Battle of the Eastern Solomons


The naval Battle of the Eastern Solomons (also known as the Battle of the Stewart Islands and, in Japanese sources, as the Second Battle of the Solomon Sea), took place on 24–25 August 1942, and was the third carrier battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II and the second major engagement fought between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Guadalcanal Campaign. As at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, the ships of the two adversaries were never within sight of each other. Instead, all attacks were carried out by carrier-based or land-based aircraft.

After several damaging air attacks, the naval surface combatants from both America and Japan withdrew from the battle area without either side securing a clear victory. However, the U.S. and its allies gained tactical and strategic advantage. Japan’s losses were greater and included dozens of aircraft and their experienced aircrews. Also, Japanese reinforcements intended for Guadalcanal were delayed and eventually delivered by warships rather than transport ships, giving the Allies more time to prepare for the Japanese counteroffensive and preventing the Japanese from landing heavy artillery, ammunition, and other supplies.

Background

On 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S. Marine Corps units) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases to threaten supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and secure the islands as launching points for a campaign with an eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.

The Allied landings were directly supported by three U.S. aircraft carrier task forces (TFs): TF 11 (USS Saratoga), TF 16 (USS Enterprise), and TF 18 (USS Wasp), their respective air groups, and supporting surface warships, including a battleship, cruisers, and destroyers. The overall commander of the three carrier task forces was Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who flew his flag on Saratoga. The aircraft from the three carriers provided close air support for the invasion forces and defended against Japanese air attacks from Rabaul. After a successful landing, they remained in the South Pacific area charged with four main objectives: guarding the line of communication between the major Allied bases at New Caledonia and Espiritu Santo; giving support to Allied ground forces at Guadalcanal and Tulagi against possible Japanese counteroffensives; covering the movement of supply ships aiding Guadalcanal; and engaging and destroying any Japanese warships that came within range.

Between 15 and 20 August, the U.S. carriers covered the delivery of fighter and bomber aircraft to the newly opened Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. This small, hard-won airfield was a critical point in the entire island chain, and both military sides strategically considered that control of the airbase offered potential control of the local battle area airspace. In fact, Henderson Field and the aircraft based upon it soon resulted in telling effects on the movement of Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands and in the attrition of Japanese air forces in the South Pacific Area. Historically, Allied control of Henderson Field became the key factor in the entire battle for Guadalcanal.

Surprised by the Allied offensive in the Solomons, Japanese naval forces (under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto) and army forces prepared a counteroffensive, with the goal of driving the Allies out of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The counteroffensive was called Operation Ka. (Kana Ka is the root of kana ga, the first syllable in Gadarukanaru, the Japanese name for Guadalcanal.) The naval forces had the additional objective of destroying Allied warship forces in the South Pacific area, specifically the U.S. carriers.

Battle

Prelude

On 16 August 1942, a convoy of three slow transport ships loaded with 1,411 Japanese soldiers from the 28th “Ichiki” Infantry Regiment as well as several hundred naval troops from the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF), departed the major Japanese base at Truk Lagoon (Chuuk) and headed towards Guadalcanal. The transports were guarded by light cruiser Jintsū, eight destroyers, and four patrol boats, led by Rear Admiral Raizō Tanaka (flag in Jintsū) Also departing from Rabaul to help protect the convoy was a “close cover force” of four heavy cruisers from the 8th Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. These were the same, relatively old, heavy cruisers that had defeated an Allied naval surface force in the earlier Battle of Savo Island (with the subtraction of the Kako, which had been sunk by an American submarine). Tanaka planned to land the troops from his convoy on Guadalcanal on 24 August.

On 21 August, the rest of the Japanese Ka naval force departed Truk, heading for the southern Solomons. These ships were basically divided into three groups: the “main body” contained the Japanese carriers—Shōkaku and Zuikaku, light carrier Ryūjō, and a screening force of one heavy cruiser and eight destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo in Shōkaku; the “vanguard force” consisted of two battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers, commanded by Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe; the “advanced force” contained five heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, six destroyers, and the seaplane carrier Chitose, commanded by Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō. Finally, a force of about 100 IJN land-based bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft at Rabaul and nearby islands were positioned for operational support. Nagumo’s main body positioned itself behind the “vanguard” and “advanced” forces in an attempt to more easily remain hidden from U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.

The Ka plan dictated that once U.S. carriers were located, either by Japanese scout aircraft or an attack on one of the Japanese surface forces, Nagumo’s carriers would immediately launch a strike force to destroy them. With the U.S. carriers destroyed or disabled, Abe’s “vanguard” and Kondo’s “advanced” forces would close with and destroy the remaining Allied naval forces in a warship surface action. This would then allow Japanese naval forces the freedom to neutralize Henderson Field through bombardment while covering the landing of the Japanese army troops to retake Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

In response to an unanticipated land battle fought between U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal and Japanese forces on 19–20 August, the U.S. carrier task forces under Fletcher reversed towards Guadalcanal from their positions 400 mi (350 nmi; 640 km) to the south on 21 August. The U.S. carriers were to support the Marines, protect Henderson Field, engage the enemy and destroy any Japanese naval forces that arrived to support Japanese troops in the land battle on Guadalcanal.

Both Allied and Japanese naval forces continued to converge on 22 August and both sides conducted intense aircraft scouting efforts, however neither side spotted its adversary. The disappearance of at least one of their scouting aircraft (shot down by aircraft from Enterprise before it could send a radio report), caused the Japanese to strongly suspect that U.S. carriers were in the immediate area. The U.S., however, was unaware of the disposition and strength of approaching Japanese surface warship forces.

At 09:50 on 23 August, a U.S. PBY Catalina flying boat (based at Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands) initially sighted Tanaka’s convoy. By late afternoon, with no further sightings of Japanese ships, two aircraft strike forces from Saratoga and Henderson Field took off to attack the convoy. However, Tanaka, knowing that an attack would be forthcoming following the PBY sighting, reversed course once he had departed the area, and eluded the strike aircraft. After Tanaka reported to his superiors his loss of time by turning north to avoid the expected Allied airstrike, the landings of his troops on Guadalcanal was pushed back to 25 August. By 18:23 on 23 August, with no Japanese carriers sighted and no new intelligence reporting of their presence in the area, Fletcher detached Wasp (which was getting low on fuel) and the rest of TF 18 for the two-day trip south toward Efate Island to refuel. Thus, Wasp and her escorting warships missed the upcoming battle.

Carrier Action on August 24

At 01:45 on 24 August 1942, Nagumo ordered Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara (with the light carrier Ryūjō, the heavy cruiser Tone and destroyers Amatsukaze and Tokitsukaze) to proceed ahead of the main Japanese force and send an aircraft attack force against Henderson Field at daybreak. The Ryūjō mission was most likely in response to a request from Nishizō Tsukahara (the naval commander at Rabaul) for help from the combined fleet in neutralizing Henderson Field. The mission may also have been intended by Nagumo as a feint maneuver to divert U.S. attention allowing the rest of the Japanese force to approach the U.S. naval forces undetected as well as to help provide protection and cover for Tanaka’s convoy. Most of the aircraft on Shōkaku and Zuikaku were readied to launch on short notice if the U.S. carriers were located. Between 05:55 and 06:30, the U.S. carriers (mainly Enterprise augmented by PBY Catalinas from Ndeni) launched their own scout aircraft to search for the Japanese naval forces.

At 09:35, a Catalina made the first sighting of the Ryūjō force. Later that morning, several more sightings of Ryūjō and ships of Kondo’s and Mikawa’s forces by carrier and other U.S. reconnaissance aircraft followed. Throughout the morning and early afternoon, U.S. aircraft also sighted several Japanese scout aircraft and submarines, leading Fletcher to believe that the Japanese knew where his carriers were, which actually was not yet the case. Still, Fletcher hesitated to order a strike against the Ryūjō group until he was sure there were no other Japanese carriers in the area. Finally, with no firm word on the presence or location of other Japanese carriers, at 13:40 Fletcher launched a strike of 38 aircraft from Saratoga to attack Ryūjō. However, he kept aircraft in reserve from both U.S. carriers potentially ready should any Japanese fleet carriers be sighted.

Meantime, at 12:20, Ryūjō launched six Nakajima B5N2 “Kate” bombers and 15 A6M3 Zero fighters to attack Henderson Field in conjunction with an attack by 24 Mitsubishi G4M2 “Betty” bombers and 14 Zeros from Rabaul. However, unknown to the Ryūjō aircraft, the Rabaul aircraft had encountered severe weather and returned to their base earlier at 11:30. The Ryūjō aircraft were detected on radar by Saratoga as they flew toward Guadalcanal, further fixing the location of their ship for the impending U.S. attack. The Ryūjō aircraft arrived over Henderson Field at 14:23, and tangled with Henderson’s fighters (members of the Cactus Air Force) while bombing the airfield. In the resulting engagement, three “Kates,” three Zeros, and three U.S. fighters were shot down, and no significant damage was done to Henderson Field.

Almost simultaneously, at 14:25 a Japanese scout aircraft from the cruiser Chikuma sighted the U.S. carriers. Although the aircraft was shot down, its report was transmitted in time, and Nagumo immediately ordered his strike force launched from Shōkaku and Zuikaku. The first wave of aircraft (27 Aichi D3A2 “Val” dive bombers and 15 Zeros) was off by 14:50 and on its way toward Enterprise and Saratoga. Coincidentally about this same time, two U.S. scout aircraft finally sighted the main Japanese force. However, due to communication problems, these sighting reports never reached Fletcher. Before leaving the area, the two U.S. scout aircraft attacked Shōkaku, causing negligible damage. At 16:00 a second wave of 27 Vals and nine Zeros was launched by the Japanese carriers and headed south toward the U.S. carriers. Abe’s “Vanguard” force also surged ahead in anticipation of meeting the U.S. ships in a surface action after nightfall.

Again coincidentally about this same time, the Saratoga strike force arrived and attacked Ryūjō, hitting and heavily damaging her with three to five bombs and perhaps one torpedo, and killing 120 of her crew. Also during this time, several U.S. B-17 heavy bombers attacked the crippled Ryūjō but caused no additional damage. The crew abandoned the heavily damaged Japanese carrier at nightfall and she sank soon after. Amatsukaze and Tokitsukaze rescued Ryūjō’s survivors and the aircrews from her returning strike force, who ditched their aircraft in the ocean nearby. After the rescue operations were complete, both Japanese destroyers and Tone rejoined Nagumo’s main force.

At 16:02, still waiting for a definitive report on the location of the Japanese fleet carriers, the U.S. carriers’ radar detected the first incoming wave of Japanese strike aircraft. Fifty-three F4F-4 Wildcat fighters from the two U.S. carriers were directed by radar control towards the attackers. However, communication problems, limitations of the aircraft identification capabilities of the radar, primitive control procedures, and effective screening of the Japanese dive bombers by their escorting Zeros, prevented all but a few of the U.S. fighters from engaging the Vals before they began their attacks on the U.S. carriers. Just before the Japanese dive bombers began their attacks, Enterprise and Saratoga cleared their decks for the impending action by launching the aircraft that they had been holding ready in case the Japanese fleet carriers were sighted. These aircraft were told to fly north and attack anything they could find, or else to circle outside the battle zone, until it was safe to return.

At 16:29, the Japanese dive bombers began their attacks. Although several attempted to set up to attack the Saratoga, they quickly shifted back to the nearer carrier, Enterprise. Thus, Enterprise was the target of almost the entire Japanese air attack. Several Wildcats followed the Vals into their attack dives, despite the intense anti-aircraft artillery fire from Enterprise and her screening warships, in a desperate attempt to disrupt their attacks. As many as four Wildcats were shot down by U.S. anti-aircraft fire, as well as several Vals.

Because of the effective anti-aircraft fire from the U.S. ships, plus evasive maneuvers, the bombs from the first nine Vals missed Enterprise. However, at 16:44, an armor-piercing, delayed-action bomb penetrated the flight deck near the aft elevator and passed through three decks before detonating below the waterline, killing 35 men and wounding 70 more. Incoming sea water caused Enterprise to develop a slight list, but it was not a major breach of hull integrity.

Just 30 seconds later, the next Val planted its bomb only 15 ft (4.6 m) away from where the first bomb hit. The resulting detonation ignited a large secondary explosion from one of the nearby 5 in (127 mm) guns’ ready powder casings, killing 35 members of the nearby gun crews and starting a large fire.

About a minute later, at 16:46, the third and last bomb hit Enterprise on the flight deck forward of where the first two bombs hit. This bomb exploded on contact, creating a 10 ft (3.0 m) hole in the deck, but caused no further damage. Seven Vals (three from Shokaku, four from Zuikaku) then broke off from the attack on Enterprise to attack the U.S. battleship North Carolina. However, all of their bombs missed and all the Vals involved were shot down by either anti-aircraft fire or U.S. fighters. The attack was over at 16:48, and the surviving Japanese aircraft reassembled in small groups and returned to their ships.

Both sides thought that they had inflicted more damage than was the case. The U.S. claimed to have shot down 70 Japanese aircraft, even though there were only 42 aircraft in all. Actual Japanese losses—from all causes—in the engagement were 25 aircraft, with most of the crews of the lost aircraft not being recovered or rescued. The Japanese, for their part, mistakenly believed that they had heavily damaged two U.S. carriers, instead of just one. The U.S. lost six aircraft in the engagement, with most of the crews being rescued.

Although Enterprise was heavily damaged and on fire, her damage-control teams were able to make sufficient repairs for the ship to resume flight operations at 17:46, only one hour after the engagement ended. At 18:05, the Saratoga strike force returned from sinking Ryūjō and landed without major incident. The second wave of Japanese aircraft approached the U.S. carriers at 18:15 but was unable to locate the U.S. formation because of communication problems and had to return to their carriers without attacking any U.S. ships, losing five aircraft in the process from operational mishaps. Most of the U.S. carrier aircraft launched just before the first wave of Japanese aircraft attacked failed to find any targets. However, two SBD Dauntlesses from Saratoga sighted Kondo’s advanced force and attacked the seaplane tender Chitose, scoring two near-hits which heavily damaged the unarmored ship. The U.S. carrier aircraft either landed at Henderson Field or were able to return to their carriers after dusk. The U.S. ships retired to the south to get out of range of any approaching Japanese warships. In fact, Abe’s “Vanguard” force and Kondō’s “Advance” force were steaming south to try to catch the U.S. carrier task forces in a surface battle, but they turned around at midnight without having made contact with the U.S. warships. Nagumo’s main body, having taken heavy aircraft losses in the engagement and being low on fuel, also retreated northward.

Actions on 25 August

Believing that two U.S. carriers had been taken out of action with heavy damage, Tanaka’s reinforcement convoy again headed toward Guadalcanal, and by 08:00 on 25 August they were within 150 mi (130 nmi; 240 km) of their destination. At this time, Tanaka’s convoy was joined by five destroyers which had shelled Henderson Field the night before, causing slight damage. At 08:05, 18 U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field attacked Tanaka’s convoy, causing heavy damage to Jintsu, killing 24 crewmen, and knocking Tanaka unconscious. The troop transport Kinryu Maru was also hit and eventually sank. Just as the destroyer Mutsuki pulled alongside Kinryu Maru to rescue her crew and embarked troops, she was attacked by four U.S. B-17s from Espiritu Santo which landed five bombs on or around Mutsuki, sinking her immediately. An uninjured but shaken Tanaka transferred to the destroyer Kagerō, sent Jintsu back to Truk, and took the convoy to the Japanese base in the Shortland Islands.

Both the Japanese and the U.S. elected to completely withdraw their warships from the area, ending the battle. The Japanese naval forces lingered near the northern Solomons, out of range of the U.S. aircraft based at Henderson Field, before finally returning to Truk on 5 September.

Aftermath

The battle is generally considered to be a tactical and strategic victory for the U.S. because the Japanese lost more ships, aircraft, and aircrew, and Japanese troop reinforcements for Guadalcanal were delayed. Summing up the significance of the battle, historian Richard B. Frank states:

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was unquestionably an American victory, but it had little long-term result, apart from a further reduction in the corps of trained Japanese carrier aviators. The (Japanese) reinforcements that could not come by slow transport would soon reach Guadalcanal by other means.

The U.S. lost only seven aircrew members in the battle. However, the Japanese lost 61 veteran aircrew, who were hard for the Japanese to replace because of an institutionalized limited capacity in their naval aircrew training programs and an absence of trained reserves. The troops in Tanaka’s convoy were later loaded onto destroyers at the Shortland Islands and delivered piecemeal, without most of their heavy equipment, to Guadalcanal beginning on 29 August 1942. The Japanese claimed considerably more damage than they had inflicted, including that Hornet—not in the battle—had been sunk, thus avenging its part in the Doolittle Raid.

Emphasizing the strategic value of Henderson Field, in a separate reinforcement effort, Japanese destroyer Asagiri was sunk and two other Japanese destroyers heavily damaged on 28 August, 70 mi (61 nmi; 110 km) north of Guadalcanal in “The Slot” by U.S. aircraft based at the airfield.

Enterprise traveled to Pearl Harbor for extensive repairs, which were completed on 15 October 1942. She returned to the South Pacific on 24 October, just in time for the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands and her rematch with Shōkaku and Zuikaku.

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) seen from another U.S. ship while under attack by Japanese dive bombers during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942. An intense fire is burning in her starboard after five-inch gun gallery, the result of a bomb hit that ignited ready-service ammunition. Note the anti-aircraft shell bursts over the carrier.

The U.S. Navy aircraft carriers USS Wasp (CV-7) (foreground), USS Saratoga (CV-3), and USS Enterprise (CV-6) (background) operating in the Pacific south of Guadalcanal on 12 August 1942.

Japanese Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo.

U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher.

View from a USAAF B-17 bomber of Japanese destroyer Tokitsukaze (right, slowly backing away from the carrier) evacuating crew of the disabled carrier Ryujo (left, immobile), Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942.

View from a USAAF B-17 bomber of Japanese destroyers Amatsukaze (bottom, sailing at speed) and Tokitsukaze (right, slowly backing away from the carrier) evacuating crew of the disabled carrier Ryujo (center, immobile), Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942, photo 1 of 3.

The damaged and immobile Japanese aircraft carrier Ryujo photographed from a USAAF Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bomber, during a high-level bombing attack during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942. The destroyers Amatsukaze (lower left) and Tokitsukaze (right) had been removing her crew and are now underway, one from a bow-to-bow position and the other from alongside. Two sticks of bombs are faintly visible about one ship-length above the carrier’s bow and stern.

View from a USAAF B-17 bomber of Japanese destroyers Amatsukaze (bottom, sailing at speed) and Tokitsukaze (right, slowly backing away from the carrier) evacuating crew of the disabled carrier Ryujo (center, immobile), Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942, photo 3 of 3.

View from a USAAF B-17 bomber of Japanese destroyers Amatsukaze (center, sailing at speed) and Tokitsukaze (top right, slowly backing away from the carrier) evacuating crew of the disabled carrier Ryujo (top center, immobile), Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942; note heavy cruiser Tone underway at right edge of the photograph, photo 1 of 2.

View from a USAAF B-17 bomber of Japanese destroyers Amatsukaze (center, sailing at speed) and Tokitsukaze (top right, slowly backing away from the carrier) evacuating crew of the disabled carrier Ryujo (top center, immobile), Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942; note heavy cruiser Tone underway at right edge of the photograph, photo 2 of 2.

View from a USAAF B-17 bomber of Japanese destroyers Amatsukaze (just out of view, wake seen at bottom) and Tokitsukaze (bottom right, slowly backing away from the carrier) evacuating crew of the disabled carrier Ryujo (bottom center, immobile), Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942; note a stick of five falling bombs at top right and another stick of four falling bombs at center.

View from a USAAF B-17 bomber of Japanese heavy cruiser Tone, Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942.

Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942: The Japanese heavy cruiser Tone photographed from a USAAF Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bomber, during high-level bombing attacks on the immobile carrier Ryujo on 24 August 1942. Ryujo is out of this view, some distance to the right.

Blasted by U.S. Navy antiaircraft fire, a Japanese plane crashes into the sea off the port bow of the Enterprise.

Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942. Japanese dive bombers that attacked USS Enterprise (CV-6) during a period of 4 minutes somewhere in the South Pacific. As seen from USS Portland (CA-33). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph 80-G-299807, now in the collections of the National Archives)

A Japanese Aichi D3A dive bomber, believed to be piloted by Yoshihiro Iida, burns as it is shot down by anti-aircraft fire directly over the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942.

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) and escorts maneuver during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942. (U.S. Navy photo in: The Battles of Savo Island 9 August 1942 and the Eastern Solomons 23-25 August 1942 from the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, Department of the Navy, Washington D.C., 1994)

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) steams past the burning wreckage of two Japanese Aichi D3A dive bombers during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942. The two bombers and their bombs barely missed the ship. The photo was taken by Photographer's Mate Robert F. Read who was killed shortly after taking this photo by the second bomb to hit the "Big E". (US Navy photo)

A Japanese Aichi D3A1 "Val" dive bomber is shot down and crashes into the ocean during an attack on the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6), not visible, on 24 August 1942. (U.S. Navy photo in: The Battles of Savo Island 9 August 1942 and the Eastern Solomons 23-25 August 1942 from the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, Department of the Navy, Washington D.C., 1994)

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) is hit on her starboard quarter by Japanese dive bombers during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 21 August 1942. This was the second bomb hit that day.

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) seen from another U.S. ship while under attack by Japanese dive bombers during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942. An intense fire is burning in her starboard after five-inch gun gallery, the result of a bomb hit that ignited ready-service ammunition. Note the anti-aircraft shell bursts over the carrier. (Official U.S. Navy photo NH 97778 from the U.S. Navy Naval History and Heritage Command)

A bomb hits aft starboard 5” gun gallery of the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6), destroying it and killing almost the entire crew, during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August, 1942. This was the second bomb to hit Enterprise during the attack.

A Japanese bomb explodes on the flight deck of USS Enterprise, 24 August 1942 during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, causing minor damage. This was the third and last bomb to hit Enterprise during the battle. The bomb was dropped by a Japanese Aichi D3A1 “Val” dive bomber piloted by Kazumi Horie who died in the attack. According to the original photo caption in the U.S. Navy’s archives, this explosion killed the photographer, Photographer’s Mate 3rd Class Robert F. Read. This image, however, was actually taken by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Marion Riley, who was operating a motion picture camera from the aft end of the ship’s island, above the flight deck and who survived the battle although his photographic equipment was damaged. Robert Read was stationed in the aft starboard 5” gun gallery and was killed by the second bomb to hit Enterprise. The smoke from the bomb explosion that killed Read can be seen in the upper left of this photograph.

Enterprise damage control teams fight fires resulting from bomb hits during Japanese aerial attack on August 24, 1942. (The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 23-25 August 1942, Navy Department Office of Naval Intelligence, Combat Narrative)

Crewmen of the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) inspect and begin to repair the damage from the third bomb to hit the flight deck during Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942. (US Navy photo)

View of the 5”/38 Mark 12 dual-purpose gun number No.5 of III. battery on the aft-starboard side of the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6), circa in late August 1942. This battery was heavily damaged by the second bomb hit during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942. 38 crewmembers died including Photographer’s Mate Robert F. Read. 10 of them were never identified. (US Navy photo)

Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942. A patrol plane from USS Enterprise (CV-6) escorted by 4 fighters of Combat Air Patrol flying directly through the formation of attacking Japanese planes. As seen from USS Portland (CA-33). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph 80-G-299831, now in the collections of the National Archives)

Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942. Japanese dive bombers that attacked USS Enterprise (CV-6) during a period of 4 minutes somewhere in the South Pacific. As seen from USS Portland (CA-33). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph 80-G-299842, now in the collections of the National Archives)

Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942. Japanese dive bombers that attacked USS Enterprise (CV-6) during a period of 4 minutes somewhere in the South Pacific. As seen from USS Portland (CA-33). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph 80-G-288798, now in the collections of the National Archives)

Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942. Japanese dive bombers that attacked USS Enterprise (CV-6) during a period of 4 minutes somewhere in the South Pacific. As seen from USS Portland (CA-33). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph 80-G-299854, now in the collections of the National Archives)

Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942. Japanese dive bombers that attacked USS Enterprise (CV-6) during a period of 4 minutes somewhere in the South Pacific. Note the fire in after starboard gun gallery. As seen from USS Portland (CA-33). (Official U.S. Navy Photograph 80-G-299799, now in the collections of the National Archives)

Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24 August 1942. Japanese dive bombers that attacked USS Enterprise (CV-6) during a period of 4 minutes somewhere in the South Pacific. As seen from USS Portland (CA-33). (Official U.S. Navy photograph 80-G-299800, now in the collections of the National Archives)

Two Japanese "Val" (Type 99) dive-bombers from Shokaku return to their ship after attacking USS Enterprise during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on August 24, 1942. The pilot of the closer aircraft is Akimoto Tamotsu with Koitabashi Hiroshi in the back seat. (Australian War Memorial P02886.001)

Upward bulge in the flight deck of Enterprise as the result of a bomb exploding below decks. The damage occurred in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942, but the photo was taken some days later.

The gallery of one of the Enterprise‘s starboard 5-inch guns was heavily damaged by a Japanese bomb during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

U.S. Navy map from 1943 of The Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Tracks of Allied (U.S.) forces are most likely fairly accurate. Tracks of Japanese forces are approximate and/or conjectured.

Japanese track chart during Battle of Eastern Solomons, 23-25 Aug 1942; Annex B of Toyama's 1 November 1945 interrogation.

 

Battle of the Tenaru

Japanese soldiers, killed while assaulting U.S. Marine Corps positions, lie dead in a coconut grove on Guadalcanal after the Battle of the Tenaru on 21 August 1942. Two U.S. Marine Corps M3 Stuart tanks of A Company, 1st Tank Battalion, participating in the battle in late afternoon are visible in the background.

The Battle of the Tenaru, sometimes called the Battle of the Ilu River or the Battle of Alligator Creek, was a land battle between the Imperial Japanese Army and Allied ground forces that took place on August 21, 1942 on the island of Guadalcanal during the Pacific campaign of World War II. The battle was the first major Japanese land offensive during the Guadalcanal campaign.

In the battle, U.S. Marines, under the overall command of U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, repulsed an assault by the “First Element” of the “Ichiki” Regiment, under the command of Japanese Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki. The Marines were defending the Lunga perimeter, which guarded Henderson Field, which was captured by the Allies in landings on Guadalcanal on August 7. Ichiki’s unit was sent to Guadalcanal in response to the Allied landings with the mission of recapturing the airfield and driving the Allied forces off the island.

Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, which at that time numbered about 11,000 personnel, Ichiki’s unit conducted a nighttime frontal assault on Marine positions at Alligator Creek on the east side of the Lunga perimeter. Ichiki’s assault was defeated with heavy losses. The Marines counterattacked Ichiki’s surviving troops after daybreak, killing many more. All but 128 of the original 917 of the Ichiki Regiment’s First Element died.

The battle was the first of three separate major land offensives by the Japanese in the Guadalcanal campaign. The Japanese realized after Tenaru that Allied forces on Guadalcanal were much greater in number than originally estimated and sent larger forces to the island for their subsequent attempts to retake Henderson Field.

Background

On August 7, 1942, U.S. forces landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.

Taking the Japanese by surprise, the Allied landing forces accomplished their initial objectives of securing Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal, by nightfall on August 8. That night, as the transports unloaded, the Allied warships screening the transports were surprised and defeated by an Imperial fleet of seven cruisers and one destroyer, commanded by Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. One Australian and three U.S. cruisers were sunk and one other U.S. cruiser and two destroyers were damaged in the Battle of Savo Island. Turner withdrew all remaining Allied naval forces by the evening of August 9 without unloading all of the heavy equipment, provisions, and troops from the transports, although most of the divisional artillery was landed, consisting of thirty-two 75 mm and 105 mm howitzers. Only five days' worth of rations were landed.

The Marines ashore on Guadalcanal initially concentrated on forming a defense perimeter around the airfield, moving the landed supplies within the perimeter, and finishing the airfield. Vandegrift placed his 11,000 troops on Guadalcanal in a loose perimeter around the Lunga Point area. In four days of intense effort, the supplies were moved from the landing beach into dispersed dumps within the perimeter. Work began on the airfield immediately, mainly using captured Japanese equipment. On August 12, the airfield was named Henderson Field after Major Lofton Henderson, a Marine aviator who had been killed at the Battle of Midway. Captured Japanese stock increased the total supply of food to 14 days' worth. To conserve the limited food supplies, the Allied troops were limited to two meals per day.

In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army’s 17th Army, a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake, with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces. The 17th Army, currently heavily involved with the Japanese campaign in New Guinea, had only a few units available to send to the southern Solomons area. Of these units, the 35th Infantry Brigade under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi was at Palau, the 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment was in the Philippines, and the 28th (Ichiki) Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki, was at sea en route to Japan from Guam. The different units began to move towards Guadalcanal immediately, but Ichiki’s regiment, being the closest, arrived first.

An aerial reconnaissance of the U.S. Marine positions on Guadalcanal on August 12 by one of the senior Japanese staff officers from Rabaul sighted few U.S. troops in the open and no large ships in the waters nearby, convincing Imperial Headquarters that the Allies had withdrawn the majority of their troops. In fact, none of the Allied troops had been withdrawn. Hyakutake issued orders for an advance unit of 900 troops from Ichiki’s regiment to be landed on Guadalcanal by fast warship to immediately attack the Allied position and reoccupy the airfield area at Lunga Point. The remaining personnel in Ichiki’s regiment would be delivered to Guadalcanal by slower transport later. At the major Japanese naval base at Truk, which was the staging point for delivery of Ichiki’s regiment to Guadalcanal, Colonel Ichiki was briefed that 2,000–10,000 U.S. troops were holding the Guadalcanal beachhead and that he should, “avoid frontal attacks.”

Ichiki and 916 of his regiment’s 2,300 troops, designated the “First Element” and carrying seven days’ supply of food, were delivered to Taivu Point, about 35 kilometers (22 miles) east of Lunga Point, by six destroyers at 01:00 on August 19. Ichiki was ordered to scout the American positions and wait for the remainder of his force to arrive. Known as the Ichiki Butai (Ichiki Detachment), they were an elite and battle-seasoned force but as was about to be discovered, they were heavily stricken with “victory disease” – overconfidence due to previous success. Ichiki was so confident in the superiority of his men that he decided to destroy the American defenders before the remaining majority of his force arrived, even writing in his journal “18 August, landing; 20 August, march by night and battle; 21 August, enjoyment of the fruit of victory.” He concocted a brazenly simple plan: march straight down the beach and through the American defenses. Leaving about 100 personnel behind as a rear guard, Ichiki marched west with the remaining 800 men of his unit and made camp before dawn about 14 kilometers (8.7 miles) east of the Lunga perimeter. The U.S. Marines at Lunga Point received intelligence that a Japanese landing had occurred and took steps to find out exactly what was happening.

Prelude

Reports to Allied forces from patrols of Solomon Islanders, including retired Sergeant Major Jacob C. Vouza of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Constabulary, under the direction of Martin Clemens, a coastwatcher and officer in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force (BSIPDF), along with Allied intelligence from other sources, indicated that Japanese troops were present east of Lunga Point. To investigate further, on August 19, a Marine patrol of 60 men and four native scouts, commanded by U.S. Marine Captain Charles H. Brush, marched east from the Lunga Perimeter.

At the same time, Ichiki sent forward his own patrol of 38 men, led by his communications officer, to reconnoiter Allied troop dispositions and establish a forward communications base. Around 12:00 on August 19 at Koli Point, Brush’s patrol sighted and ambushed the Japanese patrol, killing all but five of its members, who escaped back to Taivu. The Marines suffered three dead and three wounded.

Papers discovered on the bodies of some of the Japanese officers in the patrol revealed that they belonged to a much larger unit and showed detailed intelligence of U.S. Marine positions around Lunga Point. The papers did not, however, detail exactly how large the Japanese force was or whether an attack was imminent.

Now anticipating an attack from the east, the U.S. Marine forces, under the direction of General Vandegrift, prepared their defenses on the east side of the Lunga perimeter. Several official U.S. military histories identify the location of the eastern defenses of the Lunga perimeter as emplaced on the Tenaru River. The Tenaru River, however, was actually located further to the east. The river forming the eastern boundary of the Lunga perimeter was actually the Ilu River, nicknamed Alligator Creek by the Marines, a double misnomer: there are no alligators in the Solomons, only crocodiles, and Alligator “Creek” was a tidal lagoon separated from the ocean by a sandbar about 7 to 15 meters (23 to 49 ft) in width and about 30 meters (98 feet) long.

Along the west side of Alligator Creek, Colonel Clifton B. Cates, commander of the 1st Marine Regiment, deployed his 1st (LtCol Cresswell) and 2nd battalions (LtCol Pollock). To help further defend the Alligator Creek sandbar, Cates deployed 100 men from the 1st Special Weapons Battalion with two 37mm anti-tank guns equipped with canister shot. Marine divisional artillery, consisting of both 75mm and 105mm guns, pre-targeted locations on the east side and sandbar areas of Alligator Creek, and forward artillery observers emplaced themselves in the forward Marine positions. The Marines worked all day on August 20 to prepare their defenses as much as possible before nightfall.

Learning of the annihilation of his patrol, Ichiki quickly sent forward a company to bury the bodies and followed with the rest of his troops, marching throughout the night of August 19 and finally halting at 04:30 on August 20 within a few miles of the U.S. Marine positions on the east side of Lunga Point. At this location, he prepared his troops to attack the Allied positions that night.

Battle

Just after midnight on August 21, Ichiki’s main body of troops arrived at the east bank of Alligator Creek and were surprised to encounter the Marine positions, not having expected to find U.S. forces located that distance from the airfield. Nearby U.S. Marine listening posts heard “clanking” sounds, human voices, and other noises before withdrawing to the west bank of the creek. At 01:30 Ichiki’s force opened fire with machine guns and mortars on the Marine positions on the west bank of the creek, and a first wave of about 100 Imperial soldiers charged across the sandbar towards the Marines.

Marine machine gun fire and canister rounds from the 37 mm cannons killed most of the Japanese soldiers as they crossed the sandbar. A few of the Japanese soldiers reached the Marine positions, engaged in hand to hand combat with the defenders, and captured a few of the Marine front-line emplacements. Also, Japanese machine gun and rifle fire from the east side of the creek killed several of the Marine machine-gunners. A company of Marines, held in reserve just behind the front line, attacked and killed most, if not all, of the remaining Japanese soldiers that had breached the front line defenses, ending Ichiki’s first assault about an hour after it had begun.

At 02:30 a second wave of about 150 to 200 Japanese troops again attacked across the sandbar and was again almost completely wiped out. At least one of the surviving Imperial officers from this attack advised Ichiki to withdraw his remaining forces, but Ichiki declined to do so.

As Ichiki’s troops regrouped east of the creek, Japanese mortars bombarded the Marine lines. The Marines answered with 75 mm artillery barrages and mortar fire into the areas east of the creek. At about 05:00, another wave of Japanese troops attacked, this time attempting to flank the Marine positions by wading through the ocean surf and attacking up the beach into the west bank area of the creek bed. The Marines responded with heavy machine gun and artillery fire along the beachfront area, again causing heavy casualties among Ichiki’s attacking troops and causing them to abandon their attack and withdraw back to the east bank of the creek. For the next couple of hours, the two sides exchanged rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire at close range across the sandbar and creek.

In spite of the heavy losses his force had suffered, Ichiki’s troops remained in place on the east bank of the creek, either unable or unwilling to withdraw. At daybreak on August 21, the commanders of the U.S. Marine units facing Ichiki’s troops conferred on how best to proceed, and they decided to counterattack. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Leonard B. Cresswell, crossed Alligator Creek upstream from the battle area, enveloped Ichiki’s troops from the south and east, cutting off any avenue for retreat, and began to “compress” Ichiki’s troops into a small area in a coconut grove on the east bank of the creek.

Aircraft from Henderson Field strafed Japanese soldiers that attempted to escape down the beach and, later in the afternoon, five Marine M3 Stuart tanks attacked across the sandbar into the coconut grove. The tanks swept the coconut grove with machine gun and canister cannon fire, as well as rolling over the bodies, both alive and dead, of any Japanese soldiers unable or unwilling to get out of the way. When the tank attack was over, Vandegrift wrote that, “the rear of the tanks looked like meat grinders.”

By 17:00 on August 21, Japanese resistance had ended. Colonel Ichiki was either killed during the final stages of the battle, or performed ritual suicide (seppuku) shortly thereafter, depending on the account. As curious Marines began to walk around looking at the battlefield, some wounded Japanese troops shot at them, killing or wounding several Marines. Thereafter, Marines shot and/or bayoneted any Japanese soldier lying on the ground that moved, although about 15 injured and unconscious Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner. About 30 of the Japanese troops escaped to rejoin their regiment’s rear echelon at Taivu Point.

Aftermath

For the U.S. and its allies, the victory in the Tenaru battle was psychologically significant in that Allied soldiers, after a series of defeats by Japanese Army units throughout the Pacific and east Asia, now knew that they could defeat the Imperial Armies in a land battle. The battle also set another precedent that would continue throughout the war in the Pacific, which was the reluctance of defeated Japanese soldiers to surrender and their efforts to continue killing Allied soldiers, even as the Japanese soldiers lay dying on the battlefield. On this subject Vandegrift remarked, “I have never heard or read of this kind of fighting. These people refuse to surrender. The wounded wait until men come up to examine them...and blow themselves and the other fellow to pieces with a hand grenade.” Robert Leckie, a Guadalcanal veteran, recalls the aftermath of the battle in his book Helmet For My Pillow, “Our regiment had killed something like nine hundred of them. Most lay in clusters or heaps before the gun pits commanding sandspit, as though they had not died singly but in groups. Moving among them were the souvenir hunters, picking their way delicately as though fearful of booby traps, while stripping the bodies of their possessions.”

The battle was also psychologically significant in that Imperial soldiers believed in their own invincibility and superior spirit. By August 25, most of Ichiki’s survivors reached Taivu Point and radioed Rabaul to tell 17th Army headquarters that Ichiki’s detachment had been “almost annihilated at a point short of the airfield.” Reacting with disbelief to the news, Japanese Army headquarters officers proceeded with plans to deliver additional troops to Guadalcanal to reattempt to capture Henderson Field. The next major Japanese attack on the Lunga perimeter occurred at the Battle of Edson’s Ridge about three weeks later, this time employing a much larger force than had been employed in the Tenaru battle.

Depictions

The Battle of the Tenaru is a key part of the 1945 biographical film on Al Schmid, Pride of the Marines. The brunt of the Japanese assault was borne by Marines Cpl. Lee Diamond, PFC. John Rivers and Pvt. Albert Schmid. The three were credited with 200 Japanese killed in action (KIA). Awarded the Navy Cross (America’s second highest decoration) for their actions, the trio paid dearly. Rivers lost his life, while Schmid and Diamond suffered horrendous wounds. Schmid lost sight in one eye and was left with very little in the other. Shot in his arm early in the fight, Diamond’s arms and hands were also ripped by the same grenade which blinded Schmid. In 2010, the battle became the climax of the first episode of Steven Spielberg’s and Tom Hanks’ miniseries, The Pacific.

Dead Japanese soldiers lie on the sandbar at the mouth of Alligator Creek on Guadalcanal on August 21, 1942 after being killed by U.S. Marines during the Battle of the Tenaru.

Japanese Colonel Ichiki, commander of the battalion defeated in the Battle of the Tenaru River on August 21, 1942. He committed suicide shortly after the battle ended.

British Solomons Island’s Protectorate district officer and coastwatcher Martin Clemens (center standing) with members of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force, who served as scouts and guides for Allied forces throughout the Guadalcanal campaign.

Native Solomon Islanders, under the direction of Martin Clemens, guide U.S. Marines on a patrol along the Tenaru River on Guadalcanal, August 1942.

Battle of Tenaru River (Ilu action), August 21, 1942, between U.S. Marines and Japanese force commanded by Col Ichiki. 

 

Goettge Patrol

MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine Division, confers with his staff on board the transport USS McCawley (APA-4) en route to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift; LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph McC. Pate, logistics officer; LtCol Frank G. Goettge, intelligence officer; and Col William Capers James, chief of staff.

Frank Bryan Goettge (30 December 1895 – 12 August 1942) was a United States Marine Corps intelligence officer in World War II. He led the ill-fated Goettge Patrol in the early days of the Guadalcanal campaign, and was killed during that operation.

Frank Goettge was born in Canton, Ohio. on December 30, 1895. He enlisted in the Marine Corps during World War I in May 1917, after spending one year at Ohio University. Goettge was commissioned as First Lieutenant in 1918. During World War I, Goettge served with the 5th Marines in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, and later served in occupation duty at Segendorf, Germany.

After the war, Goettge served in a number of billets, including the 1st Provisional Brigade in Haiti, and at Headquarters of the Pacific Department, in San Francisco and Hawaii. In 1924, Goettge went to Quantico and was later sent to the Marine Detachment in Peking, China. In June 1933, Goettge served aboard the battleship USS Pennsylvania, and then was Commanding Officer of the Marine detachment at Annapolis, Maryland. In June 1941, Goettge was assigned to the 1st Marine Division, and remained in that unit as division intelligence officer, until his death the following year.

Goettge was known for his prowess on the football field. First at Barberton, Ohio High School, then for several Semi-Pro football teams and on the freshman football team at Ohio University. Goettge gained national fame playing football for the Quantico Marines. Drawing attention from the NFL, Goettge eventually turned down a contract with the New York Giants.

Goettge Patrol

Prior to the Marine invasion of the Solomon Islands in Operation Watchtower, Goettge, Division D-2 augmented Marine Intelligence when he traveled to Australia spending a week in Melbourne and a few days in Sydney gathering information on the Islands from people who lived and worked there. In addition to information gleaned from interviews Goettge brought eight Australians to where the First Marine Division was forming in Wellington, New Zealand.

The Marines landed on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, and within several days rounded up a number of Japanese Navy laborers, who had been assigned to construct the airfield at Lunga Point. Most were malnourished and sick from tropical illnesses. A Japanese warrant officer was among the prisoners and, after being plied with alcohol, told the Marines that there were a number of Japanese west of the Matanikau River. These soldiers were reportedly sick, demoralized, and willing to surrender. At about the same time, Marines near the Matanikau perimeter reported seeing a white flag flying from a tree. It is possible that this was actually a normal Japanese flag with the Hinomaru disc insignia obscured.

These reports, as well as several other similar accounts were given to Goettge. He thought that this might be an opportunity to secure much of the island without significant fighting and he decided to act quickly. He organized a 25 man patrol to land just west of the Matanikau estuary. The plan was to follow the Matanikau upstream, bivouac for a night, then head east back to the Lunga perimeter.

The patrol consisted of Goettge; Japanese translator LT Ralph Corry; regimental surgeon, LCDR Malcom Pratt; and a handful of scouts and infantry. Just before the patrol departed on the evening of August 12, Goettge was informed by Colonel Whaling, the 5th Marine Regiment’s executive officer, that the Japanese were strongly defending the area between Point Cruz and the mouth of the Matanikau. Whaling suggested a landing west of Point Cruz.

The Goettge Patrol left at dusk on a tank lighter. However, a flare was seen to the east and the lighter returned to the perimeter, thinking it was a signal to return. The patrol then left for a second time around 9:00 p.m. Despite Whaling’s warning, the boat headed for an area just to the west of the Matanikau river mouth. Before the patrol reached the beach, the lighter ran aground on a sandbar. The coxswain gunned the motor to free the vessel, and the Marines disembarked on the beach around 10:00 p.m.

Unbeknownst to Goettge, the Japanese had heard the sound of the stuck landing craft, and began organizing troops on a coral plateau about 200 yards inland from the Marines. Goettge ordered a defensive perimeter established, then took two men, Captain Ringer and First Sergeant Custer, with him to scout the jungle. Not long after they left the beach, the Japanese opened fire and Goettge was killed with a shot to the head. Ringer and Custer managed to make it back to the perimeter.

Platoon Sergeant Frank Lowell Few and two Marines went back into the jungle to confirm that Goettge was indeed dead. They found his body and took his watch and insignia, so the Japanese would not be able to identify him as an officer. Over the next nine hours, the patrol lay pinned on the beach. The Japanese maintained fire on the American perimeter, but the Marines were unable to locate the Japanese in the dark jungle. About 30 minutes after landing, Sergeant Arndt was tasked to head out into the ocean and try to swim back to the Lunga perimeter, over five miles to the east. Arndt reached American lines around 5:00 a.m., but it was too late to affect the fate of the Goettge Patrol.

During the course of the night, the Japanese picked the Marines off, one by one. The Japanese would occasionally launch a flare to illuminate the beachhead perimeter. However, the Marines were unable to discern the Japanese positions in the moonless night. After some time, Captain Ringer ordered another Marine, Corporal Spaulding, to make a second attempt to get back to American lines. Like Arndt, Spaulding ran off the beach into the ocean, and then started on the grueling swim to safety. He reached American lines around 7:30 a.m.

By dawn, only four members of the patrol were still alive. Captain Ringer decided they stood a better chance in the jungle. As the Marines made their dash off the beach, the Japanese opened fire, cutting down the remaining survivors except for Platoon Sergeant Frank Few. Few managed to reach the trees. He saw a Japanese soldier firing into the corpses of the Marines and decided it would be certain death to remain. Few drew his pistol, killed the Japanese, then made a dash into the sea. Few looked back and saw Japanese troops swarming the beach, mutilating the bodies of the dead or wounded but still alive Marines. Few also managed to make it back to friendly lines by swimming approximately four miles through shark-infested waters. Few was the last survivor of the Goettge Patrol. A slightly fictionalized version of the incident is in the movie Guadalcanal Diary. In the film, the patrol is led by a “Captain Cross” and there is only one survivor, though one Marine is shown running along the beach for help.

According to a Marine Corps monograph previous to August 21, a patrol found Pratt’s dispatch case and a cloth with Goettge’s name on it; the monograph also claimed no identifiable remains were found. According to official records, no trace was ever found of the group. Subsequent to 21 August, a patrol led by Lieutenant W.S. Sivertsen found a dispatch case containing Commander Pratt’s equipment and a torn piece of clothing marked with Goettge’s name. No identifiable remains were found, however, and the members of the ill-fated group continued to be classified as missing in action. However, on August 18, a Marine patrol from 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, made a combat patrol in the same area that the Goettge Patrol was annihilated. They reported seeing remains, but Goettge’s body was never found. There are at least five eyewitness reports of finding the remains of the patrol—one from Company “I”/3/5; one from Company “K”/3/5; and three from Company “L”/3/5.

Born: December 30, 1895, Canton, Ohio

Died: August 12, 1942 (aged 46), Guadalcanal

Allegiance: United States of America

Service/branch: United States Marine Corps

Years of service: 1917-1942

Rank: Lieutenant Colonel

Unit: 1st Marine Division

Battles/wars:

World War I

Occupation of Germany

World War II

Guadalcanal Campaign

Awards: Legion of Merit with Combat V

Legacy

The Goettge Fieldhouse aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune is named in his memory.