning of August 9, an Australian coastwatcher on Bougainville radioed a warning of a Japanese airstrike on the way from Rabaul. The Allied transport crews ceased unloading for a time but were puzzled when the airstrike did not materialize. Allied forces did not discover until after the war was over that this Japanese airstrike instead concentrated on USS Jarvis south of Guadalcanal, sinking her with all hands. The Allied transports and warships all departed the Guadalcanal area by nightfall on August 9.

Japanese

In the late evening of August 9, Mikawa on Chōkai released the four cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 to return to their home base at Kavieng. At 08:10 on August 10, Kako was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine USS S-44 110 kilometers (70 mi) from her destination. The other three Japanese cruisers picked up all but 71 of her crew and went on to Kavieng.

Admiral Yamamoto signaled a congratulatory note to Mikawa on his victory, stating, “Appreciate the courageous and hard fighting of every man of your organization. I expect you to expand your exploits and you will make every effort to support the land forces of the Imperial army which are now engaged in a desperate struggle.” Later on, though, when it became apparent that Mikawa had missed an opportunity to destroy the Allied transports, he was intensely criticized by his comrades.

Tactical Result

From the time of the battle until several months later, almost all Allied supplies and reinforcements sent to Guadalcanal came by transports in small convoys, mainly during daylight hours, while Allied aircraft from the New Hebrides and Henderson Field and any available aircraft carriers flew covering missions. During this time, Allied forces on Guadalcanal received barely enough ammunition and provisions to withstand the several Japanese drives to retake the islands.

Despite their defeat in this battle, the Allies eventually won the battle for Guadalcanal, an important step in the eventual defeat of Japan. In hindsight, if Mikawa had elected to risk his ships to go after the Allied transports on the morning of August 9, he could have improved the chances of Japanese victory in the Guadalcanal campaign at its inception, and the course of the war in the southern Pacific could have gone much differently. Although the Allied warships at Guadalcanal that night were completely routed, the transports were unaffected. Many of these same transports were used many times to bring crucial supplies and reinforcements to Allied forces on Guadalcanal over succeeding months. Mikawa’s decision not to destroy the Allied transport ships when he had the opportunity would prove to be a crucial strategic mistake for the Japanese.

U.S. Naval Inquiry

A formal United States Navy board of inquiry, known as the Hepburn Investigation, prepared a report of the battle. The board interviewed most of the major Allied officers involved over several months, beginning in December 1942. The report recommended official censure for only one officer, Captain Howard D. Bode of the Chicago, for failing to broadcast a warning to the fleet of encroaching enemy ships. The report stopped short of recommending formal action against other Allied officers, including Admirals Fletcher, Turner, McCain, and Crutchley, and Captain Riefkohl. But Vice Admiral Ghormley, Vice Admiral Fletcher, and Rear Admiral Noyes were relieved of their commands. The careers of Turner, Crutchley, and McCain do not appear to have been affected by the defeat or the mistakes they made in contributing to it. Riefkohl, however, never commanded ships again. Captain Bode, upon learning that the report was going to be especially critical of his actions, shot himself in his quarters at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone, on April 19, 1943, and died the next day. Crutchley was gazetted with the Legion of Merit (Chief Commander) in September 1944.

Admiral Turner assessed why his forces were so soundly defeated in the battle:

The Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise.”

Historian Richard B. Frank adds that “This lethargy of mind would not be completely shaken off without some more hard blows to (U.S.) Navy pride around Guadalcanal, but after Savo, the United States picked itself up off the deck and prepared for the most savage combat in its history.”

Operational Changes

The report of the inquiry caused the US Navy to make many operational, and structural, changes.

Virtually every US Navy cruiser was retrofitted with emergency diesel electric generators. The fire mains of the ships were changed to a vertical loop design that could be broken many times and still function.

During the battle at Savo, many ship fires were attributed to aviation facilities filled with gas, oil, and planes. Motorboats were filled with gasoline, and also caught fire. In some cases, these facilities were dead amidships, presenting a perfect target for enemy ships at night. Ready-service lockers added to the destruction, and it was noted that these lockers were never close to being depleted, i.e. they contained much more dangerous ammunition than they needed to.

The Naval Commander in Chief Admiral King would order sweeping changes be made before ships entered surface combat in the future.

The U.S. Navy destroyer USS Ralph Talbot (DD-390) escorting the Guadalcanal-Tulagi invasion convoy, circa 7-8 August 1942. The heavy cruiser HMAS Australia (D84) is dimly visible in the far right distance, beyond the three destroyers maneuvering there.

The U.S. Navy heavy cruiser USS Astoria (CA-34) joins Task Force 16 as it approaches Tulagi, about 6 August 1942.

A U.S. destroyer steams up what later became known as Ironbottom Sound, the body of water between Guadalcanal and Tulagi, during landings on both islands, 7 August 1942. Savo Island is in the center distance and Cape Esperance, on Guadalcanal, is at the left. Photographed from USS San Juan (CL-54) from a location approximately due east from the northern tip of Savo Island.

View from the Japanese cruiser Chokai of the battle with the Allied “southern” force as aerial flares illuminate the Allied cruisers HMAS Canberra (D33) and USS Chicago (CA-29) on 9 August 1942.

Japanese, Type 93, “Long Lance” torpedo, on display outside U.S. Navy headquarters in Washington, DC, during World War II. This torpedo was recovered from Point Cruz on Guadalcanal.

The Japanese cruiser Yubari shines searchlights towards the northern force of Allied warships during the Battle of Savo Island on 9 August 1942.

The U.S. Navy heavy cruiser USS Quincy (CA-39) photographed from a Japanese cruiser during the Battle of Savo Island, off Guadalcanal, 9 August 1942. Quincy, seen here burning and illuminated by Japanese searchlights, was sunk in this action. The flames at the far left of the picture are probably from the USS Vincennes (CA-44), also on fire from gunfire and torpedo damage.

U.S. Navy destroyers remove the crew from the sinking Royal Australian Navy heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra (D33) after the Battle of Savo Island, 9 August 1942. USS Blue (DD-387) is alongside Canberra´s port bow, as USS Patterson (DD-392) approaches from astern.

U.S. Navy destroyers remove the crew from the sinking Royal Australian Navy heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra (D33) after the Battle of Savo Island, August 9, 1942. USS Blue (DD-387) is alongside Canberra´s port bow, as USS Patterson (DD-392) approaches from astern.

The Royal Australian Navy heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra (D33) burning and sinking on 9 August 1942, following the Battle of Savo Island. Savo Island is in the background.

Allied ships maneuvering off Tulagi, Solomon Islands, on 9 August 1942. The U.S. Navy heavy cruiser USS Chicago (CA-29) is at right, with a destroyer’s stern and wake in the foreground. The column of smoke in the left center distance, beyond the two destroyers, may be from the burning troop transport USS George F. Elliott (AP-13).

The U.S. Navy heavy cruiser USS Chicago (CA-29) off Guadalcanal the day after the Battle of Savo Island, showing crewmen cutting away damaged plating to enable the ship to get underway. She had been torpedoed at her extreme bow during the night action of 9 August 1942. The view looks forward along her port side, with the No. 1 eight-inch gun turret in the upper right. Note the life rafts hung on the turret side and the destroyers in the distance.

“Men wounded in the Battle of Tulagi Island being removed from the USS Blue (DD-387) to the USS Neville (AP-16), 7-8-9 August 1942.” Quoted from the original caption. This photograph was probably taken on 9 August, as Blue was transferring survivors of the Battle of Savo Island, which had taken place during the previous night.

Map showing the disposition of the Imperial Japanese and U.S. forces at the beginning of the Battle of Savo Island, circa 0100-0120 hrs on 9 August 1942.

Battle of Savo Island showing Japanese movements based on testimony from a surviving Japanese participant.

U.S. Navy map from 1943 of engagement between Japanese ships and southern force of Allied ships in battle on August 8-9, 1942.

U.S. Navy map from 1943 showing battle between Japanese ships and Allied northern force ships near Savo Island on August 9, 1942. Modified in 2006 to show that the Japanese force split into two groups.

 

Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu–Tanambogo

Allied forces wade ashore at “Beach Blue” on Tulagi, August 7, 1942.

The Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu–Tanambogo was a land battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II, between the forces of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied (mainly United States (U.S.) Marine) ground forces. It took place from 7–9 August 1942 on the Solomon Islands, during the initial Allied landings in the Guadalcanal campaign.

U.S. Marines, under the overall command of U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, captured the islands of Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo among which the Japanese Navy had constructed a naval and seaplane base. The landings were fiercely resisted by the Japanese Navy troops who, outnumbered and outgunned by the Allied forces, fought and died almost to the last man.

At the same time that the landings on Tulagi and Gavutu–Tanambogo were taking place, Allied troops were also landing on nearby Guadalcanal, with the objective of capturing an airfield under construction by Japanese forces. In contrast to the intense fighting on Tulagi and Gavutu, the landings on Guadalcanal were essentially unopposed. The landings on both Tulagi and Guadalcanal initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign and a series of combined-arms battles between Allied and Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands area.

Background

On 7 December 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, initiating a state of war between the two nations. The attack crippled much of the U.S. battleship fleet. The initial goals of Japanese leaders in the war were to neutralize the U.S. fleet, seize possessions rich in natural resources, and establish strategic military bases to defend Japan’s empire in Asia and the Pacific. In support of these goals, Japanese forces attacked and took control of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Wake Island, Gilbert Islands, New Britain, and Guam.

Two attempts by the Japanese to extend their defensive perimeter in the south and central Pacific were thwarted in the battles of Coral Sea (May 1942) and Midway (June 1942). These two strategic victories for the Allies provided them with an opportunity to take the initiative and launch an offensive against the Japanese somewhere in the Pacific. The Allies chose the Solomon Islands, specifically the southern Solomon Islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida as the location for their first offensive.

As part of an operation that resulted in the Coral Sea battle, the Japanese Navy sent troops to occupy Tulagi and nearby islands in the southern Solomons. These troops—mainly members of the 3d Kure Special Naval Landing Force—occupied Tulagi on 3 May 1942, and constructed a seaplane, ship refueling, and communications base on Tulagi and the nearby islands of Gavutu, Tanambogo and Florida, all of which were soon operational. Aware of the Japanese efforts on Tulagi, the Allies’ concern increased in early July 1942 when the Japanese Navy began constructing a large airfield near Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal. By August 1942, the Japanese had about 900 troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, and 2,800 personnel (many of whom were Korean and Japanese construction specialists and laborers) on Guadalcanal. The airfield—when complete—would protect Japan’s major base at Rabaul, threaten Allied supply and communication lines, and establish a staging area for possible future offensives against Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa (Operation FS).

The Allied plan to attack the southern Solomons was conceived by U.S. Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. He proposed the offensive to deny the use of the southern Solomon Islands by the Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to use them as starting points for a campaign with the objective of capturing or neutralizing the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign, with the eventual goal of opening the way for the U.S. to retake the Philippines. U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz—Allied commander-in-chief for Pacific forces—created the South Pacific theater—with U.S. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley in command—to direct the Allied offensive in the Solomons.

In preparation for the offensive, in May 1942, U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift was ordered to move his 1st Marine Division from the U.S. to New Zealand. Other Allied land, naval, and air force units were sent to establish bases in Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides was selected as the headquarters and main base for the impending offensive—codenamed Operation Watchtower—with the commencement date set for 7 August 1942. At first, the Allied offensive was planned just for Tulagi and the Santa Cruz Islands, omitting Guadalcanal. However, after Allied reconnaissance discovered the Japanese airfield construction efforts on Guadalcanal, capture of that airfield was added to the plan and the Santa Cruz operation was dropped.

The Allied Watchtower expeditionary force of 75 warships and transports, which included vessels from both the U.S. and Australia, assembled near Fiji on 26 July, and engaged in one rehearsal landing prior to leaving for Guadalcanal on July 31. Vandegrift was the overall commander of the 16,000 Allied (primarily U.S. Marine) ground forces involved in the landings and personally commanded the assault on Guadalcanal. In command of the 3,000 U.S. Marines set to land on Tulagi and the nearby islands of Florida, Gavutu, and Tanambogo was U.S. Brigadier General William H. Rupertus on the transport ship USS Neville.

Prelude

Bad weather allowed the Allied expeditionary force to arrive in the vicinity of Guadalcanal unseen by the Japanese on the morning of 7 August. The Japanese detected the radio traffic from the incoming Allied invasion force and prepared to send scout aircraft aloft at daybreak. The landing force ships split into two groups, with one group assigned for the assault on Guadalcanal and the other tasked with the assault on Tulagi, Florida, and Gavutu–Tanambogo. Aircraft from the aircraft carrier USS Wasp dive-bombed Japanese installations on Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and Florida and strafed and destroyed 15 Japanese seaplanes floating in the anchorages near the islands. Several of the seaplanes were warming their engines in preparation for takeoff and were lost with their aircrews and many of their support personnel.

The cruiser USS San Juan and destroyers USS Monssen (DD-436) and Buchanan bombarded planned landing sites on Tulagi and Florida Island. To cover the assaults on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, U.S. Marines from the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment made an unopposed landing on Florida Island at 07:40. They were guided to their objective by several Australians, such as Lieutenant Frank Stackpool (later Captain, British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force), who were familiar with the Tulagi-Florida area from having previously lived and worked in the area.

Battle

Tulagi

At 08:00 on August 7, 1942, two battalions of U.S. Marines, including the 1st Raider Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson (Edson’s Raiders), and the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) under Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans made an unopposed landing on the western shore of Tulagi about halfway between the two ends of the oblong-shaped island. Beds of coral near the shore kept the landing craft from reaching the shoreline. The Marines, however, were able to wade the remaining 100 m (110 yd) without hindrance from the Japanese forces, who were apparently taken by surprise by the landings and had yet to begin any organized resistance. At this time, the Japanese forces on Tulagi and Gavutu, a detachment of the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) plus members of the Yokohama Air Group—commanded by Captain Shigetoshi Miyazaki—signaled their commander at Rabaul—Captain Sadayoshi Yamada—that they were under attack, were destroying their equipment and papers, and signed off with the message, “Enemy troop strength is overwhelming, We will defend to the last man.” Masaaki Suzuki, commander of the SNLF unit, ordered his troops into pre-prepared defensive positions on Tulagi and Gavutu.

Marines of 2/5 secured the northwest end of Tulagi without opposition and then joined Edson’s Raiders in their advance towards the southeastern end of the island. The Marines advanced towards the southeast end of the island throughout the day while defeating a few isolated pockets of Japanese resistance. Around noon, Suzuki repositioned his main defenses into a line on a hill—called Hill 281 (Hill 280 in some sources) by U.S. forces based on its elevation—and a nearby ravine located at the southeast end of the island. The Japanese defenses included dozens of tunneled caves dug into the hill’s limestone cliffs and machinegun pits protected by sandbags. The Marines reached these defenses near dusk, realized that they did not have enough daylight left for a full-scale attack, and dug in for the night.

During the night, the Japanese attacked the Marine lines five times, beginning at 22:30. The attacks consisted of frontal charges along with individual and small group infiltration efforts towards Edson’s command post that at times resulted in hand to hand combat with the Marines. The Japanese temporarily broke through the Marine lines and captured a machine gun, but were quickly thrown back. After taking a few more casualties, the Marine lines held throughout the rest of the night. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in the attacks. During the night, one Marine—Edward H. Ahrens—killed 13 Japanese who assaulted his position before he was killed. Describing the Japanese attacks that took place during the night, eyewitness raider Marine Pete Sparacino said:

...full darkness set in. There was movement to the front...you could hear them jabbering. Then, the enemy found a gap and began running through the opening. The gap was (sealed) when another squad closed the gate. Some Japanese had crawled within 20 yards of (Frank) Guidone’s squad. Frank began throwing grenades from a prone position. His grenades were going off 15 yards from our position (and) we had to duck as they exploded. The enemy was all around. It was brutal and deadly. We had to be careful not to kill our comrades. We were tired but had to stay awake or be dead.

At daybreak on 8 August, six Japanese infiltrators hiding under the porch of the former British colonial headquarters shot and killed three Marines. Within five minutes, other Marines killed the six Japanese with grenades. Later that morning, the Marines, after landing reinforcements in the form of the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines (2/2), surrounded Hill 281 and the ravine, pounded both locations with mortar fire throughout the morning, and then assaulted the two positions, utilizing improvised explosive charges to kill the Japanese defenders taking cover in the many caves and fighting positions spread throughout the hill and ravine. Employing the improvised explosives, the individual Japanese fighting positions were destroyed. Significant Japanese resistance ended by the afternoon, although a few stragglers were found and killed over the next several days. In the battle for Tulagi, 307 Japanese and 45 U.S. troops died. Three Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner.

Gavutu–Tanambogo

The nearby islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo housed the Japanese seaplane base as well as 536 Japanese naval personnel from the Yokohama Air Group and 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force and Korean and Japanese civilian technicians and laborers from the 14th Construction Unit. The two islets were basically mounds of coral—both about 42 m (138 ft) high—and connected to each other by a 500 m (1,600 ft)-long causeway. The hills on Gavutu and Tanambogo were called Hills 148 and 121 respectively by the Americans because of their height in feet. The Japanese on both islets were well entrenched in bunkers and caves constructed on and in the two hills. Also, the two islets were mutually supportive since each was in machine gun range of the other. The U.S. mistakenly believed that the islets were garrisoned by only 200 naval troops and construction workers.

At 12:00 on 7 August, Gavutu was assaulted by the U.S. Marine 1st Parachute Battalion consisting of 397 men. The assault was scheduled for noon because there were not enough aircraft to provide air cover for the Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Gavutu landings at the same time. The preceding naval bombardment had damaged the seaplane ramp, forcing the naval landing craft to land the Marines in a more exposed location on a nearby small beach and dock. Japanese machine gun fire began inflicting heavy casualties, killing or wounding one in ten of the landing Marines as they scrambled inland in an attempt to get out of the crossfire coming from the two islets.

Surviving Marines were able to deploy two M1919 Browning machine guns to provide suppressing fire on Gavutu’s caves, allowing more Marines to push inland from the landing area. Seeking cover, the Marines became scattered and were quickly pinned down. Captain George Stallings—the battalion operations officer—directed Marines to begin suppressive fire with machine guns and mortars on the Japanese machine gun emplacements on Tanambogo. Shortly thereafter, American dive bombers dropped several bombs on Tanambogo, diminishing some of the volume of fire from that location.

After about two hours, Marines reached and climbed Hill 148. Working from the top, the Marines began clearing the Japanese fighting positions on the hill, most of which still remained, with explosive charges, grenades, and hand-to-hand combat. From the top of the hill, the Marines were also able to put increased suppressive fire on Tanambogo. The Marine battalion commander on Gavutu radioed General Rupertus with a request for reinforcements before attempting to assault Tanambogo.

Most of the 240 Japanese defenders on Tanambogo were aircrew and maintenance personnel from the Yokohama Air Group. Many of these were aircraft maintenance personnel and construction units not equipped for combat. One of the few Japanese soldiers captured recounts fighting armed with only hand sickles and poles. Rupertus detached one company of Marines from the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment on Florida Island to assist in assaulting Tanambogo, in spite of advice from his staff that one company was not enough. Incorrectly believing that Tanambogo was only lightly defended, this company attempted an amphibious assault directly on Tanambogo shortly after dark on 7 August. Illuminated by fires started during a U.S. naval bombardment of the islet, the five landing craft carrying the Marines were hit by heavy fire as they approached the shore, with many of the U.S. Navy boat crews being killed or wounded, as well as heavily damaging three of the boats. Realizing the position was untenable the Marine company commander ordered the remaining boats to depart with the wounded marines, and he and 12 men who had already landed sprinted across the causeway to cover on Gavutu. The Japanese on Tanambogo suffered 10 killed in the day’s fighting.

Throughout the night, as the Japanese staged isolated attacks on the marines on Gavutu under the concealment of heavy thunderstorms, Vandegrift prepared to send reinforcements to assist with the assault on Tanambogo. The 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines (3/2), still embarked on ships off Guadalcanal, was notified to prepare to assault Tanambogo on August 8.

The 3rd Battalion began landing on Gavutu at 10:00 on 8 August and assisted in destroying the remaining Japanese defenses on that islet, which was completed by 12:00. Then the 3rd Battalion prepared to assault Tanambogo. The Marines on Gavutu provided covering fire for the attack. In preparation for the assault, U.S. carrier-based dive bombers and naval gunfire bombardment were requested. After the carrier aircraft twice accidentally dropped bombs on the U.S. Marines on Gavutu, killing four of them, further carrier aircraft support was canceled. San Juan, however, placed its shells on the correct island and shelled Tanambogo for 30 minutes. The Marine assault began at 16:15, both by landing craft and across the causeway, and, with assistance from two marine Stuart light tanks, began making headway against the Japanese defenses. One of the tanks which became stuck on a stump and isolated from its infantry support was surrounded by a “frenzied mob” of about 50 Japanese airmen. The Japanese set fire to the tank, killing two of its crew and severely beat the other two crewmembers before most of them were killed by Marine rifle fire. The Marines later counted 42 Japanese bodies around the burned-out hulk of the tank, including the corpses of the Yokohama executive officer and several of the seaplane pilots. One of the Japanese survivors of the attack on the tank reported, “I recall seeing my officer, Lieutenant Commander Saburo Katsuta of the Yokohama Air Group, on top of the tank. This was the last time I saw him.” The overall commander of troops on Tanambogo was Captain (naval rank) Miyazaki-san who blew himself up inside his dugout on the late afternoon of 8 August.

Throughout the day, the Marines methodically dynamited the caves, destroying most of them by 21:00. The few surviving Japanese conducted isolated attacks throughout the night, with hand to hand engagements occurring. By noon on 9 August, all Japanese resistance on Tanambogo ended. In the battle for Gavutu and Tanambogo, 476 Japanese defenders and 70 U.S. Marines or naval personnel died. Of the 20 Japanese prisoners taken during the battle, most were not actually Japanese combatants but Korean laborers belonging to the Japanese construction unit. The poem, Graves of Gavutu, written by Frank W. McCullock, memorializes the Marines battle for Gavutu and is part of the Hell Hawk Poems collection.

Landings on Guadalcanal

In contrast to Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered much less resistance. At 09:10 on 7 August, General Vandegrift and 11,000 U.S. Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point. Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered no resistance except for “tangled” rain forest, and halted for the night about 1,000 m (1,100 yd) from the Lunga Point airfield. The next day, again against little resistance, the Marines advanced all the way to the Lunga River and secured the airfield by 16:00 on 8 August. The Japanese naval construction units had abandoned the airfield area, leaving behind food, supplies, and intact construction equipment and vehicles.

Aftermath

During the battle, about 80 Japanese escaped from Tulagi and Gavutu–Tanambogo by swimming to Florida Island. They were, however, all hunted down and killed by Marine and British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force patrols over the next two months.

The Allies quickly turned the Tulagi anchorage, one of the finest natural harbors in the South Pacific, into a naval base and refueling station. During the Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands campaigns, Tulagi served as an important base for Allied naval operations. Since the Japanese exerted control over the nearby seas at night throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, any Allied ships in the Guadalcanal area that could not depart by nightfall often took refuge in Tulagi’s harbor. Allied ships damaged in the naval battles that occurred between August and December 1942 in the vicinity of Guadalcanal usually anchored in Tulagi’s harbor for temporary repairs before heading to rear-area ports for permanent repairs.

Later in the campaign, Tulagi also became a base for U.S. PT boats that attempted to interdict “Tokyo Express” missions by the Japanese to resupply and reinforce their forces on Guadalcanal. A seaplane base was also established on nearby Florida Island. Except for some troops left to build, garrison, operate, and defend the base at Tulagi, however, the majority of the U.S. Marines that had assaulted Tulagi and the nearby islets were soon relocated to Guadalcanal to help defend the airfield, later called Henderson Field by Allied forces, located at Lunga Point, for it was to be on Guadalcanal where all of the future, crucial, land battles in the Guadalcanal campaign would be fought.

The U.S. Navy escort carrier USS Tulagi—in commission from 1943 to 1946—was named for the fighting on Tulagi.

 

Japanese Invasion of Tulagi, May 1942

Men who took Tulagi--for the first time. Officers and petty officers of the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) which seized Tulagi and Gavutu in May 1942. WO Tsurusaburo Shigeta’s information platoon, 3rd Company, photographed 17 February 1942 at Kure barracks, Kure, Japan. First row, left to right: PO3c Tokio Ishihara (or Ishiwara), PO3c Kazuo Kano, PO3c Yoshiaki Murakami, PO1c Katsuo Takano, WOo Tsurusaburo Shigeta, Sp. Lt (jg) Kakichi Yoshimoto (commander, 3rd Company, Kure 3rd SNLF), WO Takeo Ikeda, PO3c Toyosaku Saito, PO3c Shigeo Kanbara, PO3c Goro Hayashi, PO3c Masajiro Yoshimura. The majority of those in this photo subsequently died defending Tulagi against U.S. Marines in August 1942.

The invasion of Tulagi, on 3–4 May 1942, was part of Operation Mo, the Empire of Japan’s strategy in the South Pacific and South West Pacific Area in 1942. The plan called for Imperial Japanese Navy troops to capture Tulagi and nearby islands in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. The occupation of Tulagi by the Japanese was intended to cover the flank of and provide reconnaissance support for Japanese forces that were advancing on Port Moresby in New Guinea, provide greater defensive depth for the major Japanese base at Rabaul, and serve as a base for Japanese forces to threaten and interdict the supply and communication routes between the United States and Australia and New Zealand.

Without the means to effectively resist the Japanese offensive in the Solomons, the British Resident Commissioner of the Solomon Islands protectorate and the few Australian troops assigned to defend Tulagi evacuated the island just before the Japanese forces arrived on 3 May. The next day, however, a U.S. aircraft carrier task force en route to resist the Japanese forces advancing on Port Moresby (later taking part in the Battle of the Coral Sea) struck the Japanese Tulagi landing force in an air attack, destroying or damaging several of the Japanese ships and aircraft involved in the landing operation. Nevertheless, the Japanese troops successfully occupied Tulagi and began the construction of a small naval base.

Over the next several months, the Japanese established a naval refueling, communications, and seaplane reconnaissance base on Tulagi and the nearby islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo, and in July 1942 began to build a large airfield on nearby Guadalcanal. The Japanese activities on Tulagi and Guadalcanal were observed by Allied reconnaissance aircraft, as well as by Australian coastwatcher personnel stationed in the area. Because these activities threatened the Allied supply and communication lines in the South Pacific, Allied forces counter-attacked with landings of their own on Guadalcanal and Tulagi on 7 August 1942, initiating the critical Guadalcanal campaign and a series of combined arms battles between Allied and Japanese forces that, along with the New Guinea campaign, decided the course of the war in the South Pacific.

Background

On 7 December 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack crippled most of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s battleships and started a formal state of war between the two nations. In launching this war, Japanese leaders sought to neutralize the American fleet, seize possessions rich in natural resources, and obtain strategic military bases to defend their far-flung empire. Soon after, other nations—including the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—joined the U.S. as Allies in the war against Japan. In the words of the Japanese Navy’s Combined Fleet “Secret Order Number One,” dated 1 November 1941, the goals of the initial Japanese campaigns in the impending war were to, “(eject) British and American strength from the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines, (and) to establish a policy of autonomous self-sufficiency and economic independence.” To support these goals, during the first few months of 1942 Japanese forces also attacked and took control of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, Wake Island, New Britain, the Gilbert Islands, and Guam.

Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue—commander of the Japanese 4th Fleet (also called the “South Seas Force”) consisting of most of the naval units in the South Pacific area—advocated the seizing of Lae, Salamaua, and Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. Inoue believed that the capture and control of these locations would provide greater security for the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain. Japan’s Naval General Staff endorsed Inoue’s argument and began planning further operations, using these locations as supporting bases, to seize Nauru, Ocean Island, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa and thereby cut the supply lines between Australia and the U.S., with the goal of reducing or eliminating Australia as a threat to Japanese positions in the South Pacific.

The Imperial Japanese Army supported the idea of taking Port Moresby and in April 1942, with the Japanese Navy, developed a plan for the attack that was titled “Operation Mo.” The plan also included the seizure of Tulagi, a small island in the southern Solomon Islands, where a seaplane base would be set up for potential air operations against Allied territories and forces in the South Pacific. Although Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto—commander of the Combined Fleet—was concurrently planning an operation that he hoped would lure the U.S. Pacific Fleet into a decisive showdown in the central Pacific, he detached some of his large warships to support the Mo operation and placed Inoue in charge of the naval portion of the operation.

A large force consisting of two heavy aircraft carriers, one light aircraft carrier, a seaplane carrier, nine cruisers, and 13 destroyers—split into several elements—was to guard the Japanese Port Moresby invasion convoy as well as to engage any Allied naval warships that approached to contest the invasion. The Tulagi invasion force, consisting of the destroyers Kikuzuki and Yūzuki, minelayer/transports Okinoshima, and Kōei Maru, auxiliary minesweepers Wa #1, Wa #2, and transports Hagoromo Maru, Noshiro Maru #2, Tama Maru, and Azumasan Maru, subchasers Toshi Maru #3 and Tama Maru #8 and commanded by Rear Admiral Kiyohide Shima (flag on Okinoshima), departed from Rabaul on 30 April and headed towards the Solomon Islands. Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō provided air cover for the Tulagi invasion with his Covering Group of one light carrier (Shōhō), four cruisers, and one destroyer located just west of the central Solomons. A separate Cover Force (sometimes referred to as the Tulagi Support Group)—commanded by Rear Admiral Kuninori Marumo and consisting of two light cruisers, the seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru, and three gunboats—joined the Covering Group in supporting the Tulagi invasion. Once Tulagi was secured on 3 or 4 May, the Covering Group and Cover Force were to reposition to help cover the Port Moresby invasion.

At the time, Tulagi was the capital of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, which included all of the islands of the Solomons except Bougainville and Buka. William Sydney Marchant, the British Resident Commissioner of the Solomons and commander of the local defense forces, directed the evacuation of most of the white civilian residents to Australia in February 1942. Marchant was evacuated to Malaita the following month, where he helped operate a coastwatcher relay station.

The only Allied military forces at Tulagi were 24 commandos from the Australian Army’s 2/1st Independent Company, under Captain A. L. Goode, and about 25 personnel from 11 Squadron RAAF, under F/O R. B. Peagam, operating a seaplane base on nearby Gavutu-Tanambogo with four PBY Catalina maritime patrol aircraft. Three Allied coastwatchers were also located nearby, on Guadalcanal island. The task of the coastwatchers was to report on any enemy movements, or suspicious activity, that they observed in the vicinity of their stations. In the belief that it might prevent them being executed for espionage, all of the coastwatchers were commissioned as Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve officers, and they were directed by Lieutenant Commander Eric Feldt, who was located at Townsville in Australia.

Throughout most of April, the Japanese conducted “desultory” bombing raids on Tulagi with aircraft based at Rabaul or nearby that caused little, if any, damage. The coastwatchers on Guadalcanal were usually able to radio advance warning to the Australian troops on Tulagi of the approaching Japanese aircraft, but the troops did not have large enough weaponry—three Vickers machine guns and one Bren light machine gun—to seriously challenge the Japanese bombers. On 25 April, Tulagi was bombed by eight Japanese aircraft. Similar raids occurred daily over the next week, with one raid on 1 May heavily damaging one of the Catalinas at Gavutu. The remaining Catalinas successfully evacuated that same day.

Allied intelligence personnel had deciphered much of the Japanese Mo plans through radio intercepts at the Allied Fleet Radio Units (radio intelligence centers) in Melbourne, Australia and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Based on this intelligence, on 22 April, U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz—stationed at Pearl Harbor—directed Allied forces towards the Coral Sea area to interdict the Japanese Mo operation. On 27 April, the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Yorktown’s Task Force 17 (TF 17), under the command of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, sortied from Tonga and was joined by the U.S. carrier USS Lexington’s TF 11 300 nmi (350 mi; 560 km) northwest of New Caledonia on 1 May. That same day, Fletcher detached TF 11 to refuel, expecting to rejoin with Lexington and her escorts on 4 May at a predetermined location in the Coral Sea.

Landings and Air Attacks

On 2 May, coastwatcher Jack Read on Bougainville reported that a large force of Japanese ships, believed to be part of the Japanese Tulagi invasion force, had departed from the Buka area. Later that day, coastwatcher D. G. Kennedy on New Georgia island sighted and reported a large Japanese force of ships heading towards the southern Solomons. Soon after, Goode and Peagam—anticipating that the Japanese would attack with overwhelming numbers—ordered the execution of a pre-planned evacuation operation and began the destruction and demolition of their equipment and facilities on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo. The RAAF personnel and commandos embarked on two small ships early in the morning on 3 May to begin the trip to Vila, New Hebrides, just as Shima’s ships entered Savo sound to begin their landings on Tulagi. The ship with the RAAF personnel spent the day with coastwatcher and protectorate district officer Martin Clemens at Aola on Guadalcanal and departed that night.

Supporting the Japanese landings were seaplanes from Kamikawa Maru, temporarily based at Thousand Ships Bay at Santa Isabel Island. About 400 Japanese naval troops—mainly from the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force—disembarked from the transport ship on barges and immediately began construction of facilities on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo. Aircraft from Shōhō covered the landings until early afternoon, when Gotō’s force turned toward Bougainville to refuel in preparation to support the landings at Port Moresby. Once the Japanese troops were ashore, six seaplanes landed in Tulagi harbor as part of the establishment of the planned seaplane base there.

At 17:00 on 3 May, Fletcher was notified that the Japanese Tulagi invasion force had been sighted the day before approaching the southern Solomons. Unable to communicate with the Lexington task force because of the need to maintain radio silence, Yorktown’s task force proceeded independently toward Guadalcanal in order to be in position to launch airstrikes against the Japanese forces at Tulagi the next morning.

At 07:01 on 4 May, Yorktown launched a first strike consisting of 12 TBD Devastator torpedo bombers and 28 SBD Dauntless dive bombers from a position about 160 km (86 nmi; 99 mi) south of Guadalcanal. The aircraft began their attacks on Shima’s ships anchored near Tulagi at 08:50, taking the Japanese ships by surprise and at anchor. Okinoshima and the two destroyers were positioned to provide a protective barrier for Azumasan Maru and Kōei Maru which were busy unloading troops and materiel. The three minesweepers had just got underway to support the Port Moresby invasion and were still near Tulagi. Although the U.S. pilots from the first strike claimed many bomb and torpedo hits on the anchored ships, they actually hit only Okinoshima, causing minor damage, and Kikuzuki, causing major damage. Kikuzuki—with the assistance of one of the subchasers—was beached on Gavutu in an attempt to keep her from sinking. During this time, all of the other ships weighed anchor and attempted to escape from the harbor. One U.S. dive bomber destroyed a Japanese Mitsubishi F1M2 “Pete” floatplane that attempted to take off during the attack.

Yorktown’s second strike—utilizing the same aircraft—returned to Tulagi and began their attack at 12:10 on the Japanese ships, many of which were now at full steam and attempting to put distance between themselves and Tulagi harbor. The second strike hit and sank the minesweepers #1 and #2 and severely damaged Tama Maru northeast of Savo Island. Another Japanese seaplane was shot down by a U.S. dive bomber during the second strike. After four F4F-3/3A Wildcat fighters from Yorktown joined the strike, the fighters shot down two more Japanese floatplanes over Florida Island. The four U.S. fighters then strafed Yūzuki, killing her captain and nine others of her crew, and causing moderate damage to the ship. Two or three other Japanese floatplanes were damaged in Tulagi harbor and their crews were killed.

A third, smaller strike from Yorktown arrived at 15:30 and caused moderate damage to Azumasan Maru and Okinoshima. One of the TBDs in the third strike became lost, ran out of fuel, and ditched in the ocean about 60 km (32 nmi; 37 mi) south of Guadalcanal. Two of the Wildcats from the second strike also ran out of fuel and crash landed on the southern coast of Guadalcanal. Fletcher sent the destroyers USS Hammann and Perkins to rescue the aircrews from the three aircraft. Hammann was able to recover both fighter pilots, but Perkins was unable to locate the TBD’s crew. Both destroyers returned to Yorktown’s task force late that evening as the task force turned away from Guadalcanal toward the southeast in order to refuel and rendezvous with Lexington the next day.

Aftermath

On 5 May, Kikuzuki slid off of the shore of Gavutu and sank in Tulagi harbor, a total loss. Tama Maru foundered two days later. The other surviving, damaged Japanese ships were able to reach Rabaul and Kavieng for repairs. Hagoromo Maru and Noshiro Maru #2 joined the Port Moresby Invasion Group. On 10 May, as Okinoshima participated in the first Japanese attempt to take Ocean (Banaba) and Nauru Islands, titled Operation RY, she was sunk by the submarine USS S-42 off New Ireland. A total of 87 Japanese naval personnel died in the 4 May air attacks on Tulagi, and 36 of the landing troops were seriously injured.

The lost Yorktown TBD aircrew reached Guadalcanal after drifting in the ocean for three days. A Roman Catholic missionary took them to Martin Clemens who arranged for a boat to take them to San Cristobal. From San Cristobal, another boat took them to the New Hebrides and from there they eventually rejoined U.S. forces.

After striking Tulagi, Yorktown rejoined with Lexington, and the two carriers engaged the rest of the Japanese forces involved in the Mo operation from 6–8 May in the Battle of the Coral Sea. In the battle, Lexington was sunk and Yorktown was damaged. The Japanese suffered Shōhō sunk, a fleet carrier heavily damaged, and heavy losses to their carrier aircraft and aircrews. Fearing more damaging attacks from Allied land-based aircraft or warships and unable because of their aircraft losses to provide adequate air cover for their naval surface forces, the Japanese turned back from their planned assault on Port Moresby with the intention of trying again later. The next Japanese seaborne attempt to take Port Moresby, however, never happened, mainly because of their navy’s defeat in June at the Battle of Midway. Instead, the Japanese decided to try to take Port Moresby in an ultimately unsuccessful overland attack along the Kokoda Track. The failure to take Port Moresby in May 1942 would have significant and far-reaching strategic implications, many of which involved the small Japanese naval base at Tulagi.

Despite the damaging air attacks to their ships and landing forces, the Japanese proceeded with the construction of the naval seaplane base at Tulagi and Gavutu, receiving more shipments of troops and construction workers over the next several months. The base was soon operational with aircraft from the Yokohama Air Group which conducted air reconnaissance patrols throughout the surrounding area beginning on 6 May. On 27 May, the Japanese inspected the Lunga Point area on Guadalcanal as a possible location to build a large airfield. On 13 June, the Naval General Staff approved the construction of an airfield at that location and on 19 June, Admiral Inoue toured the site in anticipation of the airfield construction effort. The next day, Japanese troops began clearing the area of brush, and on 6 July, a 12-ship convoy delivered 2,000 Korean and Japanese construction workers plus 500 Japanese naval combat troops to conduct the airfield construction effort in earnest. The coastwatchers on Guadalcanal and Allied air reconnaissance observed the Japanese airfield construction efforts. Allied Catalinas and B-17s based at Port Moresby, Efate, Nouméa, and Espiritu Santo frequently bombed the Japanese bases on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Gavutu over the next several months, but without causing significant damage. Several Japanese float fighters and one Allied bomber were destroyed in aerial combat during the missions.

The Allies were greatly concerned about the Japanese airfield construction effort on Guadalcanal because, when completed, the aircraft operating from the airfield would be a significant threat to Allied operations between Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. The two strategic victories for the Allies in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway provided an opportunity to take the initiative and launch an offensive against the Japanese somewhere in the Pacific. An Allied plan to attack the southern Solomons was conceived by U.S. Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. He proposed the offensive to deny the use of the southern Solomon Islands by the Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to use them as starting points for a campaign. His goal was to neutralize or capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign, with the eventual goal of opening the way for the U.S. to retake the Philippines. U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz—Allied commander-in chief for Pacific forces—created the South Pacific theater—with U.S. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley in command—to direct the Allied offensive in the Solomons.

The failure of the Japanese to take Port Moresby and their defeat at Midway had the effect of leaving their base at Tulagi without effective protection from other Japanese bases. Tulagi was four hours flying time from Rabaul, the nearest large Japanese base. On 7 August 1942, 11,000 U.S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal and 3,000 U.S. Marines landed on Tulagi and nearby islands. The Japanese troops on Tulagi and nearby islands were outnumbered and killed almost to the last man in the Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo while the U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal captured the airfield at Lunga Point without significant resistance. Thus began the Guadalcanal campaign that resulted in a series of large, combined-arms battles between Allied and Japanese forces over the next six months which—along with the New Guinea campaign—would decide the fate of Japanese efforts to secure the southern frontier of their empire in the Pacific.

Douglas SBDs of USS Yorktown´s air group head back to the ship after a strike on Japanese ships in Tulagi harbor on 4 May 1942.

The Japanese cargo ship Koei Maru is straddled by bombs dropped from aircraft the USS Yorktown (CV-5) in Tulagi harbor on 4 May 1942. The cargo ship escaped without serious damage.

The rusting hulk of Kikuzuki, photographed on Tulagi in August 1943 after U.S. forces dragged the wreckage onto the beach.