At dawn on 11 May 1939, a large force of Outer Mongolian
cavalry clashed with border guards of the Japanese-Manchukuo 23rd
Division along the ill-defined eastern border of the Mongolian People's
Republic. At first this incident appeared to be one more in an endless series
that had taken place along the entire Manchurian border separating Manchukuo,
Mongolia and the Soviet Union. They had taken place with regularity since the
Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and, since 1937, had also increased in
intensity. Each spring saw the Japanese testing the Soviet defenses—first on
the Amur in 1937, then at Lake Hassan in 1938, and finally at Nomonhan in 1939.
Before Nomonhan, each of these summer incidents had been broken off by either
the Russians or the Japanese after a short period of fighting. The rapidity
with which the battle at Nomonhan developed into a modern, mechanized war and
the tenacity with which the Japanese held to the offensive throughout the
summer of 1939 suggests that the Japanese had at last initiated the
long-planned campaign to establish a Mengkukuo to complement the Manchukuo
established in 1931.
The war at Nomonhan which resulted from this direct
challenge to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been lost to history in
the maelstrom of World War II. Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol reverberates not at all in
comparison with the cataclysmic battles of Stalingrad, Iwo Jima, and El
Alamein. And yet, the significance of Nomonhan-Khalkin Gol for a greater
Mongolia was as great as were those battles for the political existence of the
Soviet Union, the United States and Europe. That summer war placed the final
stamp of history on the separation of the Mongol peoples along the lines of
today's Inner and Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic). The efforts of
the Russians, the Japanese and the Chinese to each carve out for itself a
sphere of influence in greater Mongolia culminated at Nomonhan in a final
separation of the Mongols—the result hoped for by first Tsarist and then Soviet
Russia. The Japanese forfeited by their complete defeat the last vestiges of
their role as protectors and promoters of Mongol nationalism; a role which had
begun to wane as early as 1937 due to the failure of the Japanese to recognize
the great need for social reform in Mongolian Manchuria and Chinese Inner
Mongolia. Despite the overtly imperialistic aims of the Japanese they remained,
up until 1939, the only source of political power by which the Mongols of
greater Mongolia could hope to attain unity; they themselves were not strong
enough; the Russians did not desire such a unified state on their long eastern
border; the Chinese lacked acceptance by any but a very small group of Inner
Mongol princes, who were themselves unpopular with the Mongols.
This, then, was the setting for Nomonhan: the Japanese, with
their dream of a Greater East Asia including Manchukuo and Mengkukuo, in direct
conflict with the Soviet Union, which desired an isolated and divided Mongolia.
Japan, aware that to conquer China she must isolate her from continental
Russia, could only gain from the conquest of Outer Mongolia: the promises to
the Young Mongol nationalists of Inner Mongolia would be fulfilled, assuring a
strong ally on Japan's eastern flank; the troublesome Communist armies in
Shensi would be circumvented; three of the four supply routes from the Soviet
Union into China would be closed; Chinese Turkestan, the back door to China
down the old Silk Route, would be open to the Japanese; the Trans-Siberian railroad
would be vulnerable to a Japanese thrust along almost 1,000 miles of track
stretching from Irkutsk to Vladivostok.
The Soviet Union, in this same period (1931-1939) held to a
defensive position, refusing to follow up its military victories at Lake Hassan
or Nomonhan. Its primary foreign policy objectives in northeast Asia were to
prevent Japan from attacking the Soviet Union, to repel any attacks made, to
maintain its Far Eastern borders and to enforce the "independence" of
the Mongolian People's Republic.
Caught between them were the Mongols of the three
Mongolias—mindful of the need of a powerful sponsor of their dream of a unified
greater Mongolia but increasingly aware that none of three major powers
surrounding them was willing to give sponsorship without also acquiring a
restrictive tutelage over them.
By 1937, Inner Mongolia could survive only if Japan forced
the creation of a Greater Mongolia—a Mengkukuo—which had to include Outer
Mongolia. Without Mongolia, Mengkukuo would not have provided the Mongols an
escape from the Chinese and likewise would not have been a viable economic
entity. Most importantly, it would not have furthered Japan's aims for the
continent.
War between Japan and the Soviet Union was seen as almost
inevitable after 1931, by the Russians. Unable to defend the Far Eastern
provinces and the long, single track Trans-Siberian railroad, the Soviet Union
first pursued a conciliatory policy toward Japan. As the strength of the Soviet
Far Eastern Army grew, this policy was gradually abandoned and replaced by one
of intransigence. In November 1934, an oral agreement was effected between
Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union by which the latter proclaimed her
readiness to defend the Mongolian People's Republic against outside aggression.
In March 1936, a formal pact was signed between the two countries, which
further strengthened the defense arrangements between them. The battle lines
were now drawn: Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union ranged against Japan's
Kwantung Army and the silently acquiescent princes of Inner Mongolia.
The initiative in the Far East belonged by default to Japan.
The Soviet Union was involved in an intricate series of diplomatic problems
after 1936 and was intent upon securing her Far Eastern flank in order to
devote her full attention to Europe. Her policy toward Japan therefore was
somewhat contradictory: allow Japan to continually violate the Manchukuo-USSR
borders and respond with only enough force to turn back their attacks but, once
turned back, make no move to pursue the Japanese or widen the battles.
Japan, by the end of 1938, held all of China necessary to
controlling trade and communication. All of the major coastal cities, lines of
communication, and railroads of importance were controlled by the Japanese
Army.
The Japanese Army, which had held the political initiative
in Japan's expansion program since 1931, feared loss of this initiative to the
Navy. The Navy, in turn, had long favored expansion to the south into Southeast
Asia and was using criticism of the heavy casualties in the China war as a
pretext to take control from the Army. The Army's program of expansion
northeast into the Asian continent and eventual war with the Soviet Union was,
by 1938, in danger of being put aside.
The lull in the China War in late 1938 and early 1939, gave
the Army an opportunity to implement its ambitions for the Asian interior. The
flank exposed to Outer Mongolia was the logical area for a strike,
circumventing as it would the strong Chinese Communist forces in Shensi
province. At the same time a direct conflict with the Soviet Union could be
avoided if such a strike was not immediately met by Soviet retaliation. Careful
testing of the border of Outer Mongolia began in December 1938, and continued
with increasing rapidity and size throughout the winter of 1939. The area
chosen was the vaguely defined eastern border area between Outer Mongolia and
the Hsingan area of Manchukuo. The border claimed by Outer Mongolia ran 15
miles to the east of the Khalkin Gol (Khalkha River) and was marked by a series
of earthen mounds called obos (border markers). The easternmost of these
markers was that of Nomon-Khan-Bürd-Obo.
The plain of Nomonhan is a low-lying, grassy oasis, marshy
in character, dotted with sand hills, which reach a height of 10 to 15 feet,
and sand bunkers of about the same depth. The sector which was in contention
between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia is a narrow rectangle 50 miles long and 15
to 20 miles wide stretching along the Khalkha River. The entire area is
commanded by the higher, western (Mongolian) bank of the river. A small hill,
called Bain Tsagan, a short distance back from the river on the western side,
presents a panoramic view of the lower, eastern (Manchukuo) bank of the river.
Another hill, Khamar-Daba, further to the south near the eastward-turning bend
of the river presents a similar view of the area to the south.
Bisecting the Khalkha and flowing into it, is a small
tributary stream, the Khailstin Gol. This stream was the meridian line on either
side of which the major battles of late August were fought. At the eastern end
of the stream, 15 miles distant from the Khalkha River, two small hills flank
either side of the Khailstin. On the summits of these two hills lie the two
obos of Nomon-Khan-Bürd-Obo.
The summer war of 1939 developed in this area in four
general stages. The first stage, beginning in December 1938, was marked by
small patrol skirmishes in which the Japanese always retreated beyond Nomonhan
when challenged by Mongol border patrols. The first stage ended about 28 May
1939 when the first large-scale Japanese offensive began. The second stage,
commencing with this Japanese offensive, lasted until about 6 July 1939 and
gave the Japanese their only victories of the war. After 6 July, the Japanese
were thrown back across the Khalkha initiating the third stage of the war, a
hiatus during which both sides brought up reinforcements for a final offensive.
The Soviet-Mongol forces initiated the fourth stage with a massed artillery
barrage on 20 August 1939. This final stage lasted only eight days and by the
end of August had resulted in almost total annihilation of the
Japanese-Manchukuo army.
The impetus for the war was the Japanese insistence on
creating an incident based on their contention that the border had historically
followed the Khalkha. A map issued by the Kwantung Army command, published by
the Land Survey Department of the Japanese Imperial Army on 15 July 1937,
showed the border of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo as lying on
the Khalkha River from a point far south of Nomonhan to its entry into Lake
Büir. This was the first official support for the Japanese contention that the
border between the two areas was the Khalkin Gol and not to the east through
Nomon-Khan-Bürd-Obo. The Japanese continued to insist, as late as the war
crimes trials in 1946-48, that the border had historically followed the Khalkha
River and not the more easterly course through Nomonhan.
Japanese publications, however, had long recognized the more
easterly border through Nomonhan. A semi-official Japanese publication had, in
1932, produced a map clearly showing the oasis area as being within the border
of the Mongolian People's Republic. Mongols from both sides of the border had
moved freely into, and across, the oasis under the watchful eyes of both Bargut
border guards at the Japanese border outpost at Nomonhan, and border guards of
the Mongolian People's Republic on the western bank of the Khalkha. It was the
practice of the Outer Mongols to regularly patrol the oasis area in relatively
large numbers.
Outer Mongolia had officially declared its eastern border to
be east of the Khalkha River in a map published for official use in 1926. That
neither Manchukuo nor Outer Mongolia considered the area vital, is evidence by
the fact that neither country had, by 1939, constructed fortifications, or
structures of any sort, in the entire rectangle. Both, however, had built
numerous border outposts at the edges of the rectangle.
Japan's probe in the Nomonhan area can be explained only as
an exploratory thrust to test the willingness of the Soviet Union to fulfill
the mutual aid pact of 1936. Japan had been preparing for this thrust for many
years and in 1938 began large-scale preparations to support it. By 1935, they
had completed a direct railroad line between Hsinking and T'aoan (Paichengtzu)
which permitted movement of troops across the Hsingan mountain range to the
vicinity of Nomonhan. In July 1938, the Japanese General Staff initiated
preparations for a thrust in the direction of the Soviet Transbaikalia
(Irkutsk) area by way of the Mongolian People's Republic.
To carry out the thrust a new Japanese division—the 23rd
Infantry Division—was transferred from Northern Kyushu to Manchukuo with duty station
at Hailar 100 miles north of Nomonhan. This division was one of the most modern
in the Japanese Army and was organized along western military rather than the
more traditional Japanese lines.
The first stage of the war, that of testing of the Mongol
border and of Mongol-Soviet responses began in December 1938 with the first
small Japanese-Bargut patrol into the rectangle. The patrols continued through
the winter of 1938-39 gradually increasing in size to about forty men. In April
1939 a large element of about three thousand men of the 3rd
Division, called the Yasuoka Unit, moved from Hailar to sites near the border.
Throughout April and early May, the Japanese regularly
pushed patrols past Nomonhan toward the Khalkha River. Up until this time, the
cavalry patrols had been quickly driven back by the Mongol patrols without
fighting. The Japanese made no attempt to hide their actions and were
constantly observed by the Mongol outposts spaced fifteen kilometers apart on
the western bank of the Khalkha.
On 11 May 1939 there occurred the first large-scale
penetration of the border. A force estimated at more than two hundred cavalry,
swept almost to the river and engaged a Mongol patrol of fifty men. After a
short skirmish in which several Mongols were killed, the Japanese-Bargut
cavalry withdrew from the rectangle.
The news of the large-scale Japanese penetration was relayed
to Tamtsak-Bulak, about 100 miles inside the Mongolian People's Republic. The 6th
Mongol Cavalry Division stationed there had been reinforced in March by a mixed
detachment of Russians under Senior Lieutenant A. E. Bykov. Bykov's detachment,
which included two mechanized rifle companies, a battery of 45-mm guns, and
several armored cars, was the closest Soviet force to the border.
Bykov, after consulting with the Soviet Command in
Ulanbatar, was ordered to take a platoon to the border to reconnoiter. After
crossing the river on 22 May, he was immediately attacked by Japanese-Bargut
cavalry and forced back across the river. The Japanese had now occupied the
rectangle in force, thus violating the Mongolian People's Republic border as
defined by Outer Mongolia and the USSR. The Soviet Union had been clearly
challenged to fulfill the promises made in the Mutual Aid Pact of 1936.
On 25 May, the 6th Mongol Cavalry Regiment (250
men) crossed the Khalkha and took up defensive positions five miles east of the
river. On 26 May, the bulk of Bykov's unit, about 1,200 men, also crossed the
river and reinforced the Mongol positions. Opposing them were Japanese forces
which included Colonel Yamagata's Special Detachment, the 64th
Infantry Regiment of the 23rd Division, a reconnaissance unit under
Lieutenant General Azuma, a motorized company under Captain Kawano, the 8th
Japanese Cavalry Unit, and the 1st and 7th Bargut Cavalry
Regiments. This force totaled about 4,500 men—three times the Soviet-Mongol
forces.
The Soviet-Mongol preparations were greatly hampered by the
remoteness of the area. Whereas Japanese railroads were but 100 miles removed
at Hailar and 60 miles away at Solun Handagai, the nearest Soviet railroad was
almost 500 miles away at Borzya, on a spur from the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In
addition, the Japanese had constructed two hard surface roads to Nomonhan while
the rear of the Mongolian People's Republic lines had only one undeveloped
trail paralleling the border. The difficulties of supply were greatly hampered
in the early stages by constant Japanese air strikes.
On 21 May General Lieutenant Kamatsubara, commander of the
23rd Division, issued the orders which began the second stage of the
war. The orders were to encircle and destroy the Soviet Mongol forces in the
rectangle. All operations were to be completed in seven to ten days. The
offensive began on the morning of 28 May north of the Khailstin Gol. The
Japanese attempted a flank movement north and west of the Soviet-Mongol
entrenchments in order to pin them into the corner of the Khalkha-Khailstin
confluence. Heavily outnumbered in men and light weapons the Soviet army fell back
under the protection of their artillery massed across the river on Bain Tsagan
hill. Late in the evening of the 28th, the 149th Rifle
Division under Major Remizov arrived, after a forced march, and was immediately
thrown into battle. This, plus the commanding fire of the Soviet artillery,
turned back the Japanese offensive.
During the month of June both sides brought up massive
reinforcements. Most of the action in June took place overhead where Japanese
and Russian air units fought continuous dog-fights with both sides claiming
fantastically lopsided victories. No reliable figures exist for actual planes
brought down. Each side managed, however, to test its very latest fighter
planes.
By the start of July Japanese forces had reached a total of
more than twenty thousand infantry and 4,700 cavalry supported by 158 emplaced
machine guns, 170 guns of 75-mm or more, 124 anti-tank guns, ninety-eight guns
of less than 75-mm, 130 tanks, and six armored cars, and two Air Divisions
totaling 225 planes. Opposing them were 12,500 Soviet-Mongol troops, of which
probably no more than five hundred were Mongols. Supporting them were 139
stationary machine guns, eighty-six light and heavy guns, twenty-three
anti-tank guns, 186 tanks and 266 armored cars. It can easily be seen from
these figures that the Japanese envisioned a trench war similar to World War I.
Their twenty thousand troops were entrenched along a 50-mile front by July,
with artillery massed to the rear with a minimum of armored mobility. By
contrast, the Soviet forces were highly mobile with almost five hundred armored
vehicles at their disposal. This mobile superiority played an immediate role in
early July.
On 2 July the Japanese launched their largest offensive to
date. After a heavy artillery barrage, tank and infantry units commanded by
General Lieutenant Yasuoka struck at the Soviet-Mongol center and succeeded in
pushing back the left (northern) flank of the Soviets to the southwest. At the
same time, General Kobayashi crossed the Khalkha, 150 yards wide, north of the
fighting and seized the bridgehead behind the battle. Here he concentrated his
strike force of infantry, supported by sixty tanks, and on the morning of 3
July took the artillery position on Bain Tsagan hill. In the process he lost
thirty of his tanks, however, and was seriously short of armor or defensive
fire power. The Soviet forces across the river were seriously
threatened—outnumbered and without artillery. The war had now definitely moved
into the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.
The Soviet-Mongol commander, General Zhukov, the hero of
Stalingrad three years later, immediately used his mobile armored superiority
to cut off and isolate the Japanese on Bain Tsagan. The 11th Tank
Brigade, under brigade commander Jakovlev, was sent to the north base of the
hill, the 24th Motorized Infantry Regiment to the northwest, and the
7th Armored Brigade, which had just arrived, to the southern flank.
The Japanese on the hill, now completely surrounded, launched attack after
attack to break out but the armored ring held. Soviet aircraft were brought in
to support the final Soviet drive up the hill. At noon on 3 July the 1st
and 3rd Battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade attacked from
the west and northwest driving the Japanese before them. At three o'clock of
the same day the Japanese were driven from the hill into the Soviet-Mongol
lines and destroyed. By Soviet estimates, the Japanese lost almost four
thousand men in this battle. The Japanese offensive stage was largely ended by
6 July and from then until late August the initiative was with the Soviet
forces.
From 8 to 12 July the Japanese tried repeatedly to gain a
foothold on the western bank but were unsuccessful. The remainder of the third
phase, lasting until 20 August, was, for the most part, marked by continuous
artillery barrages and air strikes. By 25 July the Japanese were increasingly
pressed by Soviet thrusts and had begun constructing defensive fortifications.
About this time, the Japanese High Command had decided to
increase the Japanese commitment at Nomonhan. Organizationally a new army was
created—the Sixth Army—and Lieutenant General Rippei Ogisu was moved from
command of the 13th Division in central China and made commander of
the Sixth Army, Kwantung Army Command. His orders were to make preparations for
winter encampment at Nomonhan. Three new divisions, about sixty thousand men,
were to be transferred to Nomonhan in late August for a final offensive.
Two of the divisions were to come from China and one from
the mainland. The Japanese would then have had almost one hundred thousand men
concentrated on the border. Obviously there was no intention of abandoning the
war. But before the Japanese could regain the initiative other events outran
them.
With the Japanese temporarily on the defensive, the Soviet
command decided to take the offensive and clear the Japanese from the Nomonhan
rectangle. Reinforcements poured down from Borzya. The 82nd and 57th
Infantry Divisions, one regiment of the 152nd Infantry Division, the
6th Tank Brigade, the 126th Artillery Regiment, the 85th
Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment, several companies of flame-throwing tanks,
the 212th Airborne and another Mongol Cavalry Division were moved to
the front. Because of the complete absence of railroads or highways, all the
reinforcements were carried in cars and light trucks. At the start of August
over 2,600 cars were shuttling back and forth to the theater of operations from
Borzya.
Japanese reinforcements also moved to the front in the first
weeks of August. All of the 23rd Division was committed to the
battle as was part of the 7th Division, the entire Manchurian Mixed
Brigade (Koreans, Inner Mongolians, Manchurians), three regiments of Barguts,
three regiments of heavy artillery, and all of the anti-tank batteries of the 1st
Infantry Division. By this time the Soviet-Mongol forces were clearly superior
in all categories, and to an overwhelming degree in armored vehicles.
The battle front on 20 August 1939 followed the curve of the
Khalkha River for almost 50 miles. The Soviet-Mongol forces stood with their
backs to the river facing east toward the Japanese lines. The Japanese were
evenly distributed on either side of the Khailstin Gol. The Soviet artillery on
the high western bank of the Khalkha still commanded the entire front and their
armor moved freely from one bank to the other.
The Soviet Command of the First Army Group decided to
develop its offensive around its armored superiority. For perhaps the first
time in military history an armored double flanking encirclement was
undertaken. The plan called for armored strikes around the left (northern) and
right (southern) flanks with a link-up behind the Japanese at Nomonhan. At the
same time a massive blow would be struck at the center of the Japanese front to
split it apart along the Khailstin meridian.
To effect this plan all the Soviet-Mongol forces were
organized into three groups—the Southern Group, the Northern Group, and the
Central Group. The make-up of the two strike groups, the Northern and Southern,
clearly shows the heavy Soviet reliance on mobile armor. The Southern Group was
composed of the 8th Mongol Cavalry, the 8th Mechanized
Armored Brigade, the 6th Tank Brigade (minus two battalions), the 1st
Battalion of the 11th Tank Brigade, the 1st Division of
the 185th Artillery Regiment, the 37th Anti-tank
Division, and the 57th Infantry Division.
The Northern Group, of almost equal strength, was composed
of the 6th Mongol Cavalry Division, the 7th Mechanized
Armored Division, two tank battalions of the 11th Tank Brigade, one
battalion of the 6th Brigade, the 82nd Howitzer Artillery
Regiment, the 87th Anti-tank Division, and the 601st
Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Infantry Division. The bulk of the
strength of the two strike divisions, therefore, was not infantry but mobile
armored forces with mechanized artillery support.
The Central Group, which was to strike at the Japanese
center and hold its attention while the flanking movements developed, was made
up of the 82nd Infantry Division (minus the 601st
Regiment), the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division, and the 5th
Infantry Machine Gun Brigade.
The reserve forces, which were concentrated at Khamar-Daba
Hill to the southwest of the Khailstin-Khalkha confluence, were composed of the
212th Airborne Brigade, the 9th Mechanized Infantry
Brigade, a tank battalion of the 6th Tank Brigade and various Mongol
units.
Opposing the Northern Group were 72nd, 64th,
and 26th Japanese Infantry Regiments, while the 71st and
28th Infantry Regiments faced the Southern Group. The Japanese
artillery was massed in stationary positions behind the center of the Japanese
lines. Japanese headquarters at the high rise of Nomonhan overlooked the
battlefield from the east while Soviet headquarters behind the Khalkha on
Khamar-Daba hill directed the artillery fire and observed the flanking
operations.
The Mongol cavalry units were largely excluded from the
battle, either relegated to reserve duty or "securing the outer flanks of
the Southern or Northern Groups." Some of the Mongols had in fact been
transferred out of the area of the fighting after the 2 July Japanese
offensive.
In addition to the mobile artillery units, the Soviets also
massed artillery along the entire high western bank of the river to complement
that stationed on Bain Tsagan and Khamar-Daba hills. Almost six hundred
artillery pieces were ranged along the front, reaching a density of five pieces
per kilometer. Soviet artillery at this time was capable of twice the firing
rate of Japanese artillery.
The massed artillery was to open the Soviet offensive with a
two-hour-and-forty-five-minute barrage. At the conclusion of the barrage the
Japanese center was to be engaged. South of the Khailstin meridian the 57th
Infantry Division was to turn in the Japanese flank enabling the Southern Group
to strike toward Nomonhan. At the same time the 82nd Infantry
Division was to press back the Japanese northern flank allowing the Northern
Group to also move toward Nomonhan. If successful both Japanese flanks would be
enveloped, completely encircling the Japanese forces. Almost exactly the same
double flanking armored encirclement was used at Stalingrad in 1942.
At 5:45 on the morning of 20 August 1939, Soviet aircraft
began bombing the Japanese positions. At 7:00 o'clock the artillery began its
mass bombardment of the Japanese center and rear artillery positions. At 8:45 a
fifteen-minute massed fire barrage was carried out against the Japanese center
directly below Bain Tsagan. Exactly on schedule at 9:00 o'clock the Soviet
infantry engaged the Japanese along the entire front. Overhead continuous
dog-fights began as the Japanese attempted to counter the developing Soviet
offensive with air strikes.
Soviet headquarters envisaged two stages in the offensive:
the first stage from 20 to 23 August was intended to split off the Japanese
flanks and destroy them; the second stage, from 24 to 31 August was to
completely encircle and destroy the main force. The link-up behind the Japanese
at Nomonhan would cut off retreat and interdict reinforcements.
On 23 August the Northern and Southern groups linked up at
Nomonhan exactly on schedule. The encircled Japanese forces were unable to
break out of the ring and were quickly isolated in small pockets. Reinforcements
were too far from the scene because the Japanese High Command had not intended
to undertake a major operation until the end of August.
By 31 August 1939 the Japanese threat to Outer Mongolia had
ended. The Japanese lost 52-55,000 men of which almost twenty-five thousand
were killed. About ten thousand dead were from the Japanese 23rd
Division, and almost the same number were killed from the 7th
Division. Soviet-Mongol losses were estimated at nine thousand killed, but no
really reliable casualty figures exist.
For the Soviet Army, Nomonhan
was a highly successful test of contemporary Soviet military strategy. Before
World War II Soviet theory held that the initial period in any war would be
marked by a covering operation carried out by a minimal force with the main
emphasis in this initial period on waging a battle for air superiority. During
this period the main forces would be mobilized, concentrated, and deployed.
This in part explains the early successes and rapid reversals of the Japanese
forces in all of the Soviet-Mongol border incidents from 1935 until 1939; each
time the Japanese interpreted the small Soviet border force as either a measure
of the lack of Soviet commitment to a particular area or saw a chance to seize
an undefended portion of territory quickly and present the Soviet Union with a
fait accompli.
Soviet strategy was also strongly vindicated by Nomonhan. A
present-day Soviet military strategist summarizes the military strategy of
World War II as follows:
Different techniques were used to encircle major enemy
formations. The most characteristic were simultaneous strikes in two areas,
enveloping the flanks of the enemy forces and advances in depth in converging
directions, and one strong enveloping attack aimed at trapping the enemy forces
against hard to cross natural barriers. In some cases the encirclement of large
enemy formations was accomplished by penetration of the front at several
points.
These tactics were used over and over in World War II but
comparison with the Nomonhan campaign as described in this article shows that
all were combined at Nomonhan in what was the first test of Soviet strategy
since the Russian civil war. The Japanese were therefore fighting a World War I
battle against World War II tactics. This in part explains the fantastic losses
suffered by the Japanese. Japan admitted, in an official announcement in
November 1939, that at least eighteen thousand had been killed at Nomonhan
making this the heaviest casualty figure admitted by the Japanese from 1931 until
the end of the Pacific War in 1945.
Despite the staggering Japanese losses the plan of the
Kwantung Army Command to bring up three new divisions still held firm. Soviet
forces made no move to follow up the victory, but maintained their positions
inside the border at Nomonhan. In the midst of the preparations, however, came
the news of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, which had been signed on 24
August 1939, during the greatest fighting at Nomonhan. The news stunned all
Japan but the effect on the Kwantung Army was even greater. It was faced with
the possibility of a Soviet offensive not just at Nomonhan, but in all
Manchukuo.
The result was a complete turn-about of Japanese policy, in
Inner Asia in particular. The total defeat of the Japanese at Nomonhan,
combined with the retreat forced by the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact,
temporarily ended the Japanese Army's total control of the direction of
Japanese foreign policy. The temporary shift of power to the Navy turned
Japan's attention southward to the Asian empires of France and Great Britain.
The Army, forced into a period of realignment and re-examination, was, for the
moment, powerless to support or further Inner Mongol nationalism. Events of the
next five years in Asia did not again allow an opportunity for forcing a Mongol
Union. By 1945 the last possible support for Mongol union—the Japanese—had been
destroyed.
Nomonhan marked the high point of Japanese expansion in
Northeast Asia. Had the thrust into Outer Mongolia been successful and not been
challenged by the Soviet Union, the Inner Mongol hope for Mengkukuo might well
have become a reality. Instead the Mongols of Inner and Outer Mongolia were
effectively and finally split apart by the Japanese defeat. Six years later the
cleavage of the two Mongolias was formally recognized by the Yalta agreement by
which the Great Powers recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia.
The powerful demonstration at Nomonhan of the Soviet Union's
willingness to commit large forces to the defense of the territorial integrity
of the Mongolian People's Republic established the de facto existence of the
Mongolian People's Republic as a separate, independent state. Border
negotiations between Japanese-Manchukuoan and Soviet-Mongol representatives
over the next ten months (September 1939-June 1940) served to confirm the
existence of a Mongol nation made up of an area defined by Tsarist ministers in
1915. The Soviet Union had thus tested its eastern buffer zone, Outer Mongolia,
in battle, and subsequently tested it politically at Yalta. The Protocol of
Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference says simply: "The status quo
in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved."
This recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent entity
confirmed the Soviet sphere of influence there and, in effect, the separateness
of Inner and Outer Mongolia.
For Inner Mongolia, Nomonhan symbolized Japan's inability to
fulfill her promises of a greater Mongolia. It also heightened the
disillusionment with the Japanese, which had been building since 1935. In 1939
Japan began encouraging movement of Chinese settlers into Manchuria and
remained adamantly opposed to Prince Teh's appeals for a nation of Hsingan and
his own Meng Chiang, established in 1937. Prince Teh, who has wrongly been
termed a Japanese puppet in the image of Wang Ching-wei, continued to work for
Mongol union; if not of all the Mongols then at least the Mongols of Chinese
Inner Mongolia.
Prince Teh, in the extremely difficult position he occupied between
Russia, China, and Japan, remained above all else a Mongol nationalist. His
political activities were always predicated on the hope that some formula could
be arrived at by which his people could gain political autonomy and protection
from Chinese encroachment. Of all the Mongol leaders of Inner Mongolia of the
period, he remains the most sympathetic and most devoted to the ideal of Mongol
union. Only events outside of Inner Mongolia ended his efforts.
The political demands of the great powers determined the
fate of Inner Mongolia, as have great power politics in every instance since
1911. Chinese Communist successes in establishing a strong base of power in
northern China during the war years meant the Soviet Union now had even further
reasons for opposing a greater Mongol union. The Inner Mongols who hoped for a
Pan-Mongol nationalist movement under the aegis of the advancing Soviet-Outer
Mongolia forces in 1945 were doomed to further frustration and disappointment.
Soviet-Chinese Communist negotiations had, by 1945, already established that
the Chinese Communists were to have full authority in Inner Mongolia.
The military advance of the Russians was therefore largely
an empty gesture for the Inner Mongols. It differed from the possible political
significance of the Nomonhan campaign in that it served only to allow the
Soviet Union the opportunity to establish which Chinese army was to control
Inner Mongolia; Nomonhan had at least offered the possibility of Mongol union
even though under Japanese dominance.
Inner Mongolia's futile efforts up to 1949 to establish
autonomy were doomed by the political needs of the Soviet Union and the Chinese
Communists. There was no way in which an autonomous Mongol area could be
established in Chinese Inner Mongolia and western Manchuria without seriously
hampering Soviet post-war aims for Manchuria and Chinese Communist plans for
all China.
No comments:
Post a Comment