Humanism and Peace: Eleanor Roosevelt’s “Mission” to the Pacific, August-September 1943

Eleanor Roosevelt at an air field in Sydney, Australia, 1943.

by Timothy P. Maga

“About the only value the story of my life may have,” Eleanor Roosevelt once wrote, “is to show that one can, even without any particular gifts, overcome obstacles that seem insurmountable if one is willing to face the fact that they must be overcome.”[1] Roosevelt’s claim was quite modest. Possessing a multi­tude of “particular gifts,” she had a signi­ficant impact on issues ranging from min­ing conditions to Pacific policy. In­deed, it is her role in Pacific policy during the critical period of the August 1943 Quadrant conference that concerns this article. Applying her “particular gifts” in an effort to improve Australian-Amer­ican relations, expand Red Cross opera­tions in the South Pacific, and focus attention on the lack of staple provisions for U.S. troops in the region, Mrs. Roo­se­velt met considerable success during an August-September 1943 visit to the Pacific front. To the First Lady, success in these areas equaled the successful in­terjection of humanism in Pacific policy. Even if that success brought limited results, she reasoned, at least the humanist cause had been cham­pioned. The Pacific tour illustrated her skill in leading that cause, stimulating a policy shift for the betterment of Amer­ica’s conduct of the Pacific War.

Although Mrs. Roosevelt’s interest in the mechanics of Pacific policy-mak­ing was weak, her wartime concern for the welfare of Americans fighting Japan’s fanatical troops was strong and her desire for a postwar Pacific free from future conflict was well-known. The First Lady’s modest public statements con­cern­ing her role in Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal often implied that her con­cerns and desires might never be trans­lated into policy. This was not the case. Noting her contributions to the wartime New Deal, she insisted that she “some­times acted as a spur, even though the spurring was not always wanted.”[2] Yet, her “spurring” approach was not simply a wartime phenomenon, for it could be traced back to the mid-1920s.

As early as 1921, Eleanor and Frank­lin Roosevelt’s lives had been altered irrevocably. During a vacation at their summer home, Franklin contracted a near fatal case of polio. Triumphing over the worst phases of the disease, Franklin fought to regain the use of his legs, but his physical prowess remained quite limited. The future president’s poli­ti­cal mentor, Louis Howe, prodded Eleanor, always painfully shy in public, to become an activist in the Democratic Party and keep the Roosevelt name alive. With a sense of duty, she made speeches and official appearances, also discovering that the self-proclaimed “shy and solemn child” was happily giving way to the politically active woman. By 1925, the Victorian matron who once op­posed woman’s suffrage was an enthu­siastic supporter of women’s rights and other progressive causes. Those other causes included a mixed domestic agenda of civil rights/civil liberties is­sues, and economic welfare. Together, these causes were labeled “humanist” by the future First Lady; however, the term did not hold the same strong ideo­logical connotations for her as it did to the French Socialists, for instance, and other European or American ideo­logues.[3] She remained committed to selected causes, not rigid ideological guidelines. Consequently, she was well-suited for a role in the type of “experi­mental” government that her husband called the New Deal.

Eleanor’s further discovery that the humanist cause must include an activist America working for world peace came slowly. Wedding humanist concern to American foreign policy, particularly in the world of Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin and Konoye, would be a difficult task indeed. Yet, Eleanor was an experienced poli­ti­cian by the time of Franklin’s 1932 elec­tion to the presidency. She was well aware of the fact that a president’s wife embraces social activities, not causes. Nevertheless, she vowed to assist him dur­ing the nation’s worst economic de­pression in its history. Borrowing ideas and programs from both the political left and right, Franklin’s New Deal en­couraged activism in the name of “relief, recovery, and reform.” The new presi­dent depended on his wife to gather first-hand information, for he could not. Be­sides offering the data that he desired, Eleanor lobbied for immediate measures to remedy the Depression. Touring the nation, she visited ghettos, prisons, coal mines, and other depression-wracked areas. These visits, and her public state­ments about them, assisted the passage of key New Deal legislative efforts as well as confirmed the First Lady’s com­mitment to uplifting the downtrodden.[4]

Applying this commitment to Amer­ican foreign policy tested her political mettle. In 1935, while her husband un­successfully fought an isolationist effort in Congress to limit his policy options during foreign affairs crises, Eleanor assailed the very institution of war. Working through the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, the foreign policy expression of twelve American women’s organizations, the First Lady decried the possibility of a second World War and urged world leaders to respect the peaceful wishes of their subjects. Her passionate appeal against war, and for the protection of civilian rights should war come, helped the president in his endeavor to play down his exaggerated image in Congress as a closet Wilsonian interventionist. Moreover, her appeal con­tinued to reflect a genuine personal interest in preventing war or protecting civilians trapped in the “madness of war.”

As early as 1935, she had casti­gated Japan for its threats to peace in the Far East and for turning its peace­time industries into war machines. Time was running out for peace in the Pacific and elsewhere. Berlin’s sword-rattling over the Rhineland and Tokyo’s threats of a China invasion worried her, prompt­ing fears of world destruction in the next war.

If we do not find another way to settle our disputes and solve the problems of our generation, we will probably find our civilization disappearing also, but that will not happen because we are unable to fight, but because we do not find a substitute for war.[5]

Between 1935 and 1941, the First Lady’s foreign policy position remained unchanged as she watched America move from “neutrality” to “non-belli­gerency” to “lend-lease” supporter of anti-Axis causes. America’s entry in a second World War, as she long feared, appeared inevitable. Given the worsen­ing situation of American-Japanese rela­tions and growing American concern over a possible Nazi invasion of Great Bri­tain, Mrs. Roosevelt shed her war pre­vention rhetoric in favor of refugee assistance. She became an active sup­porter of the New York-based Emer­gency Rescue Committee, whose refu­gee assistance operations during the German invasion of France and in non-occupied Vichy France were highly suc­cessful. The First Lady stumped the nation for the refugee cause during late 1940 and early 1941. Asking for financial contributions to the Emergency Rescue Committee, the Red Cross and other refugee-assisting organizations, she also urged all combatants to safeguard the rights of civilians in the war zones. She even helped form a new committee, specializing in the immigration of refugee children in Britain to the United States.

Her latter activity stimulated the unpopular political suggestion that the Roosevelt administration contemplated a shift from America’s closed door ap­proach to immigration. That approach dated back to the Quota Laws of the early 1920’s. FDR entertained no such thoughts, even though the First Lady supported a generous immigration policy. In political deference to the presi­dent’s hard line defense of rigid immi­gration quotas, Eleanor kept her refugee activities limited to fund drives for over­seas assistance and interceded only in selected visa cases. Despite private ap­peals to Franklin for a change of heart, Eleanor could not shake the president’s conviction that free immigration would only stimulate politically unpopular de­bates over employment and race.[6] Fol­lowing Pearl Harbor and the Amer­ican declaration of war, Eleanor’s in­terest in wartime civilian welfare broadened to in­clude adequate health care and provi­sion­ing of American troops overseas. As a “mother with sons in the war” and as a “concerned humanitarian,” she saw this extension of interests as perfectly logi­cal.[7] The tales of defeat from the Philip­pines in early 1942, and later reports from her Marine Corps son, “Jimmy,” con­vinced the First Lady that the Pacific had become America’s forgotten front in terms of troop welfare and morale. By 1943 she began to worry that the Pacific theater might always take secondary pre­ference to Europe. America’s service­men in the Pacific deserved a “New Deal,” she wrote Franklin during July 1943.[8] Indeed, the Europe First priority in anti-Axis strategy had been concluded in secret ABC-1 Allied military conference several months prior to Pearl Harbor, confirmed during the August 1941 sign­ing of the joint American-British declara­tion of war aims (Atlantic Charter), and reconfirmed at the post-Pearl Harbor Arcadia conference of Allies in Wash­ington, D.C. Such priorities directly af­fected adequate provisioning to Amer­ican troops in the Pacific.[9] The problem was magnified by the impact of the Pacific’s tropical climate on existing pro­visions, the remote locations of many battles, and the fanatical nature of Japan’s prosecution of the war. The Europe First policy disappeared by 1943 and especially when victory came into grasp in the Solomon Islands campaign. But the new attention from Washington meant more war material for the Pacific, not necessarily better health care, food supplies, and other non-lethal provi­sions.

Mrs. Roosevelt saw a certain in­jus­tice in how her husband’s administration had helped to create the “forgotten front.”[10] On the other hand, she did not challenge nor closely analyze the major policies at hand. The Pacific command did not see themselves as “forgotten” as the First Lady thought.[11] Never­the­less, the health and provisioning problems did exist, and the First Lady proposed to remedy them, somehow, by the end of 1943. In the meantime, she viewed the entire war as an opportunity to succeed where Woodrow Wilson’s “war to end all wars” had failed. Her mid-1930’s anti-war zeal returned, and she saw the suc­cessful realization of the Atlantic Charter as the best means to achieve lasting peace in the Pacific and elsewhere.[12] Calling for de-colonization, self-deter­mi­nation, and a United Nations to assure the postwar peace, the Atlantic Charter, despite its name, applied well to the largely colonized Pacific region. Delays to reaching that new postwar era of Pacific peace and harmony were ob­vi­ous. Besides Japan itself, the Allies were often their own worst enemy. For in­stance, in 1943, squabbles between the American and Australian High Com­mands in New Guinea were delaying the progress of the war.[13] The Australian minister in Washington, Sir Owen Dixon, complained to FDR that strategy de­bates between America’s General Doug­las MacArthur and Australia’s General George Vasey were, in effect, assisting the Japanese and prolonging the agony of American-Australian troops in one of the most inhospitable climates of the world.[14] Further complaints of Amer­ica’s reluctance to cooperate with Australian planning in the Solomon Islands cam­paign suggested that the Australian-Amer­ican relationship was in need of repair.

To the First Lady, the news of the grow­ing rift between the two largest Pacific democracies came as a shock. Australia and America must work to­gether, she believed, to assure the peace­ful postwar democratization of the Pacific based on Atlantic Charter prin­ciples. Although censored and cautiously worded, her NBC radio speech of 21 February 1943 stressed the necessity of Pacific power cooperation in the name of postwar harmony and continued peace. Comparing the Atlantic Charter to the Mayflower Pact, she claimed that the document embodied the “spirit of human­ity,” and that America and Aus­tralia must encourage the people of the Pacific to determine their own des­tiny.[15]

Expanding on Minister Dixon’s argu­ment, Mrs. Roosevelt worried that the Allied squabble contributed to the misery of America’s troops in the Pacific. With­out question, it placed even greater ac­cent on the need for full Allied and inter-service cooperation in provisioning troops. She began inquiries into the suc­cess or failures of the Red Cross and other “humanitarian” organizations in the Pacific. And, as she became more acquainted with the type of war being fought there, she wondered if this jungle warfare was not “making savages out of American youth.” If so, the issue of adequate health care and related mat­ters was even more important. She had to see for herself.[16]

Writing to the president on 25 July 1943, the First Lady outlined the neces­sity of improving Australian-American rela­tions and provisioning Pacific theater troops. Successful prosecution of the war was at stake, she argued, if both issues were left unaddressed. Postwar har­mony in the Pacific and ex-GI loyalty to the Democratic Party could also be assured if actions were taken imme­diately. She recommended a personal visit, representing the president, to Aus­tralia and Guadalcanal. The latter had been the scene of bloody fighting since November 1942 and was not yet free from enemy activity. The former re­mained in the threat of Japanese inva­sion, although that threat diminished by the day. She promised comprehensive reports on the health and provisioning of American forces as well as on the status of American-Australian relations. Em­ploy­ing both modesty and political dis­claimers, she noted that she did not pre­sume to be a diplomat or a relief specialist. All she hoped to achieve, the First Lady insisted, was “serious consi­de­ra­tion” of her reports’ recommenda­tions.[17]

Granting his wife’s request five days later, the president welcomed her enthu­siasm. He even expanded some aspects of her visit while quietly eliminating others. The president particularly liked her Australia suggestion, noting that she must avoid time-consuming formal wel­coming ceremonies in favor of frank discussions with Prime Minister John Curtin. Nevertheless, he hoped to keep the Australian visit within a “general” and “somewhat informal” framework, so as not to annoy or disturb the American Em­bassy in Australia. The latter was doing a fine job and would appreciate the First Lady’s visit, he said, but she must be careful not to “upstage” their work.[18] To FDR, “upstaging” meant the nego­tiation of any diplomatic arrange­ment. The First Lady was not em­powered to make such an arrangement, nor did she ever suggest one. In any event, she intended to encourage, if not stimulate, a warmer American-Australian dialogue and FDR always applauded the effort.

Although the First Lady was un­aware of the problem, New Zealand-American relations were strained as well, and for similar chain-of-Allied com­mand reasons. FDR therefore included a brief stop in New Zealand on his wife’s itinerary, but hedged on her wish to visit Guadalcanal. In his personal messages to Eleanor, he noted that the Guadal­canal visit depended on battle develop­ments and the whims of local military commanders. Privately, he asked Briga­dier General C. R. Smith, Deputy Com­mander of the Army Air Corps, to scratch Guadalcanal from the itinerary. It was too dangerous for her, he complained. Smith was in charge of arranging a successful schedule for the First Lady; however, FDR permitted him to reinstate Guadalcanal if total American victory became obvious or if a high-ranking on-site commander, such as Lieutenant Gen­eral Millard Harmon or Admiral Chester Nimitz, personally assured her safety. Both total victory and safety guarantees appeared unlikely in early August 1943. In fact, Mrs. Roosevelt had proposed an immediate departure. Hop­ing to avoid any domestic political oppo­sition to her visit plans, she hoped to be in the Pacific and writing her reports be­fore the Republicans could devise an anti-visit position.[19]

In solidarity, the Republican Na­tional Committee had denounced the First Lady’s only other wartime trip. Tra­vel­ing to London during the spring of 1943, she had visited both military bases and hospitals. Health care and general pro­visioning of troops were deemed ade­quate by her, and this short visit only con­firmed her opinion that the Pacific thea­ter needed greater attention. To accent the point, she later wrote that her Pacific journey was her only “true” wartime adventure. In any event, the Republicans had opposed the Britain trip on the grounds of wasteful fuel expen­ditures and the “unwarranted” use of military air transports to shuttle the First Lady back and forth across the Atlantic. Urging voters to write the White House and express their displeasure, thou­sands, including many Democrats, an­swered the call. Some complained of the First Lady’s “pointless junkets” of “un­limited gasoline” in gas-rationed Amer­ica. Others attacked her willingness to be photographed with Negro servicemen, noting that these “incidents” only fos­tered “race trouble” at home. Still others worried if her trip to Britain had had some hidden diplomatic significance. These writers urged full disclosure as well as a “congressional clamp” on the First Lady’s travels.[20]

The many protests were fresh in mind when she petitioned Franklin for the Pacific trip. On the other hand, the presi­dent had plenty of reasons for postponing his wife’s request for an early August 1943 visit. First of all, the Aus­tralian general election was scheduled for the end of the month. The warmer American-Australian relationship argu­ment might be better received in Can­berra, FDR reasoned, immediately after Curtin’s re-election or with the instal­la­tion of a new government. Secondly, the latest Allied war conference, code-named Quadrant, was scheduled to begin in Quebec City during mid-August 1943. Britain was expected to concede to America’s predominant role in the Pacific War there, hence the issue of Allied unity was also expected to be a major discussion point. Although Amer­ican-Australian relations would not play as large a role as U.S.-Britain or U.S.-Chinese relations at Quadrant, the president would be happy to announce his wife’s visit to Australia as symbolic of the type of friendly dialogue that other Allied relationships should embrace. Thirdly, the president was already con­cerned about his 1944 re-election chances. Even though victory remained more than possible, the fourth term cam­paign promised to be a difficult one. Consequently, he worried about Elea­nor’s proposed recommendations to the Red Cross and if opposition to the First Lady’s travels might become a campaign issue.[21]

Norman Davis, director of the American Red Cross and a long-time New Deal activist, reported to the presi­dent that any First Lady-instigated shift in relief operations would be opposed by the major contributors and advisory body to the American Red Cross. The majority of those contributors and advisors, Davis pointed out, were Republicans. They dis­trusted the New Deal, he said, and many would be willing to destroy the American Red Cross during the 1944 election than see it reformed to Mrs. Roosevelt’s guide­lines.[22]

While wondering if Davis had exag­gerated the situation, the president had other worries. Indeed, his wife’s Pacific trip invited political assault, but the public opinion impact of that assault remained uncertain. Furthermore, Admiral William Halsey, Commander of U.S. Naval For­ces in the South Pacific, informed FDR that Mrs. Roosevelt’s visit might en­coun­ter serious “public relations” problems. There was a rumor, he noted, that many Marines in the islands were considering fact. The rumor concerned an alleged re­mark by Mrs. Roosevelt that the Marines had become “savage killers” who were ravaged by various tropical diseases. They must be “quarantined” in the is­lands, she supposedly said, before they can ever hope to return to the United States. Halsey admitted that his com­mand had no idea where this rumor began, but he theorized that it must have originated from a Japanese propaganda broadcast by Tokyo Rose.[23] In any event, many Marines still perceived it to be true and had no love for the First Lady because of it.

Certainly there were liabilities to the trip, but the president trusted his wife’s good political sense and assumed her adventure promised more good for the administration’s war effort than harm.[24] The onus was on the First Lady to weigh those liabilities and decide accordingly. Once informed of the Marines’ rumor, Mrs. Roosevelt became even more deter­mined to follow through with the trip and, especially, to visit the Marines on Guadalcanal. She partially blamed her­self for the rumor, since her concern over the “savage” fighting in the Pacific War could be easily twisted to fit the Japan­ese propaganda line.[25] With Briga­dier General Smith’s agreement, she plan­ned to be in the South Pacific is­lands by 18 August 1943, in Australia by 29 August, in New Zealand by 5 Sep­tem­ber, and back home by 16 Septem­ber. Smith liked the whirlwind schedule, but cautioned her on what she called “a possible deviation to Guadalcanal” be­tween 25 and 29 August. In reality, she considered the “deviation” the humani­tarian heart of the trip, with the Aus­tralian phase representing her vision of the coming era of postwar Pacific har­mony.[26]

On 11 August 1943, the president an­nounced his wife’s Pacific trip during a closed session of the Pacific War Coun­cil. Meeting since the early weeks of American entry in the war, the council dis­cussed basic issues of Allied co­operation, assessed the problems of the “captive nations” and their governments-in-exile, as well as reviewed the options for swift liberation and victory. More of a sounding board than a policy-making body, the council was chaired by FDR and included representatives of the Pacific Allies. The 11 August meeting was their 34^th session, and the presi­dent considered it a groundwork for the coming Quadrant conference. Hence, the topic of Allied cooperation was stres­sed even more than usual, and FDR echoed his wife while informing Minister Dixon that U.S.-Australian strategy squab­bles were over and that the future held great promise for the friendly alignment of American and Australian objectives in the Pacific. Meanwhile, he hinted that greater attention to the welfare of “our boys” was forthcoming.[27] He did not elaborate.

The cooperative theme of this coun­cil session served as a fine dress re­hearsal for the following week’s Quad­rant conference. If anything, Quad­rant demonstrated America’s commit­ment to continuing cooperation with wartime allies, but it also suggested that only America had the resources to achieve total victory. This suggestion was nothing new to the allies; however, Quadrant implied that it also meant American direction of the victory march to Tokyo.[28] Hence, Mrs. Roosevelt’s visit to Australia would be an early test of this post-Quadrant reality. Was America’s Pacific ally truly content with the situa­tion? What was the status of American-Australian relations? The First Lady had an excellent opportunity to answer these questions, or even, perhaps, influence the Australian response. In the mean­time, could America mobilize its much-touted resources to boost troop morale and welfare? The president implied at Quadrant that it could, and his wife intended to convince him that her im­planted suggestion was correct.

Mrs. Roosevelt officially began her trip with a visit to Bora Bora, Christmas Island, Fiji and other rear areas. Many of the men had been told that a VIP was arriving. But, they were surprised when the VIP turned out to be a “white woman,” much less the First Lady. Her tour of their bases and hospitals only confirmed her “forgotten front” thesis, for they had few of the “adequate” medical, food and lodging provisions that she witnessed in Britain. Meanwhile, her only personal complaints concerned an in­sect-infested bed and quarters on Christ­mas Island, swelled arms from tetanus and other inoculations, and a worry that she might need a new wardrobe by the end of the trip. This latter concern had no connection to fashion trends. She would lose over 30 pounds on her ad­ven­ture.[29]

The First Lady’s conclusions on the rear area situation were unflattering to Washington. Besides the provisioning is­sue, she discovered high social tensions within the ranks. Somehow, the Red Cross and other agencies, she noted, must provide recreational facilities to ease the boredom of rear area duty and relieve the race problem. The matter would be part of her report to Norman Davis.[30]

But, the combat areas remained her major concern. She flew to Admiral Hal­sey’s headquarters on New Caledonia prepared to do battle over her Guadal­canal itinerary. To her surprise, a polite Halsey promised to work out the details, but not until after her Australia-New Zea­land journey. America now truly enjoyed the upper hand on Guadalcanal, and more time assured the First Lady a greater degree of safety. Halsey did not like having to divert his attentions to the First Lady, and he told the president so. Nevertheless, he prepared her way for a September 1943 visit.[31]

The Guadalcanal debate and a delay in the final tally of the Australian elec­tion results forced Mrs. Roosevelt to alter her itinerary and head for New Zea­land. Her stop would be brief and she found little time beyond exchanging plea­santries with New Zealand govern­ment officials. Yet, she did meet with representatives from several women’s groups who promised to “work toward warm postwar relations.”[32] On the other hand, she found New Zealand hospitals in surprisingly poor shape to handle war wounded, and she complained to the New Zealand government for inexpli­cably revoking the visas of American nurse volunteers. While publicly praising New Zealand’s economic advance­ments, privately she reported “a great deal of unhappiness” with New Zea­land’s treatment of America’s wounded and those who desired to help them. The strength of anti-American sentiment in New Zealand disturbed her, and she hoped that it did not foreshadow the Australian trip.[33]

The First Lady had no explanation for New Zealand’s attitude and she made no inquiries of the American Em­bassy concerning it. Like her husband, she regarded New Zealand as, essen­tially, another rear area whose com­plaints against America took a low precedence beneath the larger problem of American-Australian relations.[34] In­deed, her flight to Australia brought more immediate issues to mind. She was broke. The First Lady left the United States with 55 pounds of luggage, with much of that weight taken up by her type­writer and Red Cross-styled uni­forms. She had paid great attention to packing this light load, but not to filling her wallet. Having spent $200 in tips out of her own pocket, she was forced to radio Washington for more cash. Her Australian visit would last thirteen days. She confided in Malvina “Tommy” Thomp­son, her personal secretary and a former Red Cross activist, that she wondered if the Australians would “accept” her.[35]

The First Lady’s “acceptance” wor­ries were unnecessary. Given Australia’s connections with the British Common­wealth, she decided to play the role of a visiting monarch. This stately approach proved to be an enormous hit with the Australian press, and the crowds at pub­lic functions remained impres­sive.[36] Her private meeting with Prime Minister Cur­tin, fresh from his re-election victory, was also successful. Curtin was flattered by the visit, and he agreed with Mrs. Roose­velt’s thesis of a coming new era of Pacific peace and harmony. Although General MacArthur was not mentioned directly, the First Lady admitted that there were certain personalities who were insensitive to Australian suffering in the war, but that those personalities also had the best interests of Allied victory in mind. She tempered the statement by noting that the dark days of the war were now over and that America and Australia were destined to share the spoils of victory. Those spoils, she pointed out, were the principles of the Atlantic Char­ter and their application in the Pacific via Australian-American cooperation.

Curtin continued to endorse the First Lady’s argument, suggesting that the FDR administration had exaggerated the impact over the New Guinea squab­ble as well as the entire row over Amer­ica’s predominant role in war-making strategy. He turned the conversation to more specific matters, namely the long-standing Australian argument concern­ing the introduction of American-made long-range bombers into the Royal Aus­tralian Air Force. This topic smacked of the type of agreement-making that Mrs. Roosevelt was expected to avoid; how­ever, she suggested that her husband was sympathetic to the issue. True Allied cooperation, she noted, implied that the Australian request would be answered eventually. Curtin welcomed this diplo­matic response. Indeed, the First Lady’s answer was well put, for her husband granted the bomber request shortly after her visit.[37]

Mrs. Roosevelt’s tour of Red Cross facilities and military hospitals was less successful. She did not discover any anti-American sentiment, nor did she find medical and relief operations as politicized as the New Zealand situation. She did find shortages of basic medical and other supplies. This was largely due to the country’s multi-gauge railroad sys­tem, which caused serious delays and even the mysterious loss of supplies. She also complained of the “sovereign state” approach of Australian govern­ment, whereby different Australian states had different regulations that affected the smooth operation of medical relief. A joint American-Australian medical bu­reau­cracy, she thought, operating out of the prime minister’s office, might provide the necessary coordination and speed for successful medical operations. This cer­tainly would be in keeping with the spirit of Allied cooperation, and would take the red tape out of Red Cross activi­ties. She later suggested this plan to Norman Davis as well.[38]

By the thirteenth day of the Aus­tralian adventure, the weight of the entire trip finally fell upon the First Lady. Weary from it all, she wrote her closest friend and confidant, “Tommy” Thompson, won­dering if the trip would bring results.

Three letters from you yesterday and two today really make life much more bearable. I do miss you very much but you shouldn’t be anxious, they treat me like a frail flower and won’t let me approach any danger. This royalty business is painful but I don’t know how to avoid it. I think besides feeling cut off from those I love, the difficulty of knowing whether all the trouble people have taken is justified by the results is too difficult for me to evaluate. Sometimes I wonder whether from the public viewpoint the Congressional group which is now here going the rounds couldn’t do just as good a job![39]

Mrs. Roosevelt’s parting to the Aus­tralian Prime Minister included an invita­tion to visit the White House. FDR had been asking for such a visit since De­cem­ber 1941, but Curtin always de­clined. His reasons concerned the dan­ger facing his country; however, they also implied a certain distaste for recog­nizing America’s overall leadership of the Pacific War. Curtin avoided a straight answer to the First Lady’s parting re­mark, but it was the first time that he also avoided a simple “No.” The State Department saw this as a marvelous development, and the American Consu­late General in Sydney was instructed to compliment the First Lady on her “pro­duc­tive” trip. America’s representatives in Australia needed little encouragement. Mrs. Roosevelt appeared to have made their job easier, and they told her so. FDR’s prediction that she might annoy the American Embassy had been mis­taken. “The success of your visit to Can­berra,” the consul general wrote, “was due very much to yourself and to the warm informality which you gave to the proceedings everywhere. We Americans are very proud of the American way of life which you so ably and well represented.”[40]

Perhaps heady with success, the First Lady wired General MacArthur, asking if she could visit the troops in the New Guinea sector. MacArthur quickly denied the request, citing safety rea­sons. The First Lady wondered if the famous general disapproved of her Aus­tralian visit and had refused the New Guinea request on those grounds.[41] Given MacArthur’s dislike for Allied mili­tary operations, and particularly Amer­ican-Australian ones, her suspicions were well-founded. In any event, Mac­Arthur’s refusal offered greater incentive to his arch-rivals in the Navy, namely Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, to guaran­tee the safety of the First Lady on Guad­al­canal. The latter was considered even more unpredictable and bloody than New Guinea. Consequently, the Navy’s safety guarantee might symbolize a cer­tain competence that MacArthur’s Army lacked. The Army-Navy rivalry would not end here, but Mrs. Roosevelt won per­mis­sion to visit Guadalcanal.[42]

Certainly, American forces had gained more ground on the large island since the First Lady’s original request to visit it. This did not mean that her safety was guaranteed. She received her orders to travel unexpectedly while in transit on New Caledonia. Given only a few hours to prepare for the journey, she worried that her visit would be too short to do any good. Indeed, the Guadalcanal trip was characterized by haphazard visits to field hospitals and mess tents. Two islands considered to the rear of the Guadalcanal battle, Effati and Espiritu Santo, were also added to the itinerary, for her plane was required to refuel there. Although deemed rear areas, these islands still saw enemy action.

On Guadalcanal, the Marines were shocked to see her. No advance notice had been given. The Marine officers who eventually served as her escort tried to shield the First Lady from enlisted men’s comments, such as “Shit, it’s Eleanor Roosevelt!” But, she insisted that she was complimented by the attention, and she urged the ranking officers not to punish subordinates for their shocked expressions. One of her first stops of the island was the cemetery. The sight of the long rows of white crosses, with comments like “My Best Buddy” carved on them, moved her to tears.[43]

Guadalcanal’s largest field hospitals were located next to the cemetery. She found rudimentary provisions there as well as one Marine who wanted her ejected from his ward. The “quarantine” rumor was alive and well on Guadal­canal. She countered it by speaking about her son’s role in the First Marine Division, and that only Tokyo Rose would have attacked her interest in Marine welfare. These pronouncements were effective, and the disgruntled Marine at the cemetery field hospital later posed for pictures with the First Lady.

Although she spent less than twenty-four hours on the island, she considered it a valuable experience. The provisioning situ­a­tion was as poor as she expected, and more medical personnel were needed. Meanwhile, she contemplated again the “savagery” of the Guadalcanal campaign, remembering the sight of dozens of hospitalized young men who had been driven insane by the battle. Despite the hardships, she concluded that the American military had not been changed or negatively influenced by the fanaticism of the enemy. What was re­quired, she firmly believed, was the pre­vention of any future war of this sort.

Arriving back in Washington two weeks later than originally planned, the First Lady was presented with hundreds of protest letters. Most of them main­tained the same arguments that op­posed her Britain trip. This time, how­ever, the protests were matched by hundreds of letters which expressed support for the trip as well as worries about the “forgotten front.” The press was more supportive as well. America’s most beloved wartime correspondent, Ernie Pyle, praised the Pacific trip as a fine move that might eventually translate into better conditions for Pacific theater troops.[44] Such praise and predictions apparently gave Mrs. Roosevelt strength to complete her lengthy report to Nor­man Davis, for it was submitted as early as 30 September 1943.

“The job everywhere in the South­west Pacific is bigger than anyone at home realizes,” she wrote to Davis, “just as the entire fighting job in that area is bigger than people at home real­ize.”[45] Besides summing up her entire adven­ture, the First Lady’s report called for “im­mediate and significant” shipments of medicines, food, and a host of pro­vi­sions. She recommended the elimination of the current Pacific area administration of the Red Cross, and its replacement with young, energetic relief workers who would increase their operations “ten-fold.” Intensive lobbying of the Federal government for general improvements to the Pacific soldier’s welfare must be led by humanitarian organizations, she con­cluded. Meanwhile, she would continue to lobby for Allied cooperative efforts that might improve the lot of the common soldiers and promise a “happy” post-war Pacific.[46] In turn, Davis submitted the report to the White House and FDR echoed many Americans by labeling his wife’s trip a complete success.

The nature of this success did not become apparent until mid-1944 and planning for the American liberation of the Mariana Islands. By that time, Red Cross operations had indeed increased ten-fold. Few Republican contributors bolted the cause of Mrs. Roosevelt’s recommendations. Congressional autho­ri­za­tions for the provisioning of Pacific area troops were also increased, and Gen­eral Holland Smith of the U.S. Marines claimed that the dichotomy be­tween European and Pacific theater pro­visioning and medical operations was over. More to the point, in June 1944, the military could also claim during the invasion of Saipan in the northern Mari­anas that its military and general pro­visioning situation was, for the first time, on equal footing.[47] These claims were never 100% accurate, but there were enough improvements to warrant pride­ful statements.

Australian-American relations en­joyed a honeymoon of sorts following the First Lady’s trip. The Curtin-FDR dia­logue was warmer and more open than ever before, but the approaching Allied victory made this easier to achieve.[48] In short, Mrs. Roosevelt’s trip served as a springboard to a shift in provisioning policy and Australian cooperative rela­tions. That shift had been already con­templated by the president as his com­ments and approach at the 34^th session of the Pacific War Council and Quad­rant indicated. Hence, Mrs. Roose­velt’s trip, as far as the White House was concerned, was useful.

To the First Lady, the trip had been an amazing experience. Nevertheless, she would make a third wartime journey. This time the destination was the Carib­bean. But, it was her second wartime adventure that remained special to her. Several years after the war she des­cribed it as her “mission” to the Pacific, implying its diplomatic nature.[49] Indeed, the trip offered her a certain diplomatic training. Be it with the Australians, the New Zealanders, or even the U.S. mili­tary in the Pacific, the First Lady demon­strated her early talents in dealing with disparate points of view yet never losing sight of her cause and objectives. Her trip was not a watershed in the history of the Pacific War, but it did place needed focus on a number of issues that the Roose­velt administration found difficult to resolve. Once again, the First Lady acted as the “spur” for the benefit of peace and “humanism.” She met suc­cess, and the benefits of that success would be appreciated by the American and Allied combatants of the Second World War in the Pacific.

 

---

[1]           Quotations of Eleanor Roosevelt, Box 1 of the Biographical Files of the Papers of Eleanor Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (hereafter referred to as FDRL). Much has been written about Eleanor Roosevelt and her commitment to various causes. This article is based on the rarely con­sulted records of the First Lady’s Pacific interests as well as her hus­band’s private papers. Although they do not examine the details and significance of Mrs. Roosevelt’s 1943 “mission” to the Pacific, the following works are most relevant to the tale: Blanche Wilson Cook, “Turn Toward Peace: Eleanor Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs,” Joan Hoff Wilson and Margorie Lightman, Without Precedent: The Life and Career of Eleanor Roose­velt (Bloomington, 1984), pages 108-121, and Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin (New York, 1973), pages 879-891.

[2]           Quotations of Eleanor Roosevelt, FDRL, Box 1, Eleanor Roosevelt Biographical Files. With charac­ter­istic modesty in her public writings, she claims to have had little or no impact on foreign-policy related issues. Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York, 1949), pages 222-247.

[3]           For an interesting summary of her views on “humanism” or “humanist causes,” see her correspondence to Norman Davis, director of the Amer­ican Red Cross, 6 August 1943, FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific. For a cogent ac­count of Eleanor Roosevelt as an early political asset to FDR, see James MacGregor Burns, Roose­velt: The Lion and the Fox (San Diego, 1956), pages 87-88, 90-91, 107.

[4]           The significance of Eleanor Roose­velt as the “legs of the President” was a common theme of the First Lady herself and especially other female personalities in the FDR ad­ministration. Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York, 1937); Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York, 1946), and Grace Tully, FDR, My Boss (New York, 1949).

[5]           For her views on war and the grow­ing problem of Japan, see: Eleanor Roosevelt, “Because the War Idea is Obsolete,” Rose Young, editor, Why Wars Must Cease (New York, 1935), pages 20-29, and This I Remember, page 235.

[6]           For a review of the First Lady’s role in refugee assistance, see my chap­ter on the topic in America, France, and the European Refugee Prob­lem, 1933-1947 (New York, 1985).

[7]           Diary of Trip to Southwest Pacific, 1943, Mid-August 1943 entries, FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific. The First Lady typed over forty pages of personal comments and recollections during her Pacific journey.

[8]           Eleanor to Franklin, 25 July 1943, ibid.

[9]           The lack of provisions for American forces in the Pacific has been a rare topic of concern for the many his­torians of the World War II Pacific theater. The work of John B. Lund­strom is a notable exception, how­ever. See his The First South Pa­cific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Stra­tegy, December 1941-June 1942 (Anna­polis, 1976).

[10]          Eleanor to Franklin, 25 July 1943, and Franklin to Eleanor, 31 July 1943, FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific.

[11]          John Costello, The Pacific War (New York, 1982), pages 398-406.

[12]          Speech by Eleanor Roosevelt, NBC Radio Broadcast, 21 February 1943, and Mid-August 1943 diary entries (Pacific trip), FDRL, Eleanor Roose­velt Papers, Boxes 3048-Speeches and 2982-Pacific.

[13]          William Manchester, American Cae­sar, Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (New York, 1983), pages 354, 367-370, 373-374, 379, 381-383, 406-407, 409; Ronald H. Spector, The American War with Japan: Eagle Against the Sun (New York, 1985), pages 214-218.

[14]          Records of the 34^th Meeting of the Pacific War Council, 11 August 1943, FDRL, Map Room, Box 168-Pacific War Council, 1943.

[15]          Draft notes and Speech by Eleanor Roosevelt, NBC Radio Broadcast, 21 February 1943, and Mid-August 1943 diary entries (Pacific trip), FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 3048-Speeches and Box 2982-Pacific.

[16]          See note above and Eleanor to Franklin, 20 August 1943, ibid.

[17]          Norman Davis, to whom the First Lady confided many of her deepest hopes for the Pacific trip’s success, would be the major recipient of these reports. He welcomed her efforts and commitment. Davis to Mrs. Roosevelt, 6 August 1943, FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific.

[18]          Franklin to Eleanor, 31 July 1943, ibid.

[19]          FDR to Brigadier General Smith and Brigadier General Smith to Mrs. Roosevelt, 6 August 1943, ibid.

[20]          Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remem­ber, pages 260-277. FDRL main­tains a bulging file of “Letters Criti­cal to the Trip” (Britain) alongside its Pacific “Letters” collection, Box 2982.

[21]          Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Nelson T. Johnson, American Con­sul General-Sydney, 7 September 1943, and Pacific Trip Reports (Australia): Eleanor Roosevelt to Davis, 30 September 1943, ibid, and Box 3049-Pacific Trip Reports.

[22]          See above note and Mid-August 1943 diary entries (Pacific Trip), ibid.

[23]          Halsey and FDR exchanged several notes on the First Lady’s visit, 15 August 1943, ibid.

[24]          FDR to Halsey, 15 August 1943, ibid.

[25]          Mid-Late August 1943 diary entries (Pacific Trip), ibid.

[26]          See above note. Her belief that the Pacific would eventually embrace peace and cooperation via local demo­cratic action remained unshak­able. See her opening comments in India and the Awakening East (New York, 1953).

[27]          Records of the 34^th Meeting of the Pacific War Council, 11 August 1943, FDRL, Map Room, Box 168-Pacific War Council, 1943.

[28]          Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington, D.C., 1959), pages 220-221, 235; “Quadrant Results and the War Against Japan,” U.S. Navy Intelligence Report, 1 Sep­tember 1943, FDRL, Map Room, Box 169-Naval Aide Files.

[29]          Pacific Times clippings on her visits to Bora Bora, Christmas Island and Fiji, 29 August 1943, and Late August 1943 diary entries (Pacific Trip), FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific.

[30]          Pacific Trip Reports (Rear Areas): Eleanor Roosevelt to Davis, 30 September 1943, ibid., Box 3049-Pacific Trip Reports.

[31]          Report on the Progress of Mrs. Roose­velt’s Trip, Office of General Douglas MacArthur (Brisbane) to Gen­eral George Marshall, 20 August 1943, FDRL, Map Room, Box 47-Mrs. Roosevelt.

[32]          Statement by New Zealand Wo­men’s Service Association (Auck­land), 2 September 1943, FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific.

[33]          Late August 1943 diary entries (Pacific Trip) and Pacific Trip Re­ports (New Zealand): Eleanor Roo­se­velt to Davis, 30 September 1943, ibid., and Box 3049-Pacific Trip Reports.

[34]          See above note and Records of the 35^th Meeting of the Pacific War Council, 29 September 1943, FDRL, Map Room, Box 168-Pacific War Council, 1943.

[35]          Early September 1943 diary entries (Pacific Trip), FDRL, Eleanor Roo­se­velt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific.

[36]          “Welcome, Mrs. Roosevelt.” This Sep­tember 1943 editorial in Bris­bane’s Sunday Mail examined the popularity of the First Lady’s pre­sence in Australia. Ibid.

[37]          For background on the bombers issue, see: Owen Dixon to Secre­tary of State Hull, 21 August 1943. See also Early-Mid September 1943 diary entries (Pacific Trip), FDRL, Map Room, Box 12-Misc. Folder, and Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific. The rapid improve­ment in American-Australian rela­tions during late 1943 is accredited to dramatic American initiatives in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Mar­shall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (New York, 1973).

[38]          Early-Mid September 1943 diary en­tries (Pacific Trip) and Pacific Trip Reports (Australia): Eleanor Roose­velt to Davis, 30 September 1943, FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific and Box 3049-Pacific Trip Reports.

[39]          Noted in diary entry for 10 Sep­tember 1943 (Pacific Trip), ibid., Box 2982-Pacific. For the First Lady’s relationship to Thompson, see: Joseph P. Lash, A World of Love: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Friends, 1943-62 (New York, 1984).

[40]          Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Nelson T. Johnson, American Con­sul General-Sydney and Johnson to Mrs. Roosevelt, 7 September 1943, FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific.

[41]          Early-Mid September 1943 diary entries (Pacific Trip), ibid.

[42]          The issue of inter-service rivalry and personality squabbles has been ex­amined in a variety of World War II-Pacific texts; however, the negative impact of that issue on American strategy is a major theme of John Costello’s Pacific War, pages 104, 222-226, 250-251, 314-315, 392-393, 449, 456-457, 481, 569, 640.

[43]          Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remem­ber, pages 307-309; Mid-September 1943 diary entries (Pacific Trip), FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 2982-Pacific.

[44]          See above note and Ernie Pyle press clipping from November 1943, ibid.

[45]          Cover letter to Red Cross reports, 30 September 1943, ibid., Box 3049.

[46]          See above note.

[47]          “Provisioning Assessment, 1943-1944,” War Department Report, 13 November 1944, FDRL, Map Room, Box 12-Misc. Folder. See also the Marianas campaign chapter in Hol­land Smith, Coral and Brass (New York, 1949).

[48]          FDR to Curtin, 10 July 1944, FDRL, Map Room, Box 12-Misc. Folder.

[49]          Biographical Files of Eleanor Roo­se­velt, FDRL, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Box 1.

 

Eleanor Roosevelt's itinerary for her Pacific trip.

Major General Maxwell Murray (left) and Admiral Aubrey Fitch greet one another as they prepare to welcome First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, exiting the aircraft, to Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, 1942.

First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt talks with a wounded American soldier during her 1943 visit to Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.

Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt talking to Mrs Janet Fraser at Auckland Airport, 1943.

Mrs Roosevelt at the naval base Auckland.

Eleanor Roosevelt in Red Cross uniform at Guadalcanal, September 1943.

Eleanor Roosevelt in Bora Bora, 1943.

Eleanor Roosevelt with a soldier on Christmas Island, 1943.

Eleanor Roosevelt in Canberra, Australia, 1943.

Eleanor Roosevelt visiting a U.S. military base in the Fiji Islands in August 1943.

Eleanor Roosevelt speaks to sailors and Navy personnel at a naval base in Brazil.

Eleanor Roosevelt eats dinner with U.S. Army servicemen based in the Virgin Islands.

Mrs. Roosevelt speaks with soldiers at Pearl Harbor.

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s better half, Eleanor, visited the UK in 1942. Here she is having a good old giggle with the girls of Britain’s Red Cross. 

Eleanor Roosevelt visiting hospitalized U.S. serviceman during her Pacific trip.

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt on a visit to Australia during World War II, meets with Australian sailors and soldiers. Photo taken probably September 1943.

Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of President Roosevelt and Jean Marie MacArthur, wife of General Douglas MacArthur.

Eleanor Roosevelt, wife of President Roosevelt and Jean Marie MacArthur, wife of General Douglas MacArthur.

Eleanor Roosevelt signing "Short Snorter" note in 1944.

Eleanor Roosevelt at Army Ranger training exhibition in Washington, D.C., 5 February 1943.

Eleanor Roosevelt flew with one of the Tuskegee Airmen, 1941.

Eleanor Roosevelt visiting hospitalized U.S. serviceman during her Pacific trip.

Mrs Roosevelt presenting medal to American soldier.

Mrs Roosevelt sharing dinner and conversation with American soldiers.

Mrs Roosevelt sharing dinner and conversation with American soldiers.

Eleanor Roosevelt visiting hospitalized U.S. serviceman during her Pacific trip.

Eleanor Roosevelt visiting hospitalized U.S. serviceman during her Pacific trip.

Eleanor Roosevelt visiting hospitalized U.S. serviceman during her Pacific trip.

Mrs Roosevelt presents medal to hospitalized American soldier.

September 15, 1943. Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, Commanding General of the South Pacific, Eleanor Roosevelt and Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander, South Pacific Force. In the background is a C-47 airplane with nose that is titled “Our Eleanor”, piloted by 1st Lieutenant Roger J. Bernard, Manchester, New Hampshire, in which Mrs. Roosevelt traveled. The aircraft, provided by the 13th Troop Carrier Squadron, was used for Eleanor Roosevelt's flight to Espiritu Santo in the South Pacific, as part of her wartime tour to boost morale. 

Mrs Roosevelt talks with a American soldier acting as a guard at a stop during her trip, with the remains of a Japanese Zero fighter in the background. 

Admiral Halsey with Mrs Roosevelt in a small boat during her Pacific trip.

Mrs Roosevelt talking with Black American servicemen.

Mrs Roosevelt with American servicemen watching a show.

Eleanor Roosevelt visits convalescing GIs in the 39th General Hospital, Auckland, New Zealand.

Eleanor Roosevelt visits convalescing GIs in the 39th General Hospital, Auckland, New Zealand.

Eleanor Roosevelt visits with a wounded American soldier at a hospital in the South Pacific in 1943.

Eleanor Roosevelt addresses Negro troops at Penrhyn Island during her 1943 South Pacific trip.

Eleanor Roosevelt (center) and Mary McLeod (second from left) greet guests at the opening of Midway Hall, one of two residence halls built by the Public Buildings Administration in 1943 for black women in government service.