From the English language edition of the German wartime magazine Signal
Is Czechoslovakia actually the same as Yugoslavia?" … This question was by no means asked by an eight-year-old mission scholar in the Australian bush. No! It was posed by a British peer, a member of the House of Lords, and it was addressed to another peer in the year 1937 after a debate in the House of Lords. The former was not in the least worried about asking the question and the latter saw nothing wrong in repeating it. It would therefore appear that the old adage still holds good that the educated Briton knows more about Africa than Europe. During the great peace conference at Paris in 1919 Lloyd George often opposed the French with their unreasonable demands. The French politicians used then to annoy him by pointing out his lack of knowledge of geography, even in its simplest form. As a matter of fact the French were never very much better in this direction. Bismarck's sarcastic attitude towards the menacing demands made in Paris after 1866 when France declared that she would never tolerate the appearance of the Prussians on the Zuider Zee, was expressed in the following words: "The very fact that the spelling of this word was correctly given in the Paris newspapers is conclusive proof that this was a foreign and not a French suggestion." This was the way in which a man of authority at that time criticized the Frenchmen's knowledge of a European district of comparatively close proximity. In addition to this, in 1919 large numbers of the strangest petitioners insisted on presenting memorandums about the conditions in Bohemia and Moravia, couched in typical Benes style, with the result that the little knowledge that the "Peace politicians" possessed was completely confused.
12,500 Miles of New Frontiers
In 1919 the new frontiers were all established as a result of lack of knowledge; of petitions of interested parties which could not be verified; of the ambition to make France, by nature and internal strength only a second-class European state, a predominating big power on the Continent; of Great Britain's pressure to limit the danger of France as a big power; and as a result of America's interference with her strange and bigoted theories. At a time when a greater number of people were converging towards the town and industrial areas, and when the rapid development of communications made a grouping of larger communities an urgent matter, if the former standard of living was to be upheld, the frontiers of states and customs were extended by 12,500 miles in a simple session of a few months! Many smaller and new states were created. If these were to exist, they would, to a certain extent, all have had to endeavor to be self-supporting; and for this very reason, they became parasites of Europe's living substance, they lowered the general standard of living and diminished Europe's competitive ability in comparison with more uniform continents such as America. Through the greater number of states the general insecurity was increased to a higher degree, inasmuch as the areas of friction which had originally led to war had now increased more than the total extension of state frontiers. This effect made itself felt at once as soon as the general feeling of exhaustion which followed the Great War began to disappear. Then these two states started concluding a series of pacts for and against one another, the value of which was shown by the inglorious foundering of the Little Entente. The new frontier delimitations caused former areas of great value to the whole of Europe, with flourishing industry and commerce, to become absolutely desolate. As an example, one need only take the neglect of the Corridor area, the decrease of production in that part of Upper Silesia ceded to Poland and the indescribable poverty of the Sudeten countries which had formerly been the seat of three-fifths of the whole of the Austro-Hungarian industry.
This was a particularly impressive example of the fact that the peace dictates were not only unjust in their final constructive decisions but were contrary to living requirements and incapable of existing. It was therefore natural that one day the demands of life would become the revisors of this enforced structure. This we experienced in Czechoslovakia. As a country, its position became untenable as soon as Germany had regained her normal healthy condition. In the early years after the creation of this state the Germans embodied in it were paying something more than sixty per cent of all its taxes; in the last years of the crisis they were still paying forty per cent. In addition to this, and in spite of all efforts to the contrary, nearly half of the exports (46 per cent) from Czechoslovakia were sent to the Reich and Austria. If the amount is calculated that the Germans in the interior of the country paid in taxes together with the quantity of exported goods delivered to Germans outside the country, the total yearly sum amounted to double as much as the already very high military budget of Czechoslovakia. As a result people of German origin were paying nearly twice over for an army which was being maintained exclusively against them. A mere tax-strike in the interior or a commercial boycott outside would have been sufficient to upset the whole of this flimsy structure. This was the value finally placed on this state even by the British and the French.
Today we are in a position to judge the practical value of the Peace Treaty of 1919. We need no longer worry about the numerous attempts of its originators to back out of their responsibility for an affair which had been of their own making, by condemning it with long-winded justifications. We have witnessed how the bastions of this enforced dictate crumbled away one after another without a gun being fired or a drop of blood being shed. All this was solely brought about by the fact that Germany recovered her inner latent strength and was able to make free use of it. This process of revision through life itself, which was eventually bound to return to its old and unalterable course need never have led to war, had it not been for Britain. As Britain wished to frustrate a sensible revision of Germany's eastern frontiers, and declared war, every serious-minded European was confronted with the gigantic question: Why war? When the last war only resulted in a kind of peace which became the fundamental cause for a fresh war. Do the British want hell on earth again!
What Were the British Motives for the Great War?
Wars have been waged in the world's history for causes that could not be settled any other way. The campaign of Prussia against Austria in 1866 is a classic example of such a war, by which any justification of a war can be gauged. Viewed from this aspect, what were the main motives of the French for going to war in 1914? They maintained that their security was menaced by the unity of Germany representing a state of twenty million more inhabitants and a vastly greater productive capacity. If France did not succeed in 1919 in destroying this unity, it was not because she did not want to, but simply because she was incapable of doing so. She achieved just as little success in trying to get rid of twenty million Germans by depriving them of their nationality and handing them over to other states. This act defeated itself as it merely increased the sense of national self-assertion in the German nation. Meanwhile, this continued pressure has, to a great extent, resulted in transforming a Germany of sixty million inhabitants into one solid united state of eighty million Germans.
The war aims of the French were a complete paralysis of Germany as a state. But to achieve this purpose they required the permanent assistance of half of the world, but especially that of Britain and America. As they never could and never will be permanently able to reckon on such assistance in peacetime, they were obliged to shoulder the burden alone of maintaining an adequate organization for the suppression of Germany. But for this they were not strong enough. This overtaxing of their strength undermined the artificial structure of France's preponderance. Since then we have seen the downfall of this giant.
What were the British motives for the Great War? What did they hope to gain from a war with Germany? They wanted to conquer Germany's ever-increasing ascendancy on the Continent and at the same time to eliminate her as a world competitor whose productive and commercial power was beginning to take the upper hand. Did they arrive at their goal? This question is answered by the very fact that after twenty years they considered themselves obliged to take up arms once more for the same cause. The Great War, which had only resulted in a marked weakening of Britain's position relative to America and the rest of the world, did not solve any of those problems which were represented as its aims. Are the problems of Europe as viewed by Britain and France in 1914 any different from those of today? Does this present war, which Britain dared to force upon Germany, offer any prospects of satisfying her most cherished desires? Not at all! The conditions which have been produced by the ever-progressing development of life in Europe are today far more advantageous to Germany and far more disadvantageous to the criminal minds of those who have thought fit to involve Europe in a fresh massacre as a solution of these problems.
Why? Because life, undeterred by peace dictates, has continued in its normal path, and because the whole of Europe still retains fresh in its mind the memory of the brutal attempts forcibly to suppress life. Everyone knows that in such times unemployment increases in all countries, that everything on our continent is closely interwoven and that it is impossible to limit a crisis to any particular country; in other words, how strong is the link of destiny amongst all European nations!
In many small countries the opinion was and is still held that Britain was a friend of the liberty of nations because of its policy of splitting up the Continent into a number of small states. This applies particularly to certain classes in those countries who are dependent as small fry on what they can earn from Britain's so-called world trade and everything connected with it. But it does not apply to the broader masses and certainly not to those nations who are dependent on a system of close cooperation and extensive grouping for protection against competition in those world markets dominated by Great Britain with cheap nigger and coolie labor. As a result of the last war, during recent decades, world competition has assumed a form which necessitates the acting of European nations in close cooperation with one another, if they are to maintain their existence and their high standard of living. Up to this war Britain's interest consisted in creating buffer states opposite its shores and preventing Europe from ever presenting a united front.
Why is the Existence of Germany Necessary to Europe?
Germany's political policy is different. Germany's mode and code of living can never come into conflict with the general order of life on the Continent as she has become a component part of this order of life itself. Britain refuses to recognize that it is linked up with the fate of Europe; on the other hand Germany cannot exist without recognizing this link in theory and in practice. This has also been proved by the development of the last decades. The opinion was held that Germany was open to robbery, extortion and impoverishment for an indefinite period. What were the consequences? All those who were determined to inflict permanent poverty on Germany fell into the pit they had dug for others, as both Britons and French were overtaken and shaken to their foundations by those same crises as they had provoked in Germany. Germany is and remains the heart of Europe. This portion of the globe can only be healthy if the heart is healthy, it is sick if the heart is ill.
All this has long passed the stage of mere assertions. It will be remembered with what bitterness the British fought against the high prices which Germany was paying to agricultural countries on the Continent for their farm products. This action of Germany placed the peasants of these countries in a position of being no longer dependent on the fluctuations of the Anglo-Saxon world markets for their revenue. Mr. Willkie now describes the position as follows: "If ever German methods succeed in achieving a uniform representation of European economic interests in the world and if our gold is deprived of its despotic influence, then America will no longer be in a position to uphold her standard of living." Yes! This describes the attitude of the British when they started this conflict with an economic war and a financial blockade against Germany which, by the way, they have already definitely lost.
None know better than the British that Germany must defend Europe if she wish to defend herself. Germany cannot exist against Europe, and it fully realizes that it cannot count on any profits for itself from even the slightest damage done to Europe. It is therefore essential that the establishment of a new peace be basically constructed by Germany on the prosperity of the Reich being closely linked up with the future prosperity of the whole of this portion of the globe. The peace that Germany requires must be instrumental in giving Europe a totally new mode of life. For this life has undergone fundamental changes owing to industrial revolution and the creation of conglomerate states. If the existence of Europe is to be assured it can no longer rely on itself and its own trade but must consider the changed aspects of the world and competitive conditions. In this Germany's interests are analogous. The ingrained characteristics of Germany's entire attitude to civilization are not evidenced by the ideals tending towards some kind of abstract everlasting bliss in this world of worry, such as were propounded by the peacemakers of 1919 and renewed again today, but on the determination to fall in line with the dictates of the laws of nature. Germany's own existence is governed by a fixed principle to harmonize all the natural qualities in the life of European nations, which cannot be changed, with state conditions, and to recognize the claims of nations for the free shaping of their own lives as determined by world conditions in relation to the Continent.
The uniformity of Europe cannot be determined by mere discussion, as the British would have it, but by the participation of all those concerned in common aims. How sincere the aims of Germany to find protection and forms of expansion for political life in Europe are, is clearly demonstrated by those important sacrifices alone which she has made with the transfer of her small national minorities from the Baltic and other states. Furthermore, those beneficial acts must be recalled whereby since 1933 the German commercial policy in the whole of the southeast of the Continent has resulted in the development and improvement of the general economic situation and in such a way that it has not even been seriously influenced by the progress of the war. Reference must also be made to the elimination of interstate tensions by revisions and arbitrations, tensions which had often been purposely created in order to prevent Europe from ever coming to rest. Thus the primary outlines of a peace such as Germany is planning are now becoming visible in economic development. Such a peace cannot be set down on paper as first of all a realizable and suitable political form must be discovered for it which can be applied to the creative political nature of European nations and because it must be slowly derived from a realistic observation of European economic requirements. It is no wonder therefore that the existence of peace and a new Europe is far more advanced than most people can imagine.
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